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ABSTRACT
This thesis has chosen as its topic the public debates on the restructuring of 
Soviet armed forces in terms of 'reasonable sufficiency' for 'defensive defense' and 
the military reform movement in relation to the domestic reforms taking place. In 
this way it was possible to grasp the nature of the issues and stakes of Soviet civil- 
military relations under the Gorbachev leadership.
The relations underwent a process of change from a traditional Soviet type 
Party-military relations, through a germinal Western style civil-military relations, 
and finally to a Third World style, in which the military became a sword and shield 
of the political leadership through a short-time contract designed to secure the 
Soviet Union. Once the contract was broken by Gorbachev, a reactionary coalition 
carried out the coup and its failure in the end led to the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, the new round of debates on military reform among the 
former Union republics was concerned with the ironic question of how to divide 
the Soviet armed forces.
During the period, there was a dramatic increase in the number of civilian 
participants in the military reform movement. Indeed, grass roots' support for it 
became the foundation of the genuine civilian control over the military. 
Concomitantly, the scope of the debates progressively widened and deepened and 
the interaction between the advocacy of military reform and the stubborn high 
command was radicalized with no area of compromise between the two polemics. 
In fact, the debates were replaced with activities that seemed highly organized, 
secret, or illegal. These unprecedented developments clearly denied the 
fundamentals of traditional perspectives on the Soviet civil-military relations.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to suggest a variation on traditional approaches 
to the Soviet civil-military relations. The prevailing tendency among Western 
analysts was based on the assumption that Soviet society was a quasi-totalitarian 
system and, therefore, that the military, one of main components of the system, 
used to act in accordance with either the interests of the armed forces, or the 
Communist Party. Basically, they assumed that the quasi-totalitarian regimes of 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were politically stable. The subject of their 
study was the relationships between the party leadership and the high command.
In essence, this thesis tries to maintain its focus on the very dynamics of civil- 
military interactions, in particular, the military reform debates appearing in the 
mass media and specialized literature under Gorbachev. During such public debates 
the various institutional, organizational, and individual forces demanded that the 
military establishment fundamentally restructure and reform the Soviet armed 
forces in conjunction with the radical changes in the world military-political 
situation and with the revolutionary restructuring in the Soviet society.
Consequently this study provides, when combined with the traditional 
approach focusing on the interactions between the party leadership and the high 
command, an in-depth analysis of the middle level of powers that linked the 
political leadership to the public and played an unprecedented role in framing and 
implementing military reform. Their activities had hardly existed in such depth and 
scope in the past history of the Soviet civil-military relations. Naturally, this means 
in terms of methodology that there was a radical change in the analytical 
environment, or the setting of the civil-military relations, caused by an amazing
6mixture of intended results and unintended consequences of Gorbachev's 
perestroika.
Under the rubric of new political thinking, Gorbachev spoke about the 
mutuality of international security. Indeed, "common human values" replaced 
"class conflict" in defining Soviet foreign and security policy objectives. More 
specifically, a doctrinal assumption that world war would be prevented by political 
means not only placed national security policy in a state of flux but also demanded 
a radical restructuring of the Soviet armed forces, which had been structured and 
postured to fight the worst-case contingency of world war.
The remarkable absence of Marxism-Leninism in the words of Gorbachev, 
however, caused an ideological vacuum. Regardless of what Gorbachev originally 
meant by "democratization", the result was nationalist movements. Nationalism 
remained potent because it offered a new social contract in the form of an ethnic 
bond. As a result, the nationalism was able to fill the vacuum easily.
Political reform to a certain degree shifted the locus of power from the party 
apparatus to state organs responsible at all levels to elected bodies, including an 
executive presidency. The Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU took 
second seat to the Supreme Soviet and the President, and a traditional Soviet type 
of party-military relations would be replaced with Western style civil-military 
relations. But the collapse of the party was accompanied by nasty ethnopolitics and 
the issue of self-determination. In a limited sense, the Soviet Union was 
"hierarchically" ruled until the Gorbachev era by a single entity, the party, which 
based its political domination of the republics on the principle of democratic 
centralism, or subordination to the highest unit of administration, i.e., Moscow. As 
Moscow lost, or gave up, ideology as a moral adhesive to help the union together, 
nationalist movements forced political elites in the republics to make demands for 
increased republican sovereignty up to for full political independence from
7Moscow. Thus, republican control over the Soviet armed forces became real.
All in all, these changes made the well-established traditional approaches to 
the Soviet civil-military relations obsolete. So, this study deals largely with the 
military reform debates free from the inferred frame of reference that assumed a 
lasting status of the Communist Party and of Soviet military doctrine. In fact, the 
frame of reference was useful because it was supplemented or paired by the 
inductive analysis of the empirical evidence provided by the structure, disposition, 
and deployment of Soviet armed forces and by weapon procurement programmes. 
There was always the difficulty of knowing why a military strategic statement was 
made, who the primary audiences were, and whether the information had to be 
taken at face value, that is, propagandistic or not. This inevitably demanded 
analysts to have a well-built frame of reference that could order the information, 
establish the context, and so on.
Favourably to analysts, although glasnost' itself could have compounded the 
difficulties of deciding on the authoritativeness of pronouncements and opinions, 
much of the debates was valuable under Gorbachev. Among other things, a matter 
of who the primary audiences were was relatively clear. It was a certain type that 
civilians provocatively challenged and military theorists, including the high 
command, reacted at the various forums. A number of radical journals and 
newspapers served as a regular forum for the angry exchange of information and 
ideas between the two. If well checked, such forums even provided for a degree of 
prediction of future political decisions concerning arms control.
Moreover, they made it easier to understand the 'why' of change in Soviet 
security and military policies, rather than 'what', on which the so-called objectives 
analysis was originally based.1 The motivations behind their arguments were in 
some way expressed, if emphasis were placed on identifying and dating the 
beginning of debates on these and other issues and on investigating the
8consequences. Therefore, this approach could reveal the nature of the civilian 
challenge to the military such as who the challengers were, what they challenged, 
and in which way they challenge the military establishment, and so on.
Naturally, the scope of this study is at once of middle range and broad. This 
study considers carefully and in detail a series of debates on restructuring of Soviet 
armed forces and military reform movement. It deals consistently with the new 
environment caused by the intended and unintended results of perestroika, 
glasnost', and the new political thinking, and seeks to conceptualize them in the 
context of the civil-military relations. So, implications of the new thinking and 
perestroika and glasnost' for the advocacy of military reform were treated broadly.
The new thinking appeared to have involved two alternate dimensions. On 
the one hand, the new thinking itself was about security ideas and assumptions for 
profound change in international affairs. On the other hand, the political leadership 
used the new thinking as the process by which the security ideas and assumptions 
were to be accomplished.
Those ideas included notions about the utility of force, in particular, that of 
nuclear weapons, and about foreign and arms control policies as tools to enhance 
the Soviet security interests. Its peculiarity was placed on the danger of nuclear 
war. This characteristic in the context of policy focused on the firstly nuclear and 
later conventional arms reductions. Consequently, the substantial change in military 
doctrine was required. In part, this logical connection explains the reason why a 
number of top military leaders very sensitively dismissed the new thinking as 
unrealistic and why Gorbachev tied himself down to doctrinal debates.
Nonetheless, the emphasis of this study is on the process side, i.e., on the 
flexible approach questioning many old ways of doing business with the US and 
other countries, particularly, in an area of arms control negotiations. As a set of 
security ideas, the new thinking was subject to an endless process of development
9through the entire period of Gorbachev's leadership. It could never become a 
closed, complete doctrine. Although the so-called new Soviet military doctrine was 
declared in 1987, it was not suitable in the operational context for immediate 
implementation by the military. In practice, the draft of the new military doctrine 
appeared at the end of 1990, together with the reform draft plan proposed by the 
Ministry of Defense. The full development of the new military doctrine must have 
taken further a couple of years. Consequently, this study assumes that restructuring 
of the Soviet military forces based on the new thinking and military doctrine hardly 
happened, or lagged behind arms control that could directly condition military 
reform.
This point needs attention. There is clear conceptual difference between the 
fact that the high command grudgingly accepted Gorbachev's arms control 
agreements and restructured European security system as an accomplished fact 
during a period of some years and the fact that it still had the opportunity to 
behave in a different way if it became necessary or desirable. So, the new thinking 
as a process appeared to have been a time bomb.
Moreover, as a process, the new thinking demanded glasnost', that is, the 
open competition of ideas about security issues, which would be able to hopefully 
function as support, input and feedback for the political system, together with the 
response of the West. If the Soviets were forced to take initiatives in foreign and 
security affairs because of their weakness, particularly in the economy, glasnost' 
was vital for the political leadership to calm down the military's possible resistance.
Perestroika could be also divided into a programme and a process like the 
new thinking. But it had more the nature of a process to politics and society than 
the new thinking. As a set of tactics aimed at resolving domestic problems, 
perestroika contained some strategies: individual and group self-interest; glasnost'; 
democratization; and law-based control. These strategies more or less meant a
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radical change in the nature of the decision-making system but they had the danger 
of increasing social and political unrest. As a process, perestroika alone had the 
potential of inducing revolutionary changes in the relationship between military and 
civilian institutions.
The primary implication of perestroika for the military reform movement was 
that it developed the middle level of power, besides the creation of USSR and 
republican parliaments and presidencies. Civilian defense intellectuals, political 
movements and associations, nationalist groups, dissident junior and middle level 
officers, and military related associations such as the Soldiers' Mothers and the 
Shchit Union were so powerful to wrestle with the military establishment in their 
ways. They simply disregarded the priority of military value to others as well as the 
vested rights of the high command about how to frame and implement military 
policies and tried to change the rules of the game of the existing civil-military 
relations. In the Baltic republics, the Soldiers' Mothers assisted draft dodgers and 
deserters. In Ukraine, the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youths and other 
opposition groups demanded the creation of national forces. In Kishinev, the 
National Guard Group encouraged Moldavians not to serve in the Soviet army. In 
Georgia, many of the opposition groups urged a boycott of the Soviet occupation 
army. Radical wings in the Armenian Liberation Movement and the Azerbaijani 
People's Front organized their own militias. Consequently, the fundamental 
question of how it was possible for them to turn up in the Soviet system shall be 
answered before anything else. Once answered, the relations between the political 
leadership and the high command can thereafter be explained with great 
effectiveness.
Under the policy of glasnost', against the long-held idea that army problems 
were too delicate to be open to public eyes, hazing and ethnic conflicts within the 
armed forces were barely revealed. Sometimes, such bullying was quite vicious,
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leading from beatings to deaths. It was reported, but unofficially, that up to 15,000 
soldiers died from 1985 to 1989 from accident, illness or in nationalist unrest, 
equivalent to the losses from ten years' war in Afghanistan. Both relatives of boys 
to be recruited and republican nationalist groups spoke out on this. In response to 
the public who were anxious about the figures, the newly strengthened local 
soviets introduced 'alternative service' as a temporary measure to allow the youth 
not to serve in the Soviet army, while saying that their citizens had the right to 
serve exclusively in their republics. Thus draft dodging became a political act 
supported by republic parliaments, governments, and pro-independence 
movements. As a result, the principle of the service as well as that of formation, 
based on military doctrinal considerations, was being fundamentally shaken. An 
idea of a smaller, volunteer professional army, supplemented by the organization of 
territorial armed forces under the command of the republics, was raised as the best 
alternative to conscription army, out with military consideration -- strong reserves 
at low cost. In reality, the impact of nationalist unrest on military reform was far 
greater than that of arms control and new military doctrine that had a close relation 
with the force structure and posture.
When the USSR Supreme Soviet began discussing a new Union Treaty, 
some republics began to argue how to form their own army units. The conscription 
nearly collapsed in the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Moldavia. Voices were heard 
advocating handing over even nuclear weapons to some republics. Decisions were 
adopted demanding the redeployment of the Soviet armed forces including 
strategic purpose forces. The creation of nuclear-free zones was declared. If 
implemented, these changes could mark the beginning of the end of the 
multinational Soviet Armed Forces.
Consequently, the future of the Soviet armed forces was dependent on the 
new Union Treaty. Military reform became a matter of compromise between
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Moscow and republics. Of course, the debate on military reform heated up, but the 
main thing was now who would decide the military policy. Until then there had 
been five broad areas in which military reform needed to be considered.
The most important involved the military needs, or in Soviet terms, the 
assessment of the nature of the external threat in order to decide on the numerical 
strength of the Soviet armed forces. Following from this was the question of 
whether the current structure of the army and navy composed of five armed 
services was needed or not. The new military doctrine declared by the political 
leadership in 1987 implicitly suggested that the structure of armed forces be 
altered: primarily offensive forces be withdrawn and destroyed and other forces 
reduced to a level consistent with ’reasonable sufficiency' for defensive defense. 
Later, if arms reduction were necessary, how far as well as whether unilaterally or 
not became major issues.
The third area concerned the allocation of financial and material resources for 
defense. A code word 'reasonable sufficiency' not only demanded a substantial cut 
in military spending but also made the economic potential as important as the 
military needs for the first time in Soviet history. The value of political and 
economic means became one of the major issues.
The fourth was a matter of the choice between the current mixed system 
where commissioned officers, warrant officers and re-enlisted men would be 
professional soldiers, while privates and sergeants would be drafted and a 
voluntary professional army where privates and sergeants would also serve on a 
contract basis. Or, combining both approaches.
The final area was the principle of service 'extra-territoriality,' that is, 
whether to send recruits to serve in the whole of the USSR outside their home 
republic. In reality, the issue was accompanied by a question of nationality 
formation, or national army.
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This study finally tries to absorb the whole of these startling developments in 
the areas of military reform within the conceptual framework of Soviet civil- 
military relations. This trial will help us to grasp an outline of the relations and at 
the same time to point out some blind spots of traditional perspectives to be filled. 
In this respect, it may be useful to look briefly at the relationships between the 
party leadership and the high command under Gorbachev along the prevailing 
perspectives.
To begin with, it was generally accepted that, in terms of degree of power 
the Soviet military could exert on the politics of the Kremlin, the Soviet high 
command had reached the height of their political power before Gorbachev came 
to power. Even the possibility of a military takeover in Moscow was examined. 
While picturing the military as a "senior partner" of the civilian apparatus of the 
Communist Party, R. Kolkowicz, for example, foresaw that the military "would be 
able, and probably willing, to assume power in a transition mode." The aftermath 
would be a "military-dominated coalition" which would try to legitimize itself on 
the basis of patriotism, militarism, and Marxism and to deal with the pile of 
national problems that was beyond the capability of the Party.2 In this respect, it 
was natural for us to speculate about Gorbachev's activities at the early stage of the 
new thinking.
The new General Secretary launched from the beginning major diplomatic 
offensives. Concomitantly, he undertook to reshape the foreign policy machine and 
gained control over it, in the end. Then many people in Western countries 
questioned "Are perestroika and the new political thinking for real?" It did not take 
long time for them to believe in Gorbachev's efforts. Instead, they asked about the 
power of his office and his ability to survive in the sense that the military was so 
powerful that Gorbachev could not do anything against the interests of the 
generals. Several Western writers suggested that the military leadership were not
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fully supporting the changes in security policy that Gorbachev began to introduce.
Despite the difference between the political leadership and the high 
command, apprehension about his future had disappeared gradually. The reasoning 
was that with no alternative figures in sight, who could become members of a 
military-dominated coalition in Kolkowicz's term, Gorbachev would be secure for 
the foreseeable future despite the conservative's opposition and the bureaucratic 
resistance to his programmes. This observation was even further strengthened in 
the fall of 1989 when he secured some amazing achievements in consolidating his 
personal power unmatched by any of his predecessors.
At a special plenum of the Central Committee and an emergency meeting of 
the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev conducted a bloodless purge. In addition to 
strengthening party leadership, he became chief of state. The purge removed any 
doubt about control of his Politburo. Some potential opponents were retired. 
During the time, the Soviet armed forces became one of the primary victims of 
Gorbachev's attempt to reform Soviet society. Of great significance was 
Gorbachev's bold, skilful activities in treating the high command. Moreover, the 
disintegration of central authority to which perestroika had led until then made the 
officer corps a resented symbol of imperial power in some republics.
However, fears that Gorbachev might be toppled by a military coup all of 
sudden appeared in the West and in the USSR, when the economic reform was still 
failing to make any progress and the so-called success in foreign policy meant the 
Soviets' unilateral concessions. Ironically, it was at a time when the power of the 
high command, whether over military budget, doctrine, or policy, fell to an all-time 
low. Virtually the entire high command were filled with Gorbachev's appointees. 
Yet, many in the West judged that Gorbachev would not fall to a plot led by his 
generals. Moreover, Gorbachev himself was still showing his ability of effecting a 
rapprochement with conservative forces and co-opting dissatisfied elements within
15
the army throughout the winter of 1990 and 1991. However, the coup came in the 
end, as if it was destined to. What was more stunning event than the coup itself 
was that Gorbachev was secured by people.
Certainly a sequence of these events from Gorbachev's abrupt intervention in 
the military affairs to the failed coup was so full of surprise. But given the correct 
analytical framework, this is not a matter of surprise. Indeed, there must be logical 
reasoning on the issue. It seems that a lot of Sovietologists failed to recognize 
something that had a fundamental meaning or importance, which was not 
necessarily obvious at first. Most likely, the traditional perspectives on the Soviet 
civil-military relations prevented them from considering it more carefully.
The main point is that those perspectives regarded the USSR as a quasi- 
totalitarian society in which the very Communist Party could control everything 
until the failed coup came. This kind of glass effectively blinded them to the real 
situation, that is, a particular set of circumstances in the Soviet civil-military 
relations that was built during a remarkably short period of time under Gorbachev. 
Main concern of this thesis is "how was it possible?"
1 For an application of this methodology, see Michael MccGwire, Military 
Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Instituion, 1987).
2 Roman Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post- 
Hegemonial Synthesis," in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations 
in Communist and Modernizing Societies, eds., Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) pp. I l l  and 132, respectively.
CHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE SOVIET 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
2.1. Introductory Remarks
The first step towards the generalization of Soviet civil-military relations 
appears to be the publication of The Soviet Military and the Communist Party in 
1967 by Roman Kolkowicz. By treating civil-military relations as one illustration of 
Soviet politics, he investigated the relationship between the Communist Party and 
the military establishment in the country from 1920s to early 1960s. The conflicts 
between the party and the military were stressed. This book polarized its readers 
into endorsers and critical challengers. In the preface to the second edition of the 
book Kolkowicz categorized the challengers: analysts in the USSR, American 
hardliners, and certain Western neo-Marxist scholars.1
Perhaps, one of the most authoritative, analytical critics was given by William 
Odom. Unlike Kolkowicz, Odom was concerned in the methodological context 
with the nature of the party. He argued that a more accurate assessment of the 
institutional values of the two entities suggested congruence, not conflict.2 For 
Odom cooperation was the hallmark of the relationship between the two. In 
response, Kolkowicz very briefly in 1985 observed that the evolving party-military 
relationship was not only conflictive but also cooperative; The relationship 
consisted of an ongoing institutional dialogue between the two, like a dialogue 
between partners in a common enterprise, not one between enemies. Subsequently 
he concluded that the military had shown itself over the decades to be the most
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loyal, reliable, and conservative institution under the party leadership.3
Given the continued growth in the size of the armed forces, the rapid 
modernization of many weapon systems, and the militancy of Soviet third world 
behaviour during the 1970s, most Western analysts pictured the country as a state 
in which the military could have whatever it wanted. Thus they called the period 
the 'golden age'. Reflecting this situation or reality, a new perspective similar to 
Kolkowicz's revised view was proposed by Timothy J. Colton, Dale Herspring, 
Edward Warner, and so on.4 Generally it stressed interaction between the two, in 
which neither side attained absolute domination but the party's sovereign power 
was accepted.
As the golden age was drawing to a close, around the end of 1970s, some 
changes arising outside the party-military-defense industry relationship were paid 
attention to. Gustafson, after critically summing up the above three perspectives, 
for example, suggested some useful ideas to understand civil-military relations 
under Gorbachev. In short, he drew a very tentative conclusion that the external 
changes of the relationship might "create or eliminate roles, add or abstract 
(political) resources."5
2.2. Two-Player Relations: Kolkowicz and Odom.
Before Kolkowicz's analysis, the Soviet military was assumed to be militarily 
powerful and well-equipped so that the West had regarded it as a formidable threat 
to security. But in political terms it was regarded to be impotent and without any 
institutional identity. Kolkowicz questioned this stance by assuming that the Soviet 
military had professional autonomy. In return, the party, once assumed, constantly 
attempted to deprive the military of the full exercise of that prerogative.
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With regard to why the party used to do everything possible to constrain or 
control the actions of military specialists, he tried to reveal deeply rooted sources 
of mistrust and antagonism in terms of both ideology and historical 
incompatibilities.6 In general, the party feared that the elements of elitism based on 
military professional expertise would be developed among an officer corps, who 
exclusively possessed vast means of violence. Thus the party tended not to allow 
an officer corps to become a closed institution, because they could grow into a 
dangerous rival for power in the state.
More specifically, the party worried that, with the growing complexity of 
modem warfare, the military had sought to obtain a larger role in high-level 
planning and the formulation of military doctrine and military policy. So, the party 
regarded national security policy and the evolution of military doctrine as the 
exclusive domain of the party leadership. If the party leadership felt necessary, it 
alone made major military decisions even against the military leadership, who 
simply regarded the political leadership as amateurs at least as far as the military 
affairs were concerned.
Of course, Kolkowicz did not deny that the two protagonists had a large 
number of mutually complementary objectives and common interests. Despite these 
strong ties, the relationship between the most powerful two institutions in the 
country was often strained and at times hostile, and it occasionally bordered on the 
critical. Only at a time when there was an acute external threat, or the party was 
internally divided, the military was freed from the party's restraints and could 
complain. But when the crisis had passed, the restraints were tightened again, he 
observed.
Proceeding from this observation, the existence of the party's control system 
in the military became cardinal in his study. He considered the essence of the 
controlling mechanism to be the coexistence of multiple sources of authority in a
19
loosely defined fashion and the constant scrutiny of committees composed of ranks 
and civilians from outside the units. The party, Kolkowicz thought, hoped to 
prevent the coalescence of power and authority at a focal point, despite its possible 
disruptive effects on efficiency as well as on morale. What was more, in order to 
raise the military's political reliability, the military commanders were gathered in 
the committees, so-called military councils, in which they were surely open to 
scrutiny and criticism. Correspondingly, there were separate sources of authority in 
most military units and even in subunits: the political organs; the military chain of 
command; the local party organs; and secret police. Based on this observation, 
most of Western analysts used to focus on the conflictive relations between the 
political officers and the commanding officer corps, or between the party 
leadership and the high command in general.
But it is noteworthy that Kolkowicz speculatively argued that multiple lines 
of authority and control within a single institution could provide the top leadership 
with competing sources of information about organizational performance.7 On the 
other hand, Odom considered these mechanisms more positively. In particular, he 
regarded political officers, party's important mechanism of subjective control in 
Kolkowicz, as much a part of the military structure as regular line officers. In 
addition, the political officers' role might in fact increase military effectiveness 
rather than detract, he argued.
It is useful to review Odom's critique of Kolkowicz's work. As mentioned 
before, Odom chose the character of the Party as a starting point of the dynamics 
of civil-military relations. On the other hand, Kolkowicz paid his attention on 
military traits common in any military in the world, such as elitism, professional 
autonomy, nationalism, detachment from society, and heroic symbolism. Then, 
Kolkowicz differentiated the military from the party in terms of the latter's desire 
for egalitarianism, subordination to ideology, proletarian internationalism,
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involvement with society, and anonymity.8
Odom argued against this view in the very simply way that the party at its 
outset adopted a military organizational ethos. The Russian Revolution itself was a 
military affair, a kind of coup. In fact, he appeared to focus on 'militant materialism' 
from the Bolshevik ideology. Leninists considered it the midwife of violence After 
the revolution and civil war were over, they continuously advocated it in order to 
mobilize people for the struggle against internal and external class enemies. In 
practical terms, Odom argued that the qualities and leadership skills of party and 
officer cadres were similar. Moreover, the military and political elites were 
unanimous in treating military power as an end of social product rather than a 
social cost, and they had worked together to achieve the militarization of the 
Soviet economy and society.
Indeed, his approach appeared to rely on totalitarian theory. Military officers 
were executors just as the leading party cadres were, and their policymaking 
influence was bureaucratic and administrative, not competitive with the party. 
Consequently, Odom concluded that the two powerful institutions were congruent, 
not conflictive. Differences of opinion, which were Kolkowicz's main concern, 
occurred from time to time, but against a background of broad pragmatic 
consensus. Although there was conflict, it was largely intra-institutional, the lower 
levels of bureaucracy against the higher levels. Moreover, on major security policy 
issues, the military was not expected to express a single corporate view. Some 
segments of the military had lined up on one side of an issue, others found 
themselves on the other side.
Accordingly, Odom argued that it would be wrong to see the Soviet civil- 
military boundary as marking a significant political cleavage. The alienation 
between the party and the army, which Kolkowicz found and attributed to the 
army's endless efforts to increase military professionalism, had little empirical basis
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in Odom’s view. It was natural for Odom in a logical context that mechanisms of 
civilian control, subjective or objective, hardly received any consideration.
In sum, their focus of analysis was on the two-players relations, consisting of 
the party and the high command. Players' motives were drawn from inherent 
characteristics of Communists and soldiers. The only difference was that 
Kolkowicz found them conflictive, whereas Odom did not. Correspondingly, the 
content and area of the relations were defined very narrowly. The main issues 
which they considered were political control and resources allocation. On the 
whole it appears that they were based on the implicit underlying concept that 
Soviet politics was elite relations within a quasi-totalitarian system, which in terms 
of methodology inevitably limited the categories of players, the basic issues, and 
the rules of game. In other words, there was the unspoken assumption that the 
political system itself did and would not change at all.
In this respect, it is interesting that just after the failed August 1991 coup 
Odom recognized the importance of a Soviet political culture, referring Robert C. 
Tucker's early claim. If the "ethnically" and "regionally" based political culture in 
the various republics and autonomous regions were ignored, he said, there could 
be in for some "nasty surprises" about future developments of the country.9 In fact, 
he saw of late the blind spot of his paradigm in which only Marxist-Leninist 
ideology could exist.
2.3. A Civil-Military Contract: Colton
Timothy J. Colton presented the concept of a contract between political and 
military leaders, and thus there was a room for the two to bargain. This is in nature 
a compromise of the works of Kolkowicz and Odom. After accepting Kolkowicz's
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starting point that the party and the military were the very distinctive institutions in 
the country, he surmised that the party had satisfied the military's interests by 
permitting the military to solve its own internal problems, by allowing it to 
participate in the decision-making process, by providing expert advice, and by 
adopting internal and external goals with which the military generally agreed.
As a whole, this perspective is to some extent congruent with Kolkowicz's 
revised view. At the same time, it gives us an impression that in order to retain 
military support the party leadership was always careful not to depart too far from 
the policies advocated by the military. Or, there could be a possibility that the party 
leadership would not take any important decision against the opinion of the 
military. Thus the most fundamental question that this perspective must address, 
consequently, is that a contract that is the product of a particular moment always 
has a chance to change under the rule of 'power politics'. If the contract is a forced 
one, it will be strained when the previously held balance of power change within 
the coalitions across major groups that have a possibility, as Colton himself 
considered, of cleavages. Then a precrisis situation should come, like at the end of 
Brezhnev leadership and during the entire period of Gorbachev's tenure.
In part, because of this complexity, he seemed to consider a broader range of 
civil-military issues, divided into three separate but not mutually exclusive 
domains: defense policy; societal choice; and sovereign power.10 Each is defined by 
the arena within which the military wields influence. Military influence was, 
therefore, deemed as legitimate in Colton's approach when motivated by 
professional concerns and confined to defense issues, whereas Kolkowicz found 
the military influence to be stability threatening. In this respect, Colton could see a 
possibility of the rise of a professional military in the Soviet Union and a tendency 
toward predominance of the objective means, with regarding to civilian control 
mechanism, which in Kolkowicz was achieved mainly by subjective means and in
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Odom was not seen as a major area.
It is also noteworthy that Colton tried to move beyond the simple two-player 
scheme, and he considered a broader array of players across various institutions 
including the party and the military. It is likely that the smoothness of the party- 
military relationship under Brezhnev, called as the golden age, made him draw such 
a conclusion. Even he was fascinated by Kolkowicz's tentative comments that 
could concede to his own perspective.11 But it was at a time when Kolkowicz's 
conflictive approach was rather suggestive of the unfolding party-military relations 
at the early part of the Gorbachev leadership. Originally, Kolkowicz also 
recognized the possibility of alliances with the major social groupings such as the 
governmental bureaucracy, the party professionals, the military, the KGB, among 
others. Simply Kolkowicz linked this to ups and downs of the political power of 
the party leadership. For example, he argued that during periods of firm leadership 
and internal stability, the party was able to keep those institutions "sufficiently 
divided and rigidly controlled."12 If the party's hold was weakened by internal 
power struggles, succession crises, and so on, however, the groups that had 
formerly been kept submissive and politically impotent tended to regain in stature 
and influence.
Based on his own paradigm, as Colton demanded that future analyses 
concentrate on areas of military participation, there was a lot of follow-up 
researches. Of significance are C. Rice's subdivision of defense policy in Colton's 
term and D. R. Herspring's way of a linkage between 'players' and 'issues'.13 On the 
whole, Herspring's work was exhaustive in its coverage of them at the early stage 
of the Gorbachev leadership and provided us with an in-depth understanding of the 
development of the military leadership of a Sokolov-Yazov-Moiseev-Akhromeev 
line. With regard to the issues, he made a distinction between military factors and 
political ones. He firstly considered two aspects of Soviet military doctrine:
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political-military or sociopolitical and military-technical. Subsequently he argued 
that the dividing line between the two aspects was often blurred in practice.
Following Colton, i.e., considering purely military affairs as falling within the 
domain of the high command, Herspring selected four topics: warfighting strategy 
and the management of the armed forces for the strictly military-technical issues, 
and arms control and budgetary process for the political-military issues.14 In 
practice, these four issues have a greater probability of conflict between the party 
leadership and the high command. In case of the warfighting strategy, for example, 
the key point is the relative importance of nuclear and conventional weapons in the 
Soviet strategy and force structure. As did Stalin, and to a lesser degree, 
Khrushchev, the party leadership reserved the right to intervene in the technical 
area. It is needless to say that arms control and the budgetary process are highly 
potential sources of discord between politicians and generals. When it came to 
arms control, which compelled the high command to give up some valuable pieces 
of equipment, the military leadership considered themselves to have a legitimate 
right to express their views. Here Herspring turned to the principle of democratic 
centralism, and drew an arguable conclusion: "the military is expected to give its 
full support, once the political leadership makes a decision on an issue like arms 
control."15
Naturally, the following questions became significant in his methodological 
framework. How effective are the top military leaders in convincing the political 
leadership to adopt positions on arms control congenial to the military? How 
effective are they in lobbying for a share of the country's budget? In other words, 
activities of the generals, particularly defense minister and chief of the General 
Staff, are the prime subject, as far as the Soviet civil-military relations are 
concerned. Inevitably, he considered the generals to be not only representatives of 
a highly cohesive organization that tended to "constrain their behaviour" on issues,
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but also those individuals who implemented "either group interests or party 
policy."16
2.4. Buffering Mechanism: T. Gustafson
Thane Gustafson raised the importance of external changes of the party- 
military-defense industry relationships in a more detailed way than Colton did after 
critically reviewing the above three perspectives of civil-military relations. 
Probably, wondering how to see Gorbachev's 'sudden' intervention in the Soviet 
security and military affairs, up to warfighting strategy, Colton very briefly 
suggested some steps how to approach the environmental changes, which 
influenced the way that Gorbachev behaved. It was the first step in his approach to 
define some major variables or environment that could have an effect on civil- 
military relations. Five areas were chosen: changes in leadership politics, economic 
stringency, technological dynamism, social maturation and malaise, and foreign 
involvement. The next was to find out significant long-term trends in them, which, 
he argued, had been "incompletely" and "inconsistently" analyzed in previous 
Western studies. Proceeding from this, how the triad of the party, military, and 
defense industry had responded to the environmental challenges was answered. 
Hypothetically, he suggested that there would be some changes in the nature of the 
issues and stakes of civil-military relations, in perceptions of the issues and stakes, 
and in the roles and alignments of the institutional players, and in the political 
assets they were able to bring to bear. Finally, from these intermediate variables, 
much of possible changes in the civil-military balance could be explained,17 he 
suggested.
Unfortunately, his work ended at this probing level. Although Colton
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summarized the environmental tendencies, he failed to grasp a series of 
fundamental factors to be studied in the future. David Holloway had already 
declared, for example, that as a result of changes initiated by Gorbachev, civil- 
military relations in the USSR entered "a new stage."18 Here, the main point in 
Holloway is not the relations within the party-state apparatus but the role of an 
independent public opinion in directing the state and its activities. By this he had 
questioned the basic context of civil-military relations.
Let us go back to Gustafson's work. In principle, he agreed with Colton's 
suggestions that external changes outside the military-industrial sector might and 
would raise new civil-military issues and alter the pattern of civil-military 
participation. But his point was that none of the effects of these changes were 
automatic. There could be the "phenomenon of lag,"19 i.e., whether such players as 
members of the political and military leadership perceived the environmental 
changes in time or not, and the buffering process against the external change. If 
both were properly matched and worked against the external changes, then the 
stability of civil-military relations could be increased, but only in short term, leaving 
the possibility of sharp increases in conflict later on.
Based on this framework, in particular on buffering process, he examined the 
civil-military relationship under Brezhnev. His first observation was that the 
generally accepted crisis of effectiveness of the Soviet system began around the 
mid-1970s. Nevertheless, there were surprisingly few signs of deep-seated civil- 
military conflict from 1975 to 1985,20 when Gorbachev came to power. Similarly 
A. Becker also focused on the other side of Gustafson's point. In short, he 
questioned a combination of "sharply falling economic returns and uninterrupted, 
siegable increases in military spending" despite a heavy burden of defense on the 
economy.21
So, Gustafson could raise a series of questions: Did not the golden age of
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civil-military relations come under strain as early as 19747; Was there not growing 
civil-military tension throughout the second half of the decade, and open conflict 
by the beginning of the 1980s? If so,22 how was it possible? Afterwards, he drew 
an illustrative conclusion. The informal allocation, which had been the main factor 
of the buffering mechanism, could continue to operate as before. Military-industrial 
needs were insured in this way in spite of the civilian leadership's efforts to slow 
down the growth rate of military spending. Buffered once against the impact of 
change on its flow of resources, the military-industrial complex could be buffered 
again by the large size of its traditional missions compared to its newer ones, such 
as military intervention in the Third World countries, and by the relative 
adaptability and effectiveness of its traditional methods of weapons design and 
procurement, and so on. Finally, the technocratic apparatus in the military- 
industrial sector remained reasonably well-staffed and continued to follow long- 
established and time-tested procedures, far from the certain parts of the machinery 
of the state that had became corrupted.23
In sum, they meant that during the Brezhnev years the military-industrial 
complex had been relatively unaffected by the external changes or the many-sided 
crisis. At the same time, they could mean that there was relatively limited adaptive 
responses by the military. This is a good starting point in this study.
2.5. Failure of Buffering Mechanism under Perestroika
In short, the new setting of the Soviet civil-military relations under 
Gorbachev, on which this study puts its attention, had some peculiar 
characteristics, unlike the previous one that the traditional perspectives assumed. 
These were: sudden increase in the number of players of the relations, particularly
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'from below'; accordingly, unprecedented width and depth in issues; and explosive 
way of interactions. All these features appear to be inevitable. First of all, the 
Soviet system had been alienating all strata of the population from itself, in 
particular the middle class and intelligentsia. The system just needed a catalyst, 
which glasnost' and perestroika became, to set off a new train of thoughts and 
actions which were extended to the civil-military relations. In short, perestroika did 
not only liberate people's minds. Most people realized that the totalitarian heritage 
had to be demolished. It also liberated from fear something that the masses had 
been taught to accept for decades: hatred for real, potential, and imaginary 
enemies.
It may be useful to reiterate that all perspectives reviewed above focused on 
a group of political elites. Colton and his followers considered a broader array of 
players and observed some cleavages within groups and alliances across them. 
Gustafson did not address this issue directly. Whilst portraying the party-military- 
defense industry relations, he gave an impression that a triad had the monolithic 
character. Both Colton and Gustafson only agreed that new civil-military issues 
might arise. In other words, they were not interested in the masses or public 
opinion.
Nevertheless, radical change in Soviet security policy demands us focus on 
the political leadership. In part, without Gorbachev the change in Soviet foreign 
and domestic policies would be impossible. In a limited sense, general assumptions 
of the "national leadership model" in Stephen M. Meyer's term were suggestive. 
Briefly, this paradigm posited that abrupt changes, as well as broad trends and 
directions in Soviet weapons procurement, were determined by the particular 
interests and pet-notions of the Soviet leadership such as the Stalins, the 
Khrushchevs, and the Brezhnevs.24 Accordingly, the capabilities of the leadership 
to move the system in the desired direction were considered as an important
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subject.
As will be examined in chapter 3, Gorbachev recruited a key cadre to help 
him set in motion a set of security ideas called new political thinking, encouraged 
various forces for change in party-military relations and thus society-military 
relations under the rubric of glasnost', and created important institutional changes, 
up to the creation of the Soviet parliament and presidency. Therefore, to a certain 
degree, chapter 3 is based on a mixture of Kolkowicz's paradigm and national 
leadership model. But basically it proceeds from Colton and his followers 
approach: no matter how radical Gorbachev might sound, in particular, concerning 
the new political thinking, the omnipresent military-industrial complex would in 
some way oppose him, barring the efforts for progress. Consequently, it meant that 
if Gorbachev was serious and was to become an initiator against such a system, he 
would have to be a dynamic, politically brilliant leader with a long-term strategy. 
At least, he needed unprecedented tactical measures. In terms of Colton's concept 
a 'bargained contract' between political and military-industrial leaders, Gorbachev 
would, or could, be easily seen to be failing to perform its civilian duties for his 
partner. It was natural that the level of civil-military discord should rise.
At the same time, this study regards that it is necessary to question the nature 
of the Soviet society or the long-term trends in it. That is to say, had it been a 
quasi-totalitarian society? If Gorbachev becomes a successful leader, the country's 
sociopolitical nature is also important, like the order side of the coin. The 
totalitarian model had been a paradigm in question since Stalin's death. For many 
analysts, it retained its utility as a reference for judging just how much change had 
occurred in the country. Communist ideology, or militant materialism, the party, 
the military, the KGB, control of media, and the command economic apparatus 
were often studied in this respect.
In general, these features seemed to have left basically unchanged even until
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the August 1991 coup. Gorbachev and his followers as well as El'tsin and his 
democrats had been struggling with the party, the command economic apparatus, 
and the military. Some success had come earlier in the areas of ideology and 
control of mass media but many difficulties had remained in the command 
economic apparatus. The three pillars of the Soviet power, the Party, the Army and 
the KGB, had collapsed after the failed coup. The character of the coup appeared 
to be first a matter of political elites. But the plotters met strong challenge from the 
public and in the end were defeated in part by them.
It was to a certain extent accepted that Soviet society had experienced 
substantial change at least over the past quarter century. By using existing statistics 
given by Soviet sociologists, for example, B. A. Ruble characterized the Soviet 
society as an urban society, a better educated society, and a complicated society 
with changes in the workplace and economy.25 If that case were true, the country 
had already had some dynamics of a modem society found in the advanced nations 
of the West that could result in a qualitatively different network of relationships 
between people and groups. Social groups can be divided into many categories 
along sex and age, urban and rural, ethnic and religious, white collar and blue 
collar, professional and peasant, and so on. Here the point is that Ruble, after 
examining the new groups or social strata, called for attention on the sociopolitical 
sensitivities of the working class, the young professionals, the professional and 
paraprofessional women, and the committed national elites.26 Furthermore, D. 
Lane classified the major groups of the fabric of Soviet society by arranging in a 
hierarchy with the most powerful at the top and the least at the bottom: elites, 
leading institutions, local interests, informal groups, social class, and finally, non- 
Russian nationalities.27
However, we must understand the real nature of these groups. It is always 
possible in any system to find groupings and even social strata, which may have
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different interests, with artificial statistics. Their existence must be linked to the 
nature and forms of control over power in society. For example, it is a question 
about whether the working class or the young professionals, which Ruble 
discovered, are exerting any pressure on the government in particular and the 
Soviet system in general. Or do the intelligentsia suffer from deprivation of 
economic and political privileges? In short, it is a matter of the dynamic. Under 
Gorbachev, one thing is clear: when the market was about to come, the 
contradiction between society and state, i.e., workers and government, became 
explosive.28
Concerning the implication of the sociopolitical groups, including nationality 
groupings, for the triad relations in general and for the Soviet armed forces in 
particular, their dynamic nature seems not so important because of the nature of 
the military affairs. Their existence alone was enough. It was in part because the 
political leadership tried to mobilize a politically calculated military reform 
movement. Consequently, the traditional Soviet mechanisms such as Participation 
by the citizen, People's Control and Public opinion must be considered, adding to 
some significant groups or institutions observed by Ruble and Lane.
The political leaderships had been interested in a form of participatory 
democracy and given their support for it, most probably, for their own sake. In 
principle, mass participation could have taken place through the party, through the 
organs of People's Control existing outside the party apparatuses to check the 
government bureaucracy, and through the articulation of public opinion. Ordinary 
people had been able to voice their criticism of, or respect for, the system of 
government by writing to or communicating with the press or other media. In the 
post-Khrushchev period, the political leadership had advocated that greater 
attention be paid to letters to the media and to public authorities as a way of 
strengthening links with the people.29 The Central Committee of the CPSU had set
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up a special department to deal with such communications. Under Gorbachev this 
type of people’s participation became vital in conjunction with glasnost’ and the 
new political thinking at the early stage of perestroika. In his book Perestroika: 
New Thinking for Our Country and the World, quoting a number of letters, 
Gorbachev noted that "we in the Politburo discuss these letters, gathering them 
together at regular intervals. That helps the country's leadership to keep abreast of 
the course of events, to assess its policies properly and readjust them, and to work 
out modem methods for handling things.30
Therefore, what is the implication for the party-military-industrial complex of 
the gradual development and formation of each of above new strata and substrata 
within Soviet society with a positive conception of their own interests? Here, the 
very central point is whether this structural change is merely external conditions 
like in Colton and Gustafson's perspectives, or not. Can the processes of social 
change, i.e., the rise of independent groups such as intelligentsia, skilled manual 
working class, nationality formations, and so on, play a role as a kind of counter- 
force against the coalition and the military? Or, do the processes have potential to 
be able to evolve the civil-military relations from a matter of business among the 
party-military-industrial coalitions into that of struggle between the coalitions, 
sometimes the military alone, and the public being conscious of military issues for 
their interests under certain conditions to come in the near future? Chapter 4 will 
cover these questions.
Of significance is Gail W. Lapidus's observation on urban middle class that 
had emerged as "a major actor" on the Soviet scene.31 Even Gorbachev's reform 
strategy lay in her realization, probably in part, that the Soviet people, and above 
all the educated middle class, could no longer be treated as the objects of official 
policy but had to be treated as "genuine subjects."32 Mentioning the so-called 
"precrisis situation" that had arrived before Gorbachev's rise to power,33 P.
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Hauslohner also glanced over the trend that the Soviet system or the social 
contract was losing support on numerous levels, particularly, among more 
educated people.
So, it was well understood that the Gorbachev leadership adopted a two- 
front strategy toward the scientific and cultural intelligentsia, improving their 
position as consumers of state benefits, and, more significantly, appealing to them 
to provide the intellectual support necessary to reform the country. In practice, this 
could have caused even at its early state a significant change in the nature of 
authority relationships throughout the polity and its consequences for the personal 
power and authority of the party leadership itself. It was, of course, against a 
long-term trend in Soviet polity.34
From the beginning General Secretary Gorbachev was obliged to proceed by 
persuading the fully grown party and state apparatus, i.e., nomenklatura, on the 
level of all- Union and republics, while building his authority through his success as 
policy maker and policy broker that could be against those nomenklaturas' 
interests. And if necessary, he had to be able to destroy some old institutions, 
which were the base of nomenklaturas, while cushioning the repercussions. At the 
same time, Gorbachev had to pay close attention to the management of the middle 
range of powers, that is, new social groups and old elites alike, so that any 
significant social groups could not be formed into an alignment against him, while 
seeking his grand goals. This paradoxical situation could force Gorbachev to act 
always in a time-consuming, indecisive way, that is, gradual and sometimes 
revolutionary changes in policy and shifts of alliances with right and left as a 
centrist. So, Soviet politics was for this reason very dramatic from 1985 to 1991.
These proceeding observations point to another, before Gorbachev came to 
power, had there been any change in the military caused by the development of a 
middle range of power? Unfortunately, the study of such occurrences was fairly
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rare. As a rudimentary step, Ellen Jones concluded in mid-1980s that the most 
immediate threat to the Soviet army was demographic, i.e., a declining draft-age 
cohort and expected the high level of permeability between military and civilian 
institutions.35 Later in late-1980s she again linked social change to the conscript. 
But this time, Jones tried to assess the extent to which social changes had affected 
the military as a "political" institution, examining how social changes had led to 
either a more conflicting or more congenial relationship between civil and military 
elites.36 So, Jones treated the social change as an environment.
Rather, it may reasonable to question that the long-term trend in Soviet 
society could not have a single, simple, or immediate impact on civil-military 
relations, or even necessarily any impact at all, unlike action-reaction response of 
physics. Here we can apply Gustafson's way of approach to the question: the 
existence of buffering systems in various forms and the adaptive response of the 
military to the changes. The totalitarian institutions that were on the process of 
secularization or breaking away could have been in part functioning as a buffering 
mechanism for the military. The Communist ideology was still regarding the 
military value as prime one, although it had been discredited to some degree in 
various areas. The military establishment was a sacred cow. The long established 
informal, or hidden, allocation system made it possible to give the military the 
steadily increasing budgetary support. In addition, the combination of a rigid, 
formal, and essentially party structure cemented the Soviet armed forces. It was 
proved by the fact that once communism disappeared and nationalism filled the 
ideological vacuum, the Soviet armed force firstly began to disintegrate along the 
nationality line.
On the other hand, the military itself had changed. The mid-1960s to the late 
1970s and early 1980s the military leadership dominated both doctrinal 
development and strategic concept development. Consequently, the bulk of the
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military's role expansion occurred in areas of foreign policy and military doctrine. 
This was, according to the Kolkowicz's perspective, because the political 
leadership was either engaged in internal power struggles, preoccupied with other 
issues or just disinterested. This was, however, a natural process in Colton and 
Herspring. Without any doubts, the so-called military's monopoly of military- 
technical expertise became an unparalleled asset in decision making process for 
national security. Most likely, therefore, Gorbachev was keen to intervene in 
doctrinal issues on the behalf of the party.
But, to be unbalanced, the military was not interested in the area concerning 
'societal choice' in Colton's term, or 'societal roles' in Gustafson, where social and 
economic changes had gradually, sometimes abruptly, occurred. Most likely, the 
military had hardly felt the necessity. On the whole, during the Brezhnev 
leadership, the generals were able to get almost everything it wanted in terms of 
resources, programmes, status, and freedom of action in developing strategic 
concepts. As Gustafson argued, this made the military's role expansion have a 
definite pattern: not at all in social roles, more in foreign and doctrinal than in 
economic, and most of all in military internal roles, i.e., the management of the 
armed forces in Herspring's term. Outside its internal arena, the military's role 
expansion was more of scope than of means: small numbers of individuals were 
involved, or at most individual offices, academies, and the like.37
Even before perestroika and glasnost' came, this unbalanced expansion had 
met with problems. The availability of manpower resources was gradually 
questioned with demographic changes and changes in living standards, lifestyles, 
and values accompanied with urbanization, education, and structural 
modernization. To be sure, these developments, together with performance during 
the Afghanistan war, could have led to a decline in acceptance of the military 
service obligation among draft-age youth.
36
The military leadership, however, was not able to take any effective, long­
term measures to meet those developments. Only what they could do was to 
complain. Being faced with a new generation of draftees, who were interested in 
Western rock music, jeans, and other symbols of Western culture, had trouble with 
the physical demands of military training, and were poor in Russian, the defense 
ministry reacted by criticizing the schools, the family, and the mass media and, at 
the same time, by assigning those with problems to not-combat units or positions.
As for demographic changes, the military had been in general buffered since 
the political leadership resolved an increasing conflict between military and civilian 
needs produced by demographic shortages largely in favour of the military. The 
college students, including those in high-prestige scientific disciplines, were drafted 
to maximize the proportion of the draft pool. But this decision became the 
backbone of the conflict between the intelligentsia and the military. As a result, 
intelligentsia-military relations under Gorbachev leadership became explosive, even 
at a time when perestroika had not yet reached its peak, as will be seen chapter 3 
and particularly chapter 4. Perhaps, this was the most eloquent, indirect evidence 
concerning military roles in the societal arena.
In short, the existence of the buffering mechanism and the adaptive response 
of the military to external change played a major role under Gorbachev in 
producing a puzzling context in the Soviet politics as well as in the civil-military 
relations. For a while, the buffering mechanisms could have made possible the 
coexistence of apparently contradictory facts. In addition, it helped the 
Sovietologists to stay in the traditional perspectives on the Soviet civil-military 
relations. As chapters 7 and 8 cover, therefore, once the buffering mechanisms 
were destroyed by firstly Gorbachev's intention and by later the by-products of his 
programmes, there was no option for the high command but to take a reactionary 
road.
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CHAPTER 3. NEW PARTY LEADERSHIP’S MOBILIZING OF 
MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT
3.1. Gorbachev’s Agenda: Defense Budget and Personnel Change
From the outset Gorbachev made clear his intention to gain, or regain, 
greater control over the defense budget and arms control. This appeared to be 
natural in the sense that the previous party leaderships had been sensitive to 
attempts by any members of the high command to interfere in decisionmaking in 
both areas. In practice, while top leaders decided the size of the defense budget 
and the general configuration and deployment of the armed forces, the high 
command enjoyed considerable autonomy concerning the details of most defence 
undertakings. In logical terms, any significant change in the defense budget and 
arms control demands firstly major changes in the basic content of current military 
thought. Consequently, Gorbachev first and foremost questioned the role of 
nuclear weapons. He announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing during 
his first summer, and followed it in rapid succession with proposals for a sharp 
cutback in strategic weapons. He tried to take complete and exclusive control over 
nuclear policy. Up to then the responsibility at least shared with the generals, who 
considered themselves to have a legitimate right to express their views as far as the 
warfighting strategy was concerned. It was inevitable that there would be a greater 
probability of conflict between Gorbachev and his generals. In principle, once the 
political leadership made a decision on the issues, the military was expected to give 
its full support. Here, the point is that Gorbachev could not make all the decisions. 
The Soviet leadership had been a collective one for many years, although he was a
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dynamic individual.
It may be useful to focus on Gorbachev's initial political position, particularly 
in the Politburo. In other words, was Gorbachev in a strong position to deal with 
the military leadership in a somehow decisive and one-sided way? To begin with, 
the high command was part of a much wider military-industrial complex (MIC), as 
Colton's perspective suggests. This is a key point. The current MIC that 
Gorbachev had to take into account had fully grown under Brezhnev for a couple 
of decades and, therefore, was a much larger and somewhat more amorphous body 
than Khrushchev had. Moreover, the mighty MIC included individuals within 
Gorbachev's own circle of close associates, who had different viewpoints and 
constituencies. It was a party-military-defense industry complex rather than a mere 
defense interest group in Gustafson's frame. This complex could attract wide 
support from the top leaders of nondefense bureaucracies ranging from the foreign 
policy establishment to party and state bureaucrats in distinctly nonmilitary sectors 
of the economy, to say nothing of the security organs.1
What was more, it was a period of succession times that could limit the range 
of authoritative, disciplinary measures for the new general secretary, given the 
Soviet politics. According to Kolkowicz's perspective, it was time for the military 
leadership to rise, faced with the possible difficulties. Under these political 
circumstances Gorbachev's prime task was to consolidate his power, while, if 
possible, simultaneously attempting to make the military establishment support his 
economic programme. Throughout the Soviet history it had been a difficult task for 
the party leadership to keep the officer corps silent along the party line.
Even just before Gorbachev came to power, i.e., from well before the death 
of Brezhnev to Chernenko's leadership, Marshal Ogarkov as chief of the General 
Staff had publicly and ceaselessly protested against party's prevailing line such as 
the unwinablility of nuclear war and the task of easing resource stringency at the
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expense of the military budget. During this period, the debates between the party 
and military leadership over the magnitude and urgency of Soviet military 
requirements had been quite remarkable.2 Gorbachev and Sokolov had observed 
the struggle as Politburo member and deputy defense minister, respectively. Even 
under Gorbachev, in April 1985 Ogarkov claimed that the international situation 
was "to a certain extent reminiscent of the years preceding the second world war"3 
and thereby his calls for a stronger defense effort right away were implicitly 
expressed. In response, Gorbachev rejected this historical analogy by saying that 
the present world was "absolutely" unlike the world of the Thirties.4 Ogarkov's 
replacement, Marshal Akhromeev backed Gorbachev's assessment with the view 
that the world was now "radically or fundamentally" different from that of the 
Thirties.5
In reality, the first step taken by the new general secretary on the defense 
budget was amazing and far from the general assumption of Soviet politics. In a 
classified speech to a training assembly of high-ranking commanding officers in 
Minsk on July 10 1985, Gorbachev expressed the need for limits on the growth of 
military expenditures and called for some changes of military personnel.6 John W. 
Parker assessed that Gorbachev's remarks were probably so frank as to preclude 
their direct publication.7 But it rather appeared that while he tackled one of his 
political priorities, the defense budget, in a way that could have preempted the 
military leadership's possible pronouncements, he avoided railing at the high 
command in public.
In late April 1985, Gorbachev had already publicly touched on the issue of 
defense spending by saying that "added increments of military power did not 
necessarily increase the state's security."8 Afterwards, in November 1985 he 
evaluated the current defense budge as "being adequate".9 And then, he 
emphasized the economy as being the main factor concerning the future of the
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Soviet system. In particular, modernizing the machine-building, computer, and 
other high-technology industries was made subjects of discussion.10 By that time, 
the country was still being shut out of world trade organizations and subjected to 
rigid restrictions on the purchase of commercial equipment and computers that 
could have any military applications. The high command, who had already 
recognized that nuclear parity would not solve all of the USSR's problems and that 
the Soviet military establishment would have to deal with the high-technology 
revolution in the West, was eager to modernize its systems and operations.
Ogarkov had already demanded that the Soviet armed forces be transformed 
with high-technology weapons and equipment and new strategy and tactics to 
accommodate them,11 while seeking greater resources from the party leadership. 
Still remaining question was who was to pay and how, under resource stringency's, 
and therefore it became the focal point of the civil-military conflict. Simply, as will 
be further discussed in the following sections, Gorbachev was about to propose a 
strategy that excluded offensives into enemy territory against the main stream of 
military thought that sought a lean, modern, high-technology force to permit a 
more rapid and effective combined-arms offensive. Through the Party Programme 
adopted at the 27th Party Congress, the political leadership ensured that the 
military establishment would not be given everything they needed to maintain a 
strong defense.12
Instead, he showed great interest in arms control. One can see the arms 
control negotiations as a way of regulating the military growth of the other side. If 
the way becomes successful to the extent that the country's security is hardly 
undermined, the political leadership can save money that is normally allocated to 
military systems for use in the civilian economy. As mentioned above, within three 
weeks after he took office Gorbachev imposed a six-months halt in the deployment 
of SS-20s in the European zone,13 and in October 1985 he announced in a speech
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to the French parliament that the total number of the missiles that faced Europe 
and were on 'standby alert' would be reduced to 243 missiles,14 i.e., the level 
fielded in June 1984. Most likely, this announcement was aimed at the resuming of 
the INF negotiations. The unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapon tests 
announced on July 29, 1985, was to take effect from August 1985. For the 
START Talks, at the end of September 1985, the Soviets proposed a plan that 
included a 50 percent reduction in all types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
capable of reaching each other's territory with a subceiling of 6,000 charges.15 By 
January 1986 this proposal was incorporated into a three-stage plan to free the 
world of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years.16
As for the further development of the negotiations, however, a great deal 
would depend on how the US responded to the series of proposals and the new 
approach, the political thinking, as the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik summits 
highlighted. Of course, it was undeniable that the Reykjavik summit was as a major 
step toward Gorbachev's broader objective. Nevertheless, he had to contend with 
the response of his generals, who believed that military strength was key to 
maintaining a country's security and therefore were suspicious of arms cuts.
As the traditional perspectives suggested, defense minister Sokolov became a 
strong spokesman for the armed forces. Remarkable was how the marshal 
responded. He firstly paid attention to the dynamic of military threat from the US 
and its NATO allies, rather than openly disagreeing with the line followed by 
Gorbachev on arms control. It was usual. The defense minister, for example, 
painted a grim picture of deepening US militarism,17 focusing his attention, in 
particular, on the SDI. Far from the party leadership's intention, however, Sokolov 
said that "one side's deployment of an extensive ABM system will inevitably 
provoke a comprehensive response, including not only a strategic offensive buildup 
but also the creation of a large-scale ABM defense."18 Thereby, he hardened his
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original position on the issue.19 Another graphic statements on the issue appeared 
after the 1986 Reykjavik summit. When a number of top leaders in the Politburo 
commented it favourably, the defense minister stated that "the US administration 
still hopes to achieve military superiority, which necessitates a constant 
improvement of the Soviet armed forces' combat capacity.... The US commitment 
to SDI has scuttled the possibilities of an agreement in Iceland."20
On the basis of this kind of argument, Sokolov repeatedly insisted that it was 
necessary for the country to strengthen its defense capacity and the combat might 
of the armed forces. Although agreeing that all the existing disputes between the 
East and the West could be resolved by political means, he strongly emphasized 
that the armed forces had been a real factor in deterring the aggressive strivings of 
imperialist reaction.21 His responses were interesting, if we consider the reason 
why Sokolov was chosen as defense minister. Herspring observed that with 
Ustinov's death in late 1984 the political leadership wanted an individual who 
would not make "waves," that is, a man who had never shown any political 
ambitions, nor any special interest in matters such as strategy or arms control. 
Most likely, Sokolov was well suited for this. Despite having had a very 
distinguished military career and having served as a first deputy minister of defense 
since 1967, he had not taken noteworthy public stands on major issues such as 
military doctrine and defense spending, before being promoted. In this respect, 
Herspring described him as "a bureaucrat's bureaucrat."22
In practice, Sokolov during his tenure as defense minister had hardly 
mentioned any doctrinal issues. This task appeared to have been committed to 
Ogarkov's replacement Marshal Akhromeev. But the chief of the General Staff had 
shown vague attitudes towards the new general secretary and his new policies in 
arms control. But his stance toward the political leadership began to change in late 
1986 when the new political thinking was gaining its momentum. On the one hand,
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he appeared to have objected to some of Gorbachev's sweeping proposals for 
eliminating nuclear missiles at Reykjavik.23 On the other hand, he supported the 
unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, whilst admitting that this 
could place the USSR at a temporary disadvantage in weapons development.24
Suddenly, in May 1987 the defense minister Sokolov was forced to resign 
after the young Western German M. Rust landed his Cessna aeroplane in Red 
Square. This event was labelled as a demonstration of military incompetence and 
thus became an opportunity for Gorbachev to have his political appointee D. 
Yazov as defense minister. Gorbachev declared in the name of the Politburo and 
the Defense Council at the 1987 June plenum that, reminding the Rust affairs, there 
should not be no doubt, either in the party or among the people, concerning the 
Soviet armed forces' ability to defend the country.25
In spite of Gorbachev's early threat, until then most of members of the high 
command had considered themselves to be excused from perestroika. They 
considered perestroika as being directed at the civilian economy and the party 
apparatus. At the Minsk meeting, Gorbachev told the military leaders that radical 
changes would have to come and, therefore, energetic leaders were needed right 
away.26 Since then he had been showing a firm and adroit hand, that is, a typical 
mixture of positive and negative measures. His inherited defense minister, for 
example, was elevated to candidate membership in the Politburo. By virtue of 
refusing to promote him to full membership, Gorbachev clearly underscored the 
principle of party supremacy, which in effect meant putting Sokolov, and thereby 
the entire uniformed defense establishment, on probation. Sokolov and even Yazov 
had ultimately failed to get full membership of the Politburo.
The removal from office of high-ranking officers also illustrates this point. In 
December 1985 Admiral S. Gorshkov was replaced as CINC of the Navy by V. 
Chernavin. Holding the post for almost 30 years, Gorshkov made Soviet naval
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forces what they were and thus was considered the 'father' of the Soviet Navy. In 
July 1985 Marshal V. Tolubko, CINC of the Strategic Missile Forces, was also 
replaced by General Yu. Maksimov, who had never served in the service until then. 
The successful Ground Forces commander was probably selected in the hope that 
under him the strategic nuclear weapons would comply with Gorbachev's radical 
reduction proposals. Jeremy R. Azrael considered the retirements of both figures as 
the "most important changes" on the military cadres, because they were "highly 
assertive military lobbyists."27 Gorbachev also showed his adroitness here by 
reassigning them to the honorific MOD Inspectorate group and by allowing then to 
retain their Central Committee membership and thus their high prestige, thereby 
reducing the potential for resentment on the part of their uniformed proteges. 
Moreover, Tolubko's departure helped the General Staffs efforts to equalize the 
status of the strategic nuclear service branches and establish a true strategic triad. 
As a major actor in the country's long strategic nuclear buildup, the marshal 
frequently argued that his branch was created the supreme branch of the Soviet 
armed forces.28 Needless to say, these personnel changes had made it easier for 
younger men to gain promotion. The retirement of Marshal Epishev, the long-time 
holder of the chief of the MPA, could be seen in the same context.
In late summer of 1986 there were new changes at the very top of the MOD 
structure that might have been related to discontent about the directions being 
taken in either economic or foreign policy, or both.29 The most noticeable case was 
the retirement of Marshal V. I. Petrov, who was known to take a hard line on 
China. Jacques Sapir presumed that his departure was bound up with Gorbachev's 
new Far East policy.30 In January 1987 another replacement in the deputy defense 
minister slot was made. This time Yazov was brought from his position as 
commander in the Far East MD to become Deputy Minister of Defense for Cadres. 
Although it was not realized at that time, this was a highly significant move. In
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addition, Army General I. Tretyak became CINC of the Air Defense Forces after 
the Rust affair.
Meanwhile, during the winter of 1986-1987 and into the spring of 1987 there 
were more personnel changes than usual throughout the military command 
structure just below the MOD. At least seven of sixteen Military District 
commanders, one of four Groups of Forces commanders, and one of four Fleet 
commanders were changed. According to Zamascikov, throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s, an average of ten top-level commanders were replaced in each two- 
year cycle.31 After Gorbachev came to power, however, the rate increased to 15 
between 1985-1986 and 20 between 1987-1988.32 Now Gorbachev's serious 
messages were surely sent through the military establishment by these personnel 
turnovers and by his comments at the January 1987 Plenum, in which the military 
establishment publicly became the subject of perestroika. The members of the high 
command began to vocalize their support for perestroika. Numerous articles on the 
subject written by them illustrated this change in their attitudes.33
Thus, the appointment of Yazov could have important implications for the 
handling of perestroika in the Soviet military, although at that moment the scope of 
perestroika was limited to 'internal' military reform. That is, more serious military 
reform demands were not arrived, yet. So, Yazov appeared to have the qualities 
needed to implement the narrowly defined military reform in that he was a 
specialist of personnel-related issues rather than of strategy or doctrine. Dale R. 
Herspring pointed out this fact through reviewing Yazov's major writings. Then he 
concludes that "there is a striking congruence between Yazov's ideas and those of 
Gorbachev; Although Yazov did not use the term perestroika, his views clearly 
mirrored those of Gorbachev."34 That is why he was selected.
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3.2. Gorbachev's Intervention in Military Doctrine.
A primary area on which we must draw our attention is how Gorbachev tried 
to intervene in military doctrinal affairs and their implementation. Considering the 
significance of the function of military doctrine in Soviet civil-military relations as 
well as in the construction of Soviet armed forces, personnel change itself appears 
to be of minor importance. There had always been and would be a possibility that 
the military leadership could withdraw their support for the political leadership and 
its programmes, if the agenda for military change became radicalized far beyond 
the point that political leadership's appointees could readily accept.
In general, it was sharp contrast to the Brezhnev years and the Andropov and 
Chernenko interregnums that from the beginning, Gorbachev was intimately, 
sometimes boldly, involved in the formulation and articulation of military doctrine 
under the name of the new political thinking. Although Gorbachev followed Stalin 
and Khrushchev into doctrinal affairs and their implementation, he had shown his 
own style. Briefly, if he felt it to be necessary, Stalin himself decided the doctrinal 
matters and commanded their implementation through terror against the military 
leadership. On the other hand, Khrushchev with minimal consultation with the high 
command imposed his new military doctrine by authoritative, official order which 
came from his office —the General Secretary, Chairman of the Defense Council, 
and CINC of the Soviet armed forces. Then he made his appointees implement the 
revised military doctrine. But he failed to stay in office long. Although he was not 
ousted by the military, nor as a consequence of his military policies, most likely, 
this gave Gorbachev some lessons. Above all, it appeared that Gorbachev brought 
doctrinal discussions in the open.
This point had a connection with the nature of changes in top leaders in the 
Politburo. Gorbachev diminished the political input of the military first and
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foremost by dropping the post defense minister from the membership of his 
Politburo. Gorbachev himself did not behave at all like previous guardians of the 
much-vaunted Soviet power. He had never been a soldier, he had no military 
orders, he never donned a uniform nor emblazoned his chest with medals. In 
general, he appeared to have tried to consolidate itself and, while simultaneously 
excluding the military from entering the Politburo, CC Secretariat, and other high 
levels of defense decisionmaking organs, and, if possible, leaving out existing 
figures who might have had connections with the military. We could find a 
primitive signal in these kind of efforts from Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 in 
which representatives of the military were very limited from the Lenin Mausoleum. 
At the 1986 Revolution Day parade, the military contingent atop the Red Square 
reviewing stand was reduced from a dozen men to four. In other words, the 
incidents could be analyzed as well-calculated indications that the new leadership 
was emphasizing civilian control over the military from the start.35
It appeared to be around the June 1987 plenum that Gorbachev gained a 
marginal majority of the voting members in the Politburo. This development was at 
that moment evaluated as a stunning success in consolidating the party leadership 
at the highest level, because it had been accomplished in only two years without 
any open, bloody struggles. The development had a number of significant 
implications for the future party-military relations of the country. Up to then, 
Gorbachev, to a certain extent, had not been in a position to dictate the Soviet 
foreign, security, and economic policies. As the resolution of the 27th Party 
Congress suggested, in which he had to proceed with care and to accept 
compromises probably not much to his liking in practical terms.
Moreover, the very institutional representative of the military, Marshal 
Sokolov, at the 27th Party Congress and at successive CC plenums, failed to attain 
voting membership in the Politburo. On the other hand, several reformist 'younger'
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Politburo members were promoted a few months after Gorbachev became general 
secretary. They attracted momentary public attention in the West. They were in 
contrast to the Brezhnev generation. Most of them had little experience in World 
War II, thus, they tended to be more receptive to innovative ideas about security. 
In addition, they had no personal stake in defending the interests or values in terms 
of previous policy.36 According to Marshal Akhromeev, who claimed that he had 
met with Brezhnev on quite a few occasions, Brezhnev did not trust the West: "We 
shall survive," he said, "if we are strong."37 The high command neither brought 
pressure on Brezhnev nor had to convince him of anything, the marshal said, 
because Brezhnev himself gave priority to military problems on his own initiative. 
Akhromeev observed, that was what his life experience prompted him.
Significant were N. Ryzhkov, E. Shevardnadze, L. Zaikov, and relatively late 
comer A. Yakovlev in the context of party-military relations. In April 1985 
Ryzhkov bypassed the customary stage of nonvoting membership in the Politburo 
and was promoted directly to voting membership. In September he succeeded the 
retiring N. Tikhonov as prime minister. E. Shevardnadze, previously a nonvoting 
member of the Politburo, was promoted to full membership in July 1985. Shortly 
after, he became the "point man" for Gorbachev in an ongoing struggle within the 
top leaders to weaken the influence of the military in general and the General Staff 
in particular, and thus to change Soviet political, economic, and military priorities. 
In July 1985 Zaikov assumed secretary responsible for oversight of the defense 
industry, held by a supporter of the military G. Romanov, and he was promoted 
directly to voting membership in the Politburo. He was later appointed Deputy 
Chairman of the Defense Council. At the early stage of Gorbachev leadership, they 
all supported Gorbachev's new foreign and security policy,38 although later 
Ryzhkov and Zaikov were thrown into opposition, together with Ligachev and 
Chebrikov, who were Gorbachev's initial political allies.
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Now, who were possible supporters of the military? Romanov had gone. V. 
Shcherbytskyi was left alone. He said that the US was seeking decisive military 
superiority over the USSR,39 and that Moscow would respond to the further 
development of SDI with "both offensive and defensive measures."40 He also 
stated that the US commitment to SDI doomed the world to many years of an arms 
race and undermined the very basis for "limiting or reducing" the number of 
weapons.41 Concerning the defense spending: the realization of Soviet internal 
tasks depended on the international situation, which remained "sharp and 
complex,"42 that is, the defense budget had to receive higher priority than the 
domestic policy. In all, however, the military had been ill-equipped to exert a 
significant influence on the party's decision making process by these changes, 
adding to some personnel changes in the CC Secretariat and other defense and 
foreign policy related organs which were accompanied with structural changes.43
Meanwhile, Gorbachev himself was becoming a pioneer of public debates on 
military doctrine. A key concept was 'reasonable sufficiency.' Gorbachev 
pronounced it first in October 1986 during a visit to Paris as an appropriate Soviet 
force planning goal.44 As noted above, he told the French parliament that the 
deployment of SS-20s would be halted for six-months. Less than two months later, 
in November 1985, Gorbachev mentioned the concept in a speech to the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, in which he vowed to hold defense spending at the same level it 
had been in 1985, 19 billion rubles, and he implied again that nuclear weapons be 
reduced. To a certain degree reflecting the failure of the Geneva summit, he said 
that the USSR and the US would have to reach a common understanding of what 
level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient. Then 
Gorbachev convincingly suggested that the level of sufficiency was "much lower" 
than that both countries had at the moment.45 In January 1986 Gorbachev called 
for a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. Now at the 27th Party Congress, the
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nature and level of reasonable sufficiency, Gorbachev explained, would continue to 
be limited by the positions and actions of the US and its allies. Therefore, 
according to him, the Soviet Union laid no claim to greater security, but would not 
settle for less.46
A clear checking point in doctrinal debates between political leaders was the 
new party programme adopted at the 27th Party Congress. It said: "The basic 
foundation of the strengthening of the defense of the socialist homeland is the 
Communist Party's guidance of military construction and the armed forces. Policy 
in the field of defense... and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely defensive in 
nature, are worked out and implemented with the party playing the guiding role... 
The CPSU considers it necessary to continue to strengthen its organising and 
directing influence on the life and activity of the armed forces."47 This reference to 
the Party's "guiding role" in the formulation of security policy and military doctrine 
was not contained in the 1961 programme. Therefore, it was quite natural that the 
cool response of the high command to the new party programme followed. 
Members of the high command failed to praise the new programme, although there 
were numerous opportunities to do so. Conversely, Sokolov publicly challenged its 
tenets. After underscoring the distinction between the political-military and 
military-technical dimensions of military doctrine, for example, he suggested that 
only the former was "entirely determined by the policy followed by the state."48
Once the party's supremacy over the military doctrine was confirmed against 
the high command's will, the debate on reasonable sufficiency was beginning to 
rapidly move toward an arena of warfighting strategy, more specifically, toward 
conventional forces. In July 1986 in a meeting with F. Mitterrand, Gorbachev said 
that even a conventional war in Europe could have catastrophic consequences for 
the entire world. Later he suggested more detailed reasons: on the one hand, as 
Ogarkov argued, the conventional weapons exceeded many times over, in
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destructive force, the weapons used in World War II; on the other hand, as the 
Chernobyl disaster suggested, if the weapons hit some facilities such as nuclear 
power stations and a network of large chemical factories, the results would be 
serious.49 At that time, 'reasonable sufficiency' had already been married to another 
popular concept 'defensive defense', by giving the former operational definition. In 
a speech in April 1987 Gorbachev said that 'reasonable sufficiency' was the level of 
military potentials required to accomplish only "defensive tasks".50 In following 
months, chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev fully endorsed these two 
points word for word. In his Victory Day article in Krasnaya zvezda, for example, 
he said that "nuclear war can only lead to mankind's destruction.... A world war 
involving the use of conventional means will also bring mankind incalculable and 
even unpredictable disasters and suffering."51
This nature of the concept 'reasonable sufficiency' became a new military 
doctrine at a place in which the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw 
Pact Treaty Organization met in Berlin to discuss military doctrine on May 28-29, 
1987. The prime task of Soviet military doctrine was on how to prevent all war, 
i.e., both nuclear and conventional wars. Yazov officially defined new Soviet 
military doctrine as follows. "Soviet military doctrine is a system of fundamental 
views on the prevention of war. It is subordinated to resolution of the cardinal 
task... not permitting war, nuclear or conventional."52Although it was in sharp 
contrast to the previous one that, in essence, meant a system of scientifically 
founded and officially endorsed views on questions of the preparation and the 
victorious waging of war,53 it appeared too broad to be implemented 
immediately.54 Nevertheless, it was significant that Yazov's approach was based on 
a profound understanding of the fact that "a nuclear threat is hanging over all and 
survival has become mankind's main concern."55 In fact, he fully accepted 
Gorbachev's current argument that the huge stockpiled arsenals of nuclear
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weapons posed a threat to the very existence of humanity and nuclear war could 
not be a means for attaining political goals. In this context, the meeting of the 
Warsaw Treaty member states endorsed a six-point plan for the elimination of 
nuclear and chemical weapons, conventional force reductions in Europe, the 
creation of a workable system of verification for each, the establishment of 
meaningful confidence-building measures, and, finally, an end both to NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in order to terminate the abnormal division of Europe into two 
opposing blocs.56
After that point and more ambitiously, Gorbachev began to develop and 
clarify much more detailed ideas relating to the implementation of the new military 
doctrine. Among them, the most eye-catching one was Gorbachev's momentous 
article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World" which appeared in Pravda on 
September 17, 1987. In this article the views of the Soviet government on peace, 
security and disarmament issues were set forth in a most detailed, streamlined, and 
integral way. Gorbachev first denied the past contribution of nuclear deterrence to 
Soviet security and thereby implied that such a policy would endanger the country, 
taking up a theme sounded earlier by Dobrynin, who was a pioneer in raising new 
security ideas as a civilian. Gorbachev worried more over the danger of accidental 
nuclear war triggered by a reflexive commitment to deterrence than the danger of 
an unprovoked Western attack. In this logic, he favourably referred to a Soviet- 
American study which suggested that strategic stability could be maintained with 
only 5 percent of existing nuclear weapons. Moreover, after having proposed the 
removal of the most dangerous offensive types of arms from the zone of contact, 
that is, 150 km on each side, in February 1987,57 Gorbachev now explained that 
the new defensive strategy required a radical restructuring of the Soviet armed 
forces: "The armed forces must be restructured to be sufficient to repel possible 
aggression, but not sufficient to conduct offensive operations."58 Not surprisingly,
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a more detailed hint on arms reductions appeared at the October 1987 plenum of 
the Cental Committee. Gorbachev gave notice that, henceforth, priority would be 
put on quality in the armed forces. Thus, Gorbachev's concept of reasonable 
sufficiency became a much more sweeping agenda of Soviet objectives in the arms 
control process.
3.3. The MPA and Rank-and-File Communists Start to Move
Although up to the Rust affair, if not earlier, some senior commanding 
officers were expressing the need for change, they did not rush into a great deal of 
changes. It appeared that, for them, two things, recognizing the need and dealing 
with the problems inherent in the military system, were different matters.59 What 
was more, with regard to the issues of new foreign and security policy, many 
members of the high command were still giving signs of doubt and dissent.60 
Therefore, it is useful to see the response of the MPA to the new leadership's 
intervention in defense budget process, arms control, and military doctrine. 
Originally the organ was designed to control both the political organs and 
Komsomol organizations within the armed forces and to ensure that the influence 
of party policies were felt in terms of both military efficiency and political 
reliability, as Kolkowicz suggested.
There had been some dramatic episodes in the history of the MPA with the 
many changes in its system. As the above mentioned traditional approaches 
suggest, the relationships between political officers and military commanders had 
been tenuous. So, here it is rather useful to review some contradictions between 
the two that had existed relatively in recent decades.61 Around the mid-1970s when 
the political leadership's priorities were beginning to change from heavy industry to 
consumer goods, the MPA was active in its way to discipline some objections
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coming from mainly A. A. Grechko and like-minded officers to the party line that 
emphasized the need for detente with the West. They were asked to grasp "the 
major positive changes" resulting from East-West detente and to accept the new 
party policies as an "organic" part of Marxism-Leninism.62 The campaign 
spearheaded by Sredin, the first deputy chief of the MPA, culminated in a national 
conference of military ideological workers in 1975. In contrast to similar 
gatherings held in earlier years, Grechko was forced to share the rostrum at this 
conference with Politburo candidate member B. Ponomarev, who offered a much 
more up-beat reading of recent international trends and progress in arms control.63
Shortly after Andropov took office, the MPA again underscored the party's 
primacy over the military establishment to calm down Ogarkov and his military 
supporters.64 Its tone was even upgraded under Chernenko. Admiral A. Sorokin 
bluntly stated in an article, for example, that "conceit" and "excessive ambitions" 
should be quickly blocked to ensure that every military leader adopted the Leninist 
leadership style. In addition he asked party organizations within the military to 
apply strictly the Central Committee's firm line against those who rejected 
criticism, while saying that there could be no indulgences for persons who forgot 
their duties as Communists.65
Conversely, under Gorbachev the MPA was asked primarily to restructure 
itself, like the other party organs and organizations in society. While criticizing the 
Soviet economy system, Gorbachev at the April 1985 plenum of the CC focused 
on the party apparatus, because in his opinion it had failed to keep up with the 
demands of the times.66 During the time of watching the development of the 
matter, the party apparatus within the armed forces called itself "to raise the level 
of exactness and personal responsibility,"67 consistent with Gorbachev's April 
speech.
Particularly, a May 1985 meeting of party aktiv appeared to be an early
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signal of the reformation of the MPA itself. Two speeches of Admiral A. Sorokin, 
first deputy chief of the MPA, were indicative of that signal. Sorokin stated that 
the political apparatus in the military had failed to meet "the demands of the April 
plenum" in a number of areas and that party organs had not eliminated "formalism 
for political-educational work", in late June and in early July 1985 respectively.68 
Even, Army General A. D. Lizichev, the new chief of the MPA, also recognized 
this in November 1986, when the campaign of perestroika in the armed forces had 
been progressing to some extent. A lot of articles on perestroika within the armed 
forces, not limited to just a matter of the party apparatus, or Communists, for 
example, were published. A special section was allowed in Krasnaya zvezda for 
various levels of military personnel to recognise problems and to suggest some 
measures. Many letters were also published therein. Thus, painful was Lizichev's 
comment on problems in the party organization within the armed forces. He 
revealed that "in some places, criticism carries a formal, superficial character. At 
many meetings, criteria characteristic of bygone days, an insufficiently fresh form 
of analysis, and a lack of sharp conclusions and self-criticism predominate."69
In the midst of renewal of party works, a noteworthy article by Lizichev 
appeared in Kommunist around the January 1987 plenum of the CC. His article 
broadly covered military doctrine as well as more specific arms control and foreign 
policy questions. It appeared to try to direct possible criticism from some military 
officers, and thereby attempted to calm down signs of division within the military 
over the new thinking, as was the precedent.
Significant was Major General I. Sidelnikov's proposal, which appeared in 
Krasnaya zvezda in December 1985, just before the 27th Party Congress of the 
CPSU. Particularly, he focused on a passage in the draft of the new Party 
Programme which stated that "the party will make every effort to ensure that the 
USSR Armed Forces are at a level excluding strategic superiority on the part of the
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imperialism's forces." The general suggested that it had to be reworked to say that 
"the party will continue to take unfailing care to ensure the armed forces possess 
all modern means for the motherland's defense."70 His message between the lines 
was clear: against the political means contained in the term "every" and for 
strengthening the armed forces rather than "to a certain level."
The 27th Party Congress, however, stuck to the draft words. Moreover, 
Gorbachev at the Party Congress answered in a clear fashion. First, probably 
keeping the term "continue" in mind, he emphasized that the party leadership was 
devoting "unremitting" attention to the country's defense capability. With regard to 
"to possess all modem means", he made it clear that the armed forces had modem 
weaponry and technology "at their disposal." And then, he concluded that the 
USSR's defense might was maintained at a level which allowed it to "reliably" 
protect the peaceful labour and lives of Soviet people.71
In the midst of the debates, Lizichev first held a centrist position. He stated 
that while there was danger in carelessness, complacency, and naive "pacifism," 
there was similar danger in overestimating the potentialities of the aggressive 
circles of imperialism."72 Then, he warned that the costs of a future war would be 
immeasurably higher than those of WWII, even if the use of weapons of "mass 
destruction" was limited. Although this was one of main points of the new thinking 
at that time, he neglected to mention the cause of the war, or the nature of 
capitalism, that was more vital than the nature of the future war. In this context, 
the party had to do everything possible to avoid a nuclear war and to eliminate war 
in general; naturally, the party was also described as taking the measures needed to 
ensure that the armed forces remain "at the level of modem demands," he 
continued.
Lizichev also repeated the standard refrain that the USSR disavowed nuclear 
force as a method of resolving political conflicts, rejected the option of preventive
59
strikes, disputed the possibility of limited nuclear war, and censured the policies of 
"neoglobalism." Indeed, he argued that the very existence of the Soviet armed 
forces was made necessary only by the danger of possible aggression. In short, he 
in some way sided with the general secretary in the article. But this article was his 
first and final one. Once Kolkowicz clearly recognized the value of the MPA for 
the party leadership as a control mechanism over the military establishment. Under 
the leadership of Gorbachev this perspective could no longer account for the 
developing facts. It does not say, however, that professional loyalties of the 
political officers and their feelings tended to outweigh political or ideological 
considerations as a whole. Rather, political reform was promoting a symbiotic 
relationship between political officers and military commanders as the political 
reform continued. Lizichev's view on the professional army, national army, and 
departization of the armed forces shared with that of Yazov and Moiseev.
Instead, the role of the party organizations and its rank-and-file officers 
became much more important than had been the case in the past. Since the January 
1987 plenum of the CC, perestroika in the armed forces had became a matter for 
the whole of the armed forces, not merely that of the MPA or Communist 
organizations. Based on the same principles as in the economic sphere, it intended 
to create an effective army, deal with laziness, inefficiency, lack of personal 
control, alcoholism, bullying (dedovshchina), friction between nationalities and 
educational backwardness, and the emphasis on personal responsibility and 
competence. In fact, these problems had already revealed themselves little by little, 
even before the 27th Party Congress. Consequently, the main point on these 
agendas is about an effective measure. The January plenum decided to introduce 
glasnost' and demokratization into the armed forces, which appeared to be 
somewhat contrary to the military spirit.
As Kolkowicz observed, during the Khrushchev era, criticism and self-
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criticism were used to denote the interference of party officials in commanders' 
decisions. Now, under Gorbachev, the essence of these principles was revived. In 
short, junior and middle level officers were allowed to have their say in the 
decision-making process and were able to exercise their initiative in implementing 
decisions. In early 1980s, i.e., at the end of Brezhnev leadership, this type of 
measure was also used. Then, mainly party members within the armed forces were 
mobilized to shore up the general secretary's support within the officer corps 
against Ogarkov and his like-minded supporters. A national conference of 
secretaries of the military's primary party organizations was convened in 1981, 
nearly ten years after a similar meeting.73 More significant was the 1982 national 
conference because it gave a blanket endorsement to Brezhnev's policies, 
particularly his stance on the military budget.74
In addition, Brezhnev and his supporters also threatened political retribution 
against officers who had failed to toe the line. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
national conference, the first deputy chief of the Defense Ministry's Main Cadres 
Administration called for tighter screening and control of commanders. Regular 
attestation of officers, he said, could serve as a "powerful stimulus" to the 
fulfilment of party and service obligations, and officers should understand the 
position in which an individual would serve. And he bluntly concluded that 
sometimes "it is necessary to remove those commanders who, despite their love of 
work and feeling of responsibility depend too little on the Party."75
Now ordinary Communists, through the MPA mechanism initially, were 
mobilized to pressure conservative commanders. For example, at a meeting of the 
party aktiv of the ministry of defense convened just after the January 1987 plenum, 
rank-and-file officers were given many chances to express their viewpoints, 
including the military implications of the January plenum. The MPA officials, 
deputy ministers, and the Central Committee overseers participated in the meeting.
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The MPA's political departments in the General Staff and in the military's central 
administrations were called to play a much more active role. One of the reasons 
was that during the past two years the officer corps had responded sluggishly to 
the party's calls for the revived policy, criticism and self-criticism, and institutional 
perestroika. Some unidentified speakers linked the currently unresolved military 
problems to the military leadership. They complained, for example, that military 
ethics and standards would not have declined, if the defense ministry's personnel 
administration had taken corrective steps and introduced "fresh forces" into 
military commands. In this connection, changes in cadres policy, including the 
downgrading of seniority and service records in making military appointments, was 
endorsed.76
Marshal Sokolov addressed the meeting, but his remarks were not reported, 
possibly, because he opposed the changes. Less than one month previously in a 
speech on Army and Navy Day, the defense minister, arguing against the idea of 
revamping the MOD, insisted that the central requirement of military personnel 
policy was a capability "to combine young and experienced cadres to ensure their 
continuity and the development of everything good that has been accumulated in 
the activity of commanders... and has passed the test of time."77 The omission of 
Sokolov's speech was in contrast to the Krasnaya zvezda's treatment of 
Gorbachev's speech at the January 1987 plenum of the CC.
The paper left out Gorbachev's comment about the "crisis phenomena" in the 
USSR and about the military's failings. In fact, Gorbachev said at the January 1987 
plenum that "Soviet military cadres have an enormous responsibility before the 
people to protect the country's security. The people and the party are doing 
everything to strengthen the armed forces and have a right to assume that no 
aggression can catch the USSR unawares. The party counts on the officer corps in 
deciding on the tasks for strengthening the state's defense capacity. The Central
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Committee is sure that all military cadres will act with the greatest responsibility.”78 
But the military newspaper reported that Gorbachev stressed that "our most 
important concern" was about the military cadres who were defending the 
country.79
As the Rust affair happened in May 1987, the measure of pressure 'from 
below' suddenly became much more dramatic and reached its peak. The Politburo 
firstly suggested a guideline on how to treat the incident. The Politburo interpreted 
it as some sort of incapability of the Soviet armed forces by firing Sokolov. 
Afterwards, at the June 1987 plenum of the CC Gorbachev remarked that the 
unprecedented event demonstrated "the existence of powerful negative 
phenomena" in the military, and he proclaimed that there had to be no doubt either 
within the party or among the people about the armed forces' ability to defend the 
country.80
Then on June 16 1987 at a meeting of most Party members of the Moscow 
Air Defence District, which appeared to be a clearly calculated place for young 
officers and civilians, all of the commanders and staff officers related to the affair 
were asked to explain why it had happened and to account for 'everything' that they 
had done wrong. It was clear, that despite a special air command with 
approximately 370,000 troops, an anti-ballistic defence system with more than 100 
launchers, about 2,200 interceptor fighter planes, 10,000 radar stations, a vast anti­
aircraft artillery network, and more than 9,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, 
they failed to detect and shoot down the plane, if it were necessary. It seemed that 
it was in fact spotted and buzzed by several military aircraft as it approached 
Moscow. They did not open fire. It is rather plausible that they were still reeling 
from the scandal caused by the downing of the South Korean Boeing in 1983. 
Ironically, the incident was considered as not an independent single case but a due 
result of accumulated mistakes.
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The commander of the Moscow Air Defence District, Marshal of Aviation 
Konstantinov, for example, was reprimanded for not realizing the seriousness of 
the situation and not undertaking measures to improve the operations of the 
command, and was consequently replaced by Colonel General of Aviation 
Tsarkov. The chief of staff of the District, Colonel General Yu. Gorkov, was 
severely criticized because he "avoids solving problems" and "has made it a 
practice of falsifying its reports to enhance its accomplishments." And "the style of 
work of the staff of the region headed by him is dominated by bureaucratism, 
useless busywork, and rapid turnover of personnel".
Moreover, Gorkov was personally accused of crude behaviour and 
intimidation of subordinates. Another Colonel General P. Khotylev, deputy 
commander for combat training, was also accused of incompetence, as was chief of 
radio technical troops Colonel General A. Ghukhov. Aviation commander O. 
Lengarov was charged with having failed to organize flight units properly. 
Moreover, Lt. Generals Yu. Brazhnikov, N. Markov, Major General V. 
Reznicheko, and a number of other high-ranking antiaircraft defence officers of the 
District were deprived of their Party memberships, and consequently of their posts 
and privileges.
Here the main concern is not the fact that a lot of senior officers were 
criticized and removed, but that they were criticized by young officers as well as 
civilians, including then Moscow First Party Secretary, B. El'tsin, who considered 
criticism the "vitamin of perestroika."81 On the one hand, the fact that young 
officers were encouraged to speak out against their commanders could be 
interpreted as a threat to the hierarchy of the military, although the measure 'from 
below' is useful for the political leadership to control over commanders.
The new defense minister Yazov grasped this point well. Up to then, senior 
commanders in general were welcoming part of the measure in that the measure
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could be used to discipline mainly junior officers. In reality, the measure was being 
used to control themselves, contrary to their wishes. Thus, on adopting a cautious 
attitude toward political liberalization as whole, Yazov warned that "criticism is a 
very sharp weapon." Sensationalism and a disrespectful attitude toward military 
cadres, which could be seen for someone as fresh ideas coming from both junior 
officers and civilians, should be avoided, he argues. In addition, he asserted on 
glasnost' that half-truths, lack of objectivity, tendentiousness are not of use to 
military preparedness and not of use to perestroika.82
On the other hand, the fact that commanders and staff officers were criticized 
by civilians, especially, by El'tsin, was significant because he showed how to attack 
a sacred cow. El'tsin said at the meeting that "there had developed a pervasive state 
of self-satisfaction, boasting, and complacency in the armed forces. It appeared 
that Soviet officers neither understood nor respected their soldiers. Favouritism 
and nepotism had become rife."83 Afterwards, the top officials of the MOD were 
urged to look the Soviet working people straight in the eye and to answer for their 
responsibility and incompetence. Conclusively, El'tsin assigned primary 
responsibility for the decline in the armed forces to the loss of authority of the 
party organization. He declared that commanders acted as if the resolutions of 
congress and Central Committee plenums did not concern them.
How to understand El'tsin's criticism? His action must be understood as an 
effort of party's control over the military in that he was the first secretary of the 
Moscow city and a candidate member of the Politburo, and therefore he was 
allowed to speak. It should be recorded, however, as a moment that unleashed new 
forces that would begin to challenge senior officer's social standing and their 
institutional role when the party began to be discredited. El'tsin and his followers' 
attacks on the high command, together with junior officers, made real waves.
Along the line of the unchallenged control of the party over the armed forces
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organization, priorities, and future capabilities, this type of meeting was repeated in 
most of the Soviet republics under the chairmanship of the local party secretaries. 
In Moscow an enlarged meeting of the Ground Troops Military Council was held 
in June 1987, headed by Army General E. Ivanovskii, then CINC of the Ground 
Forces.
With an article in Kommunist vooruzhennykh 5/7,84 the democratization 
campaign, or criticism from below, in the armed forces entered a more serious 
phase in August 1987. The main point of the article was that there was no 
contradiction between criticism of superior officers by their subordinates and the 
needs of military discipline. Initiative and creativity among subordinates should not 
be suppressed, it argued. In particular, the article encouraged discussion about how 
to carry out orders, while claiming that the prohibition on criticizing orders had 
been interpreted too broadly by commanding officers. As one of goals of the 
democratization in the armed forces, criticism of commanding officers by their 
subordinates was established, a much more radical idea was also introduced. Lt. 
General V. Korablev in the same journal argued that Gorbachev's principle of free 
elections should be extended to party organs within the armed forces,85 because 
party organs too often directed their criticism at unidentified targets. In fact, part 
of this idea was implemented in the elections to the 19th Party Conference, the 
Congress of People's Deputies, the first RSFSR Party Congress, and the 28th Party 
Congress. As a result of it, a number of junior and middle level officers were 
elected, and some of them became 'dissident', whose activities will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
3.4. Civilians Began to Meddle in Doctrinal Debates
Although around the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev energetically put
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forward the doctrinal issues centred on the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency', few 
officials reiterated it. It was June 1986 that a party figure firstly mentioned it. Head 
of the International Department of the CC, A. Dobrynin, in an article in 
Kommunist, called for new approaches to national security as well as a greater 
civilian role in the debate over national security issues.86 Appearance of this article 
had a direct connection with Gorbachev's early plan to build centres of national 
security expertise outside the military, both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and the CC Secretariat.
The MFA began to restructure itself just after the 27th Party Congress under 
Shevardnadze, and a new deputy foreign minister for personnel, V. Nikoforov. 
Shevardnadze had been a party careerist with no professional background in 
foreign affairs and Nikoforov was the former deputy head of the CC 
Organizational Party Work Department. On the other hand, an experienced 
diplomat Dobrynin became the head of the Central Committee International 
Department (ID) and was placed in charge of the nomenklatura of the MFA. In 
April 1986 G. Komiyenko moved from the MFA to the ID, as first deputy chief to 
work for Dobrynin, along with the veteran ID staffer V. Zagladin. Two 
departments for arms control were established: one in the MFA and the other in 
the ID.
In addition, there were other personnel changes to oversee foreign policy. A. 
Yakovlev, who had been head of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) since 1983, became the head of the CC Propaganda 
Department. V. Medvedev, who had been Yakovlev's deputy in the Propaganda 
Department in the early 1970s, became the head of the Socialist Bloc Relations 
Department. V. Falin a political observer with Izvestiya was elected a candidate 
member of the CC at the 27th Party Congress. In March 1986 he became the chief 
of the Novosti Press Agency, and replaced Dobrynin in the aftermath of the 19th
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Party Conference.
Further restructuring of the ID and MFA continued throughout 1988 as the 
CC Department for Relations with the Socialist Countries was brought into the ID. 
In September 1988, the creation of the CC Commission for Foreign Affairs, 
headed by A. Yakovlev, marked a critical step in continued efforts to integrate 
party and state institutions. Together the Commission, the ID, and the MFA 
emerged as an increasingly centralized party-state agency for foreign affairs. In the 
end, the MFA gained a lot from Gorbachev's reform of the national security 
establishment. The new foreign and security policy posture of the USSR gave the 
MFA a leading role to play. Moreover, the ministry gained further institutional 
prestige as a result of the changes in its relationship with the ID and later the 
Commission.
An active and earliest participant in the drive to enshrine the idea of 
reasonable sufficiency A. Dobrynin firstly called for "even more profound" works 
on international and military-political problems. At that time Gorbachev was 
stressing the threat of nuclear war and the danger of an arms race that had reached 
a qualitatively new stage. Proceeding form this recognition, Dobrynin emphasized 
the need to develop a "new theory" that could reflect the realities of the nuclear 
age. Then, he focused on the role of scientists in turning the new way of thinking 
into reality.
Already Dobrynin had expressed this point in an address in May 1986 to a 
gathering of scientists from various disciplines. More specifically, with regard to 
the concept of 'reasonable sufficiency', he argued that "immediate scientific 
analysis" to the issue demanded "lowering" the current level of military potentials, 
but without any details. As another concept 'defensive defense' was put on the 
agenda, he made explicit reference to the alternative defence concepts developed in 
the West.87 Of late, he even pushed for the creation of new section for arms
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control and military affairs staffed by civilians. As a result, Lt. General V. 
Sharodubov, who had taken part in the Soviet delegation to the SALT talks and 
INF, was transferred to the section.
In May 1987 A. Yakovlev also began vocalizing his role in increasing the 
role of civilian experts in the formulation of military policy. "The concept of 
sufficiency of military potentials, including under the conditions of a complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons, a concept which was advised by the 27th CPSU 
Congress, needs to be revealed and filled with substance. Of no less importance is 
the task of analyzing, in connection with the military specialists, our military 
doctrine, the strategic essence of which is based on the policy of averting nuclear 
war."88
Although, Shevardnadze rarely referred to 'reasonable sufficiency' at that 
time, he played in defining the defense agenda an important role that could mean 
the MFA's bid for a more substantial role at the expense of the high command. 
Personally, Shevardnadze attached great value to the views of experts. It was quite 
natural, therefore, that the MFA was well linked to outside intellectuals. The MFA 
created a Scientific Information Centre to coordinate academic research. 
Moreover, most departments of the ministry established consultative councils to let 
scholars voice their opinions on international issues.89 In particular, the MFA's 
monthly journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (International Affairs) was asked to 
function as a broad forum for serious writings on security issues, which in nature 
were critical of the armed forces. So, civilian defense intellectuals were inspired.
To be sure, the most noticeable was Shevardnadze's opening speech at a July 
1988 conference of the national security community held at the MFA, in which 
more than 300 experts attended, including chief of the General Staff Akhromeev. 
There the foreign minister called for an effective "parliamentary mechanism" for 
the discussion of international and military issues, and through this he implied that
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the MFA should be given veto power over weapon programmes.90 This was a clear 
recognition of the problems in the past Soviet security behaviours. Shevardnadze 
criticized the past military decisionmaking and in particular denounced the Soviet 
chemical weapons programme which was the product of "primitive and distorted" 
notions of Soviet interests.91
In terms of doctrinal debates, his brief questioning of 'nuclear deterrence' was 
significant. In principle, he accepted that nuclear weapons could have been 
instrumental in preventing a third world war for over forty years. But he suggested 
a paradoxical situation in the area of conventional forces. As early as September 
1985 when he made a speech to the UN General Assembly, Shevardnadze 
reiterated unintended and uncontrolled outbreak of war in the nuclear-space age 
and implicitly questioned the nuclear deterrence.92 Now, his main point is that if 
nuclear weapons had really been a deterrent, they would logically have curbed the 
race in conventional armaments. Actually the reverse had happened, he argued. In 
fact, the Soviet high command had overcome the nature and dynamic of nuclear 
weapons and had developed all kind of options to be able to conduct war. 
Realising that nuclear war was out of the question, for it could not be won, the 
Soviet built up their conventional armed forces because they regarded conventional 
war as permissible even in the presence of the nuclear deterrent. Now, 
Shevardnadze questioned the very danger of a war using conventional arms. 
Simply the foreign minister concluded that nuclear deterrence was a "frozen 
legacy" of the political "Ice Age", and he admitted that the only real function of 
nuclear weapons was to endanger the survival of humanity.93 He went to say that 
"the principle of sufficiency" should be sufficient for defence but not for attack. In 
much more practical terms, he proposed a staged reduction of conventional 
armaments by removing present imbalances and asymmetries from reciprocal 
exchange of data to a reduction in armed forces by 500,000 men on either side of
70
the WTO and NATO.
Let us go back to mid-1987 when the drive for military reform was initiated 
by an unprecedented wave of articles in which civilian defense experts invaded the 
domain of the military theoreticians and took stands uncongenial to mainstream 
military thought.94 One of the earliest but broadest ones appeared to be A. Bovin's 
questioning of the Soviet decision to place SS-20's in European Russia.95 Thomas 
F. Remington argued that, assuming that glasnost' had not led to open debates on 
Soviet foreign policy by Soviet writers as it had in domestic matters, this 
publication was primarily aimed at foreign audiences and used as a bargaining chip 
in arms negotiations.96 It should have been considered as a signal of the new era. 
General Yu. Lebedev's angry response to Bovin's dissent reflected this point in the 
following week's issue Moscow News.91
A much more serious case was the debate between a writer A. Adamovich 
and Colonel General D. Volkogonov. Adamovich rejected the developments of 
Soviet warfighting options, i.e., to launch a retaliatory strike only after absorbing a 
nuclear attack on Soviet territory,98 by saying that "we don't want to take part in 
the destruction of mankind, not with a first, not with a second, not with any further 
strike."99 In response, Volkogonov at a writers' conference labelled Adamovich's 
"crying from the heart" as a "disturbing undercurrent of pacifism."100 Afterwards, 
the political general separated pacifism from the battle for peace and even warned 
against such a mood. The general considered readiness for nuclear retaliation to be 
essential in order to deter the potential enemy first strike. These polemics 
continued in several journals over a period of months.101 Meanwhile, Volkogonov 
showed the difference between the two more clearly in an interview with Krasnaya 
zvezda. In Volkogonov's opinion, Adamovich thought that there was no need for a 
deterrent capability. Consequently, the general argued that his view was far beyond 
unilateral disarmament and could mean "survival at any price." If a political
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mechanism failed to prevent war, he reiterated, the country had to rely on a 
military mechanism.102 In response, Adamovich continuously rejected the concept 
of deterrence based on retaliation, by saying that the very retaliation was 
unnecessary, because any attacker would fatally incur the radiation effects of his 
own strike. The point was that a nuclear arms race and nuclear war had to be 
prevented.
Notable and much more authoritative was the involvement of the MFA and 
the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, principally the Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) directed by O. Bykov and 
the Institute for the Study of USA and Canada (IUSAC) headed by G. Arbatov. As 
a kind of joint work of the MFA and the Institutes, a coauthored work, 
"Reasonable Sufficiency—Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," by deputy director 
of the IUSAC V. Zhurkin, senior researcher A. Kortunov, and researcher S. 
Karaganov attracted public attention.103
Let us consider civilians' arguments over major issues. First, they sought to 
redefine a fundamental question, that is, the nature of the Western threat as 
Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov did. More broadly they assumed there would 
be no world war. Whilst military leaders contended that a real "military threat" 
continued to exist. For example, in 1987 the new defense minister Yazov spoke of 
the "serious reality" of possible Western aggression against the socialist 
countries.104 The civilian theorists, however, disregarded, in methodological terms, 
the dimensions of military figures, although some acknowledged the role of nuclear 
forces in reducing the likelihood of war.105
In general, they focused on the nature or impression of the Western 
countries. Already the new Party Programme had recognized that the present-day 
capitalism differed in many respects from what it was at the beginning and even in 
the middle of the 20th century.106 At first Primakov and later Gorbachev on Lenin's
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behalf had raised the relative importance of peaceful coexistence or construction 
cooperation particularly in the nuclear age.107 In January 1987 Bovin argued that 
national interests had proved stronger than class interests based on the WWII.108 
This point was a direct challenge to the well established sociopolitical aspect of 
military doctrine and was too provocative not to initiate the debate about the 
analytical priority of national interests versus class interests. Later in November 
1987 he suggested that the traditional Soviet assessment of the West's intentions to 
wage war to eliminate socialism might be incorrect. Based on his earlier comment 
that although the nature of the capitalism could not change, but the means of its 
realization could, Bovin argued that in the nuclear age there existed a desire for 
self-preservation, even in Washington. Therefore, it was assumed that there would 
be no world war.
Second, the civilians used the concept 'reasonable sufficiency' to lower the 
level of military potential, while the military used the same principle to defend it. 
Primakov asserted, for example, that the USSR required only a "qualitative parity," 
which he defined as the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on an aggressor in 
response to a nuclear first strike.109 Based on such a tentative belief, military 
strength between the superpowers should be reduced to levels acceptable to both 
sides, he concluded.110 Further discussions of the concept by civilian analysts in 
1987 and 1988 laid the groundwork for a challenge to the high command's 
insistence on strategic parity. It was the concept of "minimum nuclear deterrence" 
as compatible with reasonable sufficiency for defense. I. Malashenko, researcher of 
the IUSAC, said that a transition in practice to minimum deterrence could become 
an important stage in moving forward a nuclear-free world.111 Until then the 
civilian analysts had rejected the term nuclear deterrence itself, as mentioned 
before. In terms of number, Zhurkin and others suggested 10 to 20 percent of the 
existing Soviet strategic forces112 and Arbatov suggested 10 to 15 percent.113 R.
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Bogdanov, formerly a deputy director of the IMEMO, and A. Kortunov took really 
worst-case possibilities into account and then suggested that five warheads would 
be a sufficient deterrent to dissuade anyone from deliberate decision to attack.114 
Subsequently, they argued for unilateral reduction to a level of minimum 
deterrence: 500 single-warhead missiles, part mobile land-based ICBMs and part 
sea-based SLBMs. This view was considered as "incompetent" by military 
theoreticians, who reaffirmed the need for parity.115 Former US Secretary of 
Defense McNamara also expressed his support for "negotiated reciprocal 
reductions" gradually leading to a balanced minimum deterrent.116 On the other 
hand, most civilian analysts supported Bogdanov and Kortunov.117
The third concerned the relation between offense and defense, as the 
concept 'reasonable sufficiency' began to be applied to the conventional forces and 
the military favoured a more concrete concept "defensive" sufficiency when it was 
forced to define the concept. The civilian theorists still tried to link the relation 
between offense and defense to the problem of the arms race, or a stable balance of 
power, whereas the military theorists did see some merits in defensive operations. 
In January 1987 A. Kokoshin very conclusively argued that the problem of the 
arms race was a product not of the defense but of the offense with endless efforts 
to overcome the defense and thus instability was a product of the increasing 
destructiveness of offensive systems.118 Proceeding from this recognition, civilian 
analysts tried to demonstrate the potential superiority of the defensive over the 
offensive by providing historical examples of its use at the military-technical 
level.119 Hence they more deeply involved in the previous domain of the military.
But the battle of Kursk itself, chosen as a model case of defensive defense, 
had much room for discussion, because an initial defensive phase was followed by 
a successful large-scale counteroffensive. As the debate went on, the concept 
counteroffensive became critical. Inevitably, the military favoured a more extensive
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counteroffensive capability in terms of when and where to defeat the aggressor.120 
while the civilians advocated the more limited counteroffensive capability, up to 
complete reliance on nonoffensive means of defense. After hypothesizing four 
alternative options that could result from a confrontation of conventional military 
forces, V. Larionov, for example, emphasized their fourth option, "a defense 
without the possibility of conducting offensive operations."121 For this, smaller 
troops units would be required, but their mobility would have to be increased to 
give them greater effectiveness.
Finally, in applying the concept 'reasonable sufficiency for defensive defense' 
to conventional forces, the civilian analysts particularly advocated unilateral 
measures. Simply Zhurkin and others praised Khrushchev's unilateral reduction of 
Soviet forces by 2.1 million men,122 while noting that conventional arms presented 
a greater threat to maintaining strategic stability. Foreign minister Shevardnadze 
aired the number 500,000 men to be cut. This was a key barrier to many officers' 
acceptance of reasonable sufficiency in a hurry. At that time, with the release of 
data on NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces in Europe, the military leadership 
was arguing that there was roughly equivalent overall military power between the 
two, while admitting that the Warsaw Pact might be ahead of NATO in tanks and 
artillery, NATO had an advantage in strike aircraft.123 But the civilians focused on 
the advantage of the 20,000 tanks that the Warsaw Pact had. The central tenet of 
their argument was that in the future, no attack would be possible at all, and so 
there would be no need of a counteroffensive potential, in which tank forces would 
play a pivotal role. Naturally, the tanks would be reduced unilaterally.
All in all, these developments clearly highlighted the change in the nature of 
the public debates on military affairs. Before Gorbachev's rise to power, Soviet 
civilian analysts had hardly commented on them. In such a short period of time, the 
civilians firstly aired the basic military issues, thereby undermined military
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assumptions that had previously been excluded from consideration, and generated 
public support for their military policy options, including the unilateral force 
reductions. They were not interested in the set of long-standing military reasons, or 
military-technical aspects of theatre warfare that had underlain the existing huge 
size and offensive oriented structure and posture of Soviet conventional forces. 
Most of the civilian analysts used to regard the fact that the Soviet armed forces 
were much larger than necessary as valid.
Concerning the dynamic of the civilian defence experts, B. S. Lambeth gave 
them generous mark in that some leading figures such as Arbatov, Primakov, and 
so on, had been in place and in pursuit of policy relevance since the mid-1950s.124 
On the other hand, M. MccGwire regarded them as the extended 
"nomenklatura,"125 which had been originally established in the first half of 1984 to 
address the problems introduced by the US SDI. In a compromising way, J. Snyder 
even argued that as Moscow's defense intellectuals had sought to force changes 
that would institutionalize the policies they preferred, Gorbachev's security 
concepts had, in turn, grown directly from the new domestic institutions he was 
promoting and the political constituencies he was relying on.126
As a whole, it appeared that Gorbachev had to a certain extent encouraged 
them to speak out and that the civilians therefore perceived more freedom to 
conduct certain areas of analysis in the wake of Gorbachev's pioneering statements 
and proposals. They had not yet acquired prominence simply on the merits of their 
views. Rather, they were the beneficiaries of a broader process of institutional 
changes designed by Gorbachev to wrest control of the defense agenda from its 
traditional repository in the MOD and the General Staff. In sum, their views in 
comparison with the military ones had not yet formalized into full-fledged influence 
relationships. If they had high policymaking ambitions, they had to wait until such 
role in the policy formulation process was fully institutionalized. In practice it did
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not take very long. By early 1989, the MFA and the USSR Supreme Soviet, along 
with a strengthened Central Committee staff organization led by Yakovlev, deeply 
entered into the defense arena.
3.5. Gorbachev’s 1988 UN Speech, Debates on 'Reasonable Sufficiency’, and
Party-Military Relations
Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral force reductions at the UN in 
December 1988 was a momentous decision. It ended the debates on the 
restructuring of Soviet armed forces in terms of military doctrine. At the same 
time, it meant a turning point in Party-military relations. The announcement was 
accompanied the resignation of Marshal Akhromeev and the appointment of the 
relatively junior Moiseev as chief of the General Staff. Moreover, in the weeks 
following Moiseev's promotion, a number of articles by senior General Staff 
officers appeared in the press.127 In general, they all clearly supported the force 
reductions. In particular, their contents suggested to a certain extent that the Party 
had been conducting a campaign aimed at bringing 'disobedient' within the General 
Staff into line with Gorbachev's arms control line.
In military doctrinal terms, however, of significance was Lobov's recognition 
that the unilateral cuts demonstrated the unity of the political-military and military- 
technical aspects of Soviet military doctrine.128 Under Brezhnev, the military- 
technical aspect had increasingly become the preserve of the General Staff and 
various military institutions. It had, however, become clear by the mid-1980s that 
well-considered military decisions intended to enhance the security of the country 
had the opposite effect. As Soviet deployment of SS-20s and US response to 
deploy the MX, Pershing II, cruise missiles suggested, they had made war more 
likely, while incurring heavy political, economic, and even military costs.
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Therefore, General Staff had been under pressure. It was insisted that the upper 
reaches of military-technical aspect should come within the purview of the broader 
political-military establishment. In this context A. Kokoshin argued that there had 
to be a complete correspondence between the two aspects,129 while claiming that 
war could no longer serve as a rational means of politics and a lot of decisions 
made at the boundary between politics and strategy might have fatal and 
irreversible consequences. Of course, his argument recognized the need for the top 
state and political leadership to know the fundamentals of military strategy, 
operational plans, the functioning of the military mechanism of carrying out 
decisions, and so on.
It is worth summarising Gorbachev’s statement: the country would reduce its 
numerical strength by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks in the territories of the country's 
European allies, including six tank divisions (5,000 tanks) in the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft; 
assault landing troops and several other formations and units, including assault 
crossing units with their weapons and combat equipment in above countries; nearly 
one-fifth of all Soviet armament production; and the level of defense spending by 
14.2%.130 As a whole, these figures meant that the Soviet Union would reduce its 
troop strength by 12 percent. Concerning the approximate impact of these 
reductions on the balance of forces in Central Europe, the USSR's ability to launch 
a deep offensive on short notice, i.e., a large-scale standing start attack, on 
Western Europe would be sharply diminished because the potential for a surprise 
attack would be removed.
As we have seen in previous sections, Gorbachev had identified himself with 
a set of concepts such as 'reasonable sufficiency', 'defensive defence', 'asymmetric 
force reductions', and so on, and had mobilized the civilian forces to support him. 
But Gorbachev, since the end of 1987 when he hinted the prospect of reaching
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agreement on a considerable reduction of conventional forces at the next summit in 
Moscow, appeared to have been restrained, particularly in taking a unilateral 
measure, by the institutional power of the military in terms of both Soviet politics 
and monolithic military expertise.131 It was in the fall of 1988 that political leaders 
seemed to move further towards adopting a position of 'reasonable sufficiency for 
defensive defence', if necessary, without the adoption of such a position by the US 
and its allies. Now throughout the announcement Gorbachev proved himself to be 
sincere in what he had stated.
Nonetheless, a suspicion remained when we focused on the retirement of 
Marshal Akhromeev, who, together with Yazov, had publicly argued against 
unilateral cuts. The immediate assumption in the West was that Akhromeev had 
resigned in protest over the unilateral measure. But Akhromeev himself denied this 
speculation in several interviews in early January of 1989. His main point was that 
Gorbachev's decision was correct, was justified from both political and military 
viewpoints, and was thoroughly considered from the military point of view.132 This 
kind of denial continued until the end of the year. For example, in an open letter to 
the chief editor of Ogonek he insisted that by mid-1988 the political and military 
leaders had "jointly" reached the conclusion that unilateral force cuts were 
possible.133 This twist in Akhromeev's attitude can give us an alternative 
interpretation, that is, a sort of compromise between the political leadership and 
major part of members of the high command, centred on Akhromeev.
Marshal Akhromeev had actively participated in arms control negotiations, 
including the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty, and in instituting perestroika 
within the armed forces during his tenure as chief of the General Staff. Being chief 
of the General Staff and having extensive expertise in military science and 
technology made it possible for him to be an authoritative representative of the 
military. Domestically, he fulfilled a crucial function in explaining and justifying
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arms control to Soviets. In carrying out this function, he often bolstered 
Gorbachev's positions against dissent from some elements in the Soviet military. In 
addition, he stressed the importance of political means for preserving international 
security and the need for perestroika in the military.
In relation to arms control, however, the marshal emphasized that any 
reduction in Soviet forces had to depend on corresponding reductions in American 
or NATO forces. For example, in January 1988, he warned that "defense 
sufficiency" cannot be interpreted one-sidedly, without regard to the developing 
correlation of forces against civilian defence intellectuals. It would be even more of 
a mistake to understand it, according to him, as unilateral disarmament.134 
Fundamentally he believed that the limits of reasonable sufficiency were not set by 
the USSR but by the US and its NATO allies. In March 1988 he still held this 
position but argued somewhat differently that there was an approximate "parity" 
between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO in the area of armed forces and 
conventional weapons.135 Unfortunately, however, the plan for unilateral force 
reductions was announced over his repeated objections.
This was enough to undercut his military and professional authority and his 
political position both within and outside the armed forces. In this context, Fred 
Wehling argued that Akhromeev voluntarily exited from his position: the conflict 
between his duties as the senior military officer and his loyalty to Gorbachev's 
programme of military reforms became unresolvable.136 Herspring, on the contrary, 
suggested that Gorbachev "deliberately" replaced Akhromeev in order to 
continuously work arms control issues with Yazov's protege and Far East MD 
commander Mikhail Moiseev to implement military reforms.137 Either case means 
that Akhromeev's ouster was not an astute political move.
In this respect, it was hardly unusual that Akhromeev was appointed as an 
advisor to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, it was at a time when
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Gorbachev was intending to increase the legitimacy of the Supreme Soviet as a 
locus of political power. Akhromeev had served in the Supreme Soviet since 1984 
and was again elected in March 1989 as a People's Deputy from the Beltski Okrug 
of the Moldavian republic after running unopposed. The appointment not only 
might help Gorbachev's effort but also did not alienate Akhromeev from 
Gorbachev himself.
As Wehling foresaw,138 Akhromeev as the adviser would be able to provide a 
direct link between Gorbachev and upholders of perestroika in the armed forces, 
i.e., as long as the Marshal could maintain his professional reputation and contact 
with the military establishment, the General Staff or the Defense Ministry could be 
bypassed. In that case, Gorbachev's effort could or had to be another indication of 
the trend to downgrade the General Staff in defense policy-making apparatus 
whose resources were monopoly of military-technical issues.
The personal background of his replacement, relatively unknown and 49- 
year-old Moiseev, was very suggestive of this. He was selected over the heads of 
many more senior generals; he had no experience of war, not even in Afghanistan; 
he had never served on the General Staff in the past; and he had never written any 
articles about war-fighting strategies but administrative and personnel issues. This 
was evidence of one of the continuing trends of Gorbachev's personnel policy.
The Yazov-Moiseev military leadership should have grasped Gorbachev's 
very clear message that the higher levels of strategic planning or warfighting 
options, not to mention such political-military issues in Herspring's terms as 
defense budget and arms control, were now within the confines of the civilians. 
Instead, they were allowed to buildup of the Far Easterners within the high 
command,139 i.e., those who served within the past ten years in the Soviet Forces 
of the Far East such as the Far Eastern MD, the Transbaikal MD, the Siberian MD, 
the Central Asian MD, and the Pacific Fleet.
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This forming of Far Easterners appeared to a certain degree to be a replay of 
the Stalingrad Group that had been formed mainly between 1957-1963 under 
Khrushchev. It gained control of the armed forces, and acquired a high level of 
political influence through its association with Khrushchev.140 The Far Easterner at 
that time, however, were hardly seen as a hegemonical interest or pressure group 
within the armed forces. They were only developing as a group, united by personal 
ties and patronage relationships formed during their years of serving together in 
geographically remote areas. At most, their characterisation as "outsiders" with 
respect to the Moscow-based military hierarchy that developed under Brezhnev, 
may have been in important consideration for Gorbachev."141
Therefore, the decisive factor in decision making on the unilateral force 
reductions appeared to be the balance of power in the party leadership, that is, in 
favour with Gorbachev and his reformist allies against conservatives, rather than 
over the high command. There was a dramatic party leadership change approved at 
the September 1988 plenum of the CC and the USSR Supreme Soviet session. 
Gorbachev was positioned to facilitate a show of his determination to impose his 
will against the reluctant military high command. J. W. Parker even observed some 
unannounced shifts in the composition of the Defense Council, focusing on 
Gromyko, Chebrikov, and Ligachev.142 In this respect, he concluded that 
Gorbachev's announcement wholly confirmed the superiority of the party 
leadership over the military.
Concerning the possibility of compromise between the political leadership 
and majority of the high command, centred on Akhromeev, as mentioned above, it 
was too early to say, if not too cautious, whether the supremacy of the party over 
the military was established or not. What was clear at that moment was that the 
Akhromeev-Yazov-Moiseev military line-up was quite submissive to the political 
leadership. Yazov's Order of the Day for November 7 was suggestive. Yet, in the
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midst of hot debates between civilians and many of senior generals on the new 
political thinking, Yazov declared that Soviet diplomacy was "creating more 
favourable conditions for slackening tension, broadening comprehensive East-West 
contacts, curbing the arms race, reducing military expenditure, and settling regional 
conflict."143
Moiseev was on ahead of Yazov. The new chief of the General Staff declared 
that "we have now entered a new stage in the building of the armed forces,"144 
which began in 1985-1986. This recognition was good for the political leadership. 
But ominously the general began to pronounce on military doctrinal issues. He 
stated, for example, that "almost all positions on strategy, operational art, and 
tactics are undergoing fundamental changes under the influence not only of 
military-technical but also of military-political factors. In essence, a new theory of 
military art is being created."145 In this context, the future role of the General Staff 
was to study military and political questions and the preparation of thorough, 
carefully considered proposals, he continued. This was a very noticeable point 
because Moiseev's previous writings dealt with personnel questions and thus he 
was not expected to address military strategic questions. Adding to this 
pronouncement, therefore, his view on the Western threat had a significant 
implication on the future civil-military relations. Moiseev warned that there was no 
change in the aggressive orientation of "imperialist" policy and that in particular the 
US remained intent on equipping its troops with the most modem technologies and 
weapon systems.
In conceptual terms, however, it was approaching the end of the party- 
military relations, although the party politics would continue. An era of genuine 
civil-military relations in the country was about to open with the new setting, the 
Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. As the debate of 
how to restructure the Soviet armed forces in the context of new military doctrine
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ended, concern about the course of internal military restructuring emerged as a 
major theme. This concern came from the recognition that, in a society that was 
becoming more open, the battle for the minds of people would become an 
important factor in civil-military relations. In order to preserve people's faith, there 
should not be shortcomings within the armed forces. In fact, the military leadership 
was conducting a noticeable action in defence of the status of the Soviet armed 
forces in the rapidly changing society. At a party conference held in the Group of 
Soviet Forces in Germany the defence minister devoted virtually the whole of his 
speech to a delineation of shortcomings needed to be overcome.146
Perestroika in its early stage involved a relaxation of Communist Party 
control over many aspects of Soviet life, particularly in the area of economic 
management. At the same time, it was an assault on the entrenched party 
bureaucracy. The new general secretary from the beginning demanded that the 
party reformed itself first. His efforts were boosted by those external societal 
pressures released by perestroika itself. The three years following the January 1987 
plenum saw the greatest and most radical turnover of government and party 
personnel since Stalin. The political system continued to change. The process of 
shifting power from the party to state organs had been nearly completed in May 
1989 when the Congress of People's Deputies convened for its first session. During 
that time, Gorbachev's power appeared to have reached its peak both as the party 
and national leader.
With regard to the party-military relations, the major changes in the party 
structure at the September 1988 plenum of the CC were significant. The existing 
departments of the CC Secretariat were regrouped, or disappeared, and placed 
under the purview of six commissions consisting of CC members plus some 
nonmembers. This prepared the way for transferring executive authority from the 
Secretariat to the commissions at the November 1988 plenum. This movement
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significantly weakened the power of the permanent officials of the central party 
apparatus who were opposed to perestroika and nominally transferred that power 
to the elected Central Committee. As a result, the political status of leading 
conservative figures became doubtful.
Nonetheless, Gorbachev had to wait for some time to solve a paradoxical 
dilemma caused by the unprecedentedly successful turnover of government and 
party personnel. The problem was caused by the relationship between the general 
secretary and the CC, or the dependence of the two, the danger of which was 
shown by Khrushchev’s fate in October 1964. The CC members were elected on 
the basis of the posts they held. Consequently they were normally removed from 
the CC when they were demoted to a lesser job or retired, usually at the Party 
Congress. Under Gorbachev's leadership, although a lot of high-ranking officials 
had been demoted or retired, some of them were still holding the CC memberships. 
Nearly 40% of the voting members of the CC elected in March 1986 had already 
been retired or demoted by July 1989, and the figure was to rise to some 50% by 
the time of the 28th Party Congress. The so-called lame ducks had been a political 
burden to Gorbachev. If anti-Gorbachev forces attempted a sort of coup in the CC, 
many of them would surely support the effort for personal reasons as well as policy 
ones. Thus, Gorbachev had often hinted at his desire for personal changes in the 
CC, but that was unsuccessful until the April 1989 plenum, at which 110 members 
of the CC and the Central Auditing Commission resigned. Moreover, the CC itself 
changed in a surprisingly-reduced number of members with 251 full members.
As a whole, the April 1989 plenum was accepted as a triumph both for 
Gorbachev personally and for his policies.147 Once he held the twin posts of 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet and CPSU General Secretary, it would be 
extremely difficult for his opponents to topple him from power. Even if his party 
colleagues managed to replace him as general secretary, he could not be removed
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from the presidency without a vote of the Congress of People's Deputies.
This success, however, was a very complicated matter, with regard to the 
party-military context. Until the summer of 1988 the party leadership had been 
united by an in-principle consensus on the need for major change. From before and 
after the 19th Party Conference to the April 1989 plenum it appeared to have been 
divided publicly into two blocs on various issues, particularly the status of the 
party. At a widely publicized meeting at the CC, for the first time since the ouster 
of Khrushchev, the top man in the Politburo came under open attack from his 
colleagues such as Ryzhkov, Ligachev, and Zaikov. They urged Gorbachev to 
reinstate the party apparatus in its previous powers and to order a crackdown on 
growing dissent in the country.148
From the outset Gorbachev made clear his intention to gain greater control 
over the defense budget and arms control. For this he deliberately encouraged the 
various foces to participate in a more open and pluralistic debate about Soviet 
security and military policy. This could effectively undercut the military and 
professional authority and political position of the members of the high command 
both within and outside the military establishment and made it possible to end the 
debates on the restructuring of the Soviet armed forces in terms of new military 
doctrine in an impressive way, i.e., through Gorbachev's announcement of the 
unilateral force reductions at the UN in 1988. But it seems unlikely that Gorbachev 
could have foreseen the fundamental challenges inherent in the actual debates that 
took shape. Originally the debate was designed to claim the party's jurisdiction 
over the high command in general and military doctrine in particular. But 
perestroika and glasnost' significantly altered the relationship of the party and 
society and that of the military and society. This made Gorbahcev face a dilemma 
of how to respond to the social pressures from below and to the isolated high 
command simultaneously, when the polarization among the party leadership came
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to the surface. According to Kolkowicz's paradigm on the Soviet party-military 
relations, this polarization could mean that it was time for the military to act 
against the forces challenging its interests with the help of one segment of the party 
leadership which was openly competing against the other. In practice, there 
appeared to have been evidence of some support among conservatives within the 
party apparatus for at least some issues under the parliamentary system, as will be 
seen in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 4. VARIOUS CIVILIAN FORCES’ ADVOCACY OF
MILITARY REFORM
4.1. Setting the New Stage by Savinkin and Vicys and 1989 Elections
In the previous chapter, we established that an era of genuine civil-military 
relations in the USSR was about to begin. Around the fall of 1988, when the 
debates on restructuring of the Soviet armed forces based on 'reasonable 
sufficiency' came to a close, the new round of military reform debates reflecting the 
new Soviet society appeared. Its key idea was the introduction of a mixed 
professional-militia system. The previous debates on the new political thinking 
virtually isolated the grudging senior generals from Soviet society in general and 
from the rank-and-file officers in particular. Meanwhile the activities of the middle 
level of powers publicly supporting restructuring of the armed forces in accordance 
with the new defensive military doctrine undertook a kind of loose coalition. This 
coalition was composed of civilian defense intellectuals, young officers, various 
political associations, and mass media from the MFA's monthly journal 
Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' to reformist ones such as XX Vek i Mir, Ogonek, 
Komsomol'skaya pravda, and the television programme Vzglyad.
The March 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies made it 
possible for the coalition to have a chance to gather momentum. On the one hand, 
the elections allowed them a much-needed independent institutional base. 
Consequently, they were able to influence over the Soviet armed forces on behalf 
of people and society rather than the Communist Party. On the other hand, the 
elections made the high command face directly various sociopolitical and
93
institutional forces and even the public. The latter, or the very election campaigns 
alone, was enough to transform the Party-military relations into the civil-military 
relations. All sorts of grievances related to the military were expressed. Military 
candidates were asked to answer some delicate issues such as principles of service 
and formation. These activities were hardly seen before.
Here it is necessary to review two Lieutenant Colonels' articles focusing on 
the idea of the professional-militia system. Lt Colonel A. Savinkin's article which 
appeared in November 1988 in Moscow News was one of the first proposals for 
military reform in terms of how to man the armed forces. By the time, the main 
stream of the debate on reasonable sufficiency for defense was still unilateral 
reductions in Soviet armed forces. Although Savinkin's' article was short, it was 
enough to touch the essence of the current mood of the civilian defense experts 
and of the political leadership. How to understand the concepts of threat and 
security in the current world situation? Where does the threat to the USSR come 
from? Is it military, political or economic? What does the USSR need to meet this 
threat? And finally, what kinds of forces are necessary? After briefly reviewing 
these questions, he drew a conclusion: the country had to introduce a mixed 
professional-militia system, consisting of "a relatively small, perfectly technically 
equipped, professionally trained and mainly voluntarily staffed military organization 
supported by a broad network of local militia formations."1
A professional-militia system would, he argued, create a democratic military 
structure that would be integrated into society; make it possible to reshape the 
army in accordance with the principles of reasonable sufficiency and defensive 
defense; reduce the military burden; and even remove a potential military threat to 
other countries.2 Although Savinkin's proposal was the most widely covered in the 
media, in fact, it was not the only proposal of its kind. In a roundtable table 
discussion organized by XX Vek i Mir, the concept of a professional army was
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raised. But its necessity was different. It was argued in the panel that only 
professionals would be able to participate in future military operations conducted 
by "sophisticated and technologically advanced... military machines."3 In other 
words, the imperative of modem technology needed the professional army, they 
considered. Major General N. Chaldymov, who made an opening statement in the 
discussion, agreed with this point. The general's disagreements with civilian 
representatives focused on which alternative structure should be adopted. There 
Savinkin praised the virtues of a cadre-militia system as it existed in the country in 
the 1920s.4
In approaching the issue, he now seemed to pay much of his attention to the 
relation between the military and society, rather than to doctrinal, military- 
economic matters. A starting point of his argument was the belief that the strength 
of the armed forces lay in popular support. This was a relatively new element in 
military reform considerations. At the end of 1988, Yazov appeared to be aware of 
the fact in practical terms. Referring to the social, ethnic problems that could have 
negative impact on the military's public image and social status, he stated that it 
was necessary to do everything to strengthen the faith that Soviet people had in the 
armed forces.5 The Soviet armed forces were being dislocated, according to 
Savinkin, by the influence of war in Afghanistan, the slower pace of perestroika in 
the military, the political alienation of the armed forces from the people, the lack of 
information in Soviet society about defense policy and life in the armed forces, and 
so on. In this context the colonel treated military reform as an urgent matter. So, if 
the idea was adopted, it would enjoy closer ties to and greater respect from the 
people because it had the nature of a people's army, Savinkin stated.
Lt. Colonel Z. Vicys, a Lithuanian military engineer serving in Vilnius, also 
became a pioneering figure in the debate on the professional-militia system. 
Whereas Savinkin focused on the professional army, Vicys did on the militia
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system or territorial formations. Focusing on internal military relations such as 
nonregulation behaviour, he argued that the creation of national formations would 
raise responsibility for service, would further the inculcation of patriotic feelings, 
and would be a genuine school of internationalism.6 His article was published in a 
local paper Sovetskaya Latvia in January 1989 and Komsomolskaya pravda 
(Lithuania) in February. Ironically, strong, quick, and monotonous critiques of the 
idea by the high command, which were published in Krasnaya zvezda7, made it a 
nationwide issue.
Territorial units were criticized as inimical to the introduction of modern 
military technology, which, the above academicians argued, demanded a 
professional army. In particular, Yazov argued that the territorial units would 
disrupt the chain of command and that in the event of an attack on the country they 
would tend to stay within their own republic borders rather than joining in the 
general repulse of the enemy.8 A military theoretician, Lt General of Aviation V. 
Serebryannikov, also contended that the territorial-militia formations were notably 
inferior to the current cadre system in preparedness, coordination, and in the 
military and technical training of personnel. 9
In the meanwhile, the MFA indirectly involved in the debates by sanctioning 
the publication of reserve Colonel G. Alimurzayev's article in its journal 
International Affairs. The colonel also strongly supported the combination of a 
small cadre and militia system that offered the only opportunity to avoid immense 
military expenditures and provide military training to the masses.10 During WWII's 
initial phase, the regular army, he wrote, suffered tremendous losses and allowed 
the aggressor to reach the gates of Moscow.
The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, in which eighty two 
military officer deputies were elected, had a number of implications for the military 
reform movements. One hundred and twenty one military personnel ran in the first
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election with seventy six elected and six more gaining seats after a run-off.11 They 
comprised 3.6% of the deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies but only 
1.6% of the Supreme Soviet in comparison with 3.7% of the previous Supreme 
Soviet elected in 1984. The drop in proportion appeared to be meaningful because 
first of all the new Supreme Soviet was to function differently. The previous 
Supreme Soviet met for four or five days a year and voted unanimously on bills 
thus hardly had a chance to check the government. It made sense to have symbolic 
representation: a certain quota of workers, peasants, factory managers, military 
officers, party secretaries, and so forth. Now the legislature was to become a more 
meaningful body and thus needed more capable people.
In turn, more progressive and capable people, including 'dissident' junior and 
middle level officers, wanted to go there. Although many high military 
commanders were protected by one-candidate elections, some were forced to run 
in competitive races. Most of them won easy victories.12 Of significance among the 
losers were Colonel General Yu. A. Yashin, Deputy Minister of Defense; Army 
General B. V. Snetkov, CINC of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; Colonel 
General A. V. Betekhtin, First Deputy Chief of the Ground Forces; Admiral K. V. 
Makarov, Chief of the Main Naval Staff; the commanders of the Northern, Pacific, 
and Black Sea Fleets; and the commanders of the Leningrad, Volga, and Far 
Eastern Military Districts.
We must consider why they lost and to whom. One can say that the voters 
simply rejected them because they were conservatives, but this is only partly 
correct. It should also be noted that there were some mistakes in particular in their 
strategy connected with a delicate situation. If a district elects a high official who 
does not intend to give up his post, the district gives up the possibility of being 
represented in the more important Supreme Soviet. This situation may have caused 
the defeat of some commanders. For example, the commander of the Far Eastern
97
MD ran against a local social scientist and a Nanai by nationality, who was 
concerned with problems of the peoples of the North.
Whatever one's views about the party or the military, the commander would 
clearly have been too busy to do much of value in the Congress of People's 
Deputies, and he could never be elected to the Supreme Soviet. His opponent, 
academician E. Gayer, on the other hand, could be elected to the Supreme Soviet 
and have an impact on a question that was poorly handled in the Soviet Union. A 
person totally loyal to the system should have voted for her unless she had shown 
anti-party views herself. She was, in fact, elected. She was a candidate for deputy 
chairmanship of the Council of Nationalities and spoke out for the rights of peoples 
of the North.13 Many Westerners less cautiously concluded that the defeat of the 
Far East commander was a repudiation of the regime.
A rather awkward case occurred in other places. In a district in Ivanovo 
Oblast, for example, the commander of the Leningrad MD competed against a 
'dissident' Lt. Colonel, and lost in spite of Zaikov's allowance for standing up there. 
Therefore, the composition of officer deputies appeared to be a real blow to the 
high command. As a whole, officer deputies' backgrounds were complex in terms 
of rank and differences which were apparent in their policy positions and the 
degree of their political activism. Almost half of them were junior officers from the 
rank of colonel down. As the Soviet political situation became gradually 
radicalized, the officer deputies also split into reformists and conservatives and 
joined parliamentary groups and party clubs according to their political 
convictions. Some of the more active deputies had formed a new group to promote 
their own views. As covered later in detail, the noticeable number of young officer 
deputies even became so-called "young Turks," and joined the "Interregional 
Group of Deputies." Lieutenant N. Tutov became even a cofounder of the Social 
Democratic Party so that he was expelled from the CPSU. On the other hand, Lt
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Colonel (later Colonel) V. Alksnis and Colonel N. Petrushenko were prominent 
among young officers deputies at the conservative pole. They were called the 
"black colonels." Alksnis was instrumental in forming "Soyuz," the conservative 
parliamentary group. The group, together with "Rossiya," advocated a centralized 
Soviet state and a strong army and KGB. Although there was an attempt to unify 
them at a meeting in October, 1989, it had failed to do so because of the so strong 
differences of opinion among them.14
4.2. Impressive Opening of The Congress of People’s Deputies and The 
Supreme Soviet and Military Reform Debates
When the Congress of People's Deputies, the so-called supreme body of state 
authority in the USSR, was established, it was expected not to make any important 
decisions, for the simple reason that its structure and composition were not fit for 
it. The congress was like a rally or a debating club whose purpose was to discuss 
numerous problems. A body consisting of 2,250 members cannot make any 
responsible decisions in principle, especially if they require thorough preparations 
and detailed discussion. Nevertheless, this nature of the Congress of People's 
Deputies, not to mention the Supreme Soviet, was in many ways more dramatic 
than the election itself. In short, in the case of the Congress, a debating club was 
alone enough to raise public attention, initially because the proceedings of the 
Congress were covered on live television.
When the Tbilisi events were being discussed, 92% of people of the Georgian 
capital Tbilisi watched Soviet national television.15 At the session the commander 
of the Transcaucasian MD and People's Deputy Colonel General I. Rodionov, who 
had been in charge of troops that suppressed a demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 
1989, blamed the leaders of local informal groups for the deaths, while claiming
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that he only followed orders.16 The general said that the MVD troops had been 
responsible for clearing the square where the deaths occurred, and the army could 
not be blamed. He also said that it was the MVD troops who had used the teargas, 
and that regular troops were not issued with it. On the other hand, former 
Georgian first secretary D. Patiashvili, who had been known to order Rodionov to 
use troops against the demonstrators, named generals directly involved in the 
action. E. Shevardnadze stated, for example, that the decision to use troops had 
been taken by the Georgian republican leadership against the advice of Rodionov.17 
Against this kind of assertions, the Georgian first secretary stated that the day 
before the incidents he was visited by Rodionov and deputy defense minister K. 
Kochetov. But he refused to say who gave the order first. Besides, a number of 
delegates treated the incidents as a deliberate provocation, presumably aimed at 
overturning Gorbachev's policy, while others poured scorn on the notion that 
Moscow was not involved in what happened there.18 In the end, the Congress of 
People's Deputies made a decision to set up a commission to review the 
circumstances.
As planned, at its second session, the Congress of People's Deputies had a 
chance to hear presentation of a commission responsible for investigating the 
Tbilisi incidents. In short, its chairman A. Sobchak said that serious errors had been 
made both by the former Georgian leadership and by the military and party 
leadership at all levels of the Union. The main point was that they should have not 
decided to use the army against the demonstrations. On the other hand, chief of 
USSR Military Prosecutor A. Katusev claimed that the Georgian themselves were 
responsible for the death of their compatriots and that the actions taken against 
them by the troops were entirely justified. Katusev's speech caused the exit from 
the session of almost the entire Georgian contingent, followed by a massive walk­
out of over 200 progressive deputies from other parts of the Soviet Union,
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including A. Yakovlev. After Gorbachev's cool but compromising speech, the 
Congress of People's Deputies adopted a resolution condemning the use of 
violence against the demonstrators. Thus, the military leadership got the clear 
message with regard to the domestic function of the armed forces. In soon, 
Rodionov was transferred to head of the Voroshilov Military Academy of the 
General Staff in Moscow.
Meanwhile, the top leaders in the Politburo were also involved in political 
conflicts. It was revealed that at the meeting of the Central Committee chaired by 
Ligachev, defense minister Yazov was ordered to send troops to Tbilisi, while 
Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and so on, were abroad, i.e., in London. In 
general, radical deputies questioned whether the party organ had power by law to 
give orders to the armed forces. But it was a more serious question to ask who 
was directly responsible for it. In the end, the then chief of the KGB Chebrikov 
was believed to have been dropped from the Politburo because of his involvement 
in the event.19 Nevertheless, Ligachev was continuously criticized. R. Medvedev 
and Petrushenko suggested that the Tbilisi incident was a provocation by Ligachev 
against Gorbachev and his policies at the first session of the Congress of People's 
Deputies.20 Gorbachev sent Shevardnadze in November 1988 and Yakovlev in 
February 1989 to appease the Georgians.21 In addition, Shevardnadze, Georgian by 
birth, had threatened to resign because he regarded the public exposure of the 
affairs to be inadequate. He also engaged in a verbal battle in public with Ligachev, 
who argued that the decision to send troops to Tbilisi was confirmed by the whole 
party leadership, including Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev. 
Shevardnadze responded by saying that there had been no Politburo meeting, just a 
meeting at the airport on Gorbachev's return from abroad on 7 April. Gorbachev's 
instructions at that meeting were that matters should be resolved by political 
methods, Shevardnadze said.22
101
Since the Tbilisi affairs, the involvement of the armed forces in domestic 
policing operations became a new issue of the military reform movement. In 
principle, the military leadership portrayed internal policing functions as 
dishonourable missions. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev, for example, argued 
that the policing functions could detract from the dignity and high esteem of the 
armed forces and hurt their ability to fulfil their principal task of guaranteeing the 
security of the homeland.23 CINC of the Warsaw Pact Forces, General Lushev saw 
the function as "unconstitutional" and therefore, he stated, it had an extremely 
negative effect on their combat readiness.24 Major General M. Surkov, a political 
officer and chief of the political department of the garrison in the capital of 
Armenia, Yerevan, also sided with this position.25
On the other hand, CINC of the Ground Forces Army General V. 
Varennikov held a different position. Not only did he deny the armed forces' 
responsibility for the Tbilisi events but also he argued that the troops sent there had 
acted properly. In practical terms, the general questioned the capability of the KGB 
and MVD troops to cope with nationality conflicts and he did not deny the use of 
armed forces in a policing function. But he considered it only as a final, reliable 
means. In this context, the general raised the importance of proper equipment and 
training for that function.26
The proceedings of the Supreme Soviet were also dramatic because, from its 
beginning, the issues of defense budget and personnel changes were addressed. 
They had been delicate tasks for the political leadership, including Gorbachev, to 
tackle. The Supreme Soviet hearings brought into the open the details of the 
defense budget for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, 
who had already announced in January 1989 that 14.2% was to be cut from the 
military budget overall, with a 19.5% drop in procurement and a 12% fall in troop 
strength, made it public that the 1989 defense budget was 77.3 billion rubles. This
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estimation could not really be completely accurate. No reliable estimate would be 
possible until the country switched over to free market prices. In other words, the 
amount of military spending depended on the prices in terms of which it was 
calculated. Simply it appeared that prices for Soviet-made weapons were artificially 
kept several times lower, as will be seen. Nevertheless, it was at a time when the 
Soviet people, who had expressed dissatisfaction with the slow tempo of 
perestroika, were watching the television. This politically well-calculated revelation 
was enough to create popular support for a reduction of military spending in 
particular and for the new direction of military policy as a whole. Thus, the year of 
1989 saw public debates about whether the defense budget be reduced or not.
The debates over the actual size of the military budget of the past and present 
moment became as interesting as were the debates over how much it should be in 
the future. It was guessed in the West that the Soviet defense budget might be 
around 20 billion rubles in the mid-1980s. Needless to say, nobody accepted the 
figure as being near accurate. But the Soviets had not been allowed to dispute the 
military spending in public until glasnost' came. Around Gorbachev's disclosure, 
the intelligentsia were cautiously making the military budget a political issue, as 
they had done just before Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions in 
Soviet armed forces.
In February 1989 academician V. Goldanskiy, for example, in an interview 
with Izvestiya called the Soviet defense budget figures "simply ridiculous." He 
went on to state that Western estimates that were much higher than Soviet's official 
figures were much closer to the truth.27 In a similar fashion, A. Kireyev, an 
economist and aspiring specialist on defense affairs, wrote in Ogonek that "no one 
in the world ever took seriously the 20.2 billion ruble defense-budget figure.28 
Finally, B. Rayzberg, doctor of economic sciences, even suggested an estimated 
volume of the defense budget. Taking into account the costs of the Army's upkeep,
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operational costs, scientific research, and so on, he claimed that "our own military 
expenditure is far more in excess of 100 billion rubles a year."29
Gorbachev's announcement made the military leadership clarify the figure 
77.3 billion rubles, because this figure was still viewed with scepticism. Army 
General Moiseev, for example, claimed that "all expenditures are included in the 
announced figures," giving an example of difference in prices between the Soviet 
Union and the US. He said at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, 
together with Admiral W. Crowe, that a modem Soviet Su-25 aircraft cost 5.8 
million rubles, whereas an F-16 cost 28 million dollars and that, thus "77.8 billion 
rubles is in fact our entire defense budget."30
In return, A. Nazarenko, USSR People's Deputy and chief engineer at the 
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, responded to Moiseev's claim in a provoking way. 
Simply, he argued that the real figure for defense was apparently higher the 
announced one by saying that a number of civilian ministries should be attributed to 
the defense industry and others. He said in jest that the country spent only about 
30-40 billions dollars based on the devalued ruble, if one ruble were really worth 
20 cents. Once Moiseev had argued that in terms of both absolute and relative 
value of roubles the US military budget was incomparably larger than the USSR 
military budget in relation to the USSR and US state budgets.31 Now keeping in 
mind Moiseev's arguments, Nazarenko asked how, with parity in the primary types 
of strategic weapons, with the same number of armies, and with equal numbers of 
conventional weapons, the country had managed to spend 10-15 times less than the 
Americans, under conditions of lower labour productivity?32
A televison interview in whcih A. Kireyev openly argued with Marshal 
Akhromeev deserves considerable attention. Kireyev plainly declared that "we have 
become choked by military expenditure."33 Pegging the Soviet defense budget at 9 
percent of the country's GNP, Kireyev said that no developed capitalist country
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spent so much. Returning to the announced military budget of 77.3 billion rubles, 
he claimed that it raised more questions than it answered. In response to this 
complaint, Akhromeev interrupted the proceedings and gave Kireyev a sheet of 
paper denoting military expenditures since 1976, while asking him to study it for 
the time being. Nevertheless, Kireyev continuously challenged the figure by saying 
that "many items are simply not here."34 Later in his article in New Times, Kireyev 
went on to assert this: the Soviet defense budget did not include all the items 
included in the US budget: and it was divided into several large sections but it was 
impossible to find out which spendings were included in each section and which 
were probably left out. He suggested, for example, that there was no information 
about the amount of money allocated to strategic forces and the amount of 
spending on civil defense programmes seemed unrealistic.35
Meanwhile, the debates over what military budget level be sufficient became 
vital. The political leadership had never suggested an absolute figures. Only some 
time later, in early 1990, Gorbachev made it clear that the current budget was "far 
too high." Nearly four years ago he said the current budget was "adequate." While 
avoiding the arguable total volume of the defense budget, Gorbachev stated that 
"we have, after all, been spending almost 18-20 percent of our national revenue on 
military purposes. This does not happen in any other state..."36
With regard to another interesting issue, the personnel change, defense 
minister Yazov was subjected to severe criticism amid the confirmation of cabinet, 
the first order of business for the Supreme Soviet. Yazov was perceived to be a 
reform-minded 'young' general when he replaced Marshal S. Sokolov in the 
aftermath of the Rust affair in May 1987. Until then he had written a series of 
articles about corruption in the military, discipline, and the military's internal 
performance. Without any doubts, the Soviet people expected him to introduce 
perestroika into the armed forces. Krasnaya zvezda lauded Yazov as a model
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commander.37 Within two years since then, at the Soviet parliament Yazov was 
relentlessly accused of lacking the vision to oversee the restructuring of the armed 
forces. In other words, he was charged with being a representative of the old guard 
and with harbouring traditional thinking in his approach to military problems. 
Notably, the characteristics of those who criticised him were important. A young 
officer deputy, Lieutenant N. Tutov, called for his removal in favour of younger 
and more dynamic leaders such as Moiseev and Gromov, while saying that "Yazov 
has no real conception of perestroika in the armed forces."38 In short, they held 
Yazov personally responsible for the many problems that had emerged in the armed 
forces over the decades as well as for those that persisted at that time. Although 
the chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security of the Supreme 
Soviet, V. Lapygin, and Akhromeev were outspoken in their defense of Yazov's 
candidacy, the majority of deputies were about to vote against him. In defense of 
Yazov, Gorbachev well grasped the point. Because overall military strategy 
emanated from the Defense Council as a whole, he argued, the defense minister 
should not be accused of a lack of vision on the issue of military reform. In fact, 
Akhromeev also tried to make the role of the defense minister clear, by saying that 
Yazov was fully capable of maintaining the armed forces' peacetime readiness at a 
proper level.39
It may be rather useful to review that institutional stubbornness on various 
aspects of military restructuring and internal reform, not to mention the unilateral 
reductions, which still existed around this time. Most authoritatively, Akhromeev 
gave such evidence. The then chief of the General Staff, in a speech at a meeting of 
the General Staff party aktiv in August 1988, sharply criticized the slow pace of 
implementation of military perestroika. With regard to the new military doctrine, 
Akhromeev charged that "certain commanders and staffs have not fully grasped the 
demands of the defensive strategy and operational art," and he accused the military
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establishment of blocking plans to increase democratization and personal 
responsibility."40
Again, just before his resignation, he stressed that the new thinking was not 
penetrating army and navy life easily-the outdated, stereotype cliches were still 
exerting their influence.41 As a whole, his criticism confirmed Daniel Goure's 
judgement that the Soviet military tended to divide between "modernists" and 
"conservatives."42 Major General I. Lebedev, being categorized as the 
conservatives by Goure, for example, in an article in Kommunist declared that the 
potential to change military doctrines and force postures "unilaterally" was limited, 
whilst attacking civilian defence intellectuals as being "unqualified amateurs."43 It is 
interesting that Goure considered as "modernists" Marshal Ogarkov, Akhromeev, 
some defense industry leaders, and most of the new military leadership, including 
Yazov and, probably, Moiseev. However, for the Soviet citizens, including radical 
deputies, they were just conservatives. It is likely that the modernists also gradually 
became the conservatives. As far as glasnost' was concerned, most of the members 
of the high command, including Yazov, were critical.
Yazov's confirmation process suggested a lot. First and foremost, the defense 
minister could have been changed so effortlessly not by the party leadership but by 
the Supreme Soviet. It was unthinkable in the past. If so, the fact that in the future 
the defense minister was to face this confirmation process again and again might 
increase military accountability to civilian authorities. Yazov himself hinted at this 
point by praising the deputies. He said in an interview with Pravda, for example, 
that the Congress of People's Deputies was an "event of major significance in the 
history of revolutionary restructuring, of all-round renewal of Soviet society."44 
Then he linked the Congress to its influence on military policy. In this connection, 
an interesting question came forth: the conflictive relationship between minister of 
defense and chief of the General Staff, who was relatively free from political
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accountability. There were even some speculations.45
Meanwhile, the Supreme Soviet was continuing to show its influence over 
the high command. Against the will of the military establishment, it passed a decree 
in July 1989 ordering the deactivation of some 176,000 former students from 
active military service. It meant a symbolic victory of the new-born legislative body 
and civilian as a whole over the so stubborn military establishment. Regulations on 
deferments and terms of service for students in higher education had changed along 
with the number of draft-aged males. The latest version of the universal military 
service law limited college deferments to students in institutions approved by the 
Council of Ministers. The new provision was applied to certain universities and 
institutes in April 1982,46 and later, in October 1984, was even extended to 
Moscow University because of the continued decline of the size of the draft pool.
This implementation caused resentment not only among students but also 
among the intelligentsia. In May 1987 at a roundtable discussion organized by 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, academicians argued, for example, that the current draft 
policy had led to the destruction of students' intellectual flexibility.47 They 
proposed exempting talented students from military service on the grounds that the 
economy and the society itself needed physicists, biologists, etc. more than 
soldiers. This insistence drew a very critical response from a number of military 
representatives, including Colonel General M. A. Gareev, deputy chief of the 
General Staff, who refuted this argument in the same journal.48 Concerning another 
issue, students' military training in the frame work of the military department of 
their university or institute, which occupied 18-20 percent of study time,49 the 
military authorities wanted the training of officers there to continue. According to 
I. Ergashev, a deputy head of the military department of a Riga Institute, it was 
cheaper than conducting officers' courses in special military schools.50
In the meanwhile, Gorbachev opened further discussions on the issue without
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any concrete recommendations. In his address to a Komsomol meeting, for 
example, he noted that the students' draft should be "looked into," and the length 
of military service "could be changed."51 Hardly surprisingly, around the end of 
1988 various anti-military protests became evident in the whole Soviet society, in 
particular, on college campuses all over the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's 1988 UN 
announcement of unilateral troop reductions was also meaningful for the "quick" 
implementation of the July 11 decree. On the one hand, it provided a further spur 
to students dissatisfaction with military obligations, on the other hand, it gave a 
definite time-limit to the military establishment. Students seemed, therefore, likely 
beneficiaries of a reduction in the Soviet armed forces along the implementation of 
Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions.
One of the main criticisms of military spokesmen against the Supreme Soviet 
was that it was "hasty" in practical terms. In fact, the decree of July 11 was 
proposed by Ryzhkov and accepted during one or two minutes without a 
discussion. Moreover, the Soviet parliament forced the military establishment to 
demobilize the students from August to September. The results of hasty 
implementation of the decree were very serious for the army to such an extent that, 
according to Yazov, in the Western Group of Forces in Germany alone more than 
6,680 tanks and 1,070 artillery systems would be left crewless. In the rocket 
forces, two shifts instead of three would be performing combat alert duty. Nearly 
40 percent of posts for section commanders in military construction units would 
remain unfilled.52
Yazov noted that the extension of deferments rights for students had resulted 
in a situation where only one-third of all young people were now eligible for active 
military service."53 This general de-emphasis of military obligations had contributed 
to an increase in the number of young people avoiding military service, Yazov 
contended, while claiming that "last year a quarter of those eligible for induction in
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Moscow had failed to report to local military commissariats on the appointed 
day."54 On the other hand, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lt General G. 
Krivosheyev emotionally criticized the decision. The general insisted that so-called 
Soviet elite groups, i.e., deputies, freed themselves and their children from military 
service. These changes in draft and service regulations were a socially "unjust" 
violation of the spirit of universal military service,55 he stated. Now a bone of 
contention between the military and the intelligentsia disappeared. But the generals 
felt bitterness, not merely because military service disrupted higher education, but 
because the military resented the notion that army life was in some sense 
antithetical to science and culture, and also because the relative importance to the 
country of military power and of science. Moreover, considering the fact that the 
new draft regulations would result in the armed forces manned predominantly by 
young men with less educated working-class backgrounds, the political 
ramifications of this change were no less significant.
4.3. The Committee of Defense and State Security and Its Control over The 
Military
When the first session of the Supreme Soviet was opened, the idea of 
introducing some measures of public control over the armed forces and, in 
particular, over the KGB, was very much in the air. The creation itself of the 
Committee of Defense and State Security represented the mood of ordinary 
people, not to mention the political leadership. With regard to the public control 
over the military, Lambeth argued that "the formation of the committee was a 
direct outgrowth of earlier advocacy by Shevardnadze and others for an end to the 
military's monopoly on defense information and its replacement with a system of
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public accountability and legislative oversights."56
Whatever the background of its creation, the Committee became a central 
part of the broader challenge that the Supreme Soviet was beginning to present to 
traditional Soviet authority, that is, the Communist Party's partocracy. The real 
matter was what and how to control. For the time being, statements of V. Lapygin, 
head of the Committee, were suggestive of them. Far from people's demand, 
however, he more narrowly defined its sphere, mainly "the combat readiness" of 
the armed forces. He considered the combat readiness of the armed forces as their 
principal and most important function. Naturally, the Committee was to bear 
responsibility for it.57 The control over implementation of the new military doctrine 
by the military establishment was also a job for the Committee. He said in a 
television interview that the Committee would examine "very important 
programmes" for the development of the Army and Navy and the branches and 
categories of troops with due regard to military doctrine and their reasonable and 
reliable sufficiency. Lapygin's deputy, Colonel of the Air Force V. Ochirov showed 
some kind of political ambition, by asserting that "Yazov is going to have to appear 
before our committee to defend his arguments about why a particular programme 
is necessary for defense."58 But it was noteworthy that what Lapygin intended to 
do was "to ensure strategic stability," because the background of the concept 
strategic stability was different from the current popular advocacy of the military 
reform movement. As far as strategic nuclear weapons, civilian academicians 
focused on "minimum level of deterrence" or nuclear free world, whereas members 
of the high command argued for "strategic parity." In addition, he revealed that 
the Committee would analyze how the "demands connected with enhancing quality 
parameters" in military building were being realized.59
Another significant reference to the function of the Committee was made by 
Primakov, the newly elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet's upper chamber. He
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demanded the Committee to do more than what Lapygin considered. Lapygin was 
asked to bring defense outlays down to a level of reasonable sufficiency so that the 
rest can be used chiefly for the development of the civilian sectors."60 In view of 
the serious economic problems confronting the country, for Primakov it was not 
unexpected that budgetary issues were central to its new tasks. Social aspects of 
the defense budget, however, became his number one priority around the fall of 
1989. Lapygin said that the social position of servicemen were in a critical 
condition, and thus 1.2 billion rubles were diverted from other defense programmes 
to improve their pay and living conditions.61
With regard to the question of how to exercise control over the activity of 
the armed forces, Lapygin described the hearings of defense minister and his 
deputies, the setting up a system of non-military departmental experts, and the use 
of information supplied by public organizations, the press, and ordinary citizens as 
such measures.62 A series of these schemes appeared to be close to the concept 
"accountable" to the Soviets of People's Deputies, as stated in the Constitution, 
although every detail of the control mechanism was not elaborated, yet.
But the Committee for Defense and State Security ended its existence in the 
aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup. In fact, the nature and extent of staffing 
and operations of the Committee were still being clarified. In other words, during 
this period, it had never taken any initiative as far as restructuring the armed forces 
or military reform. Rather it had wound up itself. As Soviet society moved towards 
a rule by law, a lot of laws were naturally needed. The Committee just discussed, 
rather than produced, the concept of military reform and draft laws on defense, on 
the organs of state security, on the status of military servicemen, and on the 
performance of military service. Of course, there could be some excuses. The 
USSR Council of Ministers, or an other body with the right of legislative initiative, 
had to submit to the Supreme Soviet Presidium, as far as above draft documents
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were concerned. Only then the Committee could officially begin to examine them.
But there were some exceptions. When Gorbachev's unilateral reduction 
announcement was to be implemented in promised time, for example, members of 
the Committee were "in a great hurry" with the law on servicemen's pension 
provision. A number of officers who had not reached the age limit were forced to 
retire. In order to get them pensioned off, a new law that could cover the early 
retired personnel had to be adopted. And when servicemen were under attack 
especially in non-Russian republics, the Committee urged the ministry of defense 
and President to adopt some measures. In response, President Gorbachev soon 
issued a decree strengthening the social and legal protection of servicemen.63
The most noticeable was the Committee's swing to the right around the fall 
of 1990, when a concerted defense-industry lobby of conservative orientation was 
beginning to consolidate under the marketization. The defense-industry's lobby was 
well presented by two letters. The one was a letter with the signatures of 46 
general directors and general designers of organizations under the eight ministries 
of the defense complex addressed to the Supreme Soviet.64 The other was the so- 
called 'letter of the 53' addressed to Gorbachev, who was urged to use his 
presidential powers to the full to restore stability and discipline, if necessary by 
resort to states of emergency in regions of conflict.65 Amid of the climate of 
conservatism, the Committee for Defense and State Security warned Gorbachev 
that under the marketization the defense industry's destabilization had reached a 
dangerous level. Incidentally, Akhromeev told parliament at that time that the 
proposed programme for transition to the market might cause an irrevocable 
damage to the Soviet Union's defense capability."66 On the other hand, People's 
Deputy Major Lopatin claimed that "the conversion of the defense industry affects 
only 3% of the military-industrial complex, while the level of production is to be 
maintained for an indefinite period."67 Gorbachev, whilst recognizing the
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difficulties of the conversion, evaluated the Committee's warning as "nonsense." In 
addition, he criticized them in a political sense by saying "I believe that somebody 
wants to play on the sacred feelings of the people."68
Not surprisingly, the Committee was not so active at a "heated" debate over 
the 1991 military budget. It appeared that most of the members of the Committee 
were interested in determining the optimum size of military expenditure, not in 
cutting it, although the committee chairman Sharin insisted that the Committee had 
managed to change the "consumerist attitude" of the ministry of defense and the 
ministries of the defense industry sectors toward budget formation. At its best, the 
Committee succeeded in publishing all figures of military spending "in detail" in 
Sharin's term."69 Probably, in order to legitimize the current size of defense budget, 
they focused on the fact that neither the US nor the Nato countries were to reduce 
their armed forces for 1991 and, on the contrary, they were to improve them 
qualitatively.70 Final formulas for the defense expenditure for the year of 1991 
amounted to a reduction of two billion rubles compared to what was originally 
proposed by the Ministry of Finance and the government.
Subsequently, O. Baklanov, the CC Secretary for defense matters, 
rationalized this figure by comparing it to that of the US. In the USSR, expenditure 
on defense in 1990 was 7.2% of GNP and in the US it was 5.4%, he suggested. 
The reason why the USSR had a "somewhat higher" proportion of expenditure on 
defense could be understood, he explained, when one saw the fact that the USSR's 
GNP was several times less than the American.71
In sum, the activities of the Committee appeared to have been passive and 
controlled by the military-industrial complex, rather than controlling it, and thus 
dragged its heels over the issue of military reform. This could hardly be excused by 
the fact that the Soviet had never had such a committee before or by the argument 
that the committee was on the process of gaining access to the 'holy of holies' of
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executive power, that is, the military, or the triad of the party, military, and defense 
industry, for the first time.
There were some definite reasons why it was not functional. One can argue 
that the Constitution of the USSR was a fundamental problem because it failed to 
grant the Supreme Soviet the authority to determine basic measures in the area of 
defense and state security. Or, there was no established means for effectively 
implementing its decisions. Inevitably, the Committee was, from the beginning, 
destined to carry out only an "advise and consent" role.
The more decisive factor appeared to be the "tame" characteristic, coming 
from the composition of the Committee. Of the thirty-eight members of the 
Committee seven were military men, nineteen represented enterprises of the 
defense industry, two represented the KGB and five were secretaries of regional 
Party committees.72 Thus, it was a typical case of interested people controlling 
themselves. When Lapygin was asked about this, he said, "Why then should we 
rely on amateurs in defensive affairs, which are very specific?... The Committee 
had been selected on the basis of competence."73 First deputy chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet A. Luk'yanov, who had proposed Lapygin to the post, also 
showed the same attitude and turned down an alternative suggestion of how to use 
expertise of military and defense complex representatives.74 It was suggested that 
the Committee should consist of civilians, while military and defense industry 
representatives should be called upon for their expertise only when the need arose.
It would take years for civilians to know the problems and peculiarities 
involved, if they were selected, Lapygin further explained. Moreover, he 
emphasized that it might be necessary to take concrete decisions "now," or "very 
soon," in spite of the fact that the Committee was constitutionally not designed to 
make any decisions, as mentioned before. This argument was also inconsistent with 
the fact that he tried to pack its membership with officials from the military-
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industrial sector rather than liberal uniformed deputies.75
It should have been needless or harmful to try to break through a structural 
constraint, coming from the administrative-command economic system, which 
could prevent committee members from access of information about defence 
spending and other matters. Although, its head once commented that there were 
"too many unjustified secrets and secrecy,”76 this was probably aimed at the more 
rather than the fewer. Moreover, some of its sessions were held behind closed 
doors. As soon as the Committee got to work, a reformist deputy G. Sturua 
complained on that point.77 There might be nothing for a couple of the selected 
liberal officer deputies to do in the committee.78 Therefore, the power of public 
debates hardly reached there.
4.4. Young Officer Deputies and Military Reform Movement
By the spring of 1990, when the Committee for Defense and State Security 
was still failing to do anything productive, a group of young officer deputies 
became a powerful centre, as far as military reform was concerned. Seventeen 
reform-minded young military deputies, originally six, led by Major V. Lopatin, 
had secretly prepared a draff programme of radical military reform and submitted it 
to the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989. 
Afterwards, under the name of "project of the seventeen" part of the programme 
was made public in February 1990.79 Whatever its contents were, the event was 
remarkable in that, for the first time in Soviet history and at a time when the high 
command still showed lack of enthusiasm for a radical restructuring of the armed 
forces, the armed forces' problems were outlined by them outside the military
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establishment, i.e., in the Soviet parliament.
Certainly, it was difficult for them to prepare the draft secretly, but it was 
more difficult to distribute the prepared document among deputies at the Congress 
of People's Deputies, not to mention the Committee for Defense and State Security 
of the Supreme Soviet. Other conservative officer deputies mainly composed of 
commanders of military districts and senior generals of the ministry of defense 
asserted that the armed forces' problems should be tackled within established 
structures. According to Major E. Erokhin, one of the seventeen deputies, after the 
draft proposal was submitted to the secretariat of the Congress, it had never been 
officially circulated and simply disappeared. Instead, the authors were told by the 
secretariat that the document was being studied and that a recommendation had 
been made.80 In such a situation, Colonel A. Tsalko frequently negotiated with the 
secretariat and consulted with high ranking officials, including chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Gorbachev and 
Ryzhkov, respectively. Later, but in a compromised way, they were allowed to 
send the project to the Committee on Defense and State Security and a working 
group given a task of the elaboration of the Law on Defense, i.e., the General 
Staff. In November its full draft was released to the mass media, together with the 
MOD draff (USSR Ministry of Defense Draft: Military Reform Concept).81
The Lopatin draft first touched the reasons why the military reform was 
needed: positive improvements in the world; a significant reduction in the level of 
military threat; the priority of nonviolent means for ensuring international and 
domestic security; and revolutionary perestroika in the country.82 Through this, 
the officer deputies positively confirmed Gorbachev's new security policy and 
perestroika in the country. This verdict appeared to be declaratory with lack of 
authoritative analysis. Nevertheless, it is significant that the draft called for the 
transformation of defense and of the armed forces to be in accordance with the
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country’s "real needs" and "economic potential". Up to then the concept 'defense 
needs' had been a centre of the debates on defense issues, while 'economic 
potential' had been hardly considered.
With regard to defense needs, there was no clear analysis on the threat to the 
USSR apart from the mention of a phrase "a significant reduction in the level of 
military threat." Subsequently, it was stressed that the armed forces be brought into 
line with the level of "real military danger." Comparatively, the MOD draft 
assigned a lot of space to evaluating the threat to the USSR. The military 
leadership was yet repeating their cautious assessment of the international 
situation. The central tenet of their arguments was that "international tensions have 
abated, changes in the direction of peace are still not irreversible."83 Focusing on 
perestroika and its implication for the military, the Lopatin draft raised a 
fundamental question about who should decide and implement defense policy as 
well as military reform. If we follow this questioning, the action of evaluating the 
danger of war and the level of a military threat was not a matter of officer deputies 
as well as the MOD but that of "a community of sovereign states," in Lopatin's 
term.
In a challenging way to the authority of the military leadership, the Lopatin 
draft said that because of structural transformations in the state and society, there 
was neither precise legal regulation nor an effective state mechanism for formation 
and implementation of military policy, for organizational development and 
employment of the armed forces, and for control over them on the part of the 
USSR legislative and executive agencies and of society. Afterwards, the absence 
was very neatly linked to the centre versus periphery relations that could touch, at 
the level of analysis, the broad issues such as economic reform, conversions, and so 
on, including military affairs.
Based on the belief that the transition of the union republics to real
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sovereignty demanded fundamentally new approaches to military organizational 
development, they introduced a concept "supreme bodies of legislative power of 
the community of sovereign states"84 that would determine the priority in choice of 
defensive measures. This concept certainly denied the current constitutional 
authority of the existing institutions such as the Congress of People's Deputies, the 
Supreme Soviet, and the President. Proceeding from this, the Lopatin draft 
suggested a series of subconcepts such as a military-political alliance of sovereign 
states, coalition command and control entities, and an [administrative] institution 
of representatives of sovereign states in both centre and republics.
All in all, these ideas were radical, well ahead of the political leadership. 
Around the late winter of 1990, Gorbachev was still thinking that a New Union 
treaty was unnecessary. In part, this nature of the Lopatin draft explained why only 
the part related to reorganization of the armed forces into a professional army was 
published in Komsomol'skaya pravda in February 1990. Later in September 1990, 
when a draft of the New Union treaty, prepared by the Soviet parliament, became 
the subject of debate between Moscow and republics, the other part of the Lopatin 
draft functioned as a pioneering base. The military deputies, for example, 
suggested a starting point for further debates by stating that the introduction of the 
sphere of "joint" competence and activity between Moscow and the republics be 
necessary. They were as follows: determining the procedure for stationing, testing, 
and eliminating nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons on the 
territory of sovereign states; placing armed forces on the territory of sovereign 
states in heightened degrees of readiness, mobilizing the reserve, moving armed 
forces, and conducting exercises; appointing and promoting commanders of 
formations and commanding generals of large strategic formations located on the 
territory of sovereign states; and so on.85
More significantly, the concept "sovereign states" could mean that they had a
119
natural right to have their own armed formations and reserves, but with the centre 
granted the possibility of their use to ensure the community's security against an 
external military threat. So, it was unnecessary for them to explain in detail a 
historical, political, economic, and military rationale for a militia system, as Lt 
Colonel G. Alimurzayev did. 86 Although of minor importance, the officer deputies 
also argued that defense minister had to be a civilian and the General Staff was to 
only implement military-political and military-technical decisions, after being 
optimized in structures and renewed in makeup on "a competitive basis".
Apart from these major principles, the officer deputies handled the 
reorganization of the armed forces in a much more authoritative way. The Lopatin 
draft advocated a "phased" transition to professional armed forces of "lesser size" 
and "better quality" with a volunteer method of manpower acquisition, an 
interethnic makeup and the preservation of universal military obligation "in 
wartime" as the principal idea of military reform. This was about a matter of 
principle. In some sense, they merely summarized the current debates that had 
existed since Colonel A. Savinkin put forth the idea of the professional-militia 
system. Of significance was an idea about the sequence of the transformation 
within 4-5 years. But this time table also appeared to be a mere reflection of the 
Soviet people who believed that military reform was proceeding slowly. In 
addition, they failed to mention the most vital area, in terms their idea, the optimal 
size in numerical strength of personnel and how to raise quality. The Lopatin draft 
arranged in a row what to be reduced, what is more, mainly in the context of how 
to reduce defense expenditure. These blanks, however, were paradoxically able to 
spur the further debate in public.
As noted above, the necessity for the professional army was linked to the 
modem technology at the roundtable discussion organized by XX Vek i Mir in 
September 1988. The officer deputies further developed this point. Arguing against
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the idea that a transition to a professional army would involve substantial economic 
costs, major Lopatin said that "nobody has calculated the damages from 
breakdowns and accidents of the most complex combat equipment which are the 
"fault of the personnel," as they are elegantly described in documents. Having 
visited the troops I see: officers fulfil the duties of mechanics and technicians more 
and more, in other words, they are busy doing what soldiers and sergeants are 
supposed to do... They are afraid to let soldiers and sergeants near the 
equipment."87
Finally, the military deputies recognized the lack of "social protection" or the 
hardships of day-to-day life faced by officers and their families. Before perestroika 
came the Soviet officer corps had been considered as one of the most privileged 
groups in Soviet society. But by the middle of 1989, if not earlier, a storm of 
startling accounts of military life appeared in the mass media from the military 
news paper Krasnaya zvezda to radicals such as Ogonek and Moscow News. 
Complaints came from every comer of the country from a remote base to Moscow, 
from every branch of the Soviet armed forces, from the rank and file officers, 
retired officers, family members of military personnel, and veterans of the Afghan 
war. The subjects of their complaints were also various: housing, food, 
unemployment among families of military personnel, and so on.
In approaching these problems, the officer deputies, at first, in a modest way 
acknowledged a series of alleged military internal problems. The Lopatin draft said 
that instances of tragedies involving military equipment, the death of people in 
peacetime were increasing. Then they focused on what factors were intensifying 
the difficult situation to the extent that practically many elementary civil rights 
were deprived. Interestingly, the officer deputies tried to find its prime source in 
perestroika which in their opinion lacked social reference points for military 
reform. The "unprepared" withdrawal of Soviet forces from other countries was
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the next factor to aggravate the bad situation. In particular, the Lopatin draft 
pointed out the "absence of a well-thought-out plan" for their redeployment with 
consideration of socioeconomic conditions of regions as well as of the rights and 
capabilities of sovereign republics.88Finally, they referred such broad issues as the 
allocation of an "excessively high" share of the GNP to defense, the "diktat"89 of 
the military-industrial complex, and the "uncontrolled" arms race. These issues 
could lead to an intensification of the economy's instability and a curtailment of 
social programmes, they argued. But the issues are too broad to be used for a 
frame of reference for how to solve the hardships of day-to-day life. Rather, it 
might be useful to consider in detail some changes in the defense budget structure 
in favour of supporting upkeep of military personnel, i.e., from arms and 
equipment purchases to social needs and the preparation and implementation of 
social programmes.
Now, let us consider the implication of the publication of part of the Lopatin 
draft for the civil-military relations. Through the publication, first and foremost, a 
number of officer deputies were able to be centred on the mass media. The 
progressive journals such as Argumenty i fakty, Literaturnaya gazeta, and Ogonek, 
had repeatedly provided forums for those progressive uniformed deputies.90 It is 
arguable why they were so attractive. To a certain degree, the reason was not their 
merits appeared in the draft. As mentioned above, the idea of the phased transition 
of the Soviet armed forces into a professional-militia system was not new. Most 
likely, it was their status. As deputies they could be free from the fear of retribution 
from the high command. Of minor significance, there were too many blanks to be 
filled or answered right away in their draft reform plan.
It must be noted that those journals themselves had severely criticized the 
members of the high command by publishing details about their privileges such as 
luxurious dacha, cars, resort facilities, and so on.91 This kind of revelation not only
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heightened the vertical intermilitary tensions but also reduced the legitimacy of the 
high command who were claiming that the military reform suggested by the junior 
and middle officers was unnecessary.
This kind of coalition, between those officer deputies and liberal or radical 
journals, appeared to have become a much more decisive force in tackling the 
issues that the armed forces faced, against members of the high command. The 
head of seventeen deputies group Major V. Lopatin was not only allowed to give a 
speech to the third session of the Congress of People's Deputies, but also was 
nationally exposed.92 Interestingly, it was at a time when senior ranking military 
deputies were complaining that they had not been given enough time to speak at 
the Congress93 and thus were forced to depend on Krasnaya zvezda in order to 
speak to the nation. Major Lopatin even became a deputy defense minister of the 
RSFSR, most likely because of his view on centre-periphery relations.
The military leadership responded to this situation with a series of measures. 
The Collegium of the Defense Ministry met on April 10 1990 to discuss its draft 
proposal.94 While promising to make its own military reform plan, the General 
Staff made a temporary examination of the Lopatin project. A number of ideas 
such as the gradual transition of professionalism, the reduction of the number of 
political officers and bodies and, the introduction of elective political officers were 
turned down right away. Some reliable counter forces were mobilised to cool off 
the heat. Lt Colonel N. Nikitin, an economist, accused Lopatin of professional 
incompetence and irresponsibility with regard to his actions on the Supreme Soviet 
commission. In addition, Lopatin was described as a dupe of the liberal press.95 Lt 
Colonel V. Alksnis, a conservative deputy and later named one of the "black 
colonels", acting as a counterpart of the reform-minded officer deputies and, 
sometimes, a substitution of the high command at the Congress, began to be 
prominent in the military press.96 Finally, Lopatin was situated under threat of
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expulsion from the Communist Party, thus, could not be a delegate of the 28th 
Party Congress, but he was in the end secured by the party progressives. During 
this time even Pravda sided with Lopatin.97 The Party Control Commission 
officially overruled the MPA's decision and ordered that Lopatin be reinstated. 
Harry Gelman linked this decision to Gorbachev's instigation.98
Some of the junior and middle ranking officer deputies were emerging as a 
catalyst for calls for a review of the political organs within the armed forces since 
Lt. Colonel V. Podziruk questioned the political organs' practices.99 In the election 
to the Congress of People's Deputies, the colonel stood against the commander of 
Western Group of Forces, General B. Snetkov, and won despite active support for 
Snetkov from local party officials and the military establishment.100 Podziruk's 
critical comments not only encouraged democrats who had already began their 
attacks on the political organs under the slogan of departization of the Army, 
KGB, and MVD troops but also spurred the debate over the future role of the 
political organs within the armed forces.101 Naturally, the radical officer deputies 
and democrats cooperated to achieve the same aim. The officer deputies even 
served as coalition partners with both the Shchit Union and the Russian democrats. 
Prior to the 28th Party Congress, Lopatin examined the history of the Soviet Party- 
military relations and drew a provocative conclusion that "the Soviet armed forces 
are as it were before,"102 i.e., an instrument of the Party's power. Subsequently, the 
major left the party. Moreover, he distanced from Gorbachev, who, having 
renounced the party's constitutional monopoly on power, in Lopatin's opinion, tried 
to keep the army subordinate to the party and to use the army in ethnically troubled 
areas such as Dushanbe, Kishinev, Baku, and the Baltic republics.
The fate of the Lopatin draft ended when it was defeated by the MOD draft 
at a session of the Committee for Defense and State Security in December 1990. 
After summing up the preliminary results of the competition between the two main
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drafts, the Committee reached its final decision: to take the MOD draft as a basis 
and recommend that the government put the finishing touches to it, and officially 
submit it, in the future, to the Supreme Soviet. In fact, the Lopatin draft 
successfully fulfilled its original purpose in the sense that it became a base, or a 
starting point, of the MOD draft reform plan. Additionally, some points of the 
Lopatin draft related to centre-periphery relations in the formation of military 
policy became a pioneering work, as the debate about a New Union treaty heated 
up.
4.5. Soldiers' Mothers and Shchit and Military Reform Movement
If the group of junior and middle-level officer people's deputies were active 
at the state and institutional context, two noticeable voluntary associations, the 
Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and the Shchit (Shield) Union, unofficial military 
trade union, (Union for the Social Protection of Servicemen, Military Reservists, 
and Their Family Members), were very powerful in society. Simply, they were 
concerned with the most obvious and highly emotional issue for the ordinary 
people such as the cruel hazing of young recruits.
Many voluntary associations had existed for a long time but they had hardly 
been independent of the state. A powerful group, the Communist Party, had 
prevented others from establishing an independent existence by using various and 
very complicated mechanisms. Of them we cannot fail to notice the KGB's activity. 
The difference under perestroika was that the associations were no longer under 
the direct tutelage of the authorities. Moreover, throughout late 1989 there were a 
lot of political movements in all-Union level, besides the Communist Party, such as 
popular fronts, minority movements, internationalist movements, Russian
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nationalist groups, party clubs, parliamentary groups, independent workers' 
movements, anti-Stalinist groups, ecological and cultural movements, religious 
groups, and fledging parties. All could have had impact on the civil-military 
relations in some ways. Some of them tried to court the officer corps, in particular, 
the rank and file officers, and at the same time functioned as an umbrella 
organization.
The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers was first formed by ordinary people, 
rather than by special leaders. In Vilnius in March 1989 there was a rally held by a 
group of women who had lost their sons during military service. They in the first 
place tried to show their anger at a lack of attention of the military authorities on 
their suffering. While focusing on how to avert others' similar suffering, the 
mothers argued that new recruits had to perform their military service in home 
republics.
The reason why such a demonstration happened in Lithuania could be 
explained, though in part, by the tragic case of a young Lithuanian soldier Arturas 
Sakalauskas, who killed eight soldiers on a Leningrad train in February 1987 after 
they had allegedly beaten and tried to rape him.103 As this case was exposed 
republic-wide, the ordinary Baltics believed that army life was barbaric in general 
and ethnic minority Baltics had been among those most seriously affected by 
hazing in particular. A number of official and informal groups appealed to the 
central authorities for a public review of his case and at the same time demanded 
that the Baltics serve in or near their home republics. More progressive groups 
even argued for the establishment in the Baltic of territorial military formations or 
even of national armies.
In response, a military commentator argued that while recognizing the fact 
that twelve Lithuanians had died in the armed forces in 1987, not one of those 
deaths was in any way related to military brutality.104 He also observed that many
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Lithuanians, who had demanded that the Lithuanian youth had to be sent for 
service only in Lithuania, did not even want to hear that the soil for unhealthy 
relations in the army was mostly carried in from "outside the army". Moreover, he 
argued that civilian authorities in the Baltic republics should be held responsible for 
rising crime rates and antisocial behaviour among the draft-age cohort. In fact, this 
article was aimed at a Lithuanian Popular Front Sajudis, which had announced its 
intention in mid-October 1988 to revive the Lithuanian military units and 
institutions for the preparation of a national officer corps.
In spite of the compromise of defense minister Yazov, who agreed to allow 
increased numbers of Lithuanian conscripts to serve near home at a meeting with 
the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, A. Brazauskas, in April 
1989, while rejecting the idea of a national army,105 the soldiers' mothers continued 
to face military draft offices in Vilnius and other Lithuanian cities. They even 
presented their demands in the form of a petition as well as by picketing. During 
election campaigns to the Congress of People's Deputies the mothers asked 
candidates to reveal their attitudes towards the issue of military service, that is, 
principles of service and formation. Major General S. Nekrosius, chief of staff of 
Lithuania's Civil Defense, for example, announced his support for the territorial 
formations.106 On the other hand, the commander of the Baltic MD Colonel 
General F. Kuz'min expressed limited support for it, while cricizing the 
antimilitarism throughout the Baltic republics.107
In early April 1989, the mothers again organized a rally in Vilnius to protest 
against brutal treatment of recruits in the Soviet armed forces, together with 
Sajudis. About 5,000 people demonstrated in support of demands that Lithuanian 
youths be allowed to do their military service in the Baltic republics,108 Around 300 
women united to present the first session of the USSR Congress of People's 
Deputies with a demand that their sons be released from service in the armed
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forces.109 They, in the end, became the founding members of the committee of 
soldiers' mothers.
By the middle of 1990, this grass root activism had developed nationwide 
with the formulation of the All-Union Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. Since then, 
a significant change in the committee's activities followed. It began functioning as a 
coordinating body and information centre independent military authorities. One of 
major works was to gather cases of hazing and noncombat deaths. Naturally, 
campaign for official recognition of the hazing in the armed forces became 
important. In this context, members of the committee took part in a mass 
demonstration in Gorky park in June 1990. These activities of mothers' group were 
run by a liberal television programme Vzglyad. Once the committee' existence was 
known to the public, people who had been dissatisfied with the suffering cases and 
military authority's treatments for them showed their serious interests in a form of 
letters and telephone calls.
On the other hand, the mothers group sought to appeal to the highest 
political institutions. In a letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the committee asked 
the Soviet parliament to set up a special commission to examine all cases of 
soldiers dying in peacetime. This committee shoud be independent of military 
departments with the participation of parents. In addition, the committee demanded 
more detailed measures. In principle, draftees should carry out their military service 
in their home republic, they argued. The mothers considered that it was necessary 
to declassify and publish statistics on all cases of soldiers dying during their military 
service. In part, this demand was met with the defense ministry's decision to 
publish the names of all soldiers who died in Afghanistan. Finally, they asked that 
in case of noncombat deaths related company commanders should be removed 
from work with soldiers on active duty.110
The committee's activities reached their peak when the First All-Union
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Congress of Servicemen’s Parents was held in Moscow in September 8-9, 1990.111 
The nature of participants was impressive. First and foremost, the committee 
members had succeeded in causing politicians to become involved with the rally at 
various levels, from the USSR people’s deputies to public organizations across the 
country. A dozen of people's deputies addressed the congress delegates. E. Gayer, 
member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for example, reproached the ministry of 
defense with the fact that "there is not a single official representative of the military 
department" at the congress,112 while criticizing a number of military practices and 
a lack of their interests in solving the problems. What is more interesting was the 
fact that the RSFSR leadership and deputies showed their keen interests in the 
congress itself, not to mention its prime issue, soldiers' deaths in peacetime. A 
RSFSR people's deputy and co-chairman of Shchit Union, V. Urazhtsev, chaired 
the congress. A. Surkov, T. Koryagina, and O. Kalugin all deeply took part in the 
work of the congress. Possibly, in an attempt to give an impression that the RSFSR 
leadership shared in the care of the mothers and soldiers and officers, Koryagina 
was even introduced to the congress as a candidate for appointment to the post of 
Russia's defense minister.
Another significant development was the radicalized activities of the soldiers 
mothers. I. Kugushev, member of the organizing committee, publicly said "you 
should strive as hard as possible to find out the home addresses of everyone from 
the defense minister to the commanding officers of military units," 113 most likely, 
in order to picket them personally. After the congress, delegates picketed a nearby 
apartment block where generals and officers live. According to Colonel General B. 
Pyankov, the commander of the Siberian Military District, certain commanders 
were presented with ultimatum demands that soldiers be allowed to return 
home.114
The congress also gained a lot of publicity, primarily, by claiming that over
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the past four years since Gorbachev came to power 15,000-20,000 soldiers and 
officers had suffered "noncombat-related deaths." Delegates blamed brutality 
among the troops as one major cause of death and criticized military and political 
leaders for not being more responsive. They also called for a law or presidential 
decree protecting servicemen, to be enacted before the beginning of the fall 1990 
draft. Otherwise, they said, they would boycott the draft.
At the end of October 1990 in a letter to New Times, members of the 
Soldiers' Mothers demanded a public discussion of draft laws establishing 
principles and organization of military service and in the shortest time, within two 
years, the realization of "radical" military reform and reduction of the period of 
compulsory military service. They saw that alternative service for a period of time 
"not longer" than the usual active military service should be brought in "as soon as 
possible." Moreover, all military construction units should be disbanded and 
recruitment of non-professionals onto the railway should be banned and the same 
for the MVD and KGB troops, they went on to ask.115
The frightening exposure of the figure to the public just before the fall 1990 
draft was the most decisive way in their efforts to call upon the public to begin the 
struggle for making compulsory militry service defunct and virtually made the 
purely military issue into a political one. The military leaders were forced to 
respond to the situation in a hurry. Initially, there was a change in their attitudes 
towards the organization. Within two days of the congress, the USSR main 
military prosecutor and deputy general prosecutor met a group of soldiers' 
mothers. At the meeting Lt General of Justice A. Katusev assured the mothers, 
who demanded a thorough investigation into the circumstances in which their sons 
had been killed or severely injured and into cases of non-regulation relations in the 
units, that every case would be investigated and "criminal" charges brought, if 
necessary. The general even promised that the results of this investigation would be
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sent to every woman who had appealed to him.116
On November 5 1990, President Gorbachev met mothers of soldiers who 
dies during peacetime. It was two days before their set date to hold a radical 
demonstration, aiming at the Victory-Day rally, such as going on a hunger strike or 
blocking the movement of tanks on Red square by lying under the tanks. 
According to L. Lymer, one of the participants of the meeting with the President, 
the mothers were inspired by Gorbachev's promises that he could meet many of 
demands of the mothers such as material compensation, issuing parents a death 
certificate, and so on.117
Meanwhile, the military authority became busy explaining the figure 15,000. 
Before the congress was held, a similar rumour had been circulated in public: 
45,000 soldiers and officers had died since perestroika began. The military 
leadership had lightly treated this issue. At the end of August 1990, a General Staff 
spokesman said that only one percent of all deaths was due to violence among the 
troops, failing to mention the total numbers of deaths in peacetime.118 Now, 
Katusev revised the figure by saying that one third of all non-combat deaths among 
Soviet servicemen were the result of criminal acts, while two thirds resulted from 
accidents.119 In addition, the general announced that most of the accidental deaths 
were caused by the misuse of weapons or other equipment and that one in every 
four deaths was suicide. Subsequently, insurance for servicemen was mandated by 
a presidential decree issued at the start of 1991. Some parents, who had lost their 
sons, were to receive around 25,000 rubles each. Deputy defense minister Colonel 
General V. Babev in an interview with Izvestiya said that 285 million rubles were 
set aside in the 1991 military budget in order to implement Gorbachev's decree for 
insurance for servicemen.120
One of the key factors in the very successful development of the committee 
of soldiers' mothers appeared to be a coalition among various associations,
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including democratic political figures. But the most noticeable was its cooperated 
work with "Shchit", an unofficial trade union for servicemen. It was formed around 
October 1989 and its main aim was to protect the economic and legal rights of 
military personnel, veterans, and their families.121 Co-chairman of its board of 
directors, Reserve Lt Colonel V. Urazhtsev, noted that veterans returning from 
Afghanistan and thousands of servicemen recently discharged as a result of the 
large reduction of the armed forces along Gorbachev's 1988 UN announcement, 
which he termed as a real disaster, needed social protections. He continued to say 
that "it is no coincidence" that 40% of its members were former active servicemen 
transferred into the reserve in the course of recent reductions.122 Interestingly, the 
union was planned to open a store to serve the mothers of soldiers so that they 
could purchase needed goods at the most modest prices. It was at a time when the 
committee of soldiers' mothers was not active, yet. But this idea certainly helped 
the union absorb women's activism. Moreover, the union supported the 
transformation of the armed forces into professionals in terms of officers' declining 
standard of living. The other side of this idea meant the abolition of the draft. 
Besides, members of the union opposed the use of Army in policing operations. To 
be sure, this assertion appealed to the Russian leadership, who worried about the 
military crackdown of democrats and wanted to increase his influence over the 
Soviet armed forces, on the other. In his address to the second congress of the 
Shchit Union, for example, El'tsin criticized the fact that servicemen were killed in 
peacetime. On the other hand, he sympathetically recognized that human and social 
rights of people in military uniforms were violated and that the relations between 
the Army and local residents deteriorated in some areas.
At the founding congress of Shchit its its strength was about 10,000 
members. Up to 80% of the members were secret, because officers were dismissed 
from the Army for taking part in this organization's activity. Some 1,000 officers
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were drived out of the armed forces.123 When its second congress was opened in 
December 1990, however, according to V. Urazhtsev, cochairman of the board of 
the Shield Union and Russian people's deputy, the membership reached 200,000, 
including 15 people's deputies.124 Moreover, five hundred primary cells were 
created in all Union republics. This rapid growth caused qualitative changes in its 
activities from secret to open way. At the second congress, its leadership 
announced that they were about to take part in law-making and to work in the 
government. But they considered their prime task as departization of the Armed 
Forces, the MVD, and the KGB. When the Shchit union was formed, Yazov totally 
disregarded it. In December 1989, for example, he said that "I do not know such 
an organization, and the army doesn't need any sort of help or shield. We are 
capable of defending ourselves, and we don't need any retired officers to defend 
us."125 Meanwhile, the union had deeply involved in the Soviet politics in general 
and sided with the RSFSR leadership in particular. Shchit's revealing activity of the 
"strange" troop movements around Moscow in September 1990 reflected well that 
development.
The troop movement included Ryazan Paratroop Regiment, units of the Tula 
Assault Division, units of the Pskov Airborne Division, the units of the Vitebsk 
Airborne Division of the KGB Border Troops, and the Dzerzhinskii Division of the 
MVD. Incidentally, all of these troops were involved in the August 1991 coup. At 
that time, the RSFSR leadership was so keen to know such questions: why was the 
operation so well coordinated by the MOD, the KGB, and the MVD? who did 
issue the order to take measures?; and how was it no-one in Russia's government 
knew about such large-scale troop movements?
On September 9 the Ryazan Paratroop Regiment and units of the Tula 
Assault Division were put on the alert and were later put in a state of combat 
readiness. The next day at 03:00 the units moved off to an unknown object. Units
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of the Pskov Airborne Division began landing at an airfield in the Moscow area at 
16:00 on September 10. The USSR people's deputy N. Molotkov learnt by 
hearsay, probably by members of Shchit, about the troops' movements and drove 
to the airfield, and six other deputies dispersed to various military units. But none 
of them was allowed access to the personnel. On September 11 the Pskov Division 
flew off to new stationing locations and had returned. The Ryazan Regiment was 
given an assignment, preparing for a parade. In the meantime, the units of the KGB 
Vitebsk Airborne Division were placed in a state of combat readiness, moved 
towards Moscow, and returned. The MVD Dzerzhinskii Division was also placed 
in a state of combat readiness.
A USSR people's deputy S. Belozertsev asked a question on September 24 at 
the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning the strange movements and called on the 
government to explain what the troops were doing, referring to information 
received from the Shchit union. In return, Gorbachev lightly touched the question. 
Moreover, Belozertsev was asked to name his informers. KGB chief Kryuchkov 
also told the Soviet parliament that the Vitebsk KGB Airborne Division had been 
brought to Moscow to take part in harvesting operations, and the Rayazan 
paratroops regiment came to take part in the November parade on Red Square.
Colonel S. Kudinov, member of Shchit, deputy of Ryazan Oblast Council, 
and chief of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School Political Department, 
made the first wave by revealing details concerning the troop movements in an 
address to the Democratic Russia deputies group. First of all, he emphasized the 
fact that the Ryazan paratroops regiment received ammunition and hardware and 
that it was planned to leave for Moscow on September 22 as far as the parade was 
concerned.126 And he gave other information about the Tula Division, the MVD 
and KGB troops, and other troops of Moscow Military District.
This revelation forced defense minister Yazov to explain troop movements to
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the Supreme Soviet the following day. At first Yazov recognized that a regiment of 
the Tula division, stationed in Ryazan, arrived in Moscow from the 9th to 10th. 
But as for the day of departure, he underlined the fact that there was an order 
signed on July 30 by the commander of the Moscow Military District that this 
regiment had to be in Moscow on the 10th along the military exercise plan. Yazov 
also revealed that the airborne troops always had to be fully equipped in the 
country wherever they went. In case of the Vitebsk Airborne Division, which, 
Kudinov argued, had moved toward Moscow, not a single step was made in the 
direction of Moscow, defense minister stressed. Finally, he confirmed Kryuchkov's 
explanation on the MVD troops by saying that 1,300 men from the Dzerzhinskii 
Division were digging up potatoes in Moscow.127
The second wave came when KomsomoVskaya pravda published a letter to 
Moscow Television and to President Gorbachev from Major M. Pustobayev. After 
giving detailed information about manoeuvres which happened from 9 through 13 
September, the major questioned why those taking part in preparations for a 
parade should need steel helmets, flak jackets, arms, and ammunition and whether 
there was any Kolkhoz in Moscow, Bryansk, Rayazan, or Kaluga Oblast where any 
one of the thousands of people who took part in the manoeuvres helped 
agricultural workers. Then he concluded that Yazov deliberately refused to clarify 
the situation, and, in this connection, asked the Supreme Soviet to start an 
independent deputies investigation of the matter.
This case to a certain degree explained the fact that a coalition that included 
Shchit Union, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, republic-level associations and 
even soviets, and democrats in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was on 
the process of development. This advent spurred people's advocacy of military 
reform advocacy and even isolated the high command from their rank-and-file 
officers and from society.
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4.6. Nationality Ferment and Republican Control over the Soviet Army
Mounting nationalist ferment was the final but most decisive factor to 
provide more momentum for the military reform movement. From the time of 
Gorbachev’s accession to power in March 1985, the political aspirations of most of 
the people of the Baltic republics, for example, had evolved along with the general 
flow of perestroika. While the initial goal in 1986 was for cultural sovereignty, by 
1987 it had come to include economic and, by 1988, political sovereignty. The 
consensus by late 1989 and early 1990 was a clear desire for fully fledged 
independence. Both the Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts and the Lithuanian 
Sajudis as well as more radical groups such as the National Independence Party of 
Estonia, the National Independence Movement of Latvia and the Lithuanian 
Freedom League, had been organizing meetings to work together. And they had 
tried to involve Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, Moldavians and other 
minorities.128 In every part of the country national groups were calling for a 
relaxation of control from Moscow, and later for complete secession from the 
Union.
The Soviet armed forces' problems with regard to nationalist unrest had two 
dimensions: internally institutional and externally societal. These two dimensions 
were interrelated as the debates on a New Union Treaty continued. The internal 
dimension implied the dynamics of the ethnic factor in the military establishment, 
i.e. the ethnic makeup of the Soviet armed forces. There had been a demographic 
shift over the past two decades in favour of the non-Russian, especially the Muslin 
nationalities. As a result, as members of the high command complained, not only
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was it difficult to train them because of the language problems but there was also 
ethnic solidarity groups within the units formed that could engage in violent 
conflict and undermine discipline and morale. On the other hand, the external 
societal dimension reflects the military's involvement in domestic policing 
operations.
As far as the relations between the rise of nationalist feeling in the Union 
republics and military reform movement were concerned, the Baltic republics, 
Georgia, and the Ukraine were significant. By early 1989 when military reform 
debates reached their peak, the extent and nature of nationalist feeling in the five 
Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tadzhikistan, and 
Turkmenistan, was difficult to gauge. Although violent conflict broke out on a 
number of occasions,129 it had no significant, direct influence on the restructuring 
of Soviet armed forces. Simply the Soviet troops became 'friend or foe?' Conflict 
between the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the autonomous region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh that began in early 1988 could be seen in the same context. In 
Azerbaijan the Soviet military maintained a state of emergency after bloody 
reimposing order in Baku in January 1990. When the USSR Supreme Soviet began 
to prepare for a New Union treaty, virtually all union republics advocated military 
reform, including the creation of national armies. But their proposals had already 
departed from the dimension of purely military considerations. As will be seen later 
in chapters 5 and 8, republican authorities used the military issues as a valuable 
bargaining chip in order to take more from Moscow.
The RSFSR was typical. The order of issues raised by the Russian republican 
leadership was similar to what appeared in the Baltics, i.e., from military internal 
problems, republican control over the commanders stationing in the territory of the 
Russia in terms of materials and troops movement, use of the armed forces for 
policing, and finally the formation of a Russian army. But in general they had the
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dynamic of the Russian leadership's challenge over Gorbachev, particularly, his 
position of the CINC of the Soviet armed forces. It was in early December 1990 
that might had brought a near miss for Gorbachev. El'tsin planned a parliamentary 
debate on a proposed new constitution that would have empowered him as 
president of Russia to raise an army and declare war. Under pressure, however, 
El'tsin withdrew even the debate.
In the Baltic republics, three kind of political forces had been discernible 
during the period of 1987-1989. The first was the 'restorationist' movements such 
as the National Independence Party of Estonia, the National Independence 
Movement of Latvia and the Lithuanian Freedom League, although they were not 
major forces, yet. They aimed for the very restoration of the independent republics. 
This force, appealing to young people, succeeded in moving a major force, from 
the centrists, to the left. Centrists preferred to work within the existing political 
structures and work for change step by step, for example, for cultural autonomy. 
Both the Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts and the Lithuanian Sajudis, together 
with some of intellectuals, technocrats, and rank and file Communist Party 
members, were included in this force. At that time, this force stood for the 
sovereignty of the Baltic republics within the Soviet confederation, but later came 
to support full independence from Moscow. The third force, anti-reformist or 
conservative, included Russian-speaking Party officials, the military, bureaucrats 
and immigrant workers who did not wish to lose their privileged status. This force 
was represented by the Estonian Intermovement, Latvian Interfront and the 
Lithuanian Edinstvo.
As far as the development of civil-military relations was concerned, 
coordinated and sometimes individual activities of the Popular Fronts were 
important. Criticism of the Soviet armed forces occupied a prominent place in their 
proposals. Their programs include everything from calls for a reduction in the
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length of military service to demands for the establishment, or re-establishment,130 
of national armies. They never missed the chance to bring several cases of brutality 
in the armed forces to light using glasnosf and functioned as an umbrella of 
soldiers' mothers.
It was widely believed that ethnic minorities, especially Baltics, had been 
among those most seriously affected by such phenomena as "hazing” and 
"nonregulation" behaviour. In response, as seen in the previous section, ordinary 
people began to demand that, for example, Lithuanians be sent for service only in 
Lithuania and to argue that only territorial formations would be capable of easing 
national tensions. Nobody believed the argument that the armed forces had been a 
vehicle by which national integration had been promoted.
After becoming a major force in their Supreme Soviets, they began making 
more critical decisions. First, three republican authorities demanded that the Soviet 
army stationed there should be under control of the republics. Then, they 
unilaterally issued a proposal against calling for their youth to be allowed to 
perform their military service in their home republic. The republican authorities 
took more serious actions. The Latvian Supreme Soviet, for instance, proposed 
that servicemen on active military service in the territory of the Latvian republic 
would be granted only official housing and that the allocation of new housing 
would be stopped. The local authorities suspended the operation of USSR Council 
of Ministers' resolution governing the procedure for placing reserve officers on the 
waiting list and providing them with housing. The republic's Council of Ministers 
adopted a law that granted servicemen official housing alone. Moreover, units of 
the Soviet armed forces stationed there were not allowed to build houses for 
themselves.131
As the Lithuanian government declared its independence, the situation was 
beginning to rapidly deteriorate. Not only did those getting their call-up papers
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rarely report to the appropriate organizations but also those who had deserted 
rushed into nationalist organizations. Garrisons were about to face stoppage of 
water, electricity, and so on. Children of military personnel were limited to schools 
and kindergartens. There was no work place for wives of officers. There were even 
instances of servicemen being directly threatened and beaten up. In short, the 
Soviet army had became an occupation force.
In Georgia the Soviet armed forces were also regarded as an army of 
occupation since the military action in Tbilisi on April 9 1989. Georgians argued 
that the incidents were not exposed to the public and that somebody in Moscow 
should take the responsibility. In short, people shouted "where are your shovels?" 
if they saw soldiers. During the operation special MVD units and regular 
paratroops attacked a demonstration outside the Georgian main government 
building, using teargas and shovels. Less than one month after the incidents, in 
May 1989, a group of approximately 800 young Georgian men in various cities 
who were due to be drafted began a hunger strike to back their demand to be 
allowed to perform their military service in their home republic because of some 
unconfirmed incidence of brutality against Georgian recruits serving in the Soviet 
army. On June 7 1989 republic-wide industrial strikes were held in support of these 
demands.132
Thus, military issues were very sensitive to any associations and 
organizations, including the Georgian Supreme Soviet at the end of 1989 when the 
Tbilisi events were exposed in the second session of the Congress of People's 
Deputies. Therefore, it was not unexpected that a working group of the Georgian 
parliament sorted out the high incidence of brutality against Georgian recruits 
serving in the Soviet army. This effort by the Supreme Soviet was the earliest case 
in comparison to other republics. Part of the report was published in a local paper 
Zarya Vostoka on November 29 1989. At the following day, the Georgian
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Supreme Soviet ruled to raise the possibility of reviving the Georgian national 
army division, of opening a military academy in Tbilisi, and of allowing the 
majority of draftees from Georgia to perform their military service on Georgian 
territory.133 The idea of creating a national military formation as a place where 
young Georgians could serve rather than in the Soviet army began circulating on 
the street. Even demonstrations supporting this idea were held in a number of 
towns throughout Georgia. Naturally, the issue of Georgian army was incorporated 
into the pre-election programmes of virtually all the political parties and coalitions 
that competed in the Supreme Soviet elections in Georgia in October 1990, 
including that of the Georgian Communist Party.134 One of the first issues 
addressed by the newly elected Georgian Supreme Soviet was, not surprisingly, the 
question of forming a national military unit. In December 1990 the Georgian 
parliament issued a decree on the formation of a National Guard (NG) under the 
jurisdiction of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In the Ukraine, Rukh, the Association of Democratic Soviets and Democratic 
Blocs of Ukraine, was the most noticeable political force in terms of military 
issues. Nevertheless, the Ukraine’s highly active Committee of Soldiers' Mothers 
should also be noted, because the organization had played a key role in the 
campaign to keep Ukrainian conscripts in their native republic and enjoyed broad 
support for its efforts. In addition, as for the creation of a Ukrainian army, the 
radical "Narodna rada" parliamentary faction and the Committee to Resurrect the 
Armed Forces in Ukraine were also significant.
The organization Rukh had its origin in 1988 when attempts were made in 
various cities to launch popular-front organizations on the model of those in the 
Baltic republics. Its draft programme was published in February 1989 in 
Literaturna Ukraina. The first national congress composed of 1,158 delegates in 
Kiev on 8-10 September 1989. Some delegates pointed out that the military-related
141
provisions in the sovereignty declaration were meant to lay the groundwork for a 
Ukrainian national army.
Dmytro Pavlychko, head of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Foreign 
Affairs and a leading member of Rukh, for example, told Izvestiya that the creation 
of national armies, including a Ukrainian army, was a "normal, legitimate process" 
in the attainment of a republic's genuine sovereignty."135 However, the most urgent 
concern, which most of the parliamentarians agreed, was not whether to raise an 
army but how to stop young Ukrainians' being exposed to danger in areas of ethnic 
conflict such as Central Asia and Azerbaijan.
Accordingly, in a move that was dramatic, if unenforceable, on July 30 1990, 
the republican Supreme Soviet ordered that Ukrainian conscripts, police, and KGB 
troops should return home from conflict areas by October 1 and from all other 
parts of the USSR by December 1. This decision was a real shock to the Soviet 
high command. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev in a hurry flew in and gave an 
address to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. He tried to soothe parliamentarians by 
saying that the high command regarded Ukrainian youth as "a mainstay of the 
army."136 In fact, Ukrainians made up over a fifth of all those drafted and a 
significant proportion of the officer corps. In this respect, the general argued that 
to permit them to serve only in the Ukraine republic meant to damage the Soviet 
armed forces and therefore on the defense capability of the country as a whole. At 
the same time Moiseev reminded the deputies of the fact that the growing 
desertion from the armed had reached 3,000, including 184 Ukrainians.137 
Nevertheless, he tried to show a compromising attitudes by saying that the USSR 
defense ministry did not reject Ukrainians' decisions. Moreover, he promised that 
the MOD took the decisions into consideration when planning special measures to 
meet the interests of Ukrainian citizens. Although the drive for radical military 
reform at the all-Union level to a certain degree weakened around November, as
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Moiseev himself argued, now the military reform was clearly linked to evolving 
centre-periphery relations, the signing of a Union treaty.138
The January 1991 bloodshed in the Baltic republics accelerated the debate 
on the creation of a Ukrainian army. For example, the deputy chairman of the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Volodymyr Hryn'ov, at a conference held in Kiev on 
February 3-4 said that most recent events showed that the genuine sovereignty of 
any republic could only be asserted, and the rights of its citizens defended, if the 
country had its own army.139 The conference was devoted to "the external and 
internal security of Ukraine, the concept of a Ukrainian army, and steps towards its 
creation." All of political groups took part in the conference. The strong support of 
the DOSAAF (the official Ukrainian-language organ of the Voluntary Society for 
Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet) was surprising in that the political 
groups that organized the conference were at the centre of the drive for national 
independence, and therefore the fact that they were interested in the possibilities of 
a national army was self-explanatory.
In sum, there were a number of ways in which the military reform could be 
related to Gorbachev's broader domestic policy agenda. The alleviation of the 
burden of military spending on the country's economy was repeatedly associated 
with arms cuts particularly in conventional forces. But this pragmatic concern was 
only one of the questions addressed by the civilians. A wider agenda of domestic 
questions emerged beyond the bounds of economics as well as military strategy 
which was mentioned in chapter 3. This wider agenda covered: the military internal 
problems, the republican control over the Soviet armed forces stationing in the 
territory of the every republic in terms of materials and troops movement, the use 
of army troops for policing, and the formation of a national army. These well 
reflected the fast-moving development in the relationship between the army and 
society under the conditions of political reform. The most noticeable figure was the
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dynamic activities of the middle level of powers. They effectively challenged some 
of the military structures of the country as it had evolved over decades and even 
questioned the issue of how to divide the Soviet armed forces among the republics 
with consequences that were hard to predict, as the nationalist ferment became the 
most decisive factor to provide more momentum for the military reform 
movement.
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CHAPTER 5. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND MILITARY
REFORM
5.1. Gorbachev's Inaugural Speech and Military Reform
On March 15, 1990, Gorbachev was sworn in as the first president of the 
USSR. As another new player in civil-military relations, following the Supreme 
Soviet, the post was believed to have very powerful influence on the relations. The 
Article 127(3)/10) of the USSR Constitution reflected this well: the President of 
the USSR shall "to coordinate the work of state bodies to ensure the country’s 
security; be the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR; 
appoint and dismiss the supreme command of the Armed Forces of the USSR and 
award the highest military ranks; appoint judges to military tribunals."1 So, the 
president as head of state was to assume many of the powers that previously 
belonged to the USSR's collective head of state, the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet.
It was at a time when demands for restructuring of the armed forces and 
military reform were being frequently heard. The military reform movement 
gathered momentum since a group of challenging junior and middle-level officer 
deputies proposed a conceptualization of the military reform and part of its 
contents was published in February 1990, as seen in the previous chapter. There 
was a barrage of negative media coverage of the senior generals and of favourable 
coverage of the reform movement and its key participants.
So, it seemed that the high command was becoming isolated from society 
and even from the rank and file officers. The senior generals were seen as more
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than the nucleus of conservative forces which blocked the implementation of 
radical reforms. With regard to the military reform movement many of members of 
the high command were strongly opposed to any attempts to either clarify 
problems that armed forces had faced or to take clear-cut measures to solve them. 
The combination of the new political climate in the country given by glasnost' and 
democratisation and strong advocacy of military reform at both the grassroots and 
political leadership levels from the Kremlin to the local soviets were very subtle. 
Thus, the members of the high command were becoming increasingly expendable 
from the point of view of the political leadership, who had consciously 
orchestrated the combination. In this context, Eugene B. Rumer, observed in the 
middle of 1990 that the political leadership would be given an opportunity to purge 
the high command "at a small cost but with huge benefit,"2 although it was hasty to 
some degree.
Now President Gorbachev told the Congress of People's Deputies in his 
inaugural speech that presidential power would be used for a truly "decisive" 
advancement of all the processes of perestroika but on a democratic basis. Then he 
suggested, as prime tasks on more detailed level, the introduction of measures to 
reduce tension in the socioeconomic sphere, the drafting of a new Union Treaty, 
the establishment of a revitalised system of local soviets on which the president can 
rely when performing his functions, and etc. The president also promised to be a 
guarantor of a stable social order and energetically oppose criminality.
All issues could both positively and negatively bear on the role and status of 
the armed forces, of course. More directly, Gorbachev recognized a profound 
military reform to be an important task for himself. However, he added a fifth 
wheel to his will. That is, he would undertake the task "together" with the 
Presidential Council and "in cooperation" with the USSR Supreme Soviet. On the 
other hand, the president should also exercise "leadership" in the formulation of
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defence policy and military doctrine.3
In reality, President Gorbachev was in a politically complicated situation. In 
other words, his presidential power was questionable. The Supreme Soviet had 
acquired considerable influence since its creation in 1989, but it did not have real 
power, yet. The decisions of the legislature were hardly being enforced. The Soviet 
citizens were beginning to call the situation a vacuum of executive power. 
Moreover, whatever the Constitution said, it had been the Party and its Politburo 
that made policy, controlled the state budget, and gave orders to the armed forces. 
For Gorbachev, therefore, the Supreme Soviet's fledgling institutions were not yet 
strong enough to enable him to govern the country without the Party. 
Consequently, far from his original intention, Gorbachev appeared to have met 
another obstacle, besides the nomenklaturas.
Most importantly, his political tactic of occupying the centre of the political 
spectrum and balancing right against left while, at same time, retaining the reform 
initiative, nearly exhausted its possibilities. As the gap between the extremes of the 
political spectrum widened, fewer people occupied the centre ground, making it 
harder for Gorbachev to satisfy either the reformist radicals or the conservatives, 
including the high command. Both poles were urging Gorbachev to resign the post 
of general secretary of the CPSU, but for different, opposite reasons. Gorbachev 
was being forced to decide whether he would be the leader of perestroika or of the 
nomenklatura, although he was continuously siding with reformists as seen at a 
couple of plenums of the Central Committee held in early part of 1990. Moreover, 
Anatolii Luk'yanov, then Gorbachev's deputy, argued that the new presidency was 
essential to put a stop, once and for all, to the concentration of power in the hands 
of the party.
With regard to the constitutionally expected relations between the president 
and the high command, it was rather noticeable that Gorbachev's final manoeuvre
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in political reform to create a strong presidential system in the country was not 
enthusiastically welcomed by the high command. Moreover, the institutional 
weight and political status of the military were becoming increasingly important or 
real with a number of significant countervailing factors, particularly national unrest, 
which would be enough to negate the forces that had been trying to put pressure 
on the high command.
By early 1990, the secession crisis in Lithuania and the violence in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia heightened Gorbachev's need for the armed forces and 
their stakes in countering the spread of "antistate" and "antimilitary" sentiments. 
This need was further dramatized for Gorbachev and his colleagues when in 
January 1990 they found no alternative but to dispatch military forces to Baku. In 
addition, in April 9 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree to strengthen 
the laws against "antistate" activities. During the period, Gorbachev had made a 
number of gestures probably calculated to appease the military leadership. In a 
series of public statements in December 1989 and February and March 1990, the 
president praised the army troops and even warned the press against attacks on the 
armed forces. Defence minister Yazov was promoted to Marshal. Military parades 
were held to celebrate the Soviet victory in World War II.
Yet, by the spring of 1990 Gorbachev had not gone far in this direction of 
retreats, as a whole. Moreover, after becoming president he began to show some 
indicators pointing in the opposite direction. Symbolically, Gorbachev in a speech 
to veterans on the WWII anniversary in May 1990 again criticized those in the 
army who wanted to be immune from press criticism. He argued that perestroika 
required that the role of the army in Soviet society be looked at anew, and thus 
further spurred an Arbatov-like criticism.4 A civilian defence expert and deputy, G. 
Arbatov, most outspokenly to date denounced the military leadership.5 Under the 
title of "An Army for the Country or a Country for the Army?" he particularly
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accused the high command of denying civilians' access to important military data.
Gorbachev's turning was also confirmed by the continuing public complaints 
of chief of the General Staff, General Moiseev. Particularly, the general protested 
the deliberate exclusion of the high command from speaking at the February 1990 
plenum of the Central Committee6 and from participating in the Supreme Soviet 
debates that preceded the establishment of the executive presidency and the 
Presidential Council.7 Thus, the certain failure of behind-the-scenes negotiations on 
the new presidency between the political leadership and the high command was 
frankly disclosed at the elections to the President. President Gorbachev received 
1,329 votes among 2,000 deputies in the unopposed election. 495 deputies voted 
against him, including many in military deputies.8 According to deputy Colonel N. 
Petrushenko, officer deputies voted against Gorbachev because, they thought, he 
was indecisive, because his arms concessions had wrought havoc in the officer 
corps, and because glasnost' had allowed open criticism of the military".9 
Gorbachev was even characterized as unsuitable person to have responsibility for 
the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Subsequently, Petrushenko warned that, "when there is 
unrest in the army, there is unrest in the country." As a head of the Soyuz group, 
Colonel Alksnis proposed Bakatin as well as Ryzhkov as a candidate for the 
position of president.10
These actions could be considered as a kind of challenge by the military 
establishment to Gorbachev's leadership. Immediately after his election, Gorbachev 
met with the military deputies, probably in an attempt to assure them that their 
interests were being taken into consideration. Gorbachev paraphrased 
Petrushenko's words, noting that criticism of the armed forces had to be taken 
calmly and that "calm in the army means calm in the country."11
We cannot fail to pay attention to another Moiseev's complaint. When the 
Presidential Council got to work, he criticized the Supreme Soviet for failing to
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spell out the exact functions of the president and its council with respect to the 
armed forces in the absence of the Defence Council.12 Moiseev also focused on the 
nuclear command authority. It was possible that the chief was upset with a series 
of works by the political leadership damaging the highest organ of the military 
affairs. Thus, he appeared to limit or downgrade, in some way, the military related 
functions of the Presidential Council that were not made clear in the Constitution. 
For example, "in a special period" the Presidential Council would be transformed 
into a USSR State Committee for Defence and then take over the functions 
previously performed by the Defence Council, he said, recognizing that the 
Presidential Council would act from then on as the country's supreme and 
permanent body overseeing defence policy.
The Defence Council was a state organ composed of party and government 
officials whose primary jobs, when combined, cover virtually all aspects of national 
security, before the parliamentary system came into being. The Defence Council 
was then compared to the US National Security Council (NSC).13 In reality, it 
went beyond the NSC. In principle, the role of the NSC was to give the US 
President advice on matters of national security, with some exceptions dependent 
on the president's personal style. Considering the presence of a select group of the 
top political, military, and economic officials in the Defense Council, its decisions 
could easily become policy. Its activities were, moreover, hardly checked by other 
institutions. Its status began to slide, however, when Gorbachev made the CC 
Secretariat of the CPSU a much more important centre of national security 
policymaking than it had ever been before, particularly with the widening of the 
jurisdiction of the International Department of the Central Committee as mentioned 
in the chapter three.
Amid this change, Gorbachev publicly recognized himself as chairman of the 
Defense Council in order to raise his authority over the military. For example, in
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February 1987 he said that "the Soviet leadership, and the country's Defence 
Council, which I am instructed to head, constantly keep the problem of the security 
of the country..."14 As two years had past since then, the committees and 
commissions of the Supreme Soviet began checking the Defence Council and 
inevitably many debates on its work took place. This became apparent after 
Gorbachev announced some of details of the activities of the Defence Council 
during Yazov's confirmation as defense minister at the first session of the Supreme 
Soviet. For example, Yazov was asked to present his view on the global political- 
military situation before Lapygin's Committee for Defense and State Security. 
Others who had testified before the Committee included Moiseev and Army 
General V. Shabanov, deputy defense minister for procurement.
Gorbachev also changed the nature of the Defence Council, besides opening 
the organ to the public. In November 1989, L. Zaikov, CC Secretary responsible 
for defense industry, was promoted to the post of first deputy chairman of the 
Defense Council and assumed several functions formerly performed by defence 
minister Yazov. And the membership was also expanded to allow better civilian 
representation. But details of these changes were not made public. Only Zaikov 
revealed in an interview that Gorbachev wanted a non-military official supervising 
the work of the Defence Council during a time of retrenchment and arms control. 
Zaikov's comments indicated that opposition to Gorbachev within the military 
establishment was growing and that his own appointment represented a move to 
enhance control over the armed forces.15 William E. Odom interprets Gorbachev's 
attempts as an attempt to make the Defence Council less dependent on the Central 
Committee apparatus, and as a continued scheme for moving real power into the 
Supreme Soviet at the expense of the Party.16
Finally, the Defense Council got lost its legal foundation for its existence in 
the very lately amended USSR Constitution in March 1990. The old version of the
155
USSR Constitution said that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Soviet to 
form the Defense Council, without mentioning whatsoever of its chairman. The 
Article 121/(14) says that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall 
form the Council of Defense of the USSR and confirm its composition; appoint and 
dismiss the high command of the armed forces of the USSR. Finally, according to 
the Article 121/(5) of the USSR Constitution amended in December 1988, the 
chairman of the Defense Council was reserved for the chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet.
5.2. Gorbachev's Odessa Speech and Military Reform
Attending troop exercises at the Odessa Military District on August 17 1990, 
President Gorbachev gave a noticeable address to the military personnel. His 
speech consisted of three issues: the urgency of a transition to a market economy, 
the working out of a new Union Treaty, and military reform.17
It is necessary to trace the progress or unfolding of some circumstantial 
events to understand the character of his speech. First of all, President Gorbachev 
interrupted his summer holiday of 1990 to address the troops there, because of his 
concern about military problems, Novosti military commentator V. Pogrebenkov 
very tentatively observed.18 In fact, it was his second appearance at such a minor 
military event in less than two months. Gorbachev even appeared at a graduation 
ceremony of Soviet officers in Moscow on June 26 1990 and spoke to them.19 
There he had boosted military reform, of course. It was at a time, moreover, when 
the advocacy of military reform had already arrived with a vengeance in the USSR.
When politicians in most parts of the country, including El'tsin,20 were 
compelling the Soviet army to adopt a mixed system consisting of a smaller
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professional army supported by nationally based territorial formations, on July 25 
1990, Gorbachev issued a decree forbidding the formation of unofficial armed 
forces, i.e., national armies, and calling for the disbanding of such groups and the 
confiscation of all illegally owned weapons, ammunition, and explosives within 
fifteen days. Moreover, the decree contained the explicit threat of the use of force 
by saying that failure to comply would result in seizure of the arms by either 
republican or local authorities or by the MVD, KGB, and Army troops. But 
Gorbachev was in the end forced to extend the deadline by two months because of 
rebellious republican authorities. This clearly reflected how weak Gorbachev's 
authority was at that moment.
But the real irony was how little control Gorbachev had over the army. In 
fact, Gorbachev needed some form of additional consent, besides the publication of 
the decree. According to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General 
Omelichev, army troops would be used to enforce the decree, only if first 
requested to act by local authorities.21 It was hardly accidental that in an interview 
to mark Soviet Navy Day on July 29 1990, Admiral V. Chernavin called for 
military reform to take place within the confines of the present mixed system of 
professionals and conscripts. Moreover, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2 was 
about to be used as a new ammunition by the conservative generals to attack the 
new political thinking.
Therefore, Gorbachev was not in a strong position to conclude the debates 
on military reform but to summarize them by major issues. Nonetheless, 
Gorbachev's Odessa speech was significant in that he had made his first attempt at 
a systematic analysis of military reform from defense needs to principles of 
formation and service. Until then, Gorbachev's ideas on military reform had been 
piecemeal mainly in connection with new military doctrine, i.e., reasonable 
sufficiency for defensive defense, and arms control proposals.
157
First, Gorbachev involved the assessment of the nature of the external threat 
against the USSR. This was the traditional approach of making Soviet security 
policy, in which the external threat had been the prime determinant of defense 
building and the country's economic capability had always been of secondary 
importance. A group of young officer deputies had been arguing that 
reorganization of the armed forces had to be in accordance with both defense 
needs and economic potential in its draft plan of military reform. Some civilian 
defense experts considered the country's capacities, particularly economic, as the 
main factor of military construction. Nevertheless, the president appeared to side 
with the high command in terms of approach.
As for the assessment of the threat itself, however, his position was more 
complicated. On the one hand, he strongly insisted that the "direct military threat" 
against the Soviet Union had "evaporated." Then grasped the logic of the 
deduction: current armed forces were created to perform their functions during the 
Cold War which was now over. So naturally, changes were needed. Moreover, 
military doctrine had been modified and, therefore, the structure of the armed 
forces had to be modified.22 The president, however, had a reserved attitude 
towards the fact that there was still an excessive amount of arms in the world, 
which the military leaders regarded as being of military threat. Until then 
Gorbachev had argued that they had to be reduced to the level of reasonable 
sufficiency. While jumping some questions, he concluded that the country still 
needed "powerful and modern" armed forces.23
On the other hand, returning back the subject that was the first work within 
the frame of military reform, Gorbachev briefly suggested that it was necessary to 
have an accurate idea of such countries' plans for the development of their armed 
forces in the 1990s as the US and the other NATO countries and also Japan, 
China, and so on. Therefore, the next step was clear, but too simple. Proceeding
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from the first step, Gorbachev stated, goals and tasks in safeguarding the USSR's 
defence capability had to be set and the structure of the Soviet armed forces as 
well as its numerical strength in general and in individual directions had to decided.
The third area concerned military spending. Of course, there could not be an 
absolute, or fixed, amount of money for defense, because of the way Gorbachev 
was dealing with military reform. Before the two proceeding steps were 
completed, it was impossible for him to say detailed defense needs. Inevitably, he 
gave a hint about change in formation of the defense budget but still in a very 
suggestive way. They were as follows: what financial and material resources could 
be allocated for the maintenance of the army and navy and of their combat 
readiness; for research and development; for the serial production of weapons and 
military hardware; for the insurance of normal living conditions for personnel and 
officers' families; for housing construction and maintenance; for cultural amenities 
for the armed forces and so on. Here again, he failed to make any comments on 
relative importance among them. Only he mentioned the tasks associated with the 
withdrawal of Soviets troops from foreign countries. The president considered 
housing problems as "very urgent," confirming the military leadership's argument.24
Fourth, Gorbachev turned to the question of the principle of formation of the 
Soviet armed forces. In the context of military-technical side of military doctrine, 
this concerned whether the current principle of formation was needed or not, that 
is, a large-standing army based on conscription. This issue became much more vital 
for the high command because it was at a time when civilian and military critics, 
including the young and middle-level officer deputies, were hysterically calling for 
a gradual shift away from conscription towards a smaller professional army. 
Gorbachev refrained himself from expressing his own preference. Circumspectly, 
he described the current system as "predominant" view.25
With regard to another similar issue, formation of nationality, on the other
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hand, Gorbachev more clearly revealed his position, particularly on the dividing of 
nuclear weapons among the republics. He said, "I certainly do not think that 
anyone will suggest dividing nuclear weapons and nuclear potential."26 Along with 
it, he argued for a single unified command, based on the belief that the country's 
system of defense control was a sophisticated complex and everything was 
mutually related. Whilst he did not give further detailed explanations, he concluded 
that if the Soviets suddenly embarked on the path of creating regional structures 
and fragmenting their defenses, not only would the security of the country be 
undermined but also that of the entire world would be threatened.27 Finally, the 
principle of service of whether to send recruits to serve in areas of the USSR 
outside their home republic was touched in the same fashion, too.
On the whole, it is undeniable that Gorbachev boosted military reform 
through this speech, as many in the West observed. But it rather appeared that 
both the way of approach to the military reform and the contents of his speech 
gave an impression of his retreat in many ways, particularly in comparison to his 
1988 UN speech. To be sure, he was indecisive. The fully grown centrifugal 
tendency around the country seemed likely to continue to erode the ability of the 
military, in particular the General Staff, to maintain the current mass army based on 
conscription. This long-term factor adverse to the military's institutional interests 
would probably endure, even if Gorbachev was eventually forced to give the 
military a much greater role in trying to halt the erosion of central authority. 
Moreover, Gorbachev himself strongly tried to revise the military decisionmaking 
institution at the outset of the new presidency, as mentioned above, in such a 
fashion as to downgrade the role and leverage of the General Staff in the 
decisionmaking process by abolishing the Defense Council and by introducing the 
President Council.
All of sudden, Gorbachev moved away from this strong position. At a time
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when the General Staff was working it out under the leadership of Moiseev, 
Gorbachev said that the development of the concept of military reform was near 
completion. In addition, the concept was to be examined at the Defense Council, 
according to him, which had no legal basis of its existence. Ironically, the president 
confirmed that the Defense Council had still been retained as the leading security 
decision-making organ, but in a "revitalized" form and "attached" to the 
president.28 So, although Gorbachev had curtailed the military's dominance over 
national security decisionmaking, he had neither emasculated it nor fundamentally 
altered its pivotal role in Soviet force planning. In fact, on September 1 1990 there 
was a meeting of the Defense Council at which Marshal Yazov spoke about plans 
for military reform. Gilbert A Lewthwaite even in early 1989 well observed that 
Gorbachev's challenge had been to get the generals "out of having control of state 
policy" with regard to the Soviet defense effort, while at the same time taking care 
"not to destroy... the General Staff headquarters or smash its power."29
But it was in contrast to the Odessa speech that Gorbachev issued a decree 
directed at the problems of hazing, the deaths of soldiers in peacetime, and the 
service in ethnically trouble spots in the country. A powerful catalyst of mounting 
concern and debate over the future shape of the Soviet armed forces was brutal 
violence in military life outlined by the figure of 15,000 deaths since perestroika 
was introduced. As a sole way to eliminate such incidents, a professional-militia 
system became popular among civilians. Desire for such a system or half of the 
system, formation of national armies, was in part motivated by political factors that 
were not directly related to conditions within the army. In general, under glasnost' 
growing awareness of conditions in the armed forces alone could have lead to 
protest and action. The most noticeable case was a mass demonstration in Gorky 
Park organized by shchit union and the committee of soldiers' mothers and held in 
June 1990.
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Nevertheless, by the summer of 1990, the military leadership were still 
negligent. The defense minister dealt with the situation superficially, and avoided 
recognizing the fundamentals of the problems. For example, in an interview with 
Pravda in December 1989 Yazov said that the "antiarmy manifestations" had 
become more frequent in a number of regions, including the Baltic republics, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Ukraine, and some Central Asian 
Republics. Particularly with regard to the activities of the coalition, he described 
that a number of informal organizations and nationalist, extremist groups were 
trying to obstruct and, if they could, wreck the draft by inciting young people to 
refuse to serve, to desert, and to destroy army registration documents.30 Even a 
couple of days before the decree was issued, a General Staff spokesman said that 
the figure of 15,000 did not correspond with reality.31
Gorbachev's timely decree, therefore, appeared to be a politically well- 
calculated move. At first, one could easily regard it as part of a broader initiative 
by Gorbachev in the area of military reform because it followed the Odessa speech 
and another decree on military-political organs that emphasized the principle of 
loyalty to the state rather than to the Communist Party. In addition, it could be 
seen as a direct response to popular outrage about conditions in the Soviet armed 
forces, although it was in part designed to protect servicemen from attack in 
ethnically troubled areas.
The various institutions to be instructed by the decree reflected this point. 
The MOD, together with the MVD and the KGB, were asked to immediately take 
measures to strengthen discipline and order in the armed forces and thus ensure the 
inviolability of servicemen's legal rights. The USSR Council of Ministers was 
instructed to resolve the question of introducing mandatory state personal 
insurance for servicemen, with funding to be drawn from the MOD. The decree 
directed the USSR Supreme Soviet to examine the question of granting servicemen
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the right of recourse to military tribunals to contest unlawful actions by superiors 
and to oversee effective implementation by the MOD of all these measures. The 
USSR Prosecutor's Office was asked to resolve questions pertaining to the 
initiation of proceedings against persons blamed for the death or injury of a 
serviceman. The USSR Prosecutor General was ordered to step up monitoring of 
the Military Prosecutor's Office.32
5. 3. Gorbachev’s Turn to The Right.
Within three months since the Odessa speech, on November 13 1990, there 
was a fully televised meeting between Gorbachev and more than 1,100 uniformed 
people's deputies of all levels of soviets. For Gorbachev it was the fourth meeting 
among noteworthy ones with military cadres as the president. This first was with 
the participants of the First Congress of the USSR People's Deputies who were 
also servicemen, the second was with delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, the 
third was at military exercises in the Odessa MD.
This time can be regarded as a turning point in many senses. First of all, the 
president's speech, not to mention Gorbachev's changed, supportive attitude 
towards the MOD military reform plan, was repeatedly interrupted by shouts from 
the floor and noise in the auditorium, when people were anxiously watching the 
event on television. The supreme commander in chief, interrupted by officers, was 
driven to ask them: "Is this [marketization] of no interest to you? I am not talking 
about this to you for nothing. If perestroika proceeds in these main areas the 
atmosphere in which the army lives and works will also be completely different."33
It happened when even in the early part of November one of the most highly 
contentious themes concerned the armed forces. On the first day of the month
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Gorbachev invited a group of soldiers' parents who lost their sons in peacetime to 
the Kremlin. The next day the Russian leadership received officer deputies, 
following the event that military chiefs and military experts whose units were 
stationed on the RSFSR were invited to the RSFSR Council of Ministers on 
September 20. Then the military parade in Red Square to mark the 73rd 
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution came. The Soviet Union's most modem 
road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25 was paraded through Moscow,34 probably in order 
to bolster the declined morale of the armed forces. Moreover, the coup rumours 
had not yet calmed down since September 1990 when news of armed military units 
moving in the direction of Moscow reached the Russian leader.
Before Gorbachev appeared on the platform, there were the speeches by the 
officer deputies, the contents of which were strikingly consistent. Pain and 
bitterness came to the surface particularly in speeches by deputies from the 
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and Estonia. Their introductory remarks provided 
general information about the sociopolitical situation in their garrisons. The main 
point was that "antipeople," "antisocialist," and "separatist" forces were waging a 
struggle for power under the slogans of the development of national self-awareness 
and carrying out "mass moral terror" against servicemen. The brutal violence 
against servicemen and the chanting of the pickets around headquarters buildings 
and airfields, and so on, were common.
The activities of republican authorities were their major interests. According 
to the deputies, many of them not only adopted legislative acts and resolutions on 
the military question that contradicted USSR legislation but also demand the 
creation of ethnic military formations. There were some variations along the 
republics. V. A. Kostin from Latvia focused a lot on housing problems caused by a 
series of acts of the Latvian Council of Ministers. Colonel V. Suvadevidze critically 
saw that the law on alternative service adopted by the Georgian parliament and he
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argued that the law effectively suspended the fall 1990 draft to come. On the other 
hand, Major V. Kibalnik, representative of the MVD Dzerzhinskii Division, spoke 
mockingly of the Russian parliament, which had honoured with a minute's silence 
the memory of the "innocent victims" of Yerevan. He insisted that the innocent 
victims were militants who tried to seize the weapons of a patrol of internal troops 
personnel, and concluded that only the Russian parliamentarians did not grieve for 
the dead soldiers.35 In addition, he drew a prompt conclusion from disagreement 
with them: "did the people elect the right parliament? Could they have made a 
mistake?"
The end part of their speeches were straightforward. Gorbachev was 
repeatedly reminded that his duties as head of state, supreme commander in chief, 
and general secretary were to defend the Soviet armed forces and Communists 
against "accusations" and "denigration." Colonel V. Suvadevidze after summarising 
the situation in Georgia said, for example, that it was time the country's leadership 
stopped being an "onlooker" and came out resolutely in defense of the armed 
forces.36 Here an interesting point was that the military deputies preferred to 
appeal to Gorbachev the General Secretary, not to Gorbachev the President and to 
swear allegiance to the Communist Party. In fact, this kind of appeal, severe 
criticism of republican authorities, and the party's continued activities in the armed 
forces were resulting in more confrontation and deeper alienation between army 
units and local soviets which would impede the solution of the army's own social 
problems.
In response to the officer deputies criticisms, Gorbachev firstly accepted that 
one could talk of problems, difficulties, the aggravation of interethnic relations in 
society, and the complication in the consumer market that had all affected the 
armed forces. Then he promised to take personally all those remarks. He even said 
that "a government that does not understand the significance of the armed forces,
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and that does not take care of them has no right to exist."37 There was no change 
in his logic, however, why military reform was needed. That is, if the international 
situation altered in a different direction, then the Army would alter, too. But 
Gorbachev recognized this time some "failures" arising from the implementation of 
the treaties on reductions in the armed forces such as the INF Treaty and the 
unilateral reductions of conventional weapons, as the participants of the meeting, 
including senior military leaders, strongly argued. Based on this line, he stressed 
that "very well balanced, well-thought-out steps" in working out military reform 
were required.38
In other words, Gorbachev clearly recognized that military reform, 
particularly reductions, could affect both the armed forces and the defense sector 
of the economy, in which, according to him, the best forces of the working class, 
designers, and scientists were concentrated. On the whole, this clearly signalled a 
retreat from his earlier position on military policy. But Gorbachev never gave up 
the basis of new political thinking and his wish to move away from the militarized 
nature of the economy to a market economy.
In fact, Gorbachev allocated a large part of his speech to these two issues. 
He laid great emphasis on detente and disarmament toward a nonviolent and 
nuclear world. There was no change in his belief that the current world was 
vulnerable, confronting ecology and the depletion of resources that were arising 
acutely everywhere. In this respect, the country had to cooperage and to divert 
international relations into a "new channel,"39 he argued. In addition, he defined the 
militarized nature of the Soviet economy in an unprecedented way. "Only 10% of 
production assets have been employed in the light and food industries... How, in 
such a distorted and deformed economy, can one tackle the problems of improving 
living conditions, which do not suit any of us?"40 Gorbachev lamented.
This was the most severe description of the defense burden on the Soviet
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economy. Until then the Gorbachev leadership had sought to maintain progress in 
the economic reform partly by reducing military expenditures. The stable 
international environment was necessary for this approach because it could help 
Gorbachev to sustain political support for converting industrial capacity to civilian 
output as well as for restructuring the defense industry. Disarmament was also 
important because it could not only release material and technological resources 
but also ease the international conditions. In Gorbachev's opinion, it was time to 
substantially reduce the military expenditures, judging the current Soviet security 
situation. But officer deputies complained about the problems caused by arms 
reductions and urged Gorbachev not to cut further. Therefore, it seemed that, 
while recognizing the socioeconomic difficulties facing officers and their families, 
Gorbachev publicly depicted the militarized economy in such a way.
At the same time, he appeared to have wanted to separate the issue of 
marketization, which could mean the republic's greater autonomy, from the 
creation of national armies, currently central issue of military reform. At the 
session of 'Question and Answer,' Gorbachev firmly supported the current system 
as far as the principle of formation was concerned. In the Odessa speech he 
refrained from giving his preference. This time, however, reminding the military 
deputies of major Lopatin's accusation that the president had failed to react to a 
group of young and middle level deputies' message and their project for military 
reform, Gorbachev solely said that there were no professional armed forces 
anywhere apart from in three states, the US, the UK, and Japan and other all states 
everywhere effectively adopted the conscription system. In this context, the 
president concluded that what the country currently had was a very good 
principle.41 With regard to the creation of national armies, however, he failed to 
give any details, other than to say that the idea was "not convincing."42
Gorbachev did not see seriously the popular demand for the removal of
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Communist Party's influence over the armed forces. He accepted only the idea of 
"departization". In his opening speech to the 28th Party Congress, Gorbachev had 
rejected "depoliticization'' of the armed forces, arguing that the inculcation of 
political values was crucial to maintaining high morale.43 Both political officers and 
commanders argued that political training was carried out in all the world's armies, 
and that there were relevant institutions, they had different names, but they existed. 
Although it was not clear that as General Secretary of the CPSU Gorbachev 
himself either was ambivalent about depoliticization or had been compelled to 
compromise with the high command on the issue, he considered it acceptable to 
transform the existing political organs for the tasks of building and training, 
including moral and psychological, and educating military servicemen, rather than 
to abolish them.
Finally, the president showed his keen interests in social protection for 
servicemen and officers under market conditions, while regarding it one of the 
most important questions. On the housing problem, Gorbachev stressed that it was 
planned during the 13 th five-year plan to broaden housing construction. He even 
recalled that the united Germany was appropriating 8 billion marks specially for 
housing for Soviet servicemen. Furthermore, he promised that "we will do 
everything"44 to normalize the housing situation more rapidly, vigorously involving 
local organs in resolving it.
Let us address the fundamental question of why the president had sided with 
the high command through the speech concerning military reform. Primarily 
whether Gorbachev was forced to do so, or not? If he deliberately sided with the 
conservatives, including the high command, what was his motive? In fact, both 
questions are indivisible, just like two sides of the same coin. It was suggestive of 
this point that the centre place in an extremely broad political spectrum for 
Gorbachev was waning.
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S. Shatalin, economist in the Presidential Council, somehow pointed out this. 
In an open letter to the president, he disclosed that Gorbachev's change of heart 
occurred during a late-night session with leaders of the Russian Communist Party 
and certain members of the Politburo on November 17 1990.45 Then, he urged 
Gorbachev to abandon his mystical, suspicious attitude towards the democrats and 
to re-establish his alliance with them. According to Shatalin, the democrats were 
not weak and even had the support of many healthy forces in the army, KGB, and 
military-industrial complex. In part, his argument that the democrats were not 
weak was plausible. Ironically they were too strong as far as the relations between 
Gorbachev and the high command were concerned. In short, El'tsin as a core of the 
democrats was strongly challenging the post of the CINC of the Soviet armed 
forces.
During the last five years there had been unprecedented criticism and open 
airing of the problems of the armed forces and many institutional challenges to the 
military in the country. They all appeared to have some interrelated natures on 
which Gorbachev and his reformist allies had more or less designs. While 
developing his own views both on security and military affairs and on other policy 
areas which had an impact on the military, until then Gorbachev had deliberately 
situated the high command to face the difficulties. To be sure, a feeling that he had 
to do it so had increasingly grown with the unsatisfactory progress of economic 
reform.
From the beginning, Gorbachev recognized that the requirements of 
economic reform needed new foreign and security policies, which could have 
implications for the institutional status of the military as a whole. Thus, the 
downgrading of the military sector in policymaking processes followed necessarily 
and inevitably. In this connection, the reformist leadership had tried to encourage a 
group, from civilian defence experts to dissident officers, to take part in the debate
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on how to reform the armed forces. It was designed in order to reduce the 
military's monopoly on military information and to change the setting of the Soviet 
security policy agenda and policymaking process.
The sudden and dramatic chain of events that started in Eastern Europe in 
the late summer or early fall of 1989 led to this design being questioned. The rapid 
unravelling of Communist powers throughout the region, the resulting pressures on 
Soviet troop withdrawals, and the emergence of the issue of German unification 
had severely sharpened the difficulties confronting Gorbachev's new thinking. 
These were hardly consistent both with requirements of the economic reform and 
with overriding Soviet security interests. It is most likely that the Soviet leadership 
had hoped to slow the pace of change in the East, preserve the integrity of the 
Warsaw Pact, and defer the issue of German unification to the indefinite future.
When the unified Germany's membership of NATO was put into practice, the 
Soviets had not any options but to accept it. These developments were enough to 
be used as the most strong ammunition by hard-line conservatives, including senior 
generals, and thus re-intensified the debate about the implications of Gorbachev's 
foreign-policy priorities for the USSR's defence posture at a moment when, one 
thought, the new thinkers had nearly won the debate. Around the end of 1989, 
defense minister Yazov appeared to have endorsed the concepts of reasonable 
sufficiency and defensive defense. Now with regard to his foreign policy, 
Gorbachev was being judged to have bargained away Soviet military power and 
accepted the loss of the buffer zone while gaining almost nothing in return.
In addition, the domestic situation was very bad. The country was at the 
moment worse off economically in comparison with that of five years ago. 
President Gorbachev was wavering between wanting the benefits of a free market 
and wishing to retain centralized control of the economy. The Soviet Union was 
threatened by a growing nationalism in the various republics, manifested in
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separatist or nationalist movements in the Baltic states, in Central Asia, and in the 
Russian republic itself.
Rather ominously, it was on the verge of civil breakdown and the demise of 
the union. Among other things, however, the nationality question was delicate 
enough to renew the relationships between Gorbachev and his senior generals, 
adding to the foreign and security policy that was being questioned. On the one 
hand, the Soviet armed forces through their internal policing function played a key 
role in the regime's recent efforts to maintain order in areas driven by nationalist 
upheaval. This policing function had made the Army the focus of attack and 
hostility on the part of nationalist groups, which begun to press for an end to 
extraterritorial staffing with the military, for the establishment of national military 
units on republican territory, and for the placing of local units under local political 
control. All these demands were troublesome for the military leadership.
On the other hand, to Gorbachev, who was presiding over the collapse of the 
union, the Russian leadership's enhanced activities in order to achieve some 
influence over the Soviet armed forces were becoming a political threat. In 
September 1990, military chiefs and military experts whose units were stationed on 
the Russian republic's territory were invited to the RSFSR Council of Ministers. 
Subsequently, a number of military deputies were invited. In mid-November 1990, 
there was a meeting between the RSFSR Council of Ministers and with leaders of 
defense complex enterprises.46 The most serious, however, was El'tsin's demand 
for the resignation of the Ryzhkov's government and its replacement by a coalition 
government in which the Russian republic would nominate the prime, finance, and 
defense minister.47 Nearly two weeks before, when news of the Army, MVD, KGB 
elite units moving in the direction of Moscow reached the Russian leadership, the 
commanders of the military districts around Moscow, including Yazov, were 
summoned and were told that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet was the only legal
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power in Russia.48 And now, El'tsin had a head-on collision with Gorbachev's role 
as CINC of the armed forces and the country's nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, a cautious observer of the political activities of the RSFSR 
leadership in its attempt to raise its influence over the USSR government, naturally 
over the Soviet armed forces, could raise a question: whether this series of 
meetings had happened by chance and without any deliberate intention of the 
RSFSR leadership, or not. A political commentator of Izvestiya clearly observed 
this with some suspicion. The Russian leadership virtually attempted to use the 
views of officer deputies to put certain demands to Union bodies."49 In this 
context, Gorbachev hit the nail on the head, mentioning the issue at his meeting 
with officer deputies. Gorbachev said that "I have to say that I am resolutely 
opposed to such methods...."50 So, there could be a mutual area between 
Gorbachev and the military concerning the drawing up of a new Union Treaty,
Gorbachev first rejected the idea of the new Union Treaty at the September 
1989 plenum of the CC held to discuss nationality policy. By February 1990 
Gorbachev began talking of the need for it. In the end, it became a top agenda 
because the passage of the Union Treaty was vital to his retention of power. 
However, the main concern was that there was unlikely to be general agreement 
amongst fully grown republics about an empty concept, a "union of sovereign 
states", although it depended on Gorbachev's position on drawing up the new 
Union Treaty.
Meanwhile, the high command had shown its determined attitude towards 
retaining a unified, multinational army under a unified command, in particular, and 
maintaining Moscow's predominant role in various areas, as a whole. In the 
circumstance, If Gorbachev was resigned to a much diminished role for the centre, 
then he might be willing to keep steady pressure on the defense community. On the 
contrary, if not, it would be helpful for him to side with the armed forces. In
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reality, he chose the latter option.
Thus, he appeared to have shown a more shallow commitment to his 
commitment to military reform and at the same time tactical manoeuvres designed 
to weather the current "storm." This was also reflected by the fact that, faced with 
the dissolution of the empire, Gorbachev had already issued a number of hard-line 
statements indicating his willingness to use force as a means of putting down 
independence drives in various republics. In fact, a period of compromise or 
contract that continued to the spring of 1991 between Gorbachev and the high 
command had already started, as will be seen in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 6. MILITARY RESPONSE Is AIRING OF THE MOD
DRAFT REFORM CONCEPT
6.1. Timing of Airing of the MOD Draft Reform Concept
It was in November 1990 that the USSR ministry of defense aired the whole 
of its military reform concept (MOD draft). Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik published the 
MOD draft as well as the Lopatin plan , i.e., "On the Preparation and Conduct of 
Military Reform" developed by a group of USSR People's Deputies and signed by 
People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin.1 Consequently, readers could have a chance to 
compare the two draft plans. As seen in the previous chapters 3 and 4, around the 
elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989, there was the 
highest wave of military reform debates in the country. The debates had dynamics 
of'from below.' Ordinary people responded to civilian defence experts' criticism by 
complaining to the high command. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral arms 
reduction at the UN in December 1988 was followed on the heels of widespread 
debates over the meaning of 'reasonable sufficiency' and particularly over the 
immediate implementation of the new military doctrine adopted in 1987. One could 
say, therefore, that the announcement forcefully ended the military doctrinal 
debates, which were one aspect of the necessity for the restructuring of the Soviet 
armed forces, against his reluctant generals.
The airing of the MOD draft was directed at how to end the other aspect of 
military reform necessity coming from the domestic situation in general and internal 
problems of the armed forces in particular. The election campaigns provided a
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unprecedented, unrestricted setting for bringing the debates before a wider 
audience from the top military leadership to the ordinary people. A compromise 
had been hardly effected between the two polemics of conservative senior 
commanders and people through debates, including face-to-face discussions. This 
was in part mirrored by a variety of reform agendas such as the establishment of 
territorial and ethnic units; the reduction of the term of compulsory military 
service, the rejection of extraterritorial principles of military conscription, and so 
on. The most common measure to be taken to solve the current problems was that 
the Soviet armed forces should become a volunteer, professional army. Thus the 
word military reform mainly meant the introduction a professional army.
But many of the senior military representatives rejected this idea as soon as it 
appeared. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev simply called it a "mercenary" army.2 
Defense minister Yazov mentioned that professional soldiers serving for money 
would have poor moral qualities and poor fighting spirit.3 Chief of the MPA 
Lizichev defended on behalf of the majority of military communists the current 
system. He argued that it had been developed by the Communist Party and tested 
by World War II and therefore proved to be reliable.4 The current mass conscript 
army could benefit from some improvement as mandated by the principle of 
reasonable sufficiency, but to completely replace it would be counterproductive, he 
continued. These generals offered two main reasons why a change could not be 
made immediately. One was the inability of the Soviet economy to fund such an 
army. The other was the existence of a continuing threat to the Soviet Union. In 
other words, the danger of war still existed so that the country needed a ready 
body of military reservists.
Despite the high command's efforts to protect the current conscript army, the 
popularity of the professional army gained momentum with the publication of part 
of the Lopatin military reform draft. Under a more relaxed political atmosphere the
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media coverage against the high command and for reform movement, including the 
activities of a group of young and middle level officer deputies, forced the generals 
to change their approach to the issue. In fact, they were left with no choice but to 
begin formulating a competing programme for military reform. General Moiseev 
denied that the activities of Lopatin's committee were a catalyst for the steps taken 
by the MOD. The chief of the General Staff argued that he was immediately 
charged with overseeing a reformation of Soviet defense needs to the year 2000 
since being appointed as chief of the General Staff.5 But this claim was hardly 
credible.
The Collegium of the Defense Ministry met on April 10 1990 to discuss its 
draft reform proposal.6 The following days on April 12 and 13 Krasnaya zvezda 
published a predraft of the law on defense. Although it was brief, the predraft 
codified the main directions of military reform.7 In June 1990 an overview of the 
draft law's key areas was presented by Yazov. Of significance was his approach to 
the professional army. The defense minister said that the Soviet armed forces had 
already had a high number of professionals, whilst acknowledging that a 
professional army would be more effective than a regular army of draftees.8
Originally a military theoretician, Colonel General V. Serevryannikov, 
handled the issue in that way. Conceputalizing the difference between a small 
professional army and the current mass conscript army, he declared that the 
country had a fully professional army in which almost all officers possessed a 
higher education and were fully trained in the effective use of weapons and military 
technology.9 Here the theoretician's curious point was that Western armies were a 
kind of mass army, which forced the USSR to do the same. In case of Yazov, 
however, the term professional army was used generally. If a voluntary 
professional army were adopted, Yazov argued, there would be the limits on the 
trained reserves, economic burden, and so on.
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Moreover, the defense minister announced that within a set of ideas of 
military reform an experiment concerning the system of recruitment would begin in 
1991 first in the navy and, if successful, that could be expanded to other branches 
of the armed forces.10 Its main point was that some recruits in the navy would be 
given the option, either to serve for two years like other regular draftees serving in 
other branches of the Soviet armed forces, or to sign up for a three-year term at 
150 rubles per month. This experiment caused confusion as far as the 
professionalization of the Soviet army was concerned. Around the time, chief of 
the General Staff Moiseev recognized some advantages of a volunteer, professional 
army. If it were introduced, there could be better service and material conditions 
for officers and a higher quality of recruits, he observed. Furthermore, he assured 
that possibilities for introducing such an army were being studied and the 
possibilities, if some prerequisite conditions were met, would be put into practice.11
In reality, however, Yazov's twist hardly reflected what it was actually like, if 
we consider the number of defections from the previously unbroken high 
command's opposition to such a transition. One of the earliest ones was chief of the 
staff of the Warsaw Pact Military Organization, Army General V. N. Lobov, who 
had focused on Soviet defense policies in the 1920s and 1930s and their current 
implications.12 Another advocacy of a professional army was recently retired 
Serevryannikov, who had been considered as a leading conservative general up to 
the present moment. This time, calling for a national referendum on the question of 
a professional army, he strongly believed that the transition to such an army could 
be completed "in 5-7 years"13 under current international and domestic conditions.
It is most likely, however, that navy's position on the issue could have 
imposed a heavy burden on the military leadership. As early as 1988 chief of the 
Navy Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin suggested an idea similar to what Yazov 
mentioned as an experiment. Then it was demanded that the length of conscripts'
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service in the navy should be reduced from three years to two years like other 
branches. Admiral Chernavin, while defending the three-year term of naval 
conscription as necessary because of the complexity of naval technology, asked 
enlisted men in the navy to be offered "benefits."14 By October 1989, the Admiral 
had even submitted to the MOD a set of proposals for creating a volunteer navy. 
Therefore, Chernavin's position on volunteer enlisted men appeared to be the first 
open crack in the solidarity of members of the high command. There was a wonder 
that there would be a necessity for Gorbachev to mediate the conflict between 
Chernavin’s views and the views of the rest of the high command.15
In this respect, Yazov's commitment to the experiment represented a mere 
concession. It certainly fell short of the core of the widely shared concept of 
military reform and appeared to be a rather clever move given the situations. 
Admiral Chernavin himself confirmed this line in an interview to mark the Navy 
Day on television in July 1990. First, the view or interpretation that the Navy 
would become professional based on the contract system was criticized as a sort of 
"irresponsible, demagogic, high-pitched" one.16 He considered that the Soviet 
armed forces could not be made up on an "exclusively contract" basis, nor only on 
a volunteer basis but that there had to be a combination of both, of a universal 
military obligation and contractual voluntary make-up.
This view was well manifested by Colonel General Krivosheyev's comments 
on the issue. Whilst describing the MOD's draft for military reform on television in 
July 1990, the deputy chief of the General Staff hardly mentioned the word 
professional army itself. It was just envisaged that a certain number of generals' 
and admirals' appointments would be reduced. Instead, he tried to pay attention to 
the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, more troops cuts, and resolution of 
socioeconomic problems in the armed forces.17
Since that point the high command geared up to activities which could divert
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the public's attention from the professional army and at the same time to create the 
impression that they were responding in a timely fashion to the key issues facing 
the military and were solving its many problems. First of all, the military leadership 
argued that the year 1987, when new military doctrine was adopted, should be 
considered the beginning of military reform. Then, the high command insisted that 
the restructuring of the armed forces was in process. A list of changes in Soviet 
foreign and security policy were cited as evidence for their claim. They were the 
conclusion and fulfilment of the INF Treaty; withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan; the unilateral reduction of the armed forces along Gorbachev's 1988 
UN speech; conversion in over 400 enterprises of the defense complex; the 
reduction of military budget; and movements of such troops as The Railroad 
Troops, MVD Internal Security Forces, and KGB Border Guard Troops away 
from the armed forces.
At last, in November 1990 they aired the detailed draft of military reform. In 
general, the MOD draft laid out a lot of facts and figures but failed to show 
reform-oriented ideas. It lacked an overarching conceptual ffameworking that 
could be applied to existing problems. In this respect, the airing appeared to be a 
temporary measure to soothe ordinary people who were complaining that the 
military readership was neither prepared nor willing to support fundamental 
changes in the current system of the Soviet armed forces and that the high 
command sought to suppress dissenting view within the officer corps on the issues 
of military reform and defense policy. At its best, the main aim of the MOD draft 
seemed to be to win approval at the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and 
State Security over the Lopatin's plan that had been waiting to be finally settled 
there.
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6.2. The Level of External Threat and The Necessity for Military Reform
In the MOD draft great attention was paid to the assessment of the external 
threat to the country, in comparison to the Lopatin plan, which hardly touched 
threat assessment. In his Odessa speech, President Gorbachev showed a 
complicated, but vague, position with regard to it, as seen in the previous chapter. 
It was interesting that the MOD draft introduced its prefatory remarks with 
praising the new political thinking. The high command endorsed the argument that 
the new thinking opened up a new stage in international relations, the basic content 
of which was the cessation of the Cold War. In addition, according to it, the new 
thinking envisaged the rejection of war as a means of resolving international 
contradictions, gave unconditional priority to political methods of ensuring 
security, and proposed a cessation of nuclear testing, the elimination of nuclear and 
chemical weapons, intolerance of an arms race, a reduction of military potentials to 
the level of necessary reasonable sufficiency, the dissolution of military force 
groupings and a reduction of military expenditures, and so on.18 Through this the 
military leadership avoided collision with the political leadership, unlike some
senior commanders who were criticizing the new thinking.
On the other hand, they tried to give the impression that the implementation 
of military reform had been in process. It was emphasised that the country 
undertook a unilateral reduction of its armed forces by 500,000 persons, 10,000 
tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 890 combat aircraft; A treaty was concluded on 
the destruction of intermediate and lesser range missiles and a withdrawal of Soviet 
forces began from the territory of Eastern European countries; And since 1989 
there had been a reduction in military expenditures and the decision was made to 
convert a number of enterprises of defense sectors of industry.19
And then, down to business, the military leadership raised a series of
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fundamental questions: whether the external threat to the Soviet Union still existed; 
If yes, where did such a threat emanate from; what were the scale, character and 
targets of the threat. Up to then, generals had argued that military threat to the 
country existed and it emanated chiefly from the US and NATO. This danger, 
however, was different now, not what it used to be, they continued. In other 
words, before the new political thinking came that was an immediate war danger 
but now there was no such danger. In this context, the MOD draft introduced the 
other concept the military threat (voennaya opasnost) in a more general and long­
term respect. As Gorbachev insisted, the MOD draft made it clear that the 
immediate danger of a world nuclear war had been removed and a widescale 
military conflict between East and West was very unlikely in this historical stage. 
But the high command insisted that an overall military threat would exist as long as 
"major nuclear arsenals and powerful groupings of armed forces exist in those 
states with which acute political conflicts are potentially possible."20
This analysis was nothing new. In reality, this way of thinking in the 
assessment of the military threat had prevailed even before this publication. There 
was a more graphic description of military danger by Akhromeev. In the latest 
polemics in July 1990 against civilian defense expert and people's deputy Arbatov, 
Marshal Akhromeev said that "the US surround the USSR with military bases at 
the beginning of the 1950s, and they still have not done away with them... More 
than 500,000 US servicemen are situated at these bases. There are naval vessels, 
military aviation... The US is not reducing the number of its aircraft carrier strike 
groups. They have 15 of them. These aircraft carriers have up to 1,500 attack 
aircraft on board which can be deployed around the territory of the USSR within 
eight to 10 days... They pose a military threat to us... We could not create an 
analogous military threat to the US, which was located thousands of km across the 
oceans from us. And we could not deploy that sort of navy..."21
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Even a progressive civilian defense analyst A. Kokoshin, deputy director of 
the USSR Academy of Science US and Canada Institute, also accepted the MOD's 
conceptual dichotomy word by word in a round table discussion: "there will be a 
general military threat as long as there are large nuclear arsenals and powerful 
military machines in states with which serious political conflicts are potentially 
possible."22 Another civilian defence expert S. Rogov elaborated further upon this 
point. According to him, if nuclear weapons existed around the USSR and they 
could reach the territory of the USSR "within 30 minutes," there was a military 
threat.
Here, it is noteworthy to recall that a classical analysis of the concept of a 
military threat is generally divided into intentions and capabilities. With regard to 
the former, for decades assessments of the military threat to the Soviet Union had 
as a rule been of a highly simplistic nature and ideologized to the utmost. Now the 
military leadership felt that this simplistic nature of the estimates of the military 
threat no longer satisfied a large part of Soviet society. The MOD draft plan 
reflected this point, to some degree, as the Cold War ended. It hardly showed a 
class-based concept, or approaches to the Soviet security. Simply, it tried to focus 
on facts or capabilities, for example, an upgrading of accurate non-nuclear strategic 
offensive arms and the policy of modernization of tactical nuclear forces, 
particularly in Europe, by the US and its NATO allies. In the section of Military 
Cooperation of the USSR with Foreign Countries, however, there was a single 
worrisome sentence: "Socialist countries remain our basic partners in military 
cooperation."23 Later Marshal Akhromeev clarified this point. While emphasizing 
the fact that "military pressure" was still being brought on the country by the US 
and NATO, which wanted the Soviet Union to pursue a policy suitable for them 
but not always serving the Soviet interests, he demanded that the Soviet Union's 
"socialist choice" be protected.24
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The MOD draft plan, in general, put its relative weight on the third world 
countries, where the Lopatin draft did not touch at all. Gorbachev in his Odessa 
speech once laid emphasis on the predictable trend in the military activities of such 
states as the US, the other NATO countries and also Japan, China, Iran, Pakistan, 
India, a number of Arab states, Israel and the Southeast Asian states. But President 
Gorbachev did not use the term 'third world' countries. Simply he appeared to be 
concerned with to the long borderline of the country. Maybe, as a kind of answer 
to Gorbachev's suggestion, the high command generalized them under the name of 
third world countries and gave militarily significant characteristics. It firstly 
concluded that "the centre of international tension is shifting more and more 
toward third world regions."25 Here the main point is that leading world countries, 
including the Soviet Union, would be drawn into a war through regional conflicts. 
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was given as evidence for this conclusive 
argument. Second, an "intensive" buildup of efforts of third world countries, 
particularly Israel, Republic of South Africa, India, Pakistan, to create their own 
nuclear missile and chemical potentials was observed. Third, the MOD draft 
treated the "nationalistic aspirations" as the trigger of the adoption of adventuristic 
decisions regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction. And finally, the high 
command worried, as another source of instability, about the presence of 
aggressive totalitarian regimes that could not stop at using armed force to achieve 
their arrogant claims.
Proceeding from them, the military leadership had drawn a temporary 
conclusion that despite positive improvements the Soviet Union's international 
position remained "complicated." That is, although the threat of war had been 
removed, it had not been precluded and no guarantees of the "irreversibility of 
positive changes" in the world had formed. And as for military danger, it 
considered that the danger was "preserved" because of the development of
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international processes, paying again its great attention to the third world 
countries. Therefore, the Soviet Union still needed, the MOD draft said, 
"sufficiently powerful, mobile armed forces," as Gorbachev had frequently said. 
The military leadership, however, added another dimension of military reform, i.e., 
principles of formation and service, to the calculation: the sufficiently powerful, 
mobile armed forces had to be "multiethnic, regular, and manned on a mixed 
volunteer-compulsory basis."
6.3. Domestic Change and Military Policy.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Lopatin's plan and the 
MOD draft is the high command's approach to centre-periphery relations. Lopatin's 
group argued that the republics should have a far greater say on defense policy and 
even urged the establishment of republican-based armies and territorial service. In 
particular, it introduced the term "a community of sovereign states" and demanded 
that a determining principle of military policy in the community be "the joint 
resolution" of questions of defense organizational development and development of 
the armed forces.
In contrast, the MOD draft devoted little space to the centre-periphery 
relations and favoured retention of the existing, unified multinational army allowing 
the all-Union government to maintain control over most aspects of defense policy. 
It simply said that changes in political structures on the level of all-Union such as 
the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the President and its 
Council, demanded "precise legal regulation of the procedure" used in developing 
military policy and determining the organizations and officials responsible for 
making decisions for the country's comprehensive preparation to repel aggression,
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for determining defense appropriations and the fundamental directions of armed 
forces organizational development, and for making decisions for their employment, 
and so on.
Through this, the military leadership gave a definite answer to the Lopatin 
plan. In addition, the generals linked nationalist movements to internal stability, as 
they had repeatedly mentioned. For example, the MOD draft said that the line 
toward secession from the USSR and the establishment of national armed forces 
weakened the unity of the union and internal political stability. So, It appeared that 
the military leadership still considered the national movements as not something to 
be solved in a political way through negotiations between the Kremlin and 
republics but as something should not exist.
Then the MOD draft referred to what the new Constitution had failed to 
mention in relation to the interests of the military establishment. One was about the 
Defense Council. Another was concerned with the issue of who could order the 
ministry of defense on the use of nuclear weapons. First of all, the high command 
accepted that military policy was the prerogative of not the Party but the state in 
the person of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet and the 
President. Then it suggested, as for the fulfilment of military policy, that a divided 
but coordinated system was necessary, although it appeared to be a matter of 
conception rather than of reality.
First, the President was to head the system of coordination of the above 
structures and levels of command and control and a lot of authority was given to 
him suitable for the position. For example, the President was to organize and 
exercise overall direction of the defense of the USSR; to be the Supreme 
Command-in-Chief of the armed forces; to make decisions and issue order to the 
USSR Armed Forces on the conduct of military operations as well as on the use of 
nuclear weapons; and to declare general or partial mobilization, declare a state of
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war and bring up this question for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Among these, who was to decide to use nuclear weapons was at the top of 
the agenda in military circles regarding the President's authority. Chief of the 
General Staff once complained that the Supreme Soviet had failed to pay its 
attention on the issue, as mentioned before. Therefore, it appeared that through 
this draft the high command endorsed the president as the 'real' CINC of the armed 
forces. Its cost, however, was not cheap. The President was, according to the 
MOD draft, to rely on the Presidential Council and Defense Council. Although the 
MOD draft failed to mention the relationship between the two Councils, it tried to 
give the Defense Council the legal basis for its existence. This had also been one of 
the main concerns of the high command for the presidential system. In addition, 
when he made decisions and issued orders to the USSR Armed Forces ''on the 
conduct of military operations" as well as "on the use of nuclear weapons, the 
president had to be in accordance with "military doctrine." Perhaps, the most 
severe blow was that the President was to bear "personal responsibility" for the 
organization, status and maintenance of national defense.
Second, as the "supreme organization of state authority" in the sphere of 
military policy, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was to consider 
and make decisions on "any questions" concerning defense and determined "basic" 
directions of the country's domestic and foreign policy in the defense sphere. 
Incidentally, President Gorbachev had often reminded some military leaders, who 
criticized the current foreign and security policy based on the new political 
thinking, of the fact that it was approved by the Congress of People's Deputies. For 
example, aimed at those who had expressed anger at the new political thinking at 
the congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the 28th Party 
Congress, including some military officers and generals, he said that the country 
now had a "legitimate" foreign-policy course. And all state agencies to deal with
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international affairs had to be guided by it, i.e., the decision of the Congress of 
People's Deputies.
Third, the Supreme Soviet was to exercise "legislative regulation" in the 
sphere of defense and military organizational development; to make decisions on 
introducing martial law, declaring a state of war and employing the USSR Armed 
Forces; to determine the "overall structure and size of the USSR armed forces" 
based on requirements of defense sufficiency; to approve "the military doctrine" of 
the USSR, the basic directions of military organizational development, budget 
appropriations for defense, and amounts of material-technical resources for defense 
and monitor the correctness of their use; to determine the basic directions of the 
USSR cooperation with other states in the military sphere and amounts of material 
and financial means allocated to others states within the scope of military 
assistance; and to ratify and denounce the USSR's international treaties on such 
cooperation.
Finally, the Ministry of Defense was to be responsible for strictly military 
issues. The military leadership regarded maintaining of constant combat and 
mobilization readiness and combat effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces such 
issues. In previous years, the high command had taken part in the decisionmaking 
process in various ways. Now changes in political structures forced the ministry of 
defense to accept its limited role in the process. As for this declined status, the 
MOD draft stated that the ministry of defense was to draw up and submit "draft 
plans" for approval to the USSR President for employing the armed forces.
After establishing division of labour among the central political structures in 
this way, the MOD draft focused on the domestic sociopolitical situation of the 
armed forces. As the Lopatin plan and President Gorbachev had said, it observed 
the drop in prestige of armed forces service in connection with insufficient material 
support, poor social and everyday support, and lack of legal protection of
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servicemen. Of course, this was not new at all in their arguments. The main thing 
was what had made it possible. Over and over again, the MOD draft stressed that 
the difficult situation for the armed forces happened, first of all, as a result of 
activities by authorities of a number of republics. A number of "anti-constitutional 
legislative measures" adopted by the republican authorities was given as prime 
evidence. The next was the Soviet armed forces' reduction and withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops from foreign countries under conditions of a lack of legal and social 
protection of servicemen and their families. This type of verbalization was a two- 
edged knife. The lack of protection had been used by a number of senior generals 
as a cord word to attack perestroika and the new political thinking simultaneously. 
This time, the military leadership was very keen to give detailed figures, which had 
previously only appeared in a fragmented manner.
One well-known figure was the unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed 
forces by 500,000 persons and some equipment, begun in 1989 and ended in 
allocated time. Simultaneously with this, the withdrawal and reduction of forces, 
and the storing and destruction of arms and military equipment continued. The 
following was subject to withdrawal from the territory of Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Mongolia over 186,000 persons, including over 43,000 officers and warrant 
officers, 77 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, 3,200 tanks, 5,150 
armoured combat vehicles, 2,350 field artillery pieces, 350 combat aircraft and 364 
helicopters.
To be sure, the most difficult tasks facing the Soviet high command was the 
planned withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the territory of Germany 
over a four- year period. It was fully understandable therefore to have assigned a 
lot of space in the MOD draft for detailed information on the Western Group of 
Forces. It numbered five combined-arms armies totalling 17 divisions, one air army 
totalling five air divisions, and over 200 other formations and units in compressed
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time periods. It included 370,000 servicemen, including some 100,000 officers and 
warrant officers, 184,200 family members, including 99,300 children, over 5,000 
tanks, 9,500 APCs (armoured personnel carrier) and IF Vs (infantry fight vehicles), 
4,400 field artillery pieces, 1,700 SAM system, 620 combat aircraft and 790 
helicopters, and so on. The overall amount of stores of ammunition and supplies 
was more than 1,660,000 tons. In addition, the equipment of 12 fixed command 
and control facilities, 632 communications facilities, 31 air-field and 40 hospitals as 
well as a large amount of motor pool, garage and barracks equipment, vehicular 
and arms repair plants, and the physical facilities of rangers and training centres 
were subject to dismantling and withdrawal. In short, this numerical strength was 
hardly less than the sum of UK and France ground forces. It is reasonable, 
therefore, for the high command to consider the domestic sociopolitical situation 
of the armed forces as a precondition of military reform.
6.4. Contents of Military Reform
The reform [reorganization] of the armed forces was regarded as the nucleus 
of the entire military reform in the MOD draft. After its publication Marshal Yazov 
had described the measures that appeared in the draft as "radical" reforms.26 He 
emphasized that all armed forces components were to be "reorganized," 
"qualitatively renewed," "reduced," "given a strictly defensive direction," and so 
on. On the whole, the draft plan seemed to aim at streamlining the old system 
rather than constructing the new one based on some fundamental principles. As a 
prime evidence, the implementation of significant restructuring, including the 
changes in the existing five-branch system, was to be put off until at least 1996.27 
Whether to change the five-branch system was in the spotlight. Besides the fact
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that Gorbachev hinted that in his Odessa speech in August 1990, a significant 
change in Soviet military considerations, particularly with regard to the 
fundamentals of strategic, tactical, and battlefield offensive operations, was a 
precondition for any transformation of the five-branch system. Not surprisingly the 
military leadership was very cautious. The MOD draft said that the changes would 
not be considered until that year and that, even in that case, the changes would 
depend upon the "developments in the military-political situation,"28 a new cord 
word since General Moiseev pronounced at a meeting of General Staff Party aktiv 
in June 1990. So, for the period until 1996, the high command appeared to pass 
military reform off as a number of measures launched well before the draft 
publication, including the withdrawal and resettling of Soviet forces from Eastern 
Europe and Mongolia and the removal of civil defense and construction units from 
the administrative purview of the ministry of defense.
Although the matter of how much to reduce the Strategic missile forces was 
dependent on the ongoing START Treaty at that moment, the MOD draft 
suggested that it would be reduced by more than 30 percent. But there was no 
comment about the function of the strategic nuclear weapons. Surely, it was too 
provocative to write it there at a time when the political leadership was still 
advocating the nuclear free world. In fact, the military leadership were arguing that 
the strategic nuclear forces were to be developed to deter an enemy from initiating 
a nuclear war and, in case it began, to guarantee their execution of combat 
missions in "retaliatory operations." In this hidden strategic logic, the MOD draft 
said that priority in the restructuring of the Strategic Missile Forces was to be 
given to increasing missile weaponry's resistance, to damage-producing factors of 
nuclear and conventional weapons, and to increasing the command and control 
system's survivability. In short, the strategic missile forces were hardly touched in 
terms of their traditional functions.
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Second, there was also no comment on the status of the Ground Forces. The 
fundamentals of strategic, tactical, and battle field offensive operations made the 
ground forces the core of the Soviet armed forces. The fundamentals required 
around four million mass army with heavy armaments from tanks to medium-range 
nuclear missiles. The Air Force and Air Defense units were allocated to assist the 
ground-gaining troops that were deployed in the configuration and deep echeloned 
pattern from the forward edge of the Warsaw Pact across to the Urals and even 
further. Generally these characteristic features are needed in the event of the 
immediate threat of war. Confusingly the MOD draft insisted that the country 
needed "flexible, highly mobile forces." But it appeared that the Ground Forces 
would continue to be the basis of force groupings in continental TVD's [theatres of 
military operations], along Ogarkov's reform line. Simply, the MOD draft 
mentioned that ground forces would be reduced by 10-12%. However, there were 
some puzzling suggestions. For example, the number of armies, corps, and 
divisions were to be reduced. At the same time, subunits, units, formations and 
large strategic formations were to be reorganized, concentrating the main efforts 
on improving their defensive power. Thus, perhaps, the most impressive change 
was about a transition of the structure of combined-arms and tank armies to 
"armies with a unified structure."29 This could be confirmed by the statement that 
from 20 to 40 percent of the tanks were to be removed from their makeup. Of 
course these transformations to a certain degree confirmed the new military 
doctrine 'defensive defense'.
The Air Defense Forces were also to be reduced by 18-20 percent in a way 
that the number of large strategic formations were to be reduced. It was in the Air 
Defense Forces that some measures of a qualitative upgrading of arms and military 
equipment would be taken. The MOD draft said that air defense personnel and 
equipment were to be developed by outfitting the SAM Troops, Fighter Aviation,
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and Radio technical Troops with new weapons of warfare and by developing the 
intelligence-gathering and command and control system.30 These efforts were 
hardly at odds with Gorbachev's advocacy of reasonable sufficiency for defensive 
defense.
Fourth, there would be an reduction of 6-8 percent in the Air Forces. As a 
typical measure of streamlining, the number of different types of aviation 
equipment and the time periods for up-grading the armaments of air formations and 
units were to be reduced, the MOD draft stated.31 The number of aricraft in Air 
Force regiments was to be reduced from 40-32 in order to give it a "defenseive" 
character. In addition, attention was paid to the aircraft basing system, above all in 
European USSR.
Finally, in case of the Navy, there would be no change even in the force 
composition of personnel and equipment. Rather there would be an increase in the 
combat capabilities of the fleets under the conditions of a further reduction in ship 
strength through their qualitative renewal, and command and control systems and 
equipment and all kinds of support were to be upgraded. Finally, the Navy's 
organizational structure was to continued to be upgraded.
In sum, there would be as a whole a reduction of the size to 3.0-3.2 million 
and that of directorates at central, district, and army levels by 15-20%. The number 
of general and flag officer positions were to be reduced by at least 30% in 
connection with a reorganization of command and control entities, including those 
of the MOD central apparatus. This was one of the areas on which civilians' 
concerns had been concentrated, in the sense that senior generals were an enemy of 
military reform, in particular, and of perestroika, in general. Reflecting this 
concern, in fact, a reduction of generals had been often hinted at by the high 
command such as chief and deputy chief of the General Staff Moiseev and 
Krivosheyev.
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The MOD draft highlighted the system of manpower acquisition, or principle 
of formation. It summarized that the existing methods of manpower acquisition for 
the armed forces, combining citizens' voluntary entry into military service and the 
call-up of youth, would be retained for the "immediate" forthcoming years in 
accordance with the political, economic, social and purely military considerations. 
Instead, the high command granted some concessions to people. The volunteer 
recruitment of warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, and servicewomen for 
military service were to be expanded. A shift was to be made to a mixed principle 
of manpower acquisition, combining universal military obligation with volunteer 
entry into military service by contract to private and NCO positions. Non-military, 
i.e., alternative service is to be introduced; and so on.32
Nevertheless, the MOD draft criticized the idea of maintaining a professional 
army, one of the main concerns of the Lopatin plan. This time it was done in a very 
detailed way. Even the MOD draft suggested the calculations of expenditures for 
the upkeep of a professional army. Given a reduction in size of the Soviet armed 
forces to 2.5 million, their annual upkeep would cost the country 3.3 times, if 
average monthly pay for privates was R430, for NCOs R645, for warrant officers 
R820, for officers and generals R950, or 3.65 times, if R500, R750, R950, and 
R1100, respectively, more in comparison with 1990. In the case of the strength of 
1 January 1990, 3,993,000, 3.75 or 4.2 times. For this reason, the MOD draft 
bluntly concluded that the professional army was unthinkable. Based on this 
calculation, the military leadership rebuked advocatores of the idea strongly. They 
were simply portrayed as those who were pursuing "selfish" objectives of freeing 
some of the population from performing the sacred duty and honourable obligation 
of defending their Motherland.33
Incidentally, as for the military reasons, the military leadership summarized 
what it had repeatedly said until then. They fully accepted the belief that a regular
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professional army in peacetime was "most combat-effective." But they made it 
clear that a state without militarily trained resources would be incapable of 
supporting the transition of the armed forces from a peacetime to a wartime 
footing and the qualitative replacement of personnel losses in short time periods.
The final part of the MOD draft concerned the military-economy. Its main 
point was the volume of the defense budget. The high command showed the 
volume of appropriations for national defense up to the year 2000 in the following 
way.
Table 1: The MOD's Preliminary Calculations of Defense Budget
Description of Expenditures 1991-1995 1996-2000
Procurements of arms and
military equipment 290.7 295.0
NIOKR* 88.6 97.8
Upkeep of Army and Navy 172.1 174.8
Capital construction 28.1 26.8
Servicemen's pensions 21.4 24.0
Other expenditures 11.3 8.6
Total 612.3 617.0
*: Scientific research and experimental design work 
Unit: billions of rubles in 1991 prices
The chart combines estimated spending totals for the years 1991-1995 and 
1995-2000. There was an increase of 129.5 billion roubles in constant prices over 
the period of 1991-1995, if we calculate this using the military budget for 1991, 
which was pegged at 96.6 billion rubles.34 Consequently, this caused a lot of 
confusion and debate in the country. Defense minister Yazov tried to justify this 
growth by pointing to increases in weapons prices. According to him, tank costs
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would rise by 50%, fighter aircraft by 60-70%, and artillery systems by 40%.35 
Marshal Akhromeev also argued that the price increase eroded real value of the 
ruble so that a substantial rise in the nominal value of the defense bill was 
necessary. 36 When the Soviet parliament decided to cut two billion rubles in the 
budget, the Marshal argued that, if measured in constant 1990 rubles, the defense 
budget R96.6bn actually showed a decline in 1991 of about 8.5%, i.e., to between 
R64bn and R65bn and real cuts were made in procurement and NIOKR.37
Of significance was, however, that the MOD draft reform plan envisaged an 
absolute increase in the money spent on weapons acquisition from R39.7bn (see 
Table 2) in 1991 to R58.1bn in 1995 in constant prices. And there was also an 
increase in NIOKR from R12.4bn to nearly R17.7bn (see Table 1 and 2).
Table 2: USSR Defense Budget, 1989-1991
Items 1989 1990 1991
Procurement of arms and
military equipment 32.6 31.0 39.7
NIOKR 15.3 13.2 12.4
Upkeep of Army and Navy 20.2 19.3 31.0
Capital construction 4.6 3.8 6.2
Servicemen's pensions - - 3.2
Other expenditures 2.3 1.3 1.9
Total 77.3 71.0 96.6
Unit: billions of current rubles in 1991 prices 
Source: Izvestiya, January 12, 1991.
In its previous section, the MOD draft paid a lot of its attention to the 
improvement of military technology and its policy. In fact, there had been an 
decrease from 19.8% in 1989 to 12.6% in 1991 in NIOKR's proportion in total
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military spending, increasing the ratio of procurement spending to NIOKR from 
roughly 2:1 to 3:1 (see Table 2). Now, the MOD draft suggested that the ratio 
would rise even further, i.e., to 3.4: 1 (R58.1bn versus R17.7bn). This fact had a 
great implication for the relationship between the military and defense industry.
In principle, the military leadership considered a steady reduction in the 
armed forces' level, using less personnel and equipment, as interchangeable with a 
qualitative upgrading of arms and military equipment. The MOD draft even 
asserted that developing new spheres of military equipment and advanced 
technologies were an inalienable part of the new defensive military doctrine. Then 
it specified the prime task as being a reduction of the military-technical lag behind 
armies of NATO countries, above all in such kinds of arms as long-range precision- 
guided missiles with conventional warheads and automated command and control 
and weapon control systems. This was one of the earliest concerns of Marshal 
Ogarkov.38 The MOD draft, however, did not give any indications of the problems 
would be solved in practical terms. One of the possible ways appeared to be more 
money for military research and development. Paradoxically the MOD draft 
suggested that the generals were more interested in the weapons procurement than 
the research and design.
Moreover, the MOD draft considered the application of market prices to 
military products "unacceptable." In fact, around the fall of 1990, most of members 
of the high command sided with defense industry,39 as will be seen in the chapter 7. 
One of the noticeably exceptional cases was the view of Colonel General E. 
Shaposhnikov, the CINC of the Air Forces.40 But as a whole conservative generals 
argued that enterprises supplying products for defense needs should be given 
incentives by granting tax benefits and advantages. Most importantly, this time the 
military leadership stipulated this expressly in the text of the MOD draft.
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6.5. Treatment of the MOD Draft: Voting and Debates
On December 13, 1990, the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and 
State Security had examined the MOD draft as well as the Lopatin plan and then 
adopted the former as the basis for further work. At the same time, it was 
recommended that certain sections of the draft submitted by the deputies' group 
would be included in it, particularly those sections laying out positions on the 
social protection of military servicemen and the members of their families.41 And 
the Committee recommended that the government should put the finishing touches 
to it, and then officially submit it to the Supreme Soviet.
Later, on June 11, 1991, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers had examined and 
approved a plan for military reform sponsored by the MOD draft as expected. In 
doing so, the Cabinet of Ministers confirmed the decision made by the USSR 
Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security on December 13, 1990, 
which had already rejected the Lopatin draft. After that time, the fate of the little 
changed MOD draft lay with the Supreme Soviet and the president,42 but ended in 
a document after the failed coup.
During the period of six months, there were some critics, although the 
number of articles was limited. The main reason seemed to be that the Gulf war 
had made the new political thinkers defensive. Moreover, most of critics appeared 
after Gorbachev's turn to the left had failed to suggest any theoretically, doctrinally 
supported evidence for their arguments. Simply, complete changes in military 
leadership were called for because of their opposition to military reform.43 
However, S. Rogov's article appeared in Kommunist was to certain extent 
exceptional. Besides taking aim at defense ministry's spending projections, accused 
the military leadership of failing to define the threat to the country, on which the
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entire reform plan should be based.
Once he accepted the way of how define the ' military threat* as the military 
leadership did. Concerning the MOD military reform draft, however, Rogov 
argued that the US and Nato doctrinal changes and force reductions were 
misrepresented. In fact, the MOD draft said that the US was creating a large 
grouping of "non-nuclear strategic offensive" arms, which could be stationed 
anywhere. As Akhromeev observed, the draft also focused on the US naval forces: 
US had a "three-fold superiority" and it continued to be unshakeable.44 Against this 
argument and particularly, keeping the CFE treaty in mind, Rogov questioned the 
logic of how to propose only superficial manpower reductions in the European 
part of the USSR at a time when the CFE treaty required the removal or 
destruction of vast amounts of equipment in exactly that part of the country.45
The more serious critiques, however, were related to the results of the Gulf 
war. In general, the high command did not try to link the results of war with the 
reform in the armed forces. Chief of the General Staff at a conference on the Gulf 
war lessons in June 1991 venomously said that the main conclusion drawn at the 
conference was that political means had failed to prevent the Gulf war, although 
the possibility existed. On the other hand, Moiseev warned against those who used 
the results of the war as a pretext for making immediate changes in the military 
reform.46
By that time, for example, a reformist People's Deputy Colonel A. Tsalko 
said that the Gulf war had demonstrated the obsolescence of a doctrine based on 
massive ground forces and tanks.47 Concerning the US advanced high-technology 
weapons such as sea- launched cruise missiles, laser-and electro-optically guided 
smart bombs, and F-l 17A Stealth Fighter, which provided the high command with 
a good justification for an increase in the cost of military research and development 
of such weapons, civilian defense experts argued that those weapons could not be
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used with great efficiency without an adequate level of preparation of personnel, 
including commanders. In short, it was concluded that the operations conducted in 
the Gulf proved the advantages of a highly professional armed forces over a mass 
army based on universal military service. Consequently, the idea of the creation of 
a smaller, highly mobile, and professional army was once again became a hot issue.
In spite of the military leadership's effort to suppress the dissenting views 
within the officer corps, some interesting ideas for a radical restructuring of Soviet 
forces were further proposed by many of the participants in discussions held at the 
General Staff Academy following the conference. Among them, the most 
significant was the idea of abandoning the excessive dispersal of troops across the 
country's territory and the proposed creation of major military centres with a 
developed infrastructure.
Even the smallest subunits and installations could be easily pinpointed by 
modem means of surveillance and effectively destroyed by precision weapons so in 
the event of the danger of war it was still necessary to remove troops in good time 
from their permanent deployment sites. In addition, repulsing possible foreign 
attacks was possible only with the pre-emptive movement of troops toward the 
presumed sectors of invasion. Moreover, modern means of transport enabled that 
to be done quite quickly. Thus, there was no need to be continuously sitting and 
waiting for the aggressor right on the border, they argued.
In this sense, it would also be convenient to organize troops' combat training 
and maintain their combat readiness at the proper level in big garrisons, where 
questions of management, support, and supply were resolved for better than in 
units in "god-forsaken" remote areas in the mountains.48 Although the high 
command, including Moiseev, did not agree with them, the debates were enough to 
cause a review of the operational role of MDs and TVD.
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CHAPTER. 7 MILITARY RESPONSE II: A CONTRACT BETWEEN 
GORBACHEV AND HIGH COMMAND
7.1. Until The Military Leadership Arose against Gorbachev
In the previous chapter, we evaluated the MOD draft as being short of any 
reform-oriented ideas and an overarching conceptual framework, and thus a 
temporary measure to make time for the high command and to soothe the Soviet 
people who considered the military readership as neither prepared nor willing to 
support fundamental changes in the current system of the Soviet armed forces. In 
addition, at its best it aimed at winning over the Lopatin's plan at the voting of the 
Committee for Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet.
If we look at the MOD draft from another angle, it would be the equivalent 
of a final notice concerning military reform. The military leadership tried to end the 
debate on military reform one-sidedly after obtaining Gorbachev' consent. They 
made it clear that although the threat of war had disappeared, there were no 
guarantees of the irreversibility of positive changes and a military danger still 
existed. Therefore, the Soviet Union still needed the sufficiently powerful, mobile 
armed forces that were multiethnic, regular, and manned on a mixed volunteer- 
compulsory basis. Following the final notice, the high command began getting 
down to the much more fundamental problems, most noticeably the collapse of 
draft.
Until the spring of 1987, it was difficult to generalize the picture of 
civil/Party-military relations. From the outset the new general secretary made clear 
his intention to gain control over the defense budget and arms control based on the
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new political thinking.1 This could threaten the interests of the military. In 
response, defense minister Marshal Sokolov attempted to oppose possible changes 
being forced upon the military, but by his nature and from his speeches and 
writings he touched the political-military aspect of military doctrine, which was the 
domain of the party leadership. This meant that the defense minister gave 
responsibility for the other side of the military doctrine, military-technical issues, to 
chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev.
Whereas Sokolov held the position of maintaining the status quo, 
Akhromeev, like Ogarkov, initiated the restructuring of the Soviet armed forces 
based on his calculations. Even in the early part of Gorbachev's term, for example, 
Akhromeev played a central role at the Reykjavik meeting in 1986, in which the 
Soviets made major concessions to US demands on INF and strategic forces. He 
showed considerable flexibility and had significant authority to make concessions 
within established guidelines.2 But he was probably not a whole-hearted supporter. 
Only did he think that he could best ensure the nation's security interests as a 
member of Gorbachev's team rather than the opposition. This point was reflected 
by Parrott's observation that Akhromeev might have objected to some of 
Gorbachev's sweeping proposals for eliminating nuclear missiles.3 Therefore, 
Sokolov's vocal oppositions and other senior officers' occasional questionings to 
the new line taken by Gorbachev were short of relative political weight.
Tangibly, the civil-military relations appeared to have taken a turn for the 
worse around the summer of 1987. Gorbachev was showing a considerable degree 
of his power and the Party's authority over the military in a manner that had not 
been experienced in the country since Khrushchev. In particular, after the Rust 
affair the turnover of personnel, including Sokolov, had dramatically intensified. A 
much more serious body blow was that the military ceased to be immune to public 
criticism. Some of the leading personnel of the military had to face a series of open
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challenges ranging from military internal problems to sacred issues of military 
doctrine coming from both civilians, in particular intellectuals, and within the 
armed forces, i.e., rank and file officers.
Writer Adamovich denounced the legitimacy of second-strike nuclear 
retaliation. Some scholars argued at a round table discussion in May 1987 that the 
drafting of first and second-year college students was harmful to their intellectual 
and professional development. Chief of the Moscow Communist Party, B. El'tsin, 
together with young officers, delivered the storm of criticism in the aftermath of 
the Rust affair. These events, as a whole, signalled a new era of civil-military 
relations in the country.
In response, the new defense minister General D. Yazov took a simple road 
by recognizing the military's internal problems. He even criticized the failure of the 
armed forces to eliminate "negative" phenomena.4 Yazov appeared to be consumed 
with the implementation of perestroika in the military. In previous days he had 
shown his interest in personnel and management and, most likely, therefore, had 
been chosen by Gorbachev to assume the primary responsibility for improving 
Soviet performance in that area.
It meant that Akhromeev could continue his role with regard to arms control 
and force structure modifications. Herspring observed that as a result of this 
alignment Akhromeev became a key officer in determining the military's stance 
even on budgetary issues.5 So, the leadership of Yazov and Akhromeev, together 
with Lizichev, chief of the MPA, was beginning to mobilize support within the 
military establishment for Gorbachev's policies at a time when many of members of 
the high command were still yet showing signs of doubt and dissent on 
Gorbachev's budgetary and arms control policies.
Their first noticeable effort appeared around the Berlin Declaration on new 
military doctrine. Akhromeev, who had already endorsed word for word
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Gorbachev's statements such as how to react to the US SDI challenge and how to 
rebalance the definition of military doctrine in favour of the social-political rather 
than the military-technical side, on the front page article of Sovetskaya rossiya of 
February 21, 1987, reiterated his support for these issues. He noted that "in the 
modern nuclear-space age, the guaranteeing of security appears ever more to be a 
political problem. It can never be guaranteed through military-technical means, 
even through the creation of the most powerful offensive or defensive forces, 
including a "space shield."6 Lizichev also through an article published in 
Kommunist tried to neutralize criticism to the new political thinking.
Nonetheless, oppositional military leaders remained. Moreover, the 
unprecedented debate arranged by the political leadership over the new military 
doctrine or reasonable sufficiency between civilians and the military not only 
divided members of the high command to a large extent but also made them freely 
come to the surface. Of significance were Deputy Chief of the General Staff for 
Doctrine Colonel General M. Gareev, CINC of the WTO Marshal Kulikov, CINC 
of the Air Defence Forces General I. Tretyak, and so on.
These conservative generals disagreed with both the political leadership and 
challenging civilians in two interrelated respects: the nature of the imperialist 
threat and arms reduction agreements. They tried to keep a position that the very 
basis for reductions were the principles of parity and necessary sufficiency, based 
on a worst-case assessment of the currently existing imperialist threat. So, they 
resisted the drastic reductions of both armed forces and defense spending.
On the other hand, Akhromeev became a leading supporter of force 
reductions. But he regarded it only as a means of enhancing the security of the 
country. This point was well reflected by his consistent statements that arms 
reductions had to be bilateral and therefore reductions in Soviet forces had to 
depend on corresponding reductions in US or Nato forces. This created difficulties
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for him in relation to some of the military aspects of the new thinking that 
demanded the arms control, to a certain extent, for its own sake, and in the end led 
him to resign his job chief of the General Staff.7 Of course, as an adviser to the 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet, he could have continued to be the most influential 
figure among members of the high command, i.e., as a military's major linker when 
it came to negotiating with the political leadership over the military affairs.
Around the summer of 1989 a significant twist and turn in the attitude of the 
Yazov-Moiseev-Akhromeev-Lizichev leadership began to appear. The policy of 
glasnost' was questioned. As we have studied in chapter four, the essential point of 
the Soviet civil-military relations at this stage was that the public opinion was now 
seeking democratic mechanisms of control over the military.
The debate of military issues was intense during the election campaigns for 
the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. The lively televised 
proceedings of the new institutions were also dramatic. Gorbachev told the 
Congress of People's Deputies that the Soviet defense budget in 1989 amounted to 
77.3 billions and that it would be reduced. The debates on the Tbilisi events there 
spurred widespread popular antipathy in many non-Russian republics, not to 
mention the Georgian republic, to the existing military system. Despite defense 
minister Yazov's vehement public protests, the Supreme Soviet decided to release
176,000 drafted students early from the military service.
All of these events in the end boiled down to military reform movement, 
being an anathema to most of the senior military leaders. The advocacy of military 
reform from below, i.e., form a group of young and middle level officers, caused 
practical difficulties for the high command. The movement emerged quite suddenly 
at the end of 1988 when Lt Colonel A. Savinkin published an article in Moscow 
News that called for a radical transformation of the current Soviet armed forces 
into a professional and territorial army. The release of so called Major Lopatin's
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military reform conceptualization spurred the movement. Although there were 
many variants to the reform movement, the key point was that the Soviet Union 
had to adopt a mixed professional-militia system.
In response, the General Staff set to make its own reform plan under the 
leadership of Moiseev. On the other hand, its chief sent the first signal of the 
change in the direction to the political leadership by the publication of an article in 
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, under the tile of "Once Again on The Prestige of 
The Army." Until then he had adopted a more or less supportive or less 
confrontational approach in dealing with the political leadership. But Moiseev took 
a shrewd approach. In the article he first introduced N. Koldaeva's letter. The 
unknown candidate of juridical sciences criticized the new political thinking and its 
supporters, particularly civilian military experts; warned "biased" coverage of mass 
media of the armed forces; and then worried about the unilateral troop reductions 
and reduced military spending.8
Moiseev first evaluated the current international climate as "being warm."9 
Of course he did not forget to raise the new political thinking. Proceeding from 
this, he justified Gorbachev's UN announcement of a unilateral reduction of
500,000 troops. At the same time, he assured the reader by saying that the 
country's military capabilities were not weakened because the size and nature of the 
cuts were the results of careful discussions between the political leadership and the 
military establishment. But if we consider this point from a different angle, we see 
that he was in fact trying to raise the authority of the high command.
As for the structural change, the chief of the General Staff reiterated his 
previous comment of February 1989.10 The central tenets of'reasonable sufficiency 
for defense' were well confirmed: motorized infantry and tank divisions would 
become structurally more defensive, with reductions of 30-35% in tanks, artillery 
systems, and assault-crossing units; but defensive weapons such as antitank and
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anti-aircraft forces would be "increased" by between 50 and 100 percent.
Turning to the defense budget, Moiseev did not oppose Gorbachev's plan to 
cut military spending. But he hated those who pictured the armed forces as a 
"parasite" on Soviet society. Defense minister Yazov shared Moiseev's view. 
Rather cautiously, Yazov warned that it would be economically harmful and 
politically short-sighted, if the military budget were treated as the sole cause of the 
country's current economic difficulties.11 Incidentally, it was at a time when whilst 
the military leadership was trying to minimize perceptions of the extent of the 
military burden in order to alleviate pressure for cutting the military budget, 
opponents associated with the MFA were trying to maximize the estimate of the 
burden.
With regard to glasnost', Moiseev disclosed in his article that a new 
department staffed entirely by military officers within the USSR State Committee 
for Television and Radio (Gosteleradio) had been established to promote the 
military's point of view on defense matters. It was a sharp reversal of the policy of 
glasnost'. It was not clear at that moment whether the political leadership 
confirmed the change, or not. But, at the very least, it indicated clearly that there 
was a developing alliance between certain conservative elements within the party 
apparatus and the military leadership aimed at limiting glasnost'. H. Gelman 
regarded chief of the KGB V. Chebrikov as a leading figure among such 
conservatives.12
In this respect, it may be useful to trace back two incidents that took place in 
July 1989: the Central Committee's calling for limits on criticism of Soviet military 
and Gorbachev's facing of a public revolt at a the Central Committee meeting. On 
July 6, Krasnaya zvezda in a major announcement warned editing staff throughout 
the country against presenting on overly negative picture of the Soviet armed 
forces,13 following a hint dropped by Marshal Akhromeev, who was outspoken on
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a number of important issues, particularly on press criticism aimed at the armed 
forces.14 A number of journals such as Ogonek, VekXX i mir, and so on, were not 
only labelled incompetent publications on military affairs but also accused of 
describing army life in an unobjective and one-sided fashion and with carrying 
unreliable information concerning the armed forces' restructuring. Savinkin's article 
was singled out as a typical case among a series of incompetent publications by the 
memorandum.
Of greater importance, however, was the fact that the major part of the 
announcement consisted of a memorandum proclaimed by the Central Committee 
Departments for State-Legal Matters and for Ideology, together with the MPA. 
And the memorandum was accompanied by a resolution issued by the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee. The resolution called for a proposal to post military 
journalists from the armed forces to the editorial offices of the central newspapers 
and was to be forwarded to the USSR Council of Ministers for consideration.
On the other hand, Gorbachev bluntly rejected calls for a return to a less 
radical reform programme and categorically defended his policy of glasnost' at a 
widely publicized CPSU Central Committee meeting, in which N. Ryzhkov, E. 
Ligachev, L. Zaikov, and others urged Gorbachev to order a crackdown on 
growing dissent in the country.15 He argued that the Party had to seek 
collaboration with informal groups which the conservative party leaders regarded 
as dissidents. Furthermore, he even threatened them by saying that the party 
leadership was to bring in completely new cadres from outside, even from outside 
the party's ranks.16
Therefore, the military newspaper's announcement and Moiseev's comment 
on the new department staffed entirely by military officers within the Gosteleradio 
were puzzling. One possible explanation was that the military leadership was 
exploiting the very clear split within the party leadership itself concerning the
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continued utility of pursuing the radical policy of glasnost'. Nevertheless, it was 
more accurate to consider Moiseev's reasoned response as a slightly tentative effort 
to re-establish a workable relationship with the Gorbachev leadership. As chief of 
the General Staff, Moiseev adequately expressed his support for reduced military 
spending, arms reductions, restructuring of the armed forces, and new political 
thinking. In return, he requested significant restraints on glasnost' and particularly 
media criticism of the military. After revealing his own view on the Tbilisi affairs, 
he contended that the regular military should not be used in domestic disturbances.
As Gorbachev publicly rejected this offer, as mentioned before, defense 
minister Yazov helped Moiseev by raising the SDI question in connection with 
upcoming arms control talks. It was unusual since for the first time he touched the 
military-technical issue, which had been assigned to Marshal Akhromeev. However 
it was understandable, if we consider Gorbachev's rejection. Defense minister was 
still a proponent of increased discipline and the rooting out of bureaucratic inertia 
and generally supportive of reductions in military spending and manpower. 
Regarding to glasnost', he also registered clear dissatisfaction.17 Of importance was 
the fact that Yazov made the Soviet position on the SDI: "Any profound reduction 
in strategic weapons is possible only under conditions of a renunciation by both 
sides [the USSR and the US] of the creation and development of a widely based 
system of missile defense."18 Then Yazov argued that the US was continuing to 
adhere to its SDI programme.
This was a significant difference between the MOD and the MFA. Since the 
INF Talks resumed, the foreign ministry had expressed a willingness to decouple 
the SDI from future negotiations on strategic nuclear arms reductions. This chasm 
between the two ministries was also found in Moiseev's article. President Bush in 
late May 1989 proposed that US ground forces in Western Europe and Soviet 
troops in Eastern Europe be limited to 275,000 on each side for the July 1989
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summit on conventional force reductions. In fact, this offer would require the 
withdrawal of 35,000 US troops, a cut of around 10 percent, and of 285,000 
Soviet troops, a cut of around 50 percent.19 The chief of the General Staff said that 
Bush's proposal intended to lead to unilateral reduction of the armaments of the 
Warsaw Pact Organization countries and, in fact, to destroy them. On the contrary, 
foreign minister Shevardnadze called it "serious" and "constructive."20
In this respect, Yazov-Moiseev leadership appeared to be questioning further 
reductions in Soviet troops, or was trying to slow down Gorbachev's arms control 
pace. As the impact of withdrawals and arms cuts on the socioeconomic situation 
of the armed forces and the implication of political reform on the military status in 
the society became much more serious, the high command turned far more closely 
to their conservative colleague generals.
Marshal Akhremeev also confirmed this view. In a TV interview in October 
in which he argued with A. Kireyev, an economist and specialist on defense affairs, 
Akhromeev agreed that the US did not want war. But the marshal argued that the 
US sought to use all military, economic, and ideological mechanisms to "pressure" 
the USSR. In this context, Akhromeev revealed his sensitivity regarding arms cuts: 
force reductions could be made by "both sides", "if tensions were reduced."21 More 
specifically, the marshal reminded people of the fact there were 256 nuclear power 
plants in Europe which could create nuclear war-like conditions in a conventional 
conflict. In fact, Gorbachev had already issued a serious warning, citing the figure. 
Now, Akhromeev said that national defense could not be based on hopes and 
wishes; instead, it had to be determined by a reality where war remained a 
"possibility,"22 drawing a firm conclusion that the threat of war was not yet over.
Returning to criticism of the military, he expressed his anger on the mass 
media for depicting military life in a negative way and his concern with its lack of 
patriotism. Citing a particular issue of Ogonek which had discussed the possibility
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of a military coup, the marshal said that "there is criticism and criticism... I am 
against unfounded attacks on the armed forces and it is particularly impermissible 
when these insults are inflicted against the armed forces."23 In addition, with regard 
to Ogoneks view that the army was swathed in a "smokescreen of secrecy," the 
marshal asserted that this was a "direct accusation" against the leadership of the 
armed forces.
Since Akhromeev's television appearance, a number of senior generals 
became open in attacking the mass media. In mid-November 1989, Yazov 
observed that patriotism and dedication to international and military duty had 
declined, blaming "nationalist, extremist, separtist forces who passed themselves 
off as champions of 'national interests.'"24 Two days later, Colonel General B. 
Gromov, the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan, focused upon the media's 
"inadequate and inaccurate" coverage on the Afghan war. Even acknowledging the 
fact that the General Staff recommended against sending troops Afghanistan, but 
was overruled, the general attacked Ogonek, KomsomoVskaya pravda, and other 
media for "trying to drive a wedge between the army and society,"25 and he 
particularly spoke of an "Afghan complex" of behavioural difficulties among the 
Soviet veterans.
7.2. Politicized Armed Forces
By February 1990 Moiseev's clear message came with the publication of an 
article appeared in Krasnaya zvezda.26 After it was adopted, the chief of the 
General Staff publicly criticized the draft programme for the 28th Party Congress 
and by doing so he criticised the party leadership. As a Gorbachev appointee, 
Moiseev was expected to be more committed to Gorbachev and his programmes
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than to the traditional interests and tasks of the military establishment. On the 
contrary, like Yazov, he had shown himself not to be a simple yes-man.
It was likely that the draft Party programme fell short of attention to defense 
issues, for instance, a call to ease the harsh living conditions currently faced by the 
soldiers was encompassed in one sentence. Furthermore, it superficially evaluated 
the international situation and no space was devoted to defining the army's 
domestic policing function. In a short section devoted to "internal security," 
reference was made only to the Border Troops, the MVD troops, and the KGB.27
In this background, Moiseev seemed to argue that the political leadership 
should have carefully considered both the implications of the impending large-scale 
troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe for Soviet security arrangements and the 
problem of settling the returning troops in the Soviet Union. Particularly, 
concerning the latter point, he revealed detailed numerical figures, for example, 
from Czechoslovakia and Hungary alone over 35,000 officers and 30,000 families, 
including 19,000 children, would need to be resettled.28 Then he warned that these 
people could end up being little better than refugees and called for a detailed 
government programme to ensure their well-being.
In an open answer to the Koldaeva letter as noted above, Moiseev expressed 
optimism as a whole. But he had left himself the option of complaining for the 
future. For example, after calling attention to a Council of Ministers' resolution 
and a Supreme Soviet decree that directed local soviets to provide housing for 
demobilized soldiers, he demanded that they implement given orders right away. 
Nevertheless, the situation had not improved. This was well reflected by the 
military newspaper Krasnaya zvezda's treating the housing problems as one of the 
most pressing issues.29 So, the housing crisis became the first ammunition for some 
of the party conservatives as well as the high command to attack the new thinking 
on practical grounds.
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More ominously, Moiseev was not alone in complaining the party leadership. 
Marshal Akhromeev confirmed that he, Yazov, and Lizichev all shared Moiseev's 
views with regard to the draft party platform. Later, less than one month before the 
28th Party Congress, the chief of the MPA, Army General Lizichev condemned the 
draft Platform in a similar fashion to the Moiseev. He argued that the Party 
programme not only failed to properly evaluate the international situation but also 
underestimated the threat still posed by NATO.30
There was certain change in the manner in which the military leadership dealt 
with the new thinking. It appeared that Moiseev used the draft party platform's 
negligence as a rallying point to mobilize supporters. First it started within the 
armed forces. Aiming at the coming 28th Party Congress, they exercised a great 
deal of influence on the process of delegate selection, probably in order to prevent 
liberal officers from being elected. The most dramatic case was the failed attempts 
to expel a people's deputy Major Lopatin from the CPSU to preclude his 
election.31
Of significance were the dramatic activities of some of members of the high 
command and senior commanders at the founding congress of the Russian 
Communist Party. It was held on June 20-23 1990 amid the session of the RSFSR 
Congress of People's Deputies. It may have pleased the high command that the 
RSFSR Communist Party not only adopted hardline resolutions but also rejected 
the idea that the crisis in the country was the result of faults in the Socialist idea. 
Particularly, the congress blamed the current Politburo for political errors, by 
naming Yakovlev and Shevardnadze, as well as Gorbachev.
As for military related affairs, there was a mounting wave of dislike and 
anger at the issue "Who lost Eastern European countries?" This question in fact 
was used as further ammunition for the conservative generals to attack the new 
thinking, following the housing crisis. It was General Al'bert Makashov, the
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commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, who firstly opened the door for 
the Yazov-Moiseev military leadership to attack the new Soviet foreign and 
security policy and its results.
Makashov said that domestic reform had permitted the "ideological enemy" 
to divide soldiers from officers, and officers from generals and that the 
Communists of the army and the navy were indignant at the inaction of the Central 
Committee, the Politburo, and the government. Concerning the awful results of 
unilateral force reductions, he said that the CINC of the armed forces should be a 
realist. The realities of the world today were such that continuing unilateral 
disarmament would be an act of "stupidity" or a "crime." He believed that the so- 
called victories of diplomacy meant that the Soviet army was being driven without 
a fight out of East European countries with only the "learned peacocks" crowing 
that no one was going to attack the Soviets. The Soviet Union, however, would be 
needing the army and navy yet.32
Through this unprecedented criticism, he attacked the MFA and the 
progressive forces, from liberal intellectuals to representatives of the various 
civilian defense institutions, who under the Gorbachev leadership had redefined 
Soviet security needs and thereby encroached on what had formerly been the 
military's exclusive domain in society and in defense policy formation. On the other 
hand, he argued that the Communist Party could still, or had to, do something for 
the military.
Whereas the general did not name Gorbachev, Colonel N. Petrushenko, 
probably using his status People's Deputy, directly blamed Gorbachev for the fact 
that his arms concessions had wrought havoc in the officer corps. Moreover, the 
majority of military delegates supported a hardliner Ivan Polozkov, who defeated 
A. Vlasov, Gorbachev's candidate for the post of Russian Party first secretary.
As noted in chapter 5, during the presidential election in March 1990 most of
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officer deputies did not vote for Gorbachev. Vlasov's defeat was a painful body 
blow to Gorbachev, because at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in spite 
of the Gorbachev's support, Vlasov had been defeated by El'tsin in an election to 
the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Two congresses elected ''extremists," 
El'tsin from the left and Polozkov from the right. These incidents were enough to 
cause a substantial decrease in Gorbachev's authority over both the RSFSR and the 
USSR as a whole.
Meanwhile, one week after the RSFSR Communist Party Congress 
convened, Yazov warned that the USSR had to account for the strategic reality of 
the US and NATO increasing in strength through a policy of nuclear intimidation 
and direct confrontation. Furthermore, he raised another issue: "What prospects 
are there for peace in Europe, if Nato incorporates a unified Germany while the 
Warsaw Pact is disbanded?."33 This became the third round of ammunition for the 
conservatives to attack the new thinking.
During the days leading up to the 28th Party Congress, the debate on the 
issues intensified. Very naturally, at the 28th Party Congress a series of foreign and 
security issues, including 'who lost East Europe', occupied a prominent place in the 
proceedings. A senior political officer, Major General I. Mikulin, the head of the 
Southern Group of Forces Political Administration, brought the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe to the forefront of the debate at a meeting of 
the working group on international affairs.
First, he laid the blame for the event on the new thinking. Then, the general 
rejected Gorbachev's idea of "a common European home", one of central tenets of 
the new thinking. What was more, Mikulin criticized Gorbachev and Shevardnadze 
personally as being "indecisive" and "hasty," respectively.34 Another senior 
commander from the Navy, Admiral G. Khvatov, the commander of the Pacific 
Fleet, said "we have no allies in the West. We have no allies in the East.
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Consequently, we are back where we were in 1939."35
It was comic that Gorbachev, being faced with those two senior 
commanders' daring challenge, passed over to chief of the General Staff. In such a 
tense moment, Moiseev uttered a face-saving word: the Soviet Union possessed a 
"reliable rocket shield" that ensured itself full security."36 But this pronouncement, 
if we consider it seriously, was not unusual. The Soviet Union had never officially 
accepted the strategic nuclear forces as the main factor deterring the aggressor, as 
Moiseev's comment suggested. Moreover, the new thinking itself rejected such a 
function.
Moiseev, however, returned to his job in the traditional way used to secure 
the military interests. In a speech to the working group on international affairs, 
chief of the General Staff accused NATO countries of trying to establish military 
superiority over the USSR and of continuing to rely on force. Therefore, it was 
necessary for the USSR to maintain "parity" in both strategic and conventional 
weapons systems,37 he claimed.
Marshal Yazov in a speech to the Congress said that there was still a 
"military threat" from the West, while in a roundabout way confirming Gorbachev's 
foreign policy. The resolution of the Congress on military affairs well reflected the 
Yazov-Moiseev line. It stated that a military threat to the USSR remained and that 
there were no guarantees of the irreversibility of positive changes. The MOD draft 
plan of military reform clearly contained this word for word as seen in the previous 
chapter.
Nevertheless, it appeared that the military leadership gained little in practical 
terms, although it had hardly prepared for the Congress. The main reason was, 
among other things, the fact that the characters of the CPSU and the Party 
Congress were radically changed. Moreover, the Congress failed to take any 
concrete decisions about domestic problems facing the military. Of course, it
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lacked both the necessary authority and popular support.
In terms of international affairs, Shevardnadze, being faced with Ligachev's 
charge that West Germany had swallowed up East Germany, clearly stated that the 
issue of German unification was subject to international negotiations. That is, it 
was not for the Congress to decide. In a similar fashion, chairman of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet, El'tsin left the Congress to preside over meetings of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet. Both incidents made it clear that the Congress was primarily 
concerned with internal Party affairs. Paradoxically, what the 28th Party Congress 
had done appeared to emasculate the Party itself. So, it could be seen as a triumph 
for Gorbachev, or the reformists. However, having suffered defeat, Ligachev urged 
the military to resist democratization. Moreover, the fundamental problems facing 
the military leadership still remained.
The Soviet decision of withdrawal of some of Soviet troops from Eastern 
European countries was firstly announced by Gorbachev at the UN in 1988. At 
that moment it was mainly aimed at making the Soviet armed forces 'defensive' or 
of non-offensive orientation. So the Soviets were firmly taking the initiative on the 
matter. However, the issue of the withdrawals of Soviet troops was enveloped in 
flames with the political revolutions in Warsaw Pact countries. The political 
development of the Eastern European countries caused a sensation for the world 
community. But it meant the beginning of bitter trials for the Soviet armed forces 
stationed there. Both ordinary people and the new political leaderships in those 
countries did not want the Soviet troops to stay any longer.38 Virtually, the 
Warsaw Pact collapsed and therefore a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Eastern Europe was inevitable regardless the ongoing CFE talks.
During the 28th Party Congress and the aftermath of the storming event, the 
MFA hardly accepted the angry general's charges that the USSR had abandoned 
Socialist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and that the current leadership,
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particularly the foreign ministry, was responsible for the disintegration of the 
Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev's supporters in the MFA and elsewhere argued that the 
events in Europe were irreversible in principle and that Eastern Europe countries 
would consider the interests of the Soviet Union, a country that remained an 
influential factor in the region. To them, the West was interested in maintaining 
stability on the European continent and considered it unacceptable to transform the 
East European region into their zone, therefore, the change in these relations did 
not put Soviet national security at risk since there were political, legal, and material 
guarantees.
Academician A. Kozyrev, former head of the department of international 
organizations at the MFA and newly appointed Foreign Minister of the RSFSR, for 
example, stated that the possibility of an attack on the country was today ruled out 
completely. While accepting "nuclear deterrence", he argued that an attack on a 
nuclear power was not realistic from the purely military point of view. But, first of 
all, there were no economic motives for such an attack, he continued. "The West 
with its economy does not need our sugar coupons or queues for sausage. On the 
contrary, it most likely fears to lose its prosperity in the face of the crisis and 
instability in a country with nuclear missiles and a population of 300 million."39
But they never mentioned the central concern: the rapid tempo set for the 
withdrawals, which, according to officer corps's opinion, had turned into a 
disorderly, almost humiliating, retreat. Whatever new political thinkers said, 
soldiers definitely resented "the atmosphere of defeat" associated with their rushed 
evacuation. The question of who decided to bring soldiers home so quickly became 
more serious one as the material and sociopolitical situation facing those returning 
soldiers worsened. So, the officer corps began to blame the Soviet authorities for 
taking the political decision to end the Cold War without considering such 
mundane concerns as the absence of housing for returning soldiers. Therefore,
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there had to be a scapegoat for the military leadership. Although treaties were 
concluded at the state level, it was the military department alone that had to bear 
the responsibility and to solve all the problems.
Another hot issue, German unification and its membership of NATO, existed 
also in the same context. Just after the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989, the political leadership treated the German unification as a matter for the 
distant future. Gorbachev said, for example, that he did not think that today the 
question of reunification manifested itself as a truly correct issue. In December 
1989, talk of German unification at any time in the near future was "fraught with 
destabilization in Europe." In February 1990, after a meeting with H. Kohl, the 
West German chancellor, Gorbachev said the Germans themselves should make 
their choice in what state forms, what periods, at what pace, and under what 
conditions they would be realizing their unity.40 In addition, in the aftermath of the 
elections in East Germany on March 18 1990, the process of unification gained 
speed and greater substance. As a result, Moscow could do little to block, or 
delay, the unification but some risky measures that could isolate the USSR from 
the world.
More specifically, the Soviets opposed German membership in NATO. It 
continued, however, only for a short period of time. Instead, they tried to limit 
German military power. The Soviet Union wanted to limit German manpowers to 
between 200,000 and 250,000 men. Former East German foreign minister M. 
Meckel in July 1990 suggested a ceiling of 300,000. NATO allies looked at 
between 350,000 and 400,000. West Germany avoided advancing any figure at 
all.41 In the end, the Soviets only received permission for Soviet troops to remain 
on German soil for a temporary period, payment for Soviet acquiescence, together 
with a 5 billion mark credit. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to restrict the 
training activities of its forces stationed in eastern Germany prior to their comple
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withdrawal in 1994.42 In September 1990, the Treaty of the Final Settlement with 
Respect to Germany was signed in Moscow by France, UK, the USA, the USSR, 
the FRG and the GDR, and in October 1990, the Treaty between the USSR and 
FRG on Procedures for the Scheduled Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from the 
Territory of the FRG had made German unification a real fact.
Meanwhile, foreign minister Shevardnadze said in a report to the Soviet 
parliament on Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, Germany, the Persian Gulf, 
and on disarmament in October 1990 that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Germany there would be no confrontation on the continent, the number of 
German troops would be cut considerably, as would the number of US troops on 
the continent. The FRG government in August had already made a statement 
undertaking to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united 
Germany to 370,000 within three or four years. In general, new political thinkers, 
particularly foreign ministry officials, regarded German unification as an entirely 
favourable development. What was more, the USSR earned Germany's regard, 
according to them, because Soviet officials responded quickly and positively to the 
change in Germany's status, which would have happened sooner or later. Then they 
concluded that cooperation with Germany and that country's ability and willingness 
to help the Soviet Union held great promise for the USSR.
This MFA's optimistic evaluation was in sharp contrast to that of the military 
officials. First of all, they tried to remind the Soviets of the huge losses of 
personnel during the WWII. And then many in military officers demanded the 
neutralization of unified Germany. For example, Army General V. I. Varennikov, 
as one of the delegates to the 28th Party Congress expressed in July 1990 a typical 
view of the military: "the planned unification of the two Germanies is a matter for 
the German people, but as for the maintenance of peace, that is a matter for the 
whole world."43 In this connection, he expressed his wish that the future armed
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forces of the new European state did not belong to any military alliance. Despite 
the Soviets' failure in this kind of assertion, Soviet conservatives stuck to the 
German question, most likely, to discredit the new political thinking, and, probably, 
to slow or delay Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Germany.
7.3. A Contract between President and High Command
At the moment when everyone was thinking the 28th Party Congress had 
receded into the past, a series of very dynamic events both in domestic politics and 
in arms control talks occurred around November 1990. In the earlier case, we 
could go back to a meeting of the Defense Council held on 1 September and 
presided by President Gorbachev, at which defense minister Marshal Yazov spoke 
about plans for military reform. The series of events was far beyond a workable 
relationship between Gorbachev and the high command. So, let us assume for the 
moment that the Yazov-Moiseev leadership contracted with President Gorbachev 
to do something beneficial for each other. It continued until Gorbachev turned to 
the left in the spring of 1991.
To begin with, both Yazov and Moiseev had clearly shown their negative 
attitudes towards any further reductions through arms control negotiations, as we 
have seen. But the CFE Treaty was signed on 22 November 1990 at the CSCE 
summit in Paris. For the West, the CFE Treaty, if ratified, was very beneficial. It 
eliminated prospects for massive surprise attack on Western Europe; assured that 
Soviet forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe would not increase forward 
deployments by cutting and limiting forces located in the western third of the 
country; and established a comprehensive verification system, including on-site- 
inspection. On the other hand, for the Soviets the CFE Treaty meant huge
223
asymmetrical reductions. The US made a concession about definitions and 
numerical limits on combat aircraft. In short, the CFE Treaty did not include 
maritime patrol aircraft and 500 land-based naval aviation aircraft would not be 
subject to treaty verification.44
Nevertheless, Marshal Yazov said that the asymmetrical arms cuts were 
"natural” in a series of interviews with media on November 21 with Ian Press 
Release, on 23 November Rabochaya Trivuna, and on 26 November Moscow 
Television, and on 29 Krasnaya zvezda. Among them, the most noticeable one was 
a 6,000-word article which appeared in Krasnaya zvezda*5
In the early part of his article Marshal Yazov praised perestroika and the new 
political thinking in an unprecedented way during his tenure as defense minister. 
Furthermore, he recognized word for word what Gorbachev had argued at a 
meeting with military deputies. The defense minister said that "the USSR failed to 
avoid being drawn into the arms race and failed to overcome the obvious 
discrepancy between the scale of the defensive effort and the measures and actions 
to explore political, economic, diplomatic, and other ways of safeguarding national, 
collective, and general security."46 In addition to highly evaluating the Paris 
conference, he endorsed previous Soviet-American summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, 
Washington, Moscow, and Malta as being productive.
Then he proceeded to detail the NATO and Warsaw Pact arms reduction 
ceiling. Moreover, the marshal gave reasonable sufficiency a new definition. Yazov 
said that whereas in the past the concept implied, above all, the readiness and 
capability of states' armed forces to wage "active offensive actions," now it meant 
that armed forces correspond to the level of "actual war danger" and "minimum 
defense requirements." Then he rationalized asymmetrical cuts, particularly, in 
tanks. At the same time he explained the previous military doctrine's military- 
technical principles that made around 41,500 tanks, 45,000 armoured vehicles, and
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50,300 artillery systems by mid-1988. Now 19,000 tanks, approximately two-third 
of them, were faced with elimination under the CFE Treaty.
Once a civilian defense expert and People's Deputy Arbatov cornered 
Marshal Akhromeev in an interview on television by forecasting the elimination. 
Arbatov said: "they [military specialists] made the SS-20s, then they had to destroy 
them. They yelled to us at the time that we had parity, yet it turned out we had to 
destroy three times as may. Tanks were built, 64,000 tanks according to our own 
data, more than in the rest of the world combined. How was that possible? Who 
permitted this?"47 In response, Akhromeev tried to focus on how the armed forces 
of the two sides developed historically and what tasks they were given, rather than 
putting the question in terms of accountability. On the other hand, Major Yu. 
Selivanov rationalized that, while mentioning that one NATO tank manned with 
"professional soldiers" could knock out 2 to 3 Soviet tanks with unprofessional 
crews, the country had such tanks.48 S. Tarasenko, head of the planning 
department of the MFA, urged that Soviet tank men had to be trained so that one 
Soviet tank could knock out at least one, or better 2 to 3, hostile tanks.49
As for an assessment of the correlation of military forces, Marshal Yazov, 
based on the armaments of the USSR and NATO, calculated as follows: 1:1.5 in 
NATO's favour for tanks and armoured combat vehicles and 1:1.3 for artillery, 
combat aircraft, and attack helicopters; If NATO reached the upper level for 
artillery (20,000 units) the correlation for that type of armaments would be 1:1.5. 
But he ensured that, combined with the "powerful nuclear shield," this would 
guarantee the implementation of defensive tasks in any circumstances.
Chief of the General Staff also, but sometime later, accepted the CFE treaty 
as "irreversible." In an interview published in January 1991, Moiseev said, "it is 
clear that a new era has begun on the European continent," adding that the CFE 
treaty would significantly lower the level of the military threat in Europe.
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Nevertheless, he cautioned that Moscow still faced a powerful opponent in the 
NATO alliance. Then like Yazov, Moiseev said that the force levels allowed the 
Soviet Union under the CFE treaty to be "capable of reliably ensuring the country's 
security." Moiseev further assured his audience that the armed forces' "powerful 
atomic shield" stood behind the nation's conventional forces.50
If this twist in Yazov-Moiseev leadership's attitude toward the new thinking 
and arms reductions meant that President Gorbachev was given something, then 
what concessions were Gorbachev to make to the military? It was clear that 
Gorbachev supported the MOD reform plan, but this was a very superficial and 
cheap concession. A new union treaty appeared to be more fundamental. Up to this 
moment it had been generally expected or argued that military reform be 
conditioned by domestic economic conditions and by arms control negotiations 
with the West. All of sudden, military reform was linked, among other things, to 
evolving centre-periphery relations. In fact, the mood of the relations around the 
fall of 1990 had already become a real threat to both the military and Gorbachev. 
The followings traces the events in October alone.
On 9 October, the Tajik Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution stipulating that 
republican conscripts called up into construction battalions had to serve in the 
Turkestan Military District and primarily in Tajikistan. On 13 October, the 
Azerbaijan Council of Ministers ruled that 50% of the draftees planned for call-up 
in the fall of 1990 would perform their military service within Azerbaijan. On 13 
October, Moldavian MVD Major General I. Costas announced the draft for the 
republic's own "Carbineer Corps" to number 10,000 men under the republican 
MVD would begin in the spring of 1991.51 Already on 4 September, the Moldavian 
Supreme Soviet had adopted a decision suspending the applicability in Moldavia of 
the USSR law on military service and stopping any call-up of draftees and 
reservists in the republic until further notice. On 14 October, a representative of
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the Moscow City Soviet urged the immediate establishment of alternative service 
for conscripts in a televised meeting with military officers. On 17 October, the 
Armenian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution suspending the all-Union law on 
compulsory military service and making provision for draftees to perform their 
military service on Armenian territory in the future. The Armenian National Army 
claimed a total of 140,000 members.52 On 30 October, the Lithuanian Supreme 
Soviet said Lithuanians were not required to and should not serve in the army of a 
foreign country [the Soviet armed forces] by passing a resolution that stated 
Lithuanian youths would ignore the fall conscription. On 30 October, Estonian 
officials demanded in a meeting with the Soviets, to set up their own army and to 
have their conscripts serve only in Estonia. A similar step was taken in Uzbekistan 
on 5 September when Uzbek President Islam Karimov issued a decree banning the 
conscription of Uzbeks into military units deployed outside Uzbekistan.
All in all, the most urgent thing for the military was that the activities of 
republican authorities, sociopolitical associations and organizations, and civilians 
were threatening the fall 1990 call-up. Under these circumstances Gorbachev’s 
agreement in principle on military reform was of little importance. As the below 
table shows, the 1990 spring military draft in the country was in deep trouble 
particularly in the three Baltic republics, Georgian and Armenian republics. As a 
result of it there was the personnel shortfall of around 400,000 men in the Ground 
Forces alone in the fall of 1990, according to Colonel General D. Grinkevich, chief 
of the Ground Forces.
Generally speaking, this development could be unintended results of the new 
political thinking and perestroika. The overwhelming majority of soviet population, 
not to mention the new thinkers, perceived for the moment no real military threat 
and thus saw no need for maintaining military spending on the present level. 
Democratization and glasnosf led to an explosion of national self-awareness and
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spawned independence drives both on the periphery and even at the heart of the 
empire itself. Proindependence forces viewed Soviet armed forces as an occupation 
force and the most visible symbol of imperial power.
Table 3: Draft Situation
Republic 1989
fall
1990
spring
Azerbaijan 97.8% 100.0%
Moldavia 100.0% 100.0%
Ukraine 97.6% 99.4%
Kazakhstan 100.0% 99.2%
Belorussia 100.0% 98.9%
RSFSR 100.0% 98.6%
Tajikistan 100.0% 92.7%
Turkmenistan 100.0% 90.2%
Kirgizia 100.0% 89.5%
Uzbekistan 100.0% 87.4%
Latvia 90.7% 54.2%
Estonia 79.5% 40.2%
Lithuania 91.6% 33.6%
Georgia 94.6% 27.5%
Armenia 100.0% 7.5%
Sources: Krasnaya zvezda, July 12 and 
November 23, 1990.
These developments were the very decisive factor in making young people of 
call-up age to be disenchanted with being conscripted into the Soviet armed forces. 
The brutality of military life, which had been continuously covered by media thanks
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to glasnost', was also important in this respect. Moreover, the youth themselves 
appeared to be very susceptible to activities of various sociopolitical groups, that 
is, middle level powers. As seen in chapter 3, representatives of those groups, 
particularly Popular Fronts existing virtually in all republics with different names, 
were now using not only. methods of persuasion but also blackmail against 
conscripts and their parents. The republican authorities, as noted above, had 
adopted a number of legislative acts and decrees concerning military service that 
contradicted the USSR Law on Universal Military Duty. As a result, most of the 
youth were left wondering how they were supposed to act under these 
circumstances. Furthermore, in some republics such as the Baltic republics and 
Transcaucasia areas local authorities were conniving at draft evasion. For them, 
opposition to conscription could be part of their broader assertion of autonomy. 
Proceeding from this situation the military leadership could see that the result of 
the fall 1990 call-up was inevitably questionable.
Here, if we look back the meeting between Gorbachev and officer deputies, 
as we have seen in chapter 5, the meeting firstly seemed to be designed to 
humiliate Gorbachev in public. But the anger expressed by officer deputies 
appeared to be aimed at the republican authorities rather than Gorbachev and his 
policies.
If so, we must pay attention to Marshal Akhromeev's article which appeared 
in Sovetskaya rossiya on 14 November, the day after Gorbachev attended a 
meeting with military deputies. The marshal said that the armed forces might be 
used to maintain the country's integrity and Socialist system if they were threatened 
by "anticonstitutional forces."53 Akhromeev said, however, force would only be 
used after a decision by the Soviet parliament or the President. Although this 
ominous article had failed at that moment to attract significant attention, it 
appeared to be an important signal that the military had won a contract with the
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political leadership to cope with the "unconstitutional forces." What was more 
doomed was the Party-military relations. Confusingly, Akhromeev wrote that if 
some other party assumed power by the constitutional way, the army would accept 
the change.54 In other words, the marshal meant that the army was the instrument 
of the state, not parties, including the Communist Party. We must not miss the 
mood of the meeting between officer deputies and Gorbachev. As seen in chapter 
5, most of them swore allegiance to the Party. "None of us has quit the party nor 
will we." "I have been brought up by the Party of Lenin..." Gorbachev was 
frequently called as the General Secretary rather than as President. This Party- 
military relations must not be shadowed by the current top issue the centre- 
periphery relations.
In fact, Gorbachev had already distributed to republic leaders a draft union 
treaty worked out by a group of experts of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But it was 
short of authority. Representatives of the Baltic republics had not participated in 
the work from the early stage. The representative of the Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia had never been in earnest in drawing up the 
draft treaty. Only representatives of five republics Belorussia, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizia, Tajikistan, and Turmenia signed the result of the experts' work. As for the 
military aspect, the draft stated that the armed forces and border, internal, railroad, 
and civil defense troops had to be within the jurisdiction of the union's top organs 
of authority and government. But the political situation in the republics was 
changing day by day with the adoption of declarations of sovereignty. As a symbol 
of sovereignty, military issues became the first and foremost subject of activities of 
the republican authorities, as seen above.
At last, a moment of truth came following Akhromeev's message when 
Yazov went on national television on November 27 1990. In many instances the 
use of armed forces for the maintenance of order aggravated relations between the
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centre and local districts, intensified or gave rise to anti-Russian sentiments and 
exerted a demoralizing influence on the army. Nevertheless, defense minister again 
announced that the Soviet armed forces would take all necessary measures to 
check illegal activity in a number of republics jeopardizing the country's defense 
capability and insulting the honour and dignity of the servicemen.
It is useful to review some pretexts given by the central mass media for 
taking those measures. One week before Yazov's TV speech, Pravda reported 
some instances of "provocative acts of hooligans" against military units that had 
recently happened in a number of regions of the country. In Kishinev on November 
16, for example, about 30 people broke into the garrison Officers' Institute, tried to 
wreck it, and threatened to beat up the staffs and set fire to the building, according 
to the report. After examining other similar cases in Tbilisi and Vilnius on 17 
November and in the region of Saldus in Latvia on the next day, the paper said that 
"all necessary measures" would be adopted to cut short such actions.55
On the other hand, Izvestiya in its front page on 23 November urged not to 
push the army into a corner. Thus, it took a more or less moderate stance. The 
paper firstly recognized that the military establishment was more vulnerable now 
than ever in the light of glasnost'. Then, it warned extremists who were playing a 
game with those who "have nothing to lose."56 In this respect, Izvestiya depicted 
the socioeconomic situation facing the armed forces. First, it concluded an officer's 
pay long ago ceased to be an object of envy. Around the time, it had been reported 
by Moscow News that nearly half of officers' families live on monthly income of 
100 rubles per family number, or only two-thirds of the officially published average 
per-family-member income 153 rubles.57 The withdrawal of troops from the East 
European countries was also touched on with sympathy by Izvestiya. thousands of 
"totally innocent people" who were placed in the position of "uninvited guests in 
their own home," might be grudgingly provided with little more than a "rug in the
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corridor." The paper did not fail to mention the military personnel's situation 
stationed in the non-Russian republics. In general their children changed school 
five times in five years of study and in the sixth school, because they came from the 
family of an "occupier", the family was required to pay "1,500 occupation 
rubles."58
Meanwhile, the military news paper Krasnaya zvezda focused on the fall 
1990 draft. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Krivosheyev said that the fall draft 
was at the present moment proceeding "smoothly" in parts of Russia and Central 
Asia but the situation was "much worse" in Transcaucasia and the Baltic 
republics.59 In some sense, it was suggestive of the specific areas subject to a 
military crackdown in the near future. Krivosheyev said that in Georgia little more 
than 2 percent of conscripts for the fall draft had registered and in Armenia just 
over 5 percent. But the general gave no figures for the response to the draft in the 
Baltic republics.
Although it was expected because of the already strained relations between 
the army and society, Yazov's TV statements aroused great public interests in the 
country. A startling point was that measures outlined in the speech were taken by 
Yazov himself "on the instructions of the president." In other words, the armed 
forces would now be in charge of fulfilling them. The statement consisted of eight 
points. Each point was of great emotional and legal character. Therefore, there 
arose the question of whether each was a function proper to the armed forces.
The defense minister pointed out, for example, that nuclear weapons had not 
to be allowed to be shared among the republics. In fact, his approach on the 
relations between the union and the armed forces was somewhat questionable. 
Discussions on a draft union treaty were still under way. Supposedly and as Yazov 
himself said,60 controversial issues could emerge in such a delicate area. But the 
dislinkage of nuclear weapons to the new union treaty by its nature had to be
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resolved through talks between politicians and military officials rather than by the 
MOD alone.
On the other hand, there was a relatively clear but still emotional, message. 
For example, to stop attempts offensive to the "honour and dignity" of officers and 
soldiers and members of their families, he gave instructions that "every necessary 
measure" must be taken in the framework of the existing Constitution, laws of the 
USSR, and decrees of the country's president. Without defining the ambiguous 
concepts such as honour and dignity, Marshal Yazov underlined that servicemen 
had been given instructions to use weapons in the case of violence and armed 
attacks on servicemen of the Soviet armed forces, military facilities, ammunition 
and armament depots.61
Here, the main point or the most worrying thing of all for the military was 
that the union republics had adopted a list of "unconstitutional laws." In fact, the 
military leadership left from the constitutional or legal context. In other words, 
they were about to counterattack those who had treated the armed forces as a 
bargaining counter in political games, regardless of who set the stakes in these 
games and whatever they might be.
Let us examine such a case. Less than one week before Yazov's TV 
appearance, Colonel General F. Kuz'min, commander of the Baltic Military 
District, called a kind of economic blockade, which a resolution issued by the 
Latvia Supreme Soviet had legalized, against the armed forces an act of "political 
provocation."62 In response, People's Deputy T. Yundzis firstly considered 
Kuzmin's argument to be unconvincing. Then he stated that the resolution would 
"oblige the USSR leadership to sit down at the conference table with Latvia more 
quickly."63 In some sense, the military personnel were regarded by Yundzis as a 
pedal to which pressure had to be applied to speed up change in the centre- 
periphery relations. In fact, the military was not merely a social institution. The
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military was people, not only those in military uniform but also their wives and 
children who were about to encounter such actions as cutting off water and 
electricity.
Therefore, Yazov's announcements appeared to be part of an increasingly 
forceful campaign to intimidate independence-minded groups in the republics, 
particularly the Baltic republics. At the same time, that confirmed the growing 
consonance between the military leadership and Gorbachev on the issue of centre- 
periphery relations. Following the announcements, members of the high command 
tried to give more concrete shape with regard to areas where the necessary 
measures were to take effect; reasons of what brought them about; what kind of 
measures they would be, and so on. In fact, the speech by Yazov had provoked 
many responses and questions from TV viewers.
One of the noticeable follow-ups was Colonel General G. Krivosheyev's TV 
appearance. As a whole, there was no change in the high command's perspective 
on the relations between society, i.e., republican authorities, and the armed forces 
and on how they should be. Instead, the deputy chief of the General Staff 
suggested a lot of figures. For example, there were more than 3,500 deserters in 
the country; 81 officers and ensigns died at the hand of extremists in 1990 alone; 
30 anti-constitutional, illegal legislative acts had been passed in 1990 alone; and so 
on.64 With regard to the other side of their efforts, i.e., how to form national 
armies, Yazov had already defined it: "they gather the young men into groups. 
Without any discipline, any order. They try to obtain weapons. Through theft, 
robbery, attacks on dumps. "65
Meanwhile, Major General L. Ivashov, candidate of historical sciences, 
rationalized Yazov's statement in terms of legislation. Ivashov argued that the 
actions, which were to be implemented by the relevant commanders, military 
directorate bodies, and servicemen along the Yazov's statement, would be "in strict
234
accordance with regulations, laws, and constitution of the USSR."66 Moreover, he 
tried to limit the range of the statement and the directives issued by the defense 
minister. They would only affect "criminal elements," i.e., those who intended to 
perpetrate illegal actions against military installations and servicemen, he foresaw.
Again, the above figures were mentioned by Marshal Yazov at the first all- 
Union conference of junior and middle-rank command staff on the Army, KGB, 
and MVD troops which was held on December 5-6 1990. A slight difference was 
the figure about deaths: 69 officers and 32 ensigns died.67 In fact, this conference 
reflected the high command's keen recognition of the fact that the reliability of the 
young and middle level officers was being questioned. It was believed that the 
army was as subject to political divisions as the rest of society. Watching 
democratically-minded young officer deputies blast their superiors in parliament, 
citizens probably hoped that liberal attitudes would prevail among the military. The 
junior and middle rank command staff, however, declared in an appeal to 
servicemen, their parents, state and public organizations, and patriotic movements: 
"The fate of the socialist homeland must be above personal and ethnic interests and 
ambitions... Let us be united..."68
While the military was becoming deeply involved in the vortex of a severe 
crackdown in such a way, the Baltic republics that were the most likely to be firstly 
subjected to the crackdown was showing a cool and thus provocative response to 
Yazov's TV speech. On 1 December 1990, after having a joint session of the 
Supreme Council members of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian republics, 
Landsbergis defined the status of the Soviet military contingent as being 
"temporarily stationed on the territories of the Baltic states."69 Therefore, neither 
the Soviet military personnel and their families' dignity and human rights would be 
belittled, nor would their social and material demands be met, according to him. 
Then he urged them to observe the "principles of non-interference" in the Baltics'
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internal affairs.70 This ever more uncompromising attitudes was producing a much 
more complicated situation than the previous days.
Coincidentally, on the same day at a news conference the ministry of defense 
revealed that in Latvia 5,000 servicemen and 12,000 members of their families had 
been left without residence permits and had lost the right to medical services, to 
work, and to acquire goods.71 Moreover, an MOD spokesman said the military 
units stationed there had been refused deliveries of foodstuffs, and telephone 
communications and power and heat supplies were being taken away.
Military officers stationed there, who, most likely, had been waiting for such 
a statement, backed Yazov's speech.72 General Kuz'min, commander of the Baltic 
Military District, said in his speech that Yazov had issued such a statement, 
henceforth, the Army would take its "measures" against an economic blockade,73 
without any details. So, General Vinchenko, who was asked to explain Kuz'min's 
"measures", interpreted them in the following way: "We will not let our men 
suffer."74 The more significant development, however, appeared to be the fact that 
a conference was held at the Latvia republic Communist Party CC with the 
participation of representatives of the Army community,75 because this could imply 
the nature of the imminent crackdown that had to a certain extent critical 
implications for the current Baltic republics' authorities.
Meanwhile, at such a tense moment, President Gorbachev took the first step 
assigned to him, if a series of actions were planned. A presidential decree ordering 
local governments and agencies to enforce existing all-Union conscription laws 
was issued.76 Gorbachev called republican laws pertaining to military service 
"unconstitutional." Thus, the President embraced the generals' views. The next day, 
on December 2, Gorbachev replaced the relatively liberal Minister of Internal 
Affairs, V. Bakatin, with B. Pugo, who had been chairman of the CPSU Party 
Control Commission. Army Colonel General B. Gromov was also appointed first
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deputy minister of the MVD.77 It was reported that several regular army divisions 
would be transferred to the MVD.78
At a time when one was questioning whether Gromov's appointment could 
mean a strengthening of the role of the army in resolving interethnic conflicts or 
any other conflicts, he soon appeared in the press. In an interview with Sovetskqya 
rossiya he stressed that the USSR needed "order" and "discipline" in order to 
improve living standards.79 But these should be based on understanding and 
respect for the law and the state rather than on force, Gromov underlined. 
Nevertheless, he recognized the centre-periphery relations were problematic but in 
a moderate way. Gromov said that the passage of sovereignty declarations by 
various Soviet republics had delayed reform.
At last, in a speech to the Congress of People's Deputies on December 17, 
Gorbachev was critical of the Baltic independence movements, warning against the 
danger of "dark forces" that were threatening the integrity of the state.80 
Moreover, the armed forces were pictured as "the most important bulwark" 
guarding the state's both internal and external security. In this respect the President 
called for a resolute rebuff to any attempt to "blacken" their name or discriminate 
against them.81
We cannot fail to examine an interview by O. D. Baklanov, Secretary of the 
CPSU Central Committee and Deputy Chief of the Defense Council, because it 
was so suggestive of the possible military crackdown as well as the current 
solidarity among President, the Party, and the military. Baklanov recalled a series 
of political events. Among them were: in mid-November 1990 the Secretariat 
issued a resolution calling for links between Party and army institutions to be 
strengthened; The resolution was based on a report by the Central Committee 
Commission on Military Policy; President Gorbachev was asked by the 
Commission to take steps immediately to counter antimilitary tendencies in certain
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republics; and the Politburo met to discuss measures to stabilize the political 
situation in the USSR, in particular, to deal with development in Lithuania.82
It was not made public that in November 1990 the CC Secretariat adopted a 
decision for the defense of the Soviet armed forces from attacks supported by 
domestic opponents. Nevertheless, as Simon Kordonsky observed, since then the 
tone of national newspapers changed instantly.83 At that time the military 
leadership was effectively unable to refute the flood of charges on the part of 
individual citizens and newly formed public organizations. First and foremost, 
because they were fully supported by the facts of the instances of hazing; 
participation of troops in the Baku and Tbilisi events; the existence of clannishness 
in the army; and provocative military exercises, i.e. the September 1990 "strange” 
troops movement. Consequently, the Soviet armed forces sought protection from 
the authority which they had pledged to defend, including President Gorbachev. 
Now, the historically close links between the communist party and the defense 
industry were beginning to appear in the surface of the Soviet politics, and some 
leading members became a core of army supporters.
Baklanov was questioned whether he initiated a letter that was published in 
September 1990 and addressed to the Soviet parliament over the signatures of 46 
general directors and general designers of organizations under the eight ministries 
of the defense complex.84 A. Tizyakov, President of the National Association of 
State Enterprises, was believed that he persuaded Gorbachev to drop his support 
for the Shatalin "500 days" programme. The concerted defense industry lobby 
became apparent when the marketization was about to come.
The defense industry had an immense inertia. In general, it tried to preserve 
its production facilities and the demand for its products. It was not a matter of the 
bad intentions of anti-perestroika forces. The point is that the vast regions of the 
country fully depended on military contracts and programmes. Any substantial
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reduction of the arms and direct conversion would deprive hundreds of thousands 
of people of their livelihood, compel highly skilled workers and specialists to 
change their way of life, and abolish their social privileges and correspondingly 
high social status.
The influence of the Party was on the process of a decline, and so did its 
primary organizations lapse into inactivity and lost members. Unlike the Party, the 
defense industry was better fit for struggle under the rapidly changing 
sociopolitical conditions. The power of the Party was based on forming purely 
authoritative relations with society, and these relations began to collapse with the 
first free elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989. The 
power of the defense industry was more tangible because it held in its hands the 
better part of the country's economic potential and cooperated with the institutions 
of control over society, the military establishment, the KGB, and the MVD. The 
defense industry was now engaged in a desperate attempt to save a kind of 
privileges. The leading figures of the triad of the party, military, and defense 
industry, or the upper strata of the armed forces, the defense industry, and the 
structures connected with the two, appeared to be in the limelight. More 
ominously, deputy chief of the Defense Council said that there would be a limit to 
"the patience of the military servicemen."85
Within one week since then, on December 19 1990, at a news conference the 
defense minister Yazov called on the state of emergency by saying that "one cannot 
go on just watching people die."86 The same issue was also raised at an 
extraordinary congress of the representatives of the Soviet armed forces personnel 
stationed in the Baltic Military District held on December 21-25. Finally, the USSR 
Congress of People's Deputies was asked to introduce "presidential rule" in Baltic 
republics.
Then without warning, on December 20 foreign minister Shevardnadze gave
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his resignation speech to the Congress of People's Deputies. And around the time, 
almost all of Gorbachev's reform-minded advisers, including A. Yakovlev and N. 
Petrakov, had resigned in protest at the sudden promotion of conservatives to 
leading positions. From his resignation speech, it appeared that Shevardnadze was 
deeply convinced that he should retire in order to compel the Soviets to pay 
attention to a kind of contract between Gorbachev and the high command. In fact, 
he called it a "right-wing reactionary dictatorship." Later in his first public 
comment since his resignation he told Moscow News that he feared "military 
crackdowns" similar to those in Tbilisi and Baku.87 Concerning Shevardnadze's 
resignation statement about a "coming dictatorship," Gorbachev warned just after 
the foreign minister left the platform of "moods of panic." However, he did give a 
lingering hint of it, by stressing that "strong authority is essential for country 
today."88
The most noteworthy remark in the foreign minister's speech, in the context 
of civil-military or the relations between the MFA and the MOD, was the fact that 
Shevardnadze cited "two colonels", officer deputies Alksnis and Petrushenko. The 
foreign minister claimed, they had boasted that, having toppled Interior Minister 
Bakatin, it was now time to "settle scores with the foreign minister." Incidentally, 
Alksnis told TASS that Bakatin was not only "passive" but also rendered "concrete 
support to separatist forces" in the republics.89 Deputy E. Kogan, leader of the 
"Intermovement" and a member of Soyuz, claimed that Soyuz had persuaded 
Gorbachev to replace Bakatin with Pugo.^O
In an apparent reference to the political leadership, Shevardnadze asked, 
"Why did no one speak out against them? [Alksnis and Petrushenko]" There were 
only piecemeal details on the causes and reasons that prompted the foreign minister 
to make such a statement from the platform of the Congress of People's Deputies. 
But it was true that they continuously argued that the Soviet Union had simply
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given up to much, aiming at the MFA. Colonel Petrushenko complained, for 
example, that the armed forces could not keep up with the foreign ministry's shifts 
of policy.91 It was also true that both officer deputies questioned the ways that the 
foreign policy had been carried out under the leadership of Shevardnadze rather 
than the new policy itself. They argued that talks with the US could and should 
have been conducted in such a way to defend the Soviet Union's interests in a more 
principled manner.
In this respect, they raised a question: Should some agreements with the US 
be ratified by the Supreme Soviet in the form in which they were signed under 
Shevardnadze's leadership? For this, they even suggested a list of "unilateral 
concessions" during the negotiations with the US. Moreover, Petrushenko asked 
the establishment of a commission of the Supreme Soviet Presidium to look into 
the agreement on the united Germany. In an interview both colonels raised a 
number of questions connected with the foreign minister's pronouncements on the 
Gulf incidents.92 Finally, with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East 
Europe, Alksnis said that Shevardnadze should visit the tent cities set out on the 
snow in which the servicemen were placed after being hurriedly withdrawn from 
where there were living. He declared that it was Shevardnadze who signed the 
schedules for the withdrawal of these troops."93
Meanwhile, being faced with a suspicious situation that the military was 
likely connected with Shevardnadze departure, People's Deputy Major General M. 
Surkov officially stated just after the resignation speech that military deputies did 
not put forward anything as a group. He argued that the two colonels had done on 
their own behalf as deputies something like as noted above.94 Moreover, Alksnis 
himself revealed in his speech that his views were not shared by the military 
leadership. As evidence, he reminded deputies of the fact that Yazov had 
summoned the colonel and "asked" and "ordered" him to alter his stance. Then he
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said that "I have expressed my opinion as a deputy, the way I understand what is 
happening in our country."95 Moiseev also categorically disagreed with 
Shevardnadze's warning about the looming dictatorship, arguing that the country 
had a mature Supreme Soviet, which was able to decide matters linked with 
constitutional conflicts through negotiations.96
Shevardnadze' disagreement with the two colonels, in particular, and the 
military, as a whole, appeared to be only part of the problem. When we consider a 
linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy, it was likely that the Soviet 
foreign policy had lost its impetus at that time. This could, or should, be seen as 
the main reason for his resignation. A central tenet of the foreign policy under 
Gorbachev was that the Soviet Union could become more secure and prosperous 
by turning adversaries into allies. In other words, the deterioration in the domestic 
situation in the country had fuelled the USSR's need for international support and 
assistance. To gain the trust of former enemies, Moscow gave up a lot, including 
its East European buffer states, although, some of this happened not only as a 
result of new-found freedom but also out of absolute necessity. It was undeniable 
that the results of perestroika in foreign policy were so good for the world. But if 
the country failed to resolve its internal problems, then its "successful" foreign 
policy would also fail. The socioeconomic turmoil in the USSR at the end of 1990 
was widening and deepening the problems facing the military establishment, as 
noted above, far from absorbing that. In this respect, there should be a scapegoat.
Despite Shevardnadze's effort to stop the expected military crackdown, it 
came when the MVD troops took over the main publishing house of Latvia on 
January 2 1991. It was one day before Latvian government leaders planned to meet 
with Gorbachev, Yazov, recently appointed first deputy interior minister Gromov, 
and Party officials. It is needless to explain why it was the day. If this was a light 
tremor, the a big earthquake was yet to come.
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On January 7 1991, the defense ministry announced that airborne troops 
would be used to enforce the draft where turnout for the fall 1990 draft was low — 
the three Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, and some regions of the 
Ukraine. There were no details about the exact number of units to be dispatched to 
there, when they were expected to arrive, etc. In response to these kind of 
questions, two days later, Major General V. Manilov, the head of the Defense 
Ministry's Information Administration, revealed that the defense ministry's order 
had in fact instructed military district commanders in the relevant republics to help 
local military commissariats enforce draft regulations by contributing troops to the 
effort. And Lt General F. Markovsky, a senior spokesman for the General Staff, 
said that the airborne troops dispatched to help with draft enforcement would not 
perform "gendarme" functions and only be used to make sure that regional 
commissariats were not blockaded and to protect military personnel conducting 
draftees to their units.
Colonel General F. Kuz'min, commander of the Baltic Military District, 
confirmed Manilov's explanation. The commander, who said that he was acting on 
the orders of defense minister Yazov, informed Latvian Prime Minister I. 
Soldmanis, Lithuanian President V. Landsbergis, and Estonian President A. Ruutel 
that airborne troops would be sent to the Baltic region. However, Kuz'min did not 
give them details other than the date of January 13 to implement USSR draft laws.
Nevertheless, the vague announcement alone was enough to make political 
leaders of those republics to be anxious, and, thus, to change their attitude towards 
conscription issues. A. Ruutel and E. Savisaar, Estonian Prime Minister, and V. 
Landsbergis dispatched a telegram to Gorbachev on January 7. Moreover, 
Landsbergis expressed his willingness to travel to Moscow for talks with 
Gorbachev. Latvian Supreme Council President Gorbunovs met General Kuz'min 
at noon on January 7. Most likely, both Gorbachev and the military leadership
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might have hoped for this kind of responses from the republics. In fact, for this 
they had been setting the stage for a military crackdown.
They met, however, strong a protest, particularly from the US and RSFSR 
leaderships. This protest became the fatal one when at least 13 people were killed 
and more than 150 injured when Soviet troops stormed the radio and television 
centre in Vilnius on January 13. This incident drove both the political and military 
leaderships into a comer and in the end made Gorbachev turn to the left.
If we treat the Vilnius incident as a single case, the first malfunction appeared 
to be the political system of the Lithuanian republic. There was a desperate split 
among the people. One portion of them had a supreme legislative and executive 
body in the form of the supreme soviet and the government, while the other 
declared itself to have the authority in the form of the National Salvation 
Committee (NSC). As a result, matters developed to physical fighting on the 
streets.
The NSC firstly sent a group of one hundred people to the Lithuanian 
parliament, demanding that "anti-Soviet" broadcasts be stopped. According to the 
MOD explanation, the television called on the people to go onto the streets and 
destroy the Communists. Since the NSC representatives were not allowed to enter 
the parliament building, they headed for the TV Centre. When they were 
approaching the TV Centre, someone shot an officer in the group. Then people 
started shooting live ammunition into the air from the bushes, garrets, and 
windows. A spokesman for the NSC, Juozas Jermalavicius, defined the situation as 
a civil war. The NSC appealed to the Vilnius garrison for assistance. The 
commandant turned to the district deputy commander for authorization. The army 
tried to take control of television and radio, first of all, with the aim of warning 
against and ending "provocative actions."
Izvestiya recognized this decision as an "understandable mistake" in the sense
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that they had been under attacks and insults. In March 1990, the Lithuania 
parliament adopted a series of decisions on the status of the Soviet armed forces in 
the republic and the military service of Lithuanian citizens. Simply the Soviet 
armed forces was defined as an occupation army. There was a number of attempts 
by Lithuanians to penetrate the military installations and of sometimes attacks 
against servicemen and their families.97
Controversially, Yazov said that the garrison commander acted within the 
realms of the law in conformity with the Garrison and Guards' Manual when he 
took the decision to deploy army units under his command to support the NSC.98 
It was quite clear, however, that the paratrooper's rush to rescue the NSC and its 
supporters from the legitimate power was "unlawful,"99 even if that legitimate 
power had itself violated the Soviet Constitution. Supposing the use of force was 
part of a planned scheme, the point is how much room was allowed for the local 
military commander rather than who sanctioned the use of force. In practical terms, 
nobody knew that a chain of violent action-reactions between soldiers and angry 
demonstrators would lead up to the deaths. If anyone knew, to what extent? It 
appeared that any detailed plan could not have existed, therefore, the following 
denials were also understandable.
The defense minister said that he was not informed about it. Minister of 
internal affairs B. Pugo also told the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 14 that no 
one from the centre gave an order to use force. President Gorbachev said that he 
also learned about the incident only after it had happened. In fact, he knew a lot, 
although it is arguable whether he was a pioneer of the military crackdown. When 
an appeal by M. Burociavicius, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Lithuanian Communist Party, was put before him and it was argued that he should 
promulgate a state of emergency in Lithuania,100 Gorbachev gave neither yes nor 
no. Instead Gorbachev warned that the situation was reaching a deadlock, as
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mentioned before. By that time, the paratroopers had already been moving to 
Lithuania. When Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo wondered whether to imposing 
order by force, together with CC secretaries,101 Gorbachev did not sanction the 
military police operation in Vilnius, but on the other hand, neither did he forbid it. 
Just after the crackdown, Gorbachev defended it by calling it a defensive action.
Major General V. Nikolayevich revealed that the Army had orders not to fire 
first, only to answer to firing. The question of who fired first became a fundamental 
issue. From this stance, both political and military leaders tried to justify the use of 
military force, including tanks, against civilians in the capital of a union republic. 
The general suggested some evidence at a news conference held on January 17. A 
photograph showing a citizen placed one of his legs under the tracks of a tank and 
some bullets from the wounded and deaths which soldiers did not have were 
displayed.
The aftermath of the incident seriously strengthened the position of 
supporters of independence from the Soviet Union and centrifugal trends in the 
country. It proved that tanks were hardly the best means of convincing the Baltic 
republic's population of the expediency to sign a new union treaty. Paradoxically, it 
was not necessary for all the union republics to discriminate between right and 
wrong. They just feared that something similar to that incident could happen to 
them, and, therefore, from the beginning, could not help but denounce the military 
actions.
President of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Z. Gamsakhurdia, for example, 
told a rally on January 15 that what had happened in Vilnius could well happen in 
Georgia, too. The president expressed the Georgian government’s solidarity with 
Lithuania. The most astonishing development was, however, the attitudes of the 
RSFSR leadership toward the incidents. Leaders of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and 
the RSFSR jointly condemned the military action. El'tsin regarded the crackdown
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as "the first step in a powerful offensive against democracy" in the USSR, and he 
announced that the RSFSR would consider creating a separate Russian army to 
defend "its sovereignty." He also urged Russian soldiers not to use arms against 
civilians. It was like a real blow on the back of the neck for both Gorbachev and 
military leaders.
Gorbachev's reactions clearly reflected this. In a speech before the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, he accused El'tsin of exacerbating interethnic tensions and of 
trying to politicize the army. The president called the idea of creating a Russian 
army "a deliberate act of provocation." The officer corps also quickly responded so 
that El'tsin's appeal had no impact on attitudes in the rank and file of the Soviet 
armed forces. Krasnaya zvezda published a series of letters signed by a group of 
senior officers, including former chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov, to 
over eight hundred servicemen stationed in the Baltic region.102 The Russian 
Communist Party through a resolution said that El'tsin had lost his sense of 
political responsibility by calling for the creation of a Russian Army.103 Pravda 
called El'tsin's being destructive and directed solely at replacing Gorbachev.104 
Similarly, in an article which appeared in Sovetskaya rossiya, Marshal Akhromeev 
accused El'tsin of conducting an open struggle against Gorbachev and the USSR 
Supreme Soviet.105
Under this storm of critics, R. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet, announced that there were no concrete plans to create a 
Russian army. El'tsin also tried to approach the issue in a different way. He set up 
the new State Committee on Defense and Security of the RSFSR and then named 
Colonel General Kobets its head. The general was motioned to expose the public 
to the notion of a Russian army.
Meanwhile, Gorbachev, not to mention the military leadership, had also been 
forced into a corner. First of all, on 20 January more than 100,000 people attended
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a demonstration against the Vilnius incident in Moscow. It appeared as a kind of 
answer to El'tsin's calling the incident "the first step in a powerful offensive against 
democracy." At the extraordinary session of the RSFSR devoted to the incident, 
Colonel A. Rutskoi accused Gorbachev of placing the blame for "the bloodshed in 
Lithuania" first on the army and then on the democratic forces.106 Focusing on 
Gorbachev's denial of any prior knowledge of the incident, the colonel argued that 
anyone who had served in the army would understand that neither the head of a 
garrison not even the defense minister could give such an order without higher 
sanction. In the same context, the USSR people's deputy Colonel Alksnis called 
Gorbachev "a weak man." Because Gorbachev had indeed engineered the 
crackdown and had then abandoned his cohort, making the armed forces the 
scapegoat.107
Hardly surprisingly, Gorbachev's stance was beginning to change to a less 
confrontational course, or to try to limit the political damage caused by the military 
actions in the Baltic. The first signal was his condemnation of independent military 
actions. Just after the incident he had sided with the garrison commander, as 
mentioned above. Now at a press conference held on January 21 Gorbachev urged 
troop commanders to strictly obey his orders. Then he denounced the use of 
military forces in political struggles.108 No public organizations, committees or 
fronts were allowed to appeal to the armed forces in political struggle. But it was 
unlikely that the political leadership was estranged from the military. Gorbachev 
addressed a conference on prosecutors on February 13 1991 that only one 
dictatorship could exist in the USSR during the current critical period: the 
dictatorship of law, while he told French Foreign Minister R. Dumas that there was 
no return to totalitarianism.109. He added that the Soviet Union needed economic, 
financial, and legal stability now more than ever.
In addition, in spite of critics Gorbachev did not veto joint military and police
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patrols throughout the country that had started from on 1 February 1991.110 V. 
Kudryavtsev, the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and 
Law, said it was "illegal" for the army and the MVD to organize joint patrols on 
the streets of Soviet cities "against the wishes of the local soviets."111 The 
Committee for Constitutional Oversight of the Supreme Soviet also criticized the 
action in that the use of armed forces for maintaining law and order inside the 
USSR had firstly to be approved by the leaders of the Union republic concerned.112 
Chairman of the committee, Aleksayev, firstly observed that the armed forces 
could be used to solve internal problems, including maintaining public order, but 
solely based on the law and on the basis of legislative procedure. Then he made it 
clear that such procedure existed for the problems of a state of emergency 
confirmed by the Supreme Soviet allowing the use of internal troops, but not in 
other cases.113 Moreover, what is the most embarrassing for Gorbachev is the fact 
that the decree was originally signed by defense minister Yazov and interior 
minister Pugo on December 29, although Gorbachev did not confirm it until 
January 29 1991.
Meanwhile, the military leadership also recognized that the commander in 
Vilnius, General V. Uskhopchik had exercised "poor judgement" in launching the 
assault.114 Through this Yazov excused Gorbachev. Nonetheless, the defense 
minister continuously laid the principal responsibility for the incident with 
Landsbergis. But it was more significant that about 300,000 people attended the 
rally to mark Soviet Armed Forces Day. Interior minister Pugo, Yazov, Moiseev, 
chief of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, Moscow City Party First Secretary Yu. 
Prokof ev, and other figures took part in the demonstration. The rally in Manezh 
square, across from the Kremlin, was carefully organized by work collectives in 
Moscow factories and by local military units. Participants expressed support for 
Gorbachev, for the army, and for the preservation of the Union. They held up red
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banners reading "no to civil war," "our faith in the army and the state," "President 
Gorbachev, we support you," and "El'tsin, you won't get us."115 This was a new 
kind of approach of the military leadership to Soviet politics. One day before at the 
same place about 400,000 people rallied, calling for democracy and glasnost'. 
People then carried signs denouncing the armed forces and praised El'tsin.
By that time a significant change in the military leadership's attitude towards 
the new political thinking and arms control policy was beginning to appear. In a 
speech on Soviet Armed Forces Day, Marshal Yazov was harshly critical of the 
Soviet Union's eroding strategic position. He particularly bemoaned the loss of 
Eastern Europe: "over a forty-five-year period we jointly built powerful 
infrastructures, reached agreements, made plans. Now all of this has no juridical, 
moral, or practical value."116 This was sharply in contrast to his earlier speech 
made just after the CFE Treaty, as analyzed above. Now he ominously suggested 
that the Soviet side should reconsider its compliance with the CFE treaty both 
because Moscow had made too many concessions in negotiating it and because the 
treaty had been based on the existence of two equal alliances in Europe.
Since then a lot of worrisome voices appeared in the conservative mass 
media. On March 2, Pravda warned that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and 
closer ties between Eastern Europe and Nato could disrupt the European balance 
of power and endanger conventional arms negotiations.117 On March 5 1991 
Marshal O. Losik contended in Krasnaya zvezda that the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact emboldened other countries to interfere in Soviet internal affairs.118 
On March 26 an editorial of Krasnaya zvezda warned that new European security 
structures were emerging too slowly and voiced concern over the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact's military wing. It said NATO's role as a guarantor of European 
stability was overstated, and it cautioned against any idea of extending NATO 
membership to East European nations. The article said a new European system had
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to take into account the state interests of the USSR.
Marshal Akhromeev well summarized these opinions, adding his own 
comments. In an interview with New Times, Akhromeev firstly declared that 
military threat to the Soviet Union did exist today, which emanated chiefly from 
the US and NATO, while an "immediate war danger" had evaporated. The marshal 
tried to generalize the term "military pressure," by saying that while seeking to 
reach understanding and even to cooperate with the Soviet Union, the US was 
trying, at the same time, to bring pressure on the USSR by various means, armed 
forces included. Akhromeev illustrated where the danger lay: The military setup of 
WTO was no more but the military setup of NATO remained, and the US had been 
circling the Soviet Union with its army and naval bases -- 1,500 of them manned 
with a total of 500,000 troops. Particularly, the US aircraft carriers constituted a 
military force which, within six to eight days of receiving the "go-ahead," could 
reach the shores of the Soviet Union and pose a military threat to the country,119 
he warned. With regard to the reason why the Americans had no intention of 
cutting the naval forces, he drew a conclusion: their idea was to bring "military 
pressure" on the Soviet Union. Moreover, the US often acted from positions of 
strength,120 the marshal complained. Referring to the US support for Japan in its 
claims to the southern Kurils and the US stand on the matter of the Baltics, he 
stated a strong argument for the keeping of the armed forces enough to enable the 
country to uphold the national interests and to prevent interference in the Soviet 
internal affairs.
For that aim, Akhromeev raised the importance of the conventional forces. 
The marshal attempted a militarily realistic evalution of the fuctioning of nuclear 
weapons: nuclear weapons were neither a reliable guarantee against aggression, 
nor a safeguard of national interests. In fact, in certain situations nuclear weapons 
proved useless, as the US defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan
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suggested. He observed that the nuclear weapons became only a "political 
deterrent".121 Consequently, he took a cautious step as far as further arms 
reductions was concerned, and said that no country but the Soviet Union had 
reduced its armed forces by 12 percent and its defense spending by 18 percent.
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CHAPTER 8. MILITARY RESPONSE III: THE COUP & 
EXPROPRIATION OF THE SOVIET ARMY
8.1. The Revised Draft of A New Union Treaty and Military Reform
When a new Union Treaty became vital in terms of military reform, the 
revised draft of the new Union Treaty was published on March 9 1991, ahead of 
the national referendum planned on March 17. Compared to the first draft 
published in November 1990, the new one recognized rights of the republics with 
regard to defense policy.
For the first time in the Soviet history, the Union was to share with the 
republics the following powers: the determination of the state security strategy and 
of the defence policy; the implementation of measures to ensure the defense of the 
country and of decisions connected with the stationing and activity of troops and 
military installations on the territories of the republics; and the establishment of a 
single procedure for the draft and for the performance of military service.1 After 
the 1991 January military crackdown in Vilnius, the military aspect of the Union 
Treaty, particularly the forming of national armies, became the most controversial 
issue between the centre and the republics and thus these changes were inevitable. 
In mid-February 1991, for example, to control over military conscription, troop 
movements, and appointments of military district commanders on Russian territory 
became one of the top agendas of the Russian parliament.
Before the Vilnius incidents, the ownership of land and other natural 
resources was the main interest of the republics. The first draft clearly reflected 
this. The republican leaderships tried to clarify "who owned what" because the
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draft left considerable room for disagreement between the centre and the republics. 
According to Article 7 of the first draft, for example, the republics were to be the 
owners of the land and natural resources on their territories and also of state 
property with the exception of that part which was necessary for realizing the 
powers of the Union.2 Although the adoption of foreign and defence policy was 
still retained for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union, the republican authorities 
remained relatively silent.
The revised draft Union Treaty in March was much closer to the context of 
Lopatin's military reform conceptualization concerning centre-periphery relations. 
It could be felt from the limited contents, nevertheless, that the very notion of the 
military security system of a "union of sovereign states" was not yet formed. In 
addition, it appeared that all official plans for a military reform, and long-term 
military development programmes in particular, continued to be designed for the 
unitary model of the state. It was most likely, however, that the notion had been 
already being under discussion at certain levels.
Soviet troops were pulling out of Eastern Europe and Mongolia. They would 
be deployed strictly inside the territory of the USSR by January 1995. It was not 
announced where and how the Soviet armed forces would be redeployed. Some 
republics were considering the Soviet armed forces as an occupation army and 
demanding a radical decrease in the military presence in their confines, if not a total 
withdrawal. The Baltic parliaments insisted that the troops be withdrawn. On the 
other hand, the high command thought that such demands were "premature" and 
referred to the USSR Constitution. The MOD military reform concept did not take 
into account the changing politics. By the end of 1990, the General Staff only set 
up a directorate for relations with the state bodies of power and administration of 
the USSR and Union republics.
It seems that troops can only be deployed where they are welcome, unless
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they are truely an army of occupation, otherwise the damage of the troops' 
presense may outweigh all the desired strategic and operational advantages, not to 
mention the purely military damage. In practice, the troops were still in the areas 
where they had been deployed and they could not be transferred to new 
deployment areas overnight. Consequently, it was required as a temporary measure 
to define the troops' status in the territories of their current deployment particularly 
in the remaining outgoing republics such as the Baltics, Moldavia, Georgia, and 
Armenia. The rejection of any use of armed forces as a tool of interference in 
republican affairs, for example, would result in a calmer atmosphere.
It was necessary to conclude a separate security treaty alongside the new 
Union Treaty, because the above republics did not want to remain in the Union. 
The military-technical component of the new structure would be an integrated 
system of a new type. The military-administrative division, the theatres of 
operation, and the echelons of the new system had to correspond to the new 
political structure. As the Lopatin reform plan suggested, it was necessary to 
coordinate and legally seal the distribution of rights, duties, and prerogatives 
between the federal and national structures.
Here, the main problem was the fact that the revised draft Union Treaty itself 
was still rejected by the virtually all republican leaderships with fundamentally 
different reasoning from previous days. Now the Russian leadership, for example, 
complained that the draft was imposed from above, that is, the central authorities.3 
In fact, there were consultations between the USSR Supreme Soviet and individual 
republics and discussions in the recently upgraded Council of Federation at the 
expense of the Presidential Council.4 And two chairmen of the chambers of the 
Russian parliament took part in the process. Therefore, El'tsin was surely called in 
for the consultation. Nevertheless, he did not support even the title.
In some sense, that was rather natural. As El'tsin himself publicly said, if
258
Gorbachev wanted to retain the centralized system, El'tsin sought to destroy it. The 
Russian leadership said "we do not need a centre which is so huge and 
bureaucratic. We do not need ministries... We must rid ourselves of it."5 According 
to him, the future Soviet "federation" should be governed by a collective leadership 
of republican presidents. Paradoxically, it seemed that El'tsin wanted to play a 
leading role in that mechanism. If it were possible for him to do so, then he could 
effectively control most of the current all-Union state and government powers. In 
practical terms, he could become the CINC of the Soviet armed forces, because 
they were located mainly in Russia.
Meanwhile, chief of the General Staff Moiseev stressed that agreement on a 
Union Treaty was crucial to the continuation of military reform. But General 
Moiseev avoided expressing in public his opinion about the revised draft Union 
Treaty. Instead he continued to insist that the army should remain a unified force.6 
Concerning the general attitude of the military leadership towards the country's 
future as a Union, we rather focused on the fact that on February 23 1991, the 
military took to Manezh Square, together with the Communist Party.7 In the 
previous day, on February 22, there was also a rally called by activists from the 
Democratic Russia movement. Some of the demonstrators carried signs 
denouncing the Soviet armed forces. They demanded, there should be reliable 
guarantees that armed forces would never be used inside the country. While 
Gorbachev was criticized, El'tsin was praised.
In response, the February 23 rally to mark Soviet Armed Forces Day 
expressed support for Gorbachev, for the armed forces, and for the preservation of 
the Union. Here a focal point is that military personnel were ordered to attend the 
demonstration in civilian clothes. It was designed to increase the number of 
participants. Once the officers took to the street, however, moving beyond 
rhetoric, it could mean that the military began to intervene directly in the political
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process. Public rallies until then were the domain of the Russian democrats. Now, 
it appeared that the debates, which took the form of a 'war of slogans,1 were 
transferred to the streets.
This kind of deteriorating political atmosphere was further worsened by the 
result of the March 17 referendum on the future of the Union, in which three- 
quarters of the ballots were cast in favour of holding the USSR together as an 
integral state. Just after the referendum, President Gorbachev tried to use the result 
in order to gain some political advantage for himself. In a major interview with Der 
Spiegel Gorbachev amplified two current opposing forces. Democrats were 
described as "extremists" acting under the slogan, "the worse the better". On the 
other hand, conservatives believed that everything should be reversed.8 Through 
this, he tried once again to hold a centrist position. But the two poles were being 
further split.
The conservative forces demanded that the will of the people voiced during 
the March referendum be implemented without suspension. Moreover, some of 
them asked for Gorbachev's resignation, accusing him of being unwilling or unable 
to use the referendum result to force rebellious republics back into an "imperial 
alliance."9 Especially, a core of the conservative forces, the Russian communist 
deputies, hoped to topple El'tsin and insisted on calling the third extraordinary 
Congress of Russian People's Deputies.
At that time El'tsin was in an awkward situation. On the one hand, he was 
politically weakened by the referendum. He had urged people to cast a 'no' vote, 
while calling for the creation of a 'commonwealth of sovereign states.' On the other 
hand, he was strengthened by the result of a republic-wide poll that took the 
opportunity to combine the referendum with a vote on the introduction of the post 
of a popularly elected Russian President. The latter result became a great threat to 
the communists because it was quite sure that El'tsin would hold the post. At the
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extraordinary Congress held on March 28, however, the communist deputies failed 
to topple El'tsin. About from 300,000 to half a million10 people turned out for a 
protest rally. The demonstration was in fact banned by the Union authorities but 
permitted by the Moscow City Soviet. Neither side sought a compromise. But in 
the end the rally was allowed to proceed a short distance from the planned site 
outside the Kremlin. Once again speakers called for Russian sovereignty and for 
the resignations of President Gorbachev, ministers of the Army and the MVD, and 
the chief of the KGB.
Now, the balance of political forces was shifting to the democrats. A 
Gorbachev-El'tsin alliance was beginning to look more feasible, although 
Gorbachev was still critical of the democrats. In his speech to the first All-Army 
Party Conference held on March 29-30,11calling the democratic groups "opposition 
groups," Gorbachev said that "they are trying to exploit tensions in society and, 
among other things, hope to split the armed forces along national lines."12 But his 
stance on them was less critical than that of high command who had clearly 
emerged as a force determined to keep the Union. Both Marshal Yazov and 
Colonel General N. Shlyaga, chief of the MPA, as in the past, equated democratic 
groups, or opposition groups in Gorbachev's term, with "separatist, nationalist, and 
extremist forces."13
In less than a month since the March 28 rally Gorbachev succeeded in finding 
a consensus among the republican leaders for a new Union. On April 23 1991, the 
leaders of the USSR and nine republics agreed to halt the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, committing the signatories to approve a new Union Treaty by the 
end of 1991. A joint anti-crisis stabilisation programme was also adopted by 
Moscow and ten republics on July 23. But the programme hardly reflected 
hardliners' view. Symbolically, they were urging Gorbachev to declare presidential 
rule in South Ossetia, where Georgian nationalists were fighting Ossetians rebelling
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against Tbilisi’s decision to dissolve their autonomy and leave the USSR. At last, a 
series of meetings resulted in another new draft Union Treaty, due to be signed on 
August 20, which must have forced the coup leaders to take action in a hurry. For 
them the signing of the proposed Union Treaty had to be forestalled because it 
must have laid the constitutional foundation for a greatly decentralised Union.
The document aimed at establishing a loose confederation, although it 
referred to a "federal" government. This reflected the central theme of all those 
negotiations: the preservation of a "common economic space", while recognizing 
the right of the republics to sovereign control over property, natural resources and 
taxation. With regard to military policy, the final draft called for republican 
participation in defining the military policy of the Union and national security 
strategy, resolving questions connected with troop activities and the locating of 
military facilities on republican territories, directing defense-complex enterprises, 
and so on.14
8.2. The Military's Involvement in Political and Ethnic Conflicts
For the military the stockpiles of weapons in the Transcaucasian republics 
and elsewhere had to be cleared. Since the appointments of Pugo and Gromov as 
the minister and first deputy minister of internal affairs, respectively, the MVD 
internal troops had become a pivotal force as far as policing troops in a mechanism 
of the KGB, the MVD, the armed forces, and communist hardliners was 
concerned. This leadership change had a number of implications for the future 
policing operations. By both law and tradition the KGB had played a decisive role 
in coordinating MVD and military action when ethnic conflicts occurred. The KGB 
and the MVD appeared to have been two parts of a single state coercive apparatus
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rather than two independent institutions, considering the fact that the KGB Third 
Main Administration had monitored the ordinary MVD police, MVD troops, and 
the MVD divisions.
As nationalist unrest continued, however, the KGB-MVD relationships 
became questionable. In the non-Russian republics Moscow could no longer rely 
on the MVD ordinary police and troops because they began to show local loyalties 
and to resist subordination to the centre. Moreover some republics such as the 
Baltic republics, Armenia, and Moldavia formed independent security apparatuses 
or armed detachments. The Kremlin, therefore, was left to strengthen its control of 
part of the MVD that was still subordinated to the centre and to increase the 
number of the MVD internal troops, which were directly responsible to the MVD 
minister and through the military line of command to Gorbachev in his capacity as 
chairman of the Defense Council.15 The first increase of 30,000 troops was 
announced by former MVD minister Bakatin in September, 1989.16
The appointment of Colonel General Gromov had a significant implication 
for the relationship between the MVD troops and the armed forces. Since March 
1989 the MVD troops had been separated by Gorbachev's decree from the armed 
forces in general and from the General Staff in terms of operational command 
system. This disconnection increased to a certain extent the autonomy of the MVD 
minister. If the minister were reluctant to impose a severe military crackdown, then 
the effectiveness of a coordinated action among the KGB, MVD, and Army troops 
would drop. In fact, when the process of the republics' self-determination put him 
in a difficult position, Bakatin was moderate. He even signed, for example, 
agreements on the division of terms of references with the Interior Ministries of 
Estonia, the RSFSR, and so on, accepting the principle that the republic was 
primary and the Union was secondary.17 In this context, he was accused of being 
passive and of rendering concrete support to separatist forces in the republics.18 In
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this respect, one could say that the MVD troops were virtually takenover by the 
KGB and the armed forces.
There had been an extensive reequipment and redeployment of the MVD 
forces followed under the leadership of Pugo and Gromov. The operational 
designation troops, Opnaz (operativnogo naznacheniya), had been expanded from 
36,00019 in 1989 to a strength of around 70,000,20 with a higher rate of 
professionalization. Some of its divisions were transferred from the Army to the 
MVD, including the 55th Irkutsk-Pinsk Guards Motorized Rifle Division. But it 
was rather important that the Opnaz troops remained under the USSR MVD 
control, that is, out of control from reformists both in the centre and in the 
republics. Among the troops, the most effective and mobile unit was the 
Dzerzhinskii Motor Rifle Division with 6,500 men.21 Besides the Opnaz troops, the 
MVD riot squads, the so-called "black beret", or OMON (otryad militsii osobogo 
naznacheniya: specialized purpose militia detachments), increasingly became 
paramilitary units. The OMON units were controlled by republican governments, 
except, OMON of Moscow, Riga, and Vilnius. Incidentally, the KGB also 
expanded its troops, with an airborne division, the 103rd Guards Vitebsk Division, 
attached under the auspies of the Border Troops22
If Pugo and his new team at the ministry failed, then the future for the 
republics and the Union would be too dreadful for the military to think. A tough 
line was urgent to avoid civil war by preventing the formation of nationalist 
detachments and armies in the republics. Regardless of the nine-plus-one 
agreement, a number of elite units of the armed forces continued to be used as part 
of pacification teams in the troubled Transcaucasian republics. The MVD troops 
were still not enough for that. Thus the military could stake a claim to the domestic 
politics.
By the end of April 1991 national armies or their prototypes were appearing
264
on the Soviet map along with republics, including the Central Asians. In Kirgizstan, 
for example, there was no evidence of armed units on any large scale, but the 
possibility of armed groups emerging in the near future could not be ruled out. A 
Kirgiz cavalry, which took an active role during the Kirgiz-Uzbek riots in the Osh 
Region in June 1990,23 could re-emerge. More than 200 people died there.24 The 
Uzbeks in Osh had organized their male youth for quick mobilisation in an 
emergency since the riots.
Although the Ukraine republican parliament decided that the Ukrainians 
should do their military service only within the republic, none of the Ukrainian 
paramilitary organizations had yet been tried in battle. But the UIPA (Ukrainian 
Inter-Party Assembly) were about to form a Ukrainian national army.
In Lithuania since January's Vilnius events the National Defence Department 
guards were increased and had public support, and Siauliu Sajunga, a paramilitary 
organisation pledged allegiance to the independent republic. The Latvian 
nationalists restored the paramilitary organisation of aizsargs, which had existed 
under the old regime. In Estonia two paramilitary national formations, Kodukaitse 
and Kaitseliit, declared their readiness to fight if there was any attempt to repeat 
January's Vilnius events in Tallinn.
In Moldova, by November 1990, after campaigning against the southern 
Gagauz, who had proclaimed their independence of the republic of Moldavia, the 
Moldavian parliament raised the 1st Tiras-Tigina National Guard Battalion. In fact, 
the Moldivian volunteer units, which had hit the Gagauz minority, were 
transformed to become the National Guard rather than demobilized.25 Although 
their structure was shadowy, the Gagauz self-defence detachments sprang up by 
October 1990. In the Dniester Moldavian republic the workers' detachments run by 
the United Council of Work Collectives were operating, and some of them had 
been sent to help the Gagauz in October. Besides, the Arkalyk Party of National
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Resurrection declared its allegiance to armed struggle.
The Caucasian peoples were still causing difficulties for the high command. 
In Azerbaijan, by January 1990 the Popular Front of Azerbaijan had established an 
armed wing, and that month a National Defence Committee was created in Baku. 
When the anti-Armenian pogroms started in mid-January, Soviet troops stormed 
road blocks and occupied the city. Some 160 were killed.26 The NDC was 
dissolved, the Front's military and other formations defeated.
In Georgia, by January 1991 the republic's parliament ordered the creation of 
an Internal Troops National Guard numbering 12,000 men as seen in the previous 
chapter. Several armed formations that emerged after the Tbilisi events in April 
1989 remained. Tetri Giorgi had been involved in the conflict in South Ossetia. 
Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni (The Knights of Georgia), opposed to Gamsakhurdia, 
were supportive of the National Congress organisation, which confronted the new 
Georgian authorities. In February 1991, Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles 
stormed Shavnabada in the Tbilisi suburbs, where Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni had 
been based for several months. A third group, Shevardeni, remained neutral in the 
conflict between parliament and National Congress. Non-Georgian armed forces 
included Abkhaz units and South Ossetians units. At present, the USSR MVD 
troops had been deployed there since the first unrest in Tsikhinvali which followed 
South Ossetia's unilateral declaration of itself as an autonomous republic within 
Georgia and a state of emergency was in force in the capital city of Tskhinvali and 
the Dzhava district. This state of emergency was sponsored by the Georgian 
parliament, which had vetoed South Ossetia's decision as illegal.
More ominously, in Armenia, estimates of their total forces veered from a 
few thousand to 140,000. Their weaponry included small arms, some artillery, 
civilian helicopters, and rocket launchers. But the Soviet army and MVD troops 
were involved in disarming them. On April 30, 1991 subunits of the Azerbaijan
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republic's special OMON militia and Soviet army units entered the Armenian 
villages of Getashen and Martunashen, and exchanged fire with armed detachments 
defending the village.27 Thus the incidents also became a serious political issue, 
following the Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius incidents. According to the joint statement 
of the KGB, the MVD, and the Army, troops' moves were in compliance with the 
presidential decree on disarming illegitimate armed formations, which had already 
issued.28
Nevertheless, once again, a series of questions of who gave the order to 
enter the villages and which units were used to carry it out became a sensitive 
political issue. The Armenian envoy in Moscow, F. Mamikonian, claimed that the 
central authorities issued the order and that there were no armed militants in the 
villages, including Getashen.29 But the USSR Supreme Soviet simply passed a 
resolution saying that the Congress of People's Deputies had repeatedly discussed 
the dispute and the Soviet parliament had passed decisions, but to no effect. 
However, in a compromising way, the USSR Supreme Soviet decided to send a 
fact-finding group to hear both sides.30
Here a focal point is the fact that, according to Colonel V. Martirosyan, a 
reformist People's Deputy, the Army units were the first to enter the village and 
they were followed by the local OMON militia.31 In case, it was in contrast to the 
1990 March operation to police the demonstrations in Moscow, where the army 
troops had remained the final stronghold for public order forces. Nevertheless, 
both cases suggested the extent of how far the military would directly intervene in 
the politics. The legal justification of the Soviet army involvement in Getashen and 
Martunashen military crackdown was Gorbachev's decree to disband and disarm all 
illegal armed groups. Naturally, neither the Kremlin nor Azerbaijan cannot fail to 
understand that the only possible Armenian interpretation of the Soviet army 
involvement was that Moscow displayed solidarity with Baku. From the point of
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view of Armenia, Moscow's combined action with Baku was revenge for Yerevan's 
independent course and separatism. In addition, the decision of the Armenian 
parliament to nationalize the property of the Communist Party of Armenia could 
hardly improve Yerevan's relations with the Kremlin. Trying to find an effective 
counterbalance to Gorbachev, the Armenian leadership appealed to El'tsin. Five 
days after the storming of Getashen and Martunashen Soviet paratroopers landed 
in Yerevan and were deployed to defend a number of the defense ministry 
installations, including one helicopter unit stationed there.
Moreover, the dynamic of both operations was very suggestive of army 
troops' movements during the August coup, together that of the military 
crackdowns in Vilnius in January 1991. Therefore, it may be useful to review the 
1990 March Moscow operation. It was directed by General Tomashev, deputy 
chief of the Main Administration of the MVD for Moscow and the Moscow 
Region. All the Army, MVD, and KGB troops involved in the operation with a 
high level of interservice coordination. Armoured vehicles from the KGB 
Kantemirov Guards Tank Division were both displayed overtly on the outskirts of 
Moscow and parked restrainedly within the Kremlin. The main forces were police 
of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration (GUVD) and the MVD 
troops coming primarily from Dzerzhinskii Division and another unit probably from 
Kalinin.32 Through the operation, the MVD troops, which once carried out an 
exercise under the direction of Gromov Moscow in February 1991, had a real 
opportunity to test their plan of how to secure the city in case of massive industrial 
disorder.
The army personnel also took part in the operation. Soldiers, armed only 
with truncheons, supported the MVD police forces. Many of them stayed in 
military trucks. Large numbers of cadets from military schools, officer students 
from military academies, and senior officers were also deployed. The senior
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officers, army officers of the rank of major and above, were deployed at some 
complicated places, for example, in Manezh Square, where the union government 
forbade the rally to reach and thus collisions were expected.33 They might be 
considered as the only men available with the requisite maturity and self- 
confidence. This could be the reflection of the 1991 January Vilnius incidents.
In the view of an officer of Moscow OMON detachment, 1,500 men of the 
regular Kremlin guards or the downtown Moscow militia could easily have carried 
out the official mission of preventing a rally in Manezh Square.34 In fact, at least
50,000 officers and men were mobilised, according to General Tomashev, who 
admitted that a mere 20,000 would have been enough to completely block the 
major area, i.e., the whole of the Boulevard Ring.35 Thus there was at least a 
reserve of 30,000. In this context and, particularly, based on the fact that the army 
was mobilised, it was concluded that the very idea in the operation was not to 
maintain public order but to "threaten the people."36
In fact, there was an emergency meeting of the USSR Council of Minister on 
March 27, the day before the opening of the RSFSR Congress of People's 
Deputies, to consider the possibility of declaring a state of emergency. Around 
twenty ministers, including Kryuchkov, Yazov, and Pugo, took part in the meeting. 
The attendance of the three powerful figures was unusual, according to N. 
Vorontsov, then USSR Minister of Environment Protection. While wanting 
ministers' advice, Pavlov said that "the miners are on strike. Should we introduce a 
state of emergency or not."37 Pugo sided with the prime minister by saying a lot 
that was meant to be intimidating. Chief of the KGB also stated that left-wing 
terrorists and extremists wanted to provoke disturbance. In the end, they decided 
to bring troops into Moscow as a show of force to intimidate the large crowds 
taking part in the rally.
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8.3. Prime Minister Pavlov’s 1991 June Challenge and Military Reform
On June 17, 1991 Pavlov asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to expand the 
scope of his cabinet's authority.38 His reasoning was that the only way to avert 
economic collapse was to increase the cabinet's power because Gorbachev's 
schedule was too full to permit him to oversee the cabinets work. The important 
thing was timing. Gorbachev was scheduled to take part in the Novo-Ogaryovo 
conference during the session of the Soviet parliament. One could see the challenge 
as a carefully calculated one. Being surprised at Pavlov's demand, Gorbachev 
immediately suspended the debate on the issue and took part in the conference.
Although Gorbachev had tied himself down to the future inter-republic 
structure since the Novo-Ogaryovo agreement, a new Union Treaty was not likely 
to be signed soon. The majority of republics intended to subject it to various 
changes, while supporting the Novo-Ogaryovo draft in principle. The Soyuz group 
was categorically against signing the Union Treaty because it amounted to an 
agreement to the dissolution of the country. The left-wing parliamentary 
opposition in individual republics such as Rukh in the Ukraine and the Democratic 
Russia party also spoke up against the draft. They believed that the draft turned 
down the declared sovereignty of the republics.
Two leading figures aligned themselves to Pavlov during the parliament 
debate that continued in Gorbachev's absence. Interestingly, but ominously, Vice 
President G. Yanayev told the Supreme Soviet that Gorbachev did not think 
Pavlov's request was politically motivated. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet A. 
Luk'yanov warned the deputies not to side with the cabinet against the president, 
but he urged them to grant Pavlov's request.
Conservative deputies, including members of the "Soyuz," some of whom
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were collecting signatures to recall President Gorbachev sided with Pavlov. They 
had for a long time searched for a replacement to Gorbachev. During the 
presidential election they nominated Bakatin. E. Kogan, a co-chairman of the 
group, once depicted Pavlov as being both able to tough measures and unafraid of 
being unpopular.39 Consequently, the anti-Gorbachev bloc between the Soviet 
parliament and the Cabinet had become evident.
During two days of closed-door debate the president and his domestic and 
foreign policies were subjected to severe criticism. Perestroika was described as 
"cold, hunger, and inadequate defense," and the loss of Eastern Europe as "a 
historic defeat," by Yazov, Pugo, and Kryuchkov.40
The defense minister grasped a good chance to publicly criticize the new 
thinking and perestroika, as usual, focusing on personnel problems in the armed 
forces. He claimed some 35,000 of 100,000 officers as part of a planned reduction 
of 500,000 troops had no right to a pension. And the troops returning from 
Eastern Europe lacked housing. Over 10,000 officers in Moscow had no housing, 
and 5,000 in Leningrad. He urged a government decree making the republics 
contribute to housing officers. Based on the result of the fall 1990 draft, the 
Marshal noted that the failure to enforce the draft in Georgia, Armenia, and three 
Baltic republics, combined with republican decisions allowing draftees to serve in 
their home republics, meant that soon there would be no armed forces. This had 
already resulted in a shortfall of some 353,000 men, according to him. In this 
connection, the Soviet parliament was urged to make a clear decision on 
conscription. He added that the number of women in higher education had fallen by
90,000 last year because of men pulling out all the stops to become students and 
avoid military service. The student deferment issue became revived when a new 
version of draft military reform plan that excluded those provisions for students 
that had been legislated in April, 1989, was circulated in the Soviet parliament.41
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Finally, as for the currently most vital issue, the signing of a new Union Treaty, the 
defense minister argued that the armed forces should exist under a unified 
command.42
Upon arriving in the Kremlin from the conference, Gorbachev came out 
fighting. He explained that Pavlov had been so scared of his deputy Kucherenko's 
attacks that he thoughtlessly demanded the powers he did not actually need. 
Moreover, there was no conflict between the Cabinet and the President. In this 
connection, Gorbachev asked that the question of Cabinet powers be left up to 
himself, as head of the legislative power. And the parliament agreed to Gorbachev's 
demand. In his brief speech to the parliament, Pavlov himself agreed with the 
Gorbachev's position.43
Gorbachev gave a series of message to the Soyuz leaders and the military. By 
naming V. Alksnis and Yu. Blokhin, the president said that they were busy 
destabilising cooperation and interaction between parliament, the Cabinet and the 
President. Gorbachev again recited his recent version of the Soviet militarized 
economy: "If I didn't keep in mind that this country's economy isn't human-oriented 
and is over-militarized, if I didn't try to get rid of this burden and turn it to the 
benefit of the people, I would be derelict in my duty and I would just have to step 
down..."44 Through this, Gorbachev clearly recognized the linkage among the 
Soyuz group, defense industries, the military, and the conservative party apparatus.
This was also reflected by Gorbachev's decree on defence councils issued on 
the next day, June 22.45 This was clearly designed to cut a link between the armed 
forces and the Party, particularly at the regional level, as the Tbilisi and Vilnius 
incidents demonstrated. This shifted a large part of the communist party's influence 
over the armed forces onto elected civilian representatives. Military councils had 
long existed as a structure for collective direction of the troops, in the areas where 
they were deployed, by the top local officers and party bosses. But now they were
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to be responsible not to the communist party, but by the head of state. The new 
regulations, by stating that military councils were set up by the President, could 
mark a significant strengthening of the influence of Gorbachev not as General 
Secretary but as President. More than that, the civilians who sit alongside the 
armed forces officers on the military councils would be representatives of elected 
local government such as republic presidents and premiers or parliament 
presidiums, or local government leaders and chief executives. The military councils 
would also have to work with local public organizations and movements. Although 
it was too early to treat this as the end of communist party guidance of the armed 
forces, it was surely another forward step following the 28th Party Congress 
resolution, as far as the issue of depoliticization of the armed forces was 
concerned.
Finally, on 26 June, just before the Group of Seven summit, Gorbachev made 
a clear pitch for accelerated military reform. In March 1991 as one of key note 
speaker at the first All-Army Conference Gorbachev briefly called for military 
reform to continue.46 Now in an address to military cadets on their graduation, the 
president called for "thoroughgoing military reform" in defense and defense 
production, and he said that the "essence" of reform lay in the credo of not 
numbers but know-hows. Usually, this meant that the military would have to make 
do with less. Moreover, Gorbachev also implied that a failure by the army to 
support his general reform efforts could lead to the destabilization of society.47 In 
short, the height of the revived collision between the military leadership and 
Gorbachev became much more serious.
8.4. Activities of the Armed Forces during the Coup
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In the early hours of 19 August, a small group of conspirators under Vice- 
President G. Yanayev seized power. The self-styled State Committee for the State 
of Emergency (Emergency Committee) had eight members. The leading five 
figures, i.e., Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, and Pugo once aligned 
themselves against Gorbachev when the Prime Minister asked the Supreme Soviet 
to expand the scope of his cabinet's authority at the expense of Gorbachev's power. 
The involvement of the Secretariat for defence, O. Baklanov and, President of the 
Association of State Enterprises in Industry, A. Tizyakov in the emergency 
committee was not entirely unexpected. They were well-known for their close 
association with the defense industry. Particularly, as signatories of the December 
1990 'Letter of the 53', both figures were spreading panic that the country was 
about to be attacked by the imperialists rather than concentrating on working out 
the strategy and tactics of conversion under the policy of marketization.
Only a month prior to the coup the chairman of the USSR Peasants' Union, 
V. Starodubtsev, who had been the champion of the collective-farm system, in a 
manifesto "Word to the People" appeared in Sovetskaya Rossiya, called for the 
launching of a popular patriotic movement to prevent the destruction of the 
motherland. Incidentally, deputy interior minister Gromov and deputy defense 
minister and the CINC of the Ground Forces General V. Varennikov were among 
twelve signatories of the manifesto.
Therefore, the emergency committee had the nature of a coalition of the 
reactionaries of the Party, the KGB, the MVD, the Army, and defense industry 
elements. In effect, the KGB, equally with the Party, appeared to lead the coup. All 
Kryuchkov's deputies were directly involved in the coup.48 After the coup, 
Kryuchkov and Luk'yanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were identified 
as the leaders of the junta. Yakovlev said in an interview with Russian Television 
that the putsch's address to the Soviet people had been drafted at the CPSU
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Central Committee and the KGB.49 L. Ponomaryov, chairman of the Russain 
Parliamentary Commission for Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of the 
August 1991 Coup, even argued that the KGB chairman Kryuchkov personally 
held the "controlling packet" during the coup.50
There could be other views. Konstantin Pleshakov of New Times, for 
example, believed that no other than Balkanov was the mastermind of the putsch 
or at least was in the centre of the plot, while defining it as the coup of the military- 
industrial complex. Moreover, it was Baklanov, according to him, who was 
entrusted with representation of the junta among the four who rushed to the 
Crimea to deliver an ultimatum to Gorbachev.51 Controversially first deputy chief 
of the MVD Gromov was told at the Bilbek airfield on August 18 that the 
emergency committee had imposed a state of emergency.52 After the coup new 
defense minister E. Shaposhnikov disputed descriptions of the putsch as a "military 
coup", arguing that it was "a plot by high-ranking state officials" that counted on 
some military support.53 In general, this coup attempt appeared to fit the traditional 
practice of the Soviet military that used to find the most useful ally rather than 
having anything to do with a seizure of power. So to speak, the military held a 
position of being a participant rather than prime mover.
It was quite clear that the motivation behind the coup, particularly 
concerning its timing, was a sharpening crisis of centre-republic relations. In broad 
terms, the following events appeared to have stimulated the junta: the 
nationalization by Russia of the oil and gas industry and the promise given by 
El'tsin to raise domestic prices for oil and related products; the imminent 
introduction of national currencies in some republics; the failure to fulfil state 
deliveries of freshly harvested corn; the 50-percent cut of defense orders, the 
oncoming paralysis of the defense industry, and social consequences of the ill 
thought-out conversion of defense enterprises; the increasing commercializing of
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relations between leaders of large enterprises and sub-branches of the national 
economy, which would result in the abolition of planned management methods; the 
financial independence of leaders of enterprises and organizations and the ensuing 
loss of the last management levers; El'tsin's decree ordering departization of the 
CPSU in the enterprises in Russia; and the establishment of republican security 
systems, including military formations and national guards, and the beginning of the 
transition of republican KGB agencies to the jurisdiction of the republics.54
The organizers of the coup tried to reationalize their action primarily as an 
attempt to forestall what they viewed as the imminent demise of the country. In the 
"Appeal to the Soviet People," the emergency committee condemned what it called 
"extremist forces" who had adopted a course of destroying the Soviet Union.55 
Yanayev in detail and emotionally described this at the press conference following 
the emergency declaration: "A real threat of disintegration has arisen, the break-up 
of a single economic space, a single space of civil rights, a single defense, and a 
single foreign policy. Normal life in these circumstances is impossible. In many 
regions of the USSR, as a result of multinational, inter-ethnic clashes, there is 
bloodshed, and the break-up of the USSR would entail the most serious internal 
and international consequences. Under these circumstances, we have no other 
choice but to take decisive measures in order to stop the slide of the country 
toward catastrophe."56 For the military, "to prevent the disintegration of the 
country" could mean to restore its Unitarian structure, i.e., its prime aim of the 
coup.
It appeared, however, they did not carry out the coup attempt at the risk of 
death. Paradoxically, the chaotic sociopolitical situation made them optimistic. By 
August almost the entire bureaucratic class, the entire party-economic-military 
establishment opposed Gorbachev. They spoke about their opposition openly and 
this probably made the conspirators more confident. Moreover, the introducing of
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extraordinary and emergency measures had been being discussed since the spring 
of 1991. Of course, this was far from the coup in terms of law. A plan of 
arrangements for imposing and realizing a state of emergency regime can exist in 
every country and it provides for a number of various measures ranging from 
preventive arrests to introduction of a restricted movement in the country. 
According to the Moscow radio, Luk'yanov, in his interview given on the second 
day of the coup, said that Gorbachev intended to declare the state of emergency 
after the Union Treaty was signed, in compliance with the nine plus one agreement, 
although it was to a certain degree incredible.
For the coup leaders, the problem was Gorbachev's turn to the left since 
April 1991. The new Union treaty negotiations were still proceeding with 
difficulty. Gorbachev's rival El'tsin was becoming politically stronger day by day 
around the election to the RSFSR president. Therefore, conservative hard-liners 
might have good reasons to expect that Gorbachev would go along with their 
proposal to institute a state of emergency in the country. Unexpectedly Gorbachev 
was moving in the opposite direction. But things had already been set into motion. 
In fact, it was probably unstoppable. Gorbachev's intending to sign a new Union 
Treaty, which was vital to the plotters' interests, could have forced them to 
proceed without his official sanction of their will.
Colonel General D. Volkogonov, El'tsin's defence adviser, observed that 
Gorbachev had long been under pressure to agree to a 'coup', but at the most 
critical moment he refused to sign the statement.57 As far as the reason why he 
disapproved was concerned, Volkogonov pointed out Gorbachev's characteristic. 
That is, he had long hesitated. In this respect and at least those given to conspiracy 
theories, some could suggest that Gorbachev had organised the whole thing.58 This 
assertion was put very credibly, but there were still doubts. The composition of the 
emergency committee, nevertheless, appeared not to have been discussed
277
beforehand,59 aiming at toppling Gorbachev himself.
When it came to how to overcome the existing constitutional barriers in 
instituting a state of emergency in the whole country or some part of it, the plotters 
in a hasty but optimistic way tried to legitimize their seizure of power. Simply 
Gorbachev had to be too ill to perform his duties and in accordance with Article 
127/7 of the Constitution USSR Vice-President Yanayev assumed power as acting 
president. Consequently, it was not necessary for them to display the all-out show 
of force by surprise which a coup generally requires. Moreover, they did not 
indicate which particular localities were subject to the resolution that declared a 
state of emergency. It seemed that the coup leaders had an assumption that any 
specific declarations were not necessary until some significant opposition emerged, 
while trying to avoid an official countrywide declaration directly at variance with 
the Constitution. This assumption was part of the point that the coup was poorly 
planned.
It was doubtful, however, that in the early morning of the first day of the 
coup columns of tanks and armoured vehicles began to move towards Moscow 
and around 09:00 took up positions outside key state buildings, when as a 
precondition of troop movements the state of emergency was not officially 
imposed in Moscow. Yanayev declared it late in the afternoon of the day. There 
was a more crucial mystery. Why did the columns of tanks and troops carriers stop 
short of the Russian parliament building? The question is whether the coup leaders 
calculated that arresting El'tsin would inflame an immediate popular uprising, or 
whether they just hoped him to be persuaded to back the putsch under threat of 
attack. When the columns of tanks were moving towards Moscow, El'tsin and his 
several people were in their retreat outside Moscow. According to Sobchak, 
Mayor of Leningrad, they worried that, when they decided to go to Moscow in the 
middle of the highway, the coup leaders would want to arrest them. But as they
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drove to Moscow in the form of a motorcade, the military troops made way for 
El'tsin.60
In many cases, authoritative orders to bring in army troops were never given, 
or were so vague and belated that they could not act upon them. But it was quite 
sure that a prior consultation had been given to the related local commanders, with 
some autonomy of how to cope with the coming situation. Consequently, it was 
possible for people who might have been counted upon to support a state of 
emergency, including key military commanders and even soldiers, to raise a 
question that the emergency committee would not succeed in imposing a state of 
emergency and, therefore, to have a wait and see attitude until they could see how 
events unfolded.
These points, however, do not mean that the conspirators were not 
concerned with the development of structures for the coordination of the various 
arms of the coercive apparatus - the KGB, the MVD, and the Army. Paradoxically, 
they had prepared for all kind of emergencies in major areas, including Moscow. 
As seen in the previous section, their possible conclusion drawn from the 
aforementioned operations, as far as coercive forces were concerned, the MVD 
troops were enough, particularly in Moscow. Thus, the regular army was allocated 
to the minor role of reserve troops. But this calculation significantly hampered the 
emergency committee's ability to implement the military crackdown, especially at 
the vital areas such as Moscow and Leningrad, because the Soviet armed forces 
were showing various patterns along the units and areas.
The most extraordinary thing was the behaviour of the airborne troops. A 
highly controversial role in the putsch was played by Colonel General Pavel 
Grachev, commander of the airborne forces. From the beginning of the coup, it 
was rumoured that Grachev had been arrested because he refused to follow orders 
from defense minister Marshal Yazov. Some of airborne troops from Rayazan, the
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airborne officers' training school, sided with the El'tsin camp.61 This was a real 
shock because they were part of'the September 1990 strange troops movement', as 
seen in chapter 4. On the other hand, a Pskov airborne unit was deployed in 
Tallinn.62 The Moscow City Council building was sealed off by a group of 
paratroopers from the Kazan and Rayazan bases.63 Moreover, in the afternoon of 
August 19 Lt General N. Zimin and a paratrooper entered the office of Moscow's 
Vice Mayor Yu. Luzhkov on an unwritten order from Grachev.64 Naturally, one 
can question whether there was a rebellion by a group of paratroopers, including 
senior level of officers, who refused to accept Grachev's authority, or Grachev 
himself changed his mind all of sudden after ordering the troops' movements. In 
fact, it was proved that the latter was true. In early August Grachev was instructed 
by Yazov to explore the likely consequences of the instituting of a state of 
emergency. In the early morning of August 19, when the coup was officially 
announced, General V. Achalov, who previously commanded the airborne troops 
and attended a conference of future emergency committee members on August 17, 
ordered Grachev to alert the Kursk Paratroop Division and moved on Moscow.65 
Grachev was ordered by Achalov to place under guard major facilities such as the 
State Bank, the State Reserves, and the Radio and TV offices and subsequently by 
Yazov to prepare a detention camp. By coded cable the commander of airborne 
troops put nationwide subordinated troops on full alert.66 In a meeting to discuss 
coordination of Army, KGB, and MVD troops for a attack on the Russian 
parliament, Grachev declined to take part in the assault, together with first deputy 
of MVD Gromov. After the coup General Shaposhnikov controversially named 
Grachev as the chief hero of resistance while confirming that Grachev and himself 
agreed to oppose the coup and to ensure that neither airborne nor air force 
personnel took part in the junta.
Let us see the nationwide activities of army troops. There was no unusual
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military activity in the Central Asia. Exceptionally, Kirgizstan President A. Akaev 
immediately after Yanayev's announcement of the coup in the early morning of 
August 19 was telephoned by the commander of the Turkestan Military District. 
The commander told him that tanks and troops would be sent into the republic, if 
Akaev did not dismiss his guards.67 But, only helicopters and aircraft flew over 
Bishkek.
In the case of Georgia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine, the military mutineers 
showed different approaches. The political leaderships were visited by local 
commandants and other dispatched generals from the ministry of defense, and 
asked to side with the emergency committee.
There were talks between Georgian President Z. Gamsakhurdia and the head 
of the Transcaucasian Military District, Colonel General V. Patrikeev. In general 
the republican leadership took an equivocal attitude towards the coup. But when 
Gamsakhurdia was asked to disarm the Georgian National Guard, he agreed to the 
general's demand.68 This promise cost him his political life. After the coup, 15,000 
members of the Georgian National Guard announced that they were no longer 
subordinate to Gamsakhurdia and denounced the Georgian government for not 
opposing the coup.69
President Kravchuk of the Ukrainian met on the morning of August 19 with 
General V. Varennikov, General V. Chechevatov, commander of the Kiev Military 
District, and another general named Sharikov. At the meeting Varennikov asked 
Kravchuk not to encourage the deputies to debate the coup, and he said that "the 
army has its orders and will act."70 Here, the point was that the general said that 
"should the army have information that the situation requires the introduction of a 
state of emergency, it will be done."71 This clearly confirmed the general plan of 
the coup organizers. Of course, it was self-evident why Varennikov went there at 
such a tense moment. In part, Kravchuk himself answered: "I understood from him
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[Varennikov] that I was on the blacklist after El'tsin, i.e., the Baltics, El'tsin and 
then me."72
In the morning of 19 August Colonel General V. Osipov and V. Kolesov, 
commander in chief and deputy commander of the Southwestern Military Theatre, 
respectively, visited the Moldavian leadership, and announced that Kolesov was in 
charge of administering the state of emergency as commandant of the city of 
Kishinev. Subsequently the generals demanded that troops of the army and the 
MVD join Moldavian police in patrolling Moldavian localities. Rejecting the 
demands, however, the republican leadership mobilized more than 100,000 citizens 
to defend public buildings in the republican capital and other towns against possible 
military seizure. So, this was a somewhat different case. Moreover, some of the 
theatre forces had already moved from their original military bases and taken up 
positions in military encampments just outside Kishinev. They even made several 
attempts to enter Kishinev during the nights of August 19 to 20 and 20 to 21, but 
each time they were blocked by the human walls.
In the three Baltic republics, it appeared that the January 1991 military 
crackdown was replayed. Colonel General F. Kuz'min, commander of the Baltic 
Military District, was declared to be assuming control of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania on behalf of the emergency committee. This was usual, considering the 
previous military crackdown. But it was significant that the first secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party at a press conference on 
August 19 announced the news. On the other hand, Kuz'min made it clear that he 
was not a member of the emergency committee.73 In fact, around twenty-five staff* 
members of the KGB Directorate Five had already been dispatched.74 In addition, 
300 personnel of the 103rd Paratroop Division had also been positioned along the 
direction of Lt. General I. Perovas, deputy chairman of the KGB.75
The troops of the Army and the MVD, including the airborne troops,
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behaved as they had done in January 1991. Some seized broadcasting facilities, 
parliament buildings, and other major communications facilities on the morning of 
August 19. Others left their barracks in tanks and armoured vehicles to organize 
patrols in capitals, i.e., Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, and other cities and to set up 
checkpoints at strategically important sites, such as bridges and major 
intersections. During the operation, they did not meet with any noticeable 
resistance. In fact, civilians were actually urged to stay away from those important 
places by their political leaderships.
But there were also noticeable points that revealed the extent of coordinaton 
among the troops and subsequently the dynamic of coup organizers. The prime 
was Kuz'min's denial of his membership of the emergency committee. The army 
troops arriving in Tallinn were not aware of why they were sent in there until city 
officials handed out leaflets and talked to the soldiers as in Moscow.76 The 
commander of the military airport in Tartu in Estonia refused the Pskov airborne 
unit over flight permission, forcing the troops to travel by the land route to Tallinn. 
Moreover, the head of the Tartu military garrison told a local paper, although it 
was the second day of the coup, that he would not bring his troops out of their 
barracks for the duration of the coup.77
In the RSFSR it appeared that some commanders were given orders with 
some autonomy to the extent that if the commander had information that the 
situation required the introduction of a state of emergency, then he could declare 
it. In part this was confirmed by what General V. Varennikov told the Ukraine 
leadership. Colonel General V. Novozhilov, the commander of the Far Eastern 
Military District, said that he had received instructions from Yazov to "shut down 
news organs and deploy troops at strategic location."78 In fact, the general did not 
follow the order. In Leningrad the state of emergency was imposed by the 
commander of the Leningrad Military District but he could not deploy troops
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because of the strongest protest by Leningrad Mayor A. Sobchak, or because of 
negotiations between the two.
First and foremost, Moscow was in the spotlight as in the afternoon of 
August 19 Yanayev declared a state of emergency. At that time, tanks and other 
armoured vehicles had already taken up positions up to Manezh Square, but they 
had not cordoned off major facilities, including the Russian White House. The 
Moscow operation appeared to have involved all the Army, KGB, and MVD 
troops, but with some questionable level of interservice coordination. Most likely, 
the MVD and KGB troops were to form the main forces, based on the lessons of 
the March 28 operation in Moscow. With regard to armed forces, only one division 
of the Moscow Military District was to be mobilized with plans for seizing 
important urban centres in Moscow. According to a correspondent of Izvestiya, 
who had conducted a conversation with the chief of staff of the district, Lt General 
Zolotov, several days before the coup began V. Achalov had given oral orders to 
Zolotov, while Moiseev had issued coded telegrams to the same effects.79
On the contrary to coup organizers' belief and calculation, from the beginning 
Moscow's commandant Colonel General N. Kalinin met an unexpected situation. 
When he ordered the two KGB praetorian guard divisions, the Taman Motor Rifle 
Division and Kantemirov Tank Division, they displayed doubts about the coup. 
Some elements of the Taman division, rumoured to have been sent to storm the 
Russian White House, encircled the building by the morning of August 20. It surely 
caused shock and disarray both in the KGB leadership and in the General Staff. It 
might have minor significance in terms of military operation that those tanks and 
other officers and soldiers from the Tula Airborne Division and Rayazan 
paratroops school went over to El'tsin side. But the sight of them surrounding the 
building sent a fatal symbolic signal to the desperate military leaders who had 
counted on military unity. Moreover, according to Golovatove, the new head of
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the KGB's antiterrorists unit, known as "Alpha" squad, the KGB unit also did not 
obey an order to assault on the building that was planned to start at 03:00 on 
August 20.80
Consequently, Kryuchkov was forced to find alternative troops. On August 
20, the KGB chairman signed a coded telegram to some KGB divisions and units. 
It said that from 20:00 hours, August 20, 1991, 103rd airborne division in Vitebsk, 
75th motorized infantry division in Nakhichevan, 48th motorized infantry division 
in Chuguyev, and 28th detached motorized infantry brigade were to be 
subordinated to the Task Force Administration, Moscow.81 In other words, the 
Administration was to assume control over the combat operations of the units. 
Meanwhile, leading military figures such as Achalov and Varrenikov spent the 
whole of August 20 in preparing for an assault on the Russian parliament.
As televised in the West, the assault by pro-junta troops on barricades near 
the building appeared to be taken as a response to the unexpected situation, i.e., a 
series of defections. The early 24 hours of the coup went reasonably well, although 
it was not clear what kind of resistance El'tsin might be able to gather. The 
positioned tanks were rumbling down Manezh Square but the crowds on the 
streets were small. To some extent most people were too apathetic, cynical or just 
plain frightened of the consequences to obey El'tsin's strike call. Moreover, they 
were given a kind of medicine by the emergency committee's announcement to low 
food and consumer goods prices.
But there was a big enough minority which rallied round El'tsin boldly. The 
longer they held out, the faster sympathy for the coup flowed outside Moscow. 
Once the Russian parliament gradually became a focus of nationwide resistance, 
the coup leaders were forced into an 'impossible' choice. Some local commanders 
urged them to take more decisive action. On the night of August 19, Colonel 
General B. Pyankov, commander of the Siberian MD, sent the coded message to
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the emergency committee, which ran "the local military council is puzzled by the 
efficient action against the Russian republic leaders who continue to hoodwink the 
people, urging them not to obey the emergency committee decisions. The majority 
of the working people call for decisive action in which the military council 
supported them."82 Colonel General A. Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals 
MD, also said that "the military council and troops of the district are perturbed by 
the indecisive attitude towards El'tsin and his entourage... Delay is fatal."83 It was 
clear that El'tsin's resistance had to be broken as soon as possible, i.e., at the night 
of August 20, if they were to survive. In other words, they had to take the building 
by force with bloodshed.
In military terms, the defenders were largely unarmed, apart from Molotov 
cocktails, iron bars and a few small arms. Moreover, the weather, cold and rainy, 
was keeping many people off the streets and could provide some cover for 
attackers. Therefore, if a decision to attack was taken, then speed and violence 
would be of essence. But the troops showed lack of resolve. Rather, they appeared 
not to act in earnest. The columns of vehicles hung around for hours before 
probing the barricades. The long hours of waiting, uncertainty, the jeering of the 
crowd, and possibly lack of clear orders, could undermine troops effectiveness, 
considerably. In fact, the coup leaders themselves showed lack of resolve. That 
evening Yanayev said that he would not permit any attack by the armed forces on 
the building. He even assured El'tsin that, if orders for such an attack existed, he 
would cancel them.84
That is, the coup leadership had already lost its nerve at that time. Besides 
the defiant citizens, there was the world's media, some of them broadcasting live, 
to record the event. But it was a real irony that the coup leaders themselves were 
no longer men of the past: they did not want to shed blood on a Stalinist scale to 
achieve their ends. On the first day of the putsch, one thing was clear: the army
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was not under orders to shoot. For example, a middle ranking officer pestered with 
angry shouts of protesters in Manezh Square vowed that the troops had not been 
given an order to fire on people.85
Meanwhile, those defending the building had hours to improve their defences 
to the extent that the lightweight armoured vehicles could not penetrate the 
barricades. The vehicles used during the operation were originally designed to be 
dropped from aircraft as part of a fast-moving operation in open country and, 
therefore, not suitable against barricades of vehicles and concrete. Now a kind of 
combat engineer vehicle that had a bulldozer blade and crane, and even a built-in 
search-light for night operations were needed to get more combat vehicles through, 
disperse the pro-El'tsin crowd, occupy the building, and seize El'tsin, without 
bloodshed. In short, the attackers became small and even helpless against the 
defenders. Some of the attacking troops fired a few shots into the air in an effort to 
disperse the demonstrators, as they were isolated. Although there were three 
casualties, this was far from the coup organizers' basic line.
The operation clearly disclosed the failure of a coordinated system among 
different units such as the KGB, MVD and some elite army units. It is quite clear 
that the coup leaders knew the nature of the barricades. According to General V. 
Makhailov, chief of the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), GRU officers in 
Moscow and personnel from the General Staffs diplomatic academy were ordered 
to put on civilian clothes and spy on demonstrations and barricades.86 Here the 
main question is why the necessary combat engineer vehicles were not in the fore 
front. And why did tanks, which were heavier than the armoured troop carriers and 
thus more suitable to crush the barricades than the troop carriers, remain quiet? 
One can say that the coup efforts were cut short by the people who took to the 
streets and to the Russian parliament. However, it is correct only in part. Quite a 
few stayed at home. Moreover, popular anger cannot stop tanks. Therefore, it
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seemed that the issue was decided by the part of the army which did not support 
the plotters from the beginning. On the second day of the coup, Radio Station, the 
Moscow Echo, broadcast that Colonel General Shaposhnikov, then CINC of the 
Air Forces, was arrested. Sobchak announced that the whole of the Air Forces had 
sided with the El'tsin. In fact, the general was staying in permanent contact with 
the White House.87 This defection, including tanks and paratroopers surrounding 
the building, significantly boosted the defenders' morale. At the same time it limited 
the coup leaders' option in terms of military operation.
As a whole, however, Soviet army's action during the coup was still 
controversial and unclear. Tank columns moved into the streets of Vilnius, 
Moscow, and other cities. On the other hand, the troops of the Southwestern 
Military Theatre, which had already moved from their original military bases and 
taken up positions in military encampments just outside Kishinev, failed to do so. It 
is too early to know the whole story. The new military leadership drew a veil over 
the story but something beneficial to themselves in particular and the Soviet armed 
forces in general.
8.5. New Defense Minister’s Approach to Military Reform
In the days following his appointment, the new defense minister 
Shaposhnikov moved quickly to put his stamp on the military. Firstly, on August 
23, he apologized for what he called the "careless, and in certain cases illegal, 
actions of some military units" and he ensured that "the armed forces would never 
again be used against the people".88 The defense minister in an appeal issued on 
August 30 Krasnaya zvezda bitterly lamented the fact that at a critical point not all 
of the military leadership adopted a firm stance in opposition to the coup.89 The
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marshal said that he was proud of his actions during the coup. As mentioned 
before, Shaposhnikov even disputed descriptions of the putsch as a military coup, 
arguing that it was a plot by "high-ranking state officials" that counted on some 
military support.90
In addition, the marshal emphasized that the army itself was "guilty of 
nothing before the Soviet people,"91 because an "absolute majority" of the armed 
forces personnel took a firm stance of loyalty to the Constitution.92 In this context, 
he spoke out strongly against what he termed efforts to conduct a "witch-hunt" in 
the armed forces in the aftermath of the coup. A vindictive search for those who 
fulfilled orders during the days of the coup and those who did not would be both 
''immoral and a stain upon the honour of the officer corps," he said.93
Most likely, in a move to strengthen his relations with the armed forces, 
El'tsin not only praised the role of the armed forces in defending democracy during 
the coup but also said that he would defend the armed forces from "unjustified 
criticism."94 Moreover, he issued a decree improving social protection for 
servicemen in Russia. It promised social security guarantees for servicemen and 
veterans, better housing or rent grants, tax exemption, compulsory state-funded 
insurance for active-duty servicemen, and legal safeguards for servicemen.95 All in 
all, El'tsin promised to do what the Union government planned to do, but never 
did.
Meanwhile, the new defense minister tried to find a scapegoat in the 
Communist Party. Having been a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
he resigned from the party declaring that the party had failed to stand behind El'tsin 
during the attempted coup. Since the 28th Party Congress under the leadership of 
Colonel General N. Shlyaga political officers had been given the task of educating 
servicemen in the spirit of devoting to the policy of the state. Moreover, vows of 
allegiance of the USSR President were made at a national conference of party
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secretaries of the armed forces held a week before the coup. And a few days before 
the coup the same vows were also made by the leaders of the Army Committee of 
the party. As soon as the coup was launched, however, the party branches of the 
armed forces were ordered to mobilize Communists to carry out the decisions 
adopted by the emergency committee.96 They served the interests of the party.
The marshal firstly linked his resignation with the belief that an army in a 
multiparty system should be free of political parties and organizations of every 
kind.97 This was consistent with the political leadership's stance towards the 
communist party in the wake of the coup. Primarily aimed at the Communist Party, 
on August 22, El'tsin issued a decree ordering the elimination of party bodies and 
of their activities in all military units stationed on the territory of the Russia. Two 
days later Gorbachev extended the ban to all military units in the country.98 Finally, 
the new military leadership on August 29 told the USSR Supreme Soviet that he 
had proposed to Gorbachev not only that party bodies in the armed forces be 
disbanded but that the military-political organs be eliminated as well.
This kind of effort intended to recover the image of the Soviet armed forces 
appeared to be successful. In mid-September, the new defense minister was 
sympathetic even to Yazov by publicly saying that the former defense minister did 
not shoot at civilians. In an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta Shaposhnikov 
revealed the remaining part of what Yazov said at the first meeting of the MOD 
Collegium. "Don't do anything stupid. There will be people in the crowd who will 
throw themselves in front of the tanks or the throw Molotov cocktails. I want no 
bloodshed or carnage."99 In fact, Lt General V. Manilov had already made a similar 
comment. The general said in an interview with Komsomol'skaya pravda that 
Yazov participated in the putsch because, once the conspirators got him to say yes, 
he could not walk backwards.100 In this context, the involvement of the military in 
the coup could be simplified. Shaposhnikov continued to say in the interview that
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the troops were simply told to enter Moscow and to stop at certain places. Finally, 
he declared that it was "the people, the time, and the army" that halted the coup.101 
This was quite remarkable development, if the military leadership obviously read 
the mood of Soviet citizens.
Naturally, and at least in public, there was a small scale of purge from the 
Soviet high command. In mid-September, 9 out of 17 members of the MOD 
Collegium had left or had been transferred from various reasons.102 Marshal D. 
Yazov, General V. Varennikov, General K. Kochev, first deputy defense minister, 
and General V. Yermakov, head of the chief directorate for personnel were 
arrested or relieved from their duties as ’active organizers' of the coup. On the 
other hand, Moiseev was released at 'his own request' from his duties and sent for 
examination by a military screening commission to be discharged into the reserve 
for the health reasons. Shlyaga and Achalov103 were released from their duties in 
connection with 'the abolition of the posts'. But the former chief of the MPA was 
being examined in the hospital by the screening commission. General I. Tretyak104 
and V. Govorov, CINC of the Air Defence and CINC of Civil Defence, 
respectively, were dismissed from the armed forces for 'age reasons'. Marshal 
Akhromeev, an adviser to President Gorbachev and the former chief of the General 
Staff, had already committed suicide.
How could Shaposhnikov become the defense minister? It seemed that there 
was a differentiated command structure that consisted of only selected army 
commanders and staff officers, including those generals classified as "active 
organizers of the coup," together with their counterparts in combat units of the 
KGB and the MVD. There was no way to know when it was formed and who the 
prime organizers were. The most authoritative conclusion drawn by the RSFSR 
parliament through hearings said that "preparation of concrete measures to carry 
through a coup was initiated in the KGB in December 1990."105 Doubtless, other
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views are possible. Nevertheless, it is quite sure that Yazov was an early 
participant in the structure. At the start of August 1991 the marshal instructed 
Grachev to explore the likely consequences of the promulgation of a state of 
emergency, as mentioned before. The marshal attended a conference of fixture 
emergency committee on August 17, when the decision was taken to seize power, 
and he took part in a major meeting on the night of August 18 called by 
Kryuchkov, Pugo, and Yazov and attended by Pavlov, Luk'yanov, and others, in 
order to work out a strategy to do their secret business. In addition, Yazov acted 
as an official link between the existing command structure, that is, the MOD 
Collegium, and the other, a possible differentiated one.
General Varennikov was also one of the early participants of the command 
structure. The general visited Gorbachev in the Crimea on August 18, together 
with other three figures. Gorbachev was coerced to assent to the conspirators' 
demands. For this job the general was not able to take part in a major meeting of 
the MOD Collegium held on August 18. Subsequently the general visited the 
Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk in order to enlist his support.106 On August 20, 
with Achalov, Grachev, and Gromov, the general attended a meeting to discuss 
coordination of army, KGB and MVD troops for a planned assault against the 
Russian parliament. Grachev and Gromov declined to attack the building.107
The extent of Moiseev's involvement in the structure remained unclear, as the 
reasoning of his release, i.e., at his own request, suggested. Moreover, the general 
argued that he had no complete information about the coup efforts,108 and was 
even appointed to defense minister, though it was for one day. His involvement 
appeared to be essential and inevitable because of the very vital role that the 
General Staff could play in mobilising troops. As mentioned before, Moiseev 
ordered the chief of staff of the Moscow Military District to mobilize one division. 
But Yashin's explanation of the operation in Moscow was confusing. According to
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him, the Moscow operation was prepared by the headquarters of the district on 
Yazov's directions.109 It is true, however, that Moiseev ordered a lot of local 
commanders to make "maximum use of all means and methods" to explain the 
correctness of the measure being taken by the emergency committee, as the coup 
launched.110 Incidentally, before the coup officially launched, he did not appear to 
have used any network of the General Staff, including a computer network.111
Considering the actions of these leading military mutineers, the differentiated 
command structure had been active for more than two weeks before the coup 
launched. But the initial instruction was issued at 04:30 on August 19. It was 
addressed to army units and the directive to put troops on alert and called for 
cooperation with "healthy forces" in local organs of power and with USSR KGB 
and MVD organs.112 At 06:00, there was the first meeting of the assembled 
military leadership, the MOD Collegium. Yazov told the collegium that President 
Gorbachev was sick and that USSR Vice President G. Yanayev had assumed the 
powers of the presidency.
According to Yashin, who was called back from a holiday by Yazov to 
attend the meeting, the military leaders were surprised by the announcement of a 
state of emergency, but they initially carried out those orders issued by Yazov. 
Incidentally, General Mikhailov, chief of the GRU, also revealed that the first he 
had known of the military involvement was when he saw troops and armoured 
vehicles in the streets, as he went to work on August 19.113 It was another irony 
that the all-powerful GRU, in terms of intelligence capability, could be forgotten.
Thus there could be a chance for Shaposhnikov to have his doubts and 
communicate his feelings to other senior officers such as the first deputy 
commander of the Navy, Admiral I. Kapitanets, Grachev, and so on. On August 20 
when the coup met with resistance, Yazov was advised by Shaposhnikov to break 
with the emergency committee and to order the troops back to their barracks. The
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MOD Collegium met once again at 08:00 on August 21, by which time the coup 
had nearly failed. All participants supported Shaposhnikov's proposal to withdraw 
the troops, outlaw the emergency committee, and put an end to the whole 
business.114 Not as member of the emergency committee but as defense minister, 
Yazov ordered the troops positioned in Moscow to withdraw. In the end, the 
integrity of the high command could be recovered, and Shaposhnikov became a 
face-saving figure of the high command.
Being faced with the issue of the Soviet armed forces' future, the new 
military leadership began negotiations with republican authorities. On September 
10 and 11, Shaposhnikov met with representatives of the 12 republics and the three 
Baltic states to discuss military reforms and related centre-periphery 
responsibilities. The talks focused on how to retain a single military force and 
ensure a unified command of Soviet nuclear weapons. On a broader plane 
Shaposhnikov called for a clear demarcation of republican and all-Union 
responsibility for defense questions. In a compromising way, for example, he 
suggested that the Soviet armed forces on a sovereign republic's territory would 
pledge to defend the external borders of the republic and the state as a whole; there 
would be the principle of noninterference by the army in the republic's internal 
affairs; and military exercises, manoeuvres, and redeployment of troops would only 
occur by agreement with the republics. In return, he hoped that sovereign republics 
ensured the conditions for the armed forces' presence on their territory.115 At that 
time a lot of republics, including the Baltic states, were demanding the withdrawal 
of Soviet armed forces their territories.
Concerning sovereign republic's rights, the marshal offered that republican 
governments could participate in formulating and implementing military policy, 
drawing up the defense budget, training reserves, and organizing the draft. These 
were consistent with the final draft of a New Union Treaty. In this respect, the
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defense minister considered the restructuring of the ministry of defense to be 
necessary.116 He even advocated republican control over small formations similar 
to national guard units that could also serve as a type of armed forces reserve. 
Later Shaposhnikov clarified the creation of the national guard units in a detailed 
way. They were to protect republican government institutions and other major 
facilities. But they had to carry only firearms "without any military equipment." 
And in wartime they could provide a reserve "for the Soviet armed forces."117
However, the new military leadership's trial had not continued so long. In 
principle, Colonel General V. Semenov, the new CINC of the Ground Forces, for 
example, accepted that the structure of the ground forces would depend upon 
arrangements outlined in any future Union treaty. But in practical terms he urged 
that a unified army be retained. The main point of his arguments was that individual 
republics were unable to finance or train well-equipped ground forces. Therefore, 
only a strong central government could maintain military forces capable of reliably 
ensuring the security of the Union, he stated.118
Meanwhile, Shaposhnikov also became a strong spokesman against any 
defense budget cuts. In general, he accepted that the country faced no "genuine" 
external threat, as the former military leadership did. He consequently agreed to 
Gorbachev's major arms control proposal, including the reduction of 700,000 men. 
He argued, however, that it was necessary to increase the capabilities of those that 
were retained. At the same time, the new defense minister revealed the fact that
185,000 families of officers and warrant officers had nowhere to live.119 This was 
one of main areas used by the former military leadership as a base for more money. 
The housing problem could be resolved only by the revising of the budget 
structure. He knew this, too. The defense minister said that there would be a 
significant increase in the capital for housing construction at the expense of funds 
for the training infrastructure, testing grounds, airfields, and commanding
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centres.120
Consequently, the military' leadership appeared to have come up with the 
previous ideas, as far as the major military reform issues were concerned. 
However, in the context of the Soviet civil-military relations, the failed coup 
brought the overall crisis to the limit. The most critical thing was the collapse of 
statehood. Nevertheless, it brought something invaluable in terms of the future 
civil-military relation. A commander's order had been law for his subordinates in 
the history of the Soviet armed forces. After the coup, however, it was argued that 
orders be "legal and sufficiently correct" so as not to cause any doubts. 
Shaposhnikov, who was one of disobedient to Yazov during the coup, stated that 
orders should be checked both against "people's consciences" and against the 
"law."121 In particular, reminding the major incidents in civil-military relations such 
as Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius incidents, including the August coup, he argued that 
there should be "a [MOD] collegium decision and two signatures," that of defence 
minister and chief of the General Staff.122 According to him, those incidents were 
done over the telephone.
8.6. How to Divide the Soviet Armed Forces
In September 1991 the USSR Congress of People's Deputies declared itself 
redundant, after confirming self-determination of the union republics. Its key 
decision was a law on bodies of Soviet state power and administration of the 
USSR during an unspecified transitional period.123 This passed all its powers to the 
Supreme Soviet and a new State Council, which consisted of the Soviet President 
and top officials from the union republics. Union bodies responsible for the 
country's defence, security, and order and foreign affairs were to be directed by the
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President by agreement with the new State Council.
These arrangements were designed to operate only until a new Union Treaty 
was signed. Consequently, on October 18, 1991, eight republics signed the treaty 
of the new economic community, laying the basis for a joint effort against the 
socioeconomic crisis.124 It stressed private ownership, free enterprise, and 
competition, and bound the republics to stimulate business. They pledged not to 
unilaterally divide shared property or put up trade barriers between each other. The 
Ruble was the common currency, but members were free to have their own 
currencies.
But immediately after its signing, acute political frictions among the republics 
became more apparent. The redistribution of authority turned out to be rather 
explosive. The expropriation of the Soviet armed forces in republican favour 
became a vital issue. A strong centre was in principle incompatible with the idea of 
sovereignty. But as a coordinator the centre was seriously needed not only for 
domestic troubles but also for the West, which insisted on dealing with one, not 
twelve partners.
As everyone took it necessary and good, on November 14, a new political 
treaty was agreed upon along the principle of the Novo-Ogarevo agreement.125 
However, no sensation was created. Ukraine President L. Kravchuk again cast 
aspersion on the very idea of an "union of sovereign states." Armenia, Moldavia, 
and Georgia were even more outspoken.
Under these circumstances Gorbachev tried to secure the rapidly collapsing 
union. Characteristically he fought almost to the end of his days in the Kremlin for 
the preservation of the union and his own position. By that time Gorbachev was 
observed even to send signals to the military, hoping the last all-union institution 
would back him in action against what he saw as an "unconstitutional seizure of 
power" by El'tsin and his colleagues in the Ukraine and Belorussia,126 who had a
297
founding meeting of the commonwealth. On December 7 1991, chief of the 
General Staff, General Lobov, was replaced by Colonel General Samsonov, who 
was the commandant of Leningrad during the coup. This incident was reported as a 
result of the conflict between chief of the General Staff and defense minister.127 
Considering the fact that the general Samsonov was strongly supported by the 
democrats, in particular, Leningrad Mayor Sobchak,128 we could speculate that 
there was a linkage between Gorbachev and Lobov against democrats.
Of course, it appeared that Shaposhnikov had already sided with the Russian 
leadership since he established intimidate relationship with El'tsin amid of the coup. 
Moreover, El'tsin had already gained popularity a lot in the Soviet armed forces. 
The decisive factor was probably his August 28 decree improving social protection 
for servicemen in Russia. In addition, as mentioned before, none of democrats who 
gathered around the Russian leadership addressed a bad word to the army divisions 
which took part in the coup attempt. It was repeatedly stated that the army did not 
turn against the people. Therefore, it was quite understandable that in mid- 
December at a time when Gorbachev was still head of the Soviet armed forces, the 
defense minister discussed future military strategy with El'tsin.129
Furthermore, Gorbachev's position was fatally weakened by the republics' 
refusal to fund his government. The governments of the republics had simply 
stopped pouring money into central coffers, leaving a huge sum of budget deficit. 
Gorbachev even tried playing a Central Asia card, knowing that he had a strong 
pro-union ally, President N. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, and that the other Central 
Asian leaders preferred him to El'tsin. But they also refused.
So power slipped inexorably from Gorbachev's grasp. President Gorbachev 
was left only with a humiliating shell of office. In fact, he had no choice but to 
depart from the office. On Christmas day of 1991 President Gorbachev resigned, 
after signing a decree ending his function as CINC of the armed forces. At that
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time, the Supreme Soviet had already disappeared.
The document was handed to Marshal Shaposhnikov, the last defense 
minister of the USSR and the man who would oversee the transfer of the Soviet 
armed forces to a joint commonwealth army. Thus, it was no longer necessary to 
argue for the reform of the Soviet armed forces. The reminder of work was how to 
divide them among the former union republics.
The issue of how to divide the Soviet armed forces, particularly, nuclear 
weapons, had already became serious since in November the Ukraine parliament 
decided to place the armed forces stationed in the republic under its jurisdiction. At 
first the Ukraine insisted that it did not want to be a nuclear power but opposed the 
handing of the weapons over either Gorbachev or Russia. Now its defense ministry 
was formed under the leadership of General Konstantin Morozov. In early 
December, Kravchuk declared himself head of all the Soviet troops on Ukrainian 
soil and pressed ahead with forming a Ukrainian army.
As the Ukraine leadership and the Soviet high command entered into a 
quarrel in earnest,130 the West began to show its acute and urgent concern. But its 
concern was no longer primarily that the Soviet military machine might be 
mobilised for an all-out attack on it. On the contrary the West worried that the 
machine might not be under any political control at all.
The immediate implementation of the recent Bush-Gorbachev's proposals for 
the removal and destruction of non-strategic weapons was suggested as the single, 
most important step that could be taken. Bush and Gorbachev had already traded 
spectacular new nuclear disarmament initiatives. On September 27 1991, President 
Bush announced a unilateral move by the US to withdraw and destroy US ground- 
based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad, and on surface ships, attack 
submarines and naval aircraft, mostly deployed in Europe.131
Within one week, these unilateral measures were fully supported by the
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Soviet Union. On October 5, Gorbachev responded with great interest that not 
only matched the American cuts but also challenged President Bush and to make 
even faster strides towards disarmament, starting with a nuclear test ban. First, 
weapons to be eliminated were nuclear artillery and battlefield missiles. Second, 
weapons to be removed from alert or active service were heavy bombers, 500 
strategic missiles, tactical naval weapons, and three nuclear missile submarines. 
And finally, other unilateral moves were suggested: Soviet armed forces to be cut 
by 700,000 men, one-year nuclear test moratorium, and strategic offensive 
weapons to be cut to 5,000 over seven years, instead of to 6,000 as envisaged by 
START Treaty.132 The nature and motive of Bush's proposal was quite clear, when 
it first appeared. The US politico-military leadership could have concluded that 
tactical nuclear weapons had their day. This was not the only reason for the 
Western initiative. After the euphoria at the failure of the coup had died down, the 
West suddenly saw that the USSR no longer existed, the centre was disappearing, 
and 27,000 Soviet nuclear warheads were crawling out of the woodwork. Facing 
the bitter example of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the West began to wonder 
what would happen if the nuclear weapons were involved in a similar ethnic 
conflict in the Soviet Union.
Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed not only in Russia, the Ukraine, 
Belorussia, and Kazakhstan, which held the strategic missiles, but also in nearly all 
of the other republics in the form of from nuclear-tipped air defence missiles to 
nuclear artillery shells. Particularly, these tactical nuclear weapons alarmed the 
world. It was estimated that there were about 16,500 tactical nuclear weapons,133 
including short-range battlefield missiles, anti-submarine rockets, bombs, artillery 
shells, mines, surface-to-air missiles, and ship-to-ship weapons; and as many as
5,000 nuclear artillery shells distributed throughout at least nine republics.
Up to then Soviet nuclear weapons had been protected by a very effective,
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centralised command and control system against any unauthorised access, seizure 
or major accident. The current process of social, political, economic, and ethnic 
disintegration was forcing everyone in the collapsing Union, and by no means least 
in the Soviet armed forces, to re-examine their most basic loyalties. In certain case, 
it was almost impossible for the weakened centre to fully control the movement of 
tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, orders to use them could be given by officers 
as low-level as regimental level of formations. In mid-December, Dick Cheney, the 
US Defense Secretary, assessed that while the Soviets were well doing a job in 
securing their nuclear capability, they did not control up to 250 warheads.134
Hence both the Soviet Union and the West were in a hurry. Bush probably 
believed that a full-scale nuclear deal was only possible with the centre, Gorbachev. 
Delay could only make nuclear weapons, particularly tactical ones, a bone of 
contention at the talks on independence for the sovereign republics. And that could 
mean the West having to hold nuclear disarmament talks not with the USSR but 
with a dozen independent nuclear states.
Therefore, authorities of the union republics had to be persuaded that it was 
in their interest to allow such weapons to be withdrawn, to deactivation sites in 
Russia where practical difficulties preclude that, or to be disabled in place. 
Ironically, James Baker, the US Secretary of State, became a pioneer in such an 
effort at a time when the strategic weapons had already become an invaluable 
bargaining chip to be used in negotiations between Russia and the other republics. 
Carrying specific proposals to safeguard the Soviet nuclear weapons, Baker 
travelled to Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan where strategic nuclear 
missiles were deployed. Moreover, the US Congress set aside money around 220 
million pounds for use for dismantling Soviet missiles.135
At last, a nuclear agreement signed on December 21 in Alma Ata. Eleven 
commonwealth republics, including Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and
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Kazakhstan, accepted a single command for strategic nuclear weapons, and thus at 
least should have satisfied many of the West's concerns about the risks of control 
and even proliferation. However, they all did not accept that the rest of the army 
should remain under single command. The Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldavia were 
still adamant that they wanted their own armed forces. Moreover, they argued that 
these armies be formed on the basis of the troops already stationed in their 
republics.
Consequently, the Soviet armed forces was to break up of its own accord, 
along geographical and ethnic lines against what was supposed to happen in the 
aftermath of the coup: the former Soviet armed forces would remain under central 
command, while being gradually reduced in size to become a fully professional 
commonwealth force. Less than one week since Gorbachev resigned, Krasnaya 
zvezda, with a headline saying "The army cannot be cut up alive," argued that the 
armed forces were too complex an organism to be carved up without jeopardising 
the security of the CIS.136 But this warning was of no use.
The final effort of eight leaders of former Soviet republics, who met to have 
a talk over the contentious issue of a unified military command for conventional 
forces in Minsk on December 30, was also not useful. In fact, the text of the Minsk 
agreement left open the question of republic armies, bowing to the insistence of 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia. Based on this agreement, President Kravchuk 
of Ukraine further tried to keep under his control tactical forces, which would 
include any units, such as mechanised infantry divisions and armoured divisions, 
equipped with nuclear weapons. Most likely the Soviet armed forces would be 
divided, and very soon. Nevertheless, only Ukraine was able to raise a more or less 
independent army and a fleet of its own. There were enough ethnic Ukrainians 
among the offciers having taken the oath of allegiance to Kiev to staff Ukrainian 
army cadres. Indeed, Ukraine had a number of officer training schools graduating
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officers for all the branches. The raising of Moldavia's armed forces on the basis of 
a division of the Odessa Military Dictrict, which was to go over to Ukraine, 
created problems. The ethnic and political situation in the republic was more 
complicated than Ukraine. It was a difficult choice for the servicemen, particularly 
officers and NCOs, of the division to take an oath to defend its borders. Azerbaijan 
failed to persuade the local army commanders to defend its borders, and decided to 
raise its own armed forces. It was difficult to imagine that the officers of the four 
divisions stationed in the republic, consisting primarily of Slavs, as everywhere, 
would take the Azerbaijanian oath and would be ready to carry out orders from 
Baku. Nevertheless, some officers of other nationalities might agree to serve in the 
newly formed Azerbaijanian army. In short, Azerbaijan had much greater needs but 
very limited possibilities. Having raised its own armed forces on the basis of a 
military district, Belorussia was expected to establish close cooperation with 
Russia in the military field. The other member states of the CIS would most likely 
form a united army in which Russia would naturally play a leading role. The 
Central Asian republics would receive security guarantees from their great northern 
neighbour, evidently on favourable financial terms, and in this way Russia would 
prevent the appearance of a dangerous vacuum south of its borders.
Meanwhile, the Soviet armed forces became disunited, muddled by the 
multitude of oaths, and muzzled by social problems. Under the leadership of 
Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Army was no longer politically heterogeneous and had 
no backbone in the shape of a military concept.
In the end, in April 1992 Russian President El'tsin issued a decree ordering 
the creation of an independent Russian defence establishment. In May 1992 Army 
General P. Grachev was appointed to the post of Russian defense minister along 
the decree. This virtually ended the Shaposhnikov interregnum. If the creation of 
the CIS in December 1991 marked the end of the Soviet period in the political
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sphere, then Grachev's appointment meant the beginning of the post-Soviet period 
in the security sphere, in general, and of the new civil-military relations in Russia, 
in particular.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has chosen as its topic the public debates on the restructuring of 
Soviet armed forces in terms of 'reasonable sufficiency' for 'defensive defense' and 
the military reform movement in relation to the domestic reforms taking place. In 
this way it was possible to grasp the nature of the issues and stakes of Soviet civil- 
military relations under the Gorbachev leadership.
The relations underwent a process of change from a traditional Soviet type 
Party-military relations, through a germinal Western style civil-military relations, 
and finally to a kind of the Third World style, in which the military became a 
'sword and shield' of the political leadership through a short-time contract designed 
to secure the Soviet Union. This is not a place to make certain conceptual 
distinctions among those three styles.1 Here the Third World style mainly refers to 
a sweeping role expansion of the Soviet armed forces. Once the contract was 
broken by Gorbachev, a coalition of the conservative forces composed of state 
institutions, Party, military, and defense industry carried out the coup and its failure 
led, in the end, to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the new round 
of debates on military reform among former Union republics was concerned with 
the ironic question of how to divide the Soviet armed forces.
During the period, as we have examined, there was a dramatic increase in the 
number of civilian participants in the military reform movement. Indeed grass roots' 
support for it became the foundation of genuine civilian control over the military 
establishment. At the same time, the scope of the debates progressively widened 
and deepened and the interaction between the advocacy of military reform and the 
stubborn high command was also radicalized with no area of compromise between 
the two polemics. In fact, the debates were replaced with activities that seemed
308
highly organized, secret, or illegal. These unprecedented developments clearly 
denied all assumptions of traditional perspectives on the Soviet civil-military 
relations.
The origins of those developments were related to Gorbachev's method of 
the intervention in military affairs. Simply, the party leadership brought into the 
public arena, for the first time, a series of foreign and security issues. To make this 
tactic successful, he tried to build a wide range of supportive networks for the new 
security policy from the political leadership to the citizens and even to the rank and 
file officers of the armed forces under the rubric of glasnost' and democratization. 
At the same time, he continuously excluded both the military leadership and its 
possible supporters from the highest level of the defense decisionmaking process.
Originally the debate was designed to claim the Party's jurisdiction over 
military doctrine, but glasnost' and democratization significantly altered not only 
the relationship of the Party and society but also that of the military and society. 
Glasnost' legitimized new forms of expression and activity against the Soviet 
ideology that was the very foundation of both the party and the Soviet armed 
forces. Democratization effected the calculus of costs and benefits associated with 
political activism.
Consequently, the military reform issue even became a politically useful 
bargaining chip. This erosion of the core ideology and institution not only 
transformed the nature of Soviet politics and but also produced the new political 
system. As a result, the top leaders in the Politburo were divided. This polarization, 
reflected in Soviet society itself, made it possible for the military to side with the 
conservatives within the party apparatus in order to secure its interests, as 
Kolkowicz's generalization on Soviet Party-military relations suggested. Thus, 
Gorbachev not only lost, to a certain extent, his personal influence over his own 
appointees but also power of the general secretaryship over the high command,
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including the MPA. On the other hand, he gained the support of rank and file 
officers as well as a community of civilian military experts, who mainly linked to 
the ministry of foreign affairs. In particular, a group of junior and middle level 
officer deputies became a very decisive force in tackling the issues facing the armed 
forces with the help of mass media. All these forces opened a new era of the 
genuine civil-military relations under the conditions given by political reform.
In democracies, two mechanisms are significant to ensure civilian control 
over the military: the budget process and the framework of laws. For the new bom 
Soviet parliament, the latter was important, because previously there had not been 
such a framework. In principle, the formal, legal definition of parliamentary control 
and of the political roles that the military in the new system are to play should be 
established. In practical terms, however, this definition has to be based on an ethic 
of partnership among civilian authorities, citizens, and military. The military must 
not only be ready to accept a civil definition of what the military's responsibility 
ought to be but also must feel that this definition is legitimate. The society must 
have well-defined boundaries for the exclusive exercise of power and control by 
the military on the one hand and by civilians on the other. Moreover, in a period of 
transition the military should remain politically neutral. Restraint is also needed on 
the civilian side as well.
In reality, as we have seen, the Gorbachev leadership was ambiguous. Partly 
they tried to keep these fundamentals in mind, but in general they publicly brought 
pressure to bear on the military. Probably the high command considered the 
pressure to be unnecessary. This pressure came from the political leadership's 
efforts to raise the weight of the new political system as soon as possible. In some 
sense, Gorbachev was forced to give the public, who regarded the high command 
to be an obstacle in perestroika's path, the impression that he was also eager with 
regard to military reform as well as arms control. Gorbachev's public
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announcement about the details of the defense budget at the opening session of the 
Supreme Soviet was typical of this. Needless to say, there was also the interaction 
with economic requirements.
The advocacy of various sociopolitical forces' military reform was so strong 
that it could not set military goals that were both feasible and attainable. With 
regard to the vital question of who was to form national security and military 
policies, for example, civilians simply denied the status of the Defense Council and 
the General Staff. They hardly considered the fact that alternative mechanisms 
were not yet established.
In addition, they tried to intervene too much in the inner problems of the 
military. Their haste to exclude the representatives of the military from the 
decisionmaking process and the lack of knowledge, input, and control on the part 
of the broad body politic, combined with the obstinacy of many of members of the 
high command, led to distrust of the military or antimilitary sentiment in society. 
People spoke of the necessity of control over the military, in principle, by people, 
and, on behalf of people, in practice, by the Congress of People's Deputies, the 
Supreme Soviet, and the President. However, it was all talk and no action. In 
reality, they denied all these authorities, too, and thus denied the fundamental of 
'objective' control.
A mechanism of subjective control, the MPA, was on the process of collapse 
as the political reform proceeded. Civilian control, which in Kolkowicz's paradigm 
was achieved by subjective means and in Odom was not seen as problematic at all, 
was in Colton affected by both subjective and objective means, but with a tendency 
toward the predominance of the objective. Paradoxically, the Soviets rejected both 
means under the parliamentary system.
Consequently, the Soviet armed forces, which had been secured by the 
systematic, multiple buffering system, were barely exposed to naive politics. The
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high command was forced to uphold the prestige of the military and the material 
well-being of officers. Certainly, there were problems of corruption and 
incompetence and even a growing cleavage between officers and generals. The 
economic constraints facing the Soviets were very serious so that it was 
understandable that drastic arms cuts were so frankly linked to budget deficits and 
economic reform. Nonetheless, civilians should have resisted such a nasty urge to 
indulge in scapegoatism.
Not surprisingly, the military establishment tried to defend its own legitimacy 
and to engage in projects tangential to its primary mission to demonstrate that it 
was not a drain on society and that it had an essential role to play. Furthermore, it 
had effective means to defend itself. Once the military became politicized, effective 
parliamentary control of the armed forces soon became fictitious. The Soviet 
parliament was unable to act as a directing force because the military did not give it 
the information, including details of the defense budget, indispensable for control. 
The well-entrenched triad of the party conservatives, the high command, and 
defense industry resisted any transitions in the military economy field at the 
parliament. This was clearly reflected by the efforts of the Supreme Soviet 
Committee for Defense and State Security. The so-called two 'black colonels' 
became the military's spokesmen in the Soviet politics, as Shevardnadze's 
resignation speech suggested.
The most alarming development was the fact that, as democratization 
continued, power rapidly diffused in the fourth and fifth years of perestroika. Very 
little power was transferred to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and only some remained 
in the Party, but most of power drifted inexorably to the republics. This had great 
implications for the civil-military relations. When incipient nationalist political 
movements in a number of republics gained political power, they demanded that 'a 
military-political alliance of sovereign states' must form military policy. In fact, this
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demand was accompanied by the near collapse of conscription in such republics as 
the Baltics, Georgia, and Moldavia. This was a clear manifestation of how real and 
powerful the republican authorities’ control over the Soviet armed forces were. In 
fact, It was so quick that the military establishment could not adapt itself to the 
new situation steadily.
The winter of 1990-1991 was a decisive moment in terms of Soviet politics. 
It was at a time when the sociopolitical situations had already developed to such a 
point that a restoration of rigid controls over autonomous activity by non-political 
means was hardly conceivable in numerous regions of the USSR. It was also at a 
time when the outcome of the struggle between reformers and conservatives 
became apparent in the RSFSR where the fate of perestroika in the Soviet Union 
as a whole was likely to be decided. Although, the RSFSR was then suffering from 
all the chaotic disorders resulting from the immaturity of newly formed political 
movements and parties, its leadership presented a serious challenge to Gorbachev. 
Moreover, the gap of central authority between the extremes of the political 
spectrum widened. The brilliant centrist Gorbachev thus found it difficult to 
satisfying either the reformist radicals or the traditionalist conservatives, although 
his position was generally secure.
Under these circumstances, President Gorbachev made a contract with the 
high command to keep the Union secure. Of course, this effort could be seen as a 
reasonable goal for the 'Soviet' President. Here the main thing was how to secure 
the Union. Accordingly, Gorbachev's decision to turn to the right appeared to be 
the undoing of all his patient work and, at the same time, made the Soviet Union in 
a limited sense a garrison state, in which the military was given priority over any 
other societal institution in return for being his reliable sword and shield against 
republican powers. Consequently, the high command could regain professional 
autonomy, in particular, with regard to how to reform the armed forces and ended
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one-sidedly the unprecedented public debates on military reform. In addition, they 
could ensure conscription through strong measures including a military crackdown.
There was a carefully calculated period of preparation. On the one hand, the 
military establishment tried to inform the public of many instances, which could 
rationalize the strong measures, ranging from provocative1 acts of hooliganism 
against military personnel and units to the figure of draft failures. On the other 
hand, the high command gathered likely-minded forces around them from the 
political leadership to the public. The sudden change in the leaderships of the MVD 
and the MFA reflected this effort. At last, the ministry of defense announced that 
airborne troops would enforce the draft where turnout for the 1990 draft was low. 
On the whole, both the timing of Yazov's announcement and the nature of the 
military crackdown appeared to be intended to intimidate the political elites in the 
rebelling republics into signing a new Union treaty. But this calculation was ruined 
by the Vilnius incident.
In general, the army can alleviate the current systemic crisis but only for a 
short period. But it is dangerous that once the military is given a free reign in its 
domestic activities, it can present a threat in the long run to the political leadership 
itself, as often seen in nondemocratic states.
The aftermath of the Vilnius incident seriously strengthened the positions of 
supporters of independence from the Soviet Union and centrifugal trends in 
virtually all republics, including the RSFSR. Although it was too late, Gorbachev 
recognized this, and he changed his stance on the new Union Treaty. Of course, 
this forced plotters to proceed with the coup in a hurry. Therefore, Gorbachev 
should have endured temptations to rely on the military for his power and his view 
on the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the Soviets learnt a lot in the aftermath of the failed coup. It 
proved how powerful the people could be by themselves. Such public activism was
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the result of perestroika as a whole and of successful activities of middle level of 
power in particular. In the past the Soviet military, together with the KGB, had 
played key roles in leadership struggles, having been called upon by Party leaders 
to support their efforts. The Soviet people had been accustomed to sudden 
denunciations of certain leaders and used to official silence on how these men came 
to power. The coup attempt of August 18-21 1991 was different in many respects. 
First and foremost, it failed. The Soviet citizens were no longer men of old times. 
They rallied around El'tsin, opposed the Emergency Committee, and demanded 
Gorbachev back. In the end, many were jubilant.
Strictly speaking, however, there was little reason for it. It was rather naive 
to believe that there would be new coup attempts, of course. While observing three 
features of the Soviet political system — the weakness of the party system, the lack 
of a firmly based rule of law, and the weakness of the new pluralist order, which 
counted upon the "limited" and "qualified" support of the mass public, Stephen 
White drew a cautious conclusion just after the coup that "a stable pluralistic order 
might still lie some distance in the future."2 The germinal democratic society had to 
manage the danger of the military-industrial complex, yet. The MIC was left 
uncontrolled. The Communist Party, which had had the MIC under its control, 
collapsed. In other words, as far as the future civil-military relations in the country 
were concerned, it was the time to use the term the MIC instead of the triad of the 
Communist Party, the military, and defense industry. If the MIC continuously 
remained uncontrolled, there could be another coup and this time new putschists 
would strike a well-aimed and merciless blow which human chains could not 
prevent.
The MIC was not an expletive but a natural existing phenomenon. It cannot 
be abolished but should be civilized. Consequently, the first task of the democrats, 
particularly El'tsin, who according to William V. Wallace "has borne the main
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responsibility in the course of this crisis [coup], and was in many ways the driving 
force before the crisis,"3 was how to civilize it.
1 For a seminal work, see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1957), chapters 1-4. For more significant efforts to arrive at a generalization of the Third 
World style, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in 
Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962) and Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics 
in Modem Times (New Haven: Yale University Press Press, 1977). For a typical case 
study of the Third World style, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing 
Patters in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
2 Stephen White, "Towards a Post-Soviet Politics?" in Development in Soviet and 
Post-Soviet Politics, eds. Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), pp. 16 and 16-21, respectively.
3 BBC, August 21, 1991.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achalov, Col-Gen V. (1990, December 28). Krasnaya zvezda.
Adamovich, Ales (1987). "At the Forum and After." Moscow News., no. 10 p. 7.
Adams, Jan S. (1989). "Institutional Change and Soviet National Security Policy." In George 
E. Hudson (ed) Soviet National Security Policy under Perestroika. Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, pp. 151-170.
Akhromeev, Marshal S. (1991, January 21). "Skol'ko stoit oborona?" Izvestiya.
______ (1990, November 1). Izvestiya.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-193. p. 46.
______ (1990). FBIS-SO V-90-182. p. 32.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-145. pp. 63-65.
______ (1990, June 28). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989). "Kakiye vooruzhennye sily nuzhny sovetskomu soyuzu?" Ogonek. no. 50 p.
6.
______ (1989, October 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989, January 14). "Armiya i perestroika." Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1988, February 21). Trud.
______ (1987, June 23). "Doktrina predotvrashcheniya voini." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1987, May 9). "Velikaya poveda." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1987, February 21). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1986, August 30). "Na Stokgol'mskoi Konferentsii." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1986, May 9). "Uroki istorii." Izvestiya.
______ (1986, January 19). "Osvobodit' mir ot yademogo oruzhiya." Pravda.
______ (1985, May 7). Izvestiya.
Alexander, Arthur J. (1990, June) Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition.
R-3821-USDP. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Alexiev, Alexander R., and Nurick, Rober C. (1990 February). The Soviet Military Under 
Gorbachev. R-3907-RC. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Alimurzayev, Lt-Col G. (1989). "A Shield or A Sword? History of Soviet Military Doctrine."
International Affairs. no. 5 pp. 100-109.
Alksnis, Colonel.(1990, December 11). Trud.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-248. p. 39.
______ (1990, December 21). Komsomol’skaya pravda.
______ (1990, December 8). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 21). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1990, April 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989, October 24). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989, August 25). Krasnaya zvezda.
Allison, Graham T., Jr. (1988). "Testing Gorbachev." Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1 (Fall) 
pp. 18-32.
Arbatov, Aleksei. G. (1990, October 26). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, October 6). Nepszabadsag. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-198. pp. 74-76.
______ (1990). FBIS-SO V-90-145. pp. 63-65.
______ (1990). "Armiya dlya strany ili strana dlya army?" Ogonek, no. 5 p. 4.
______ (1988). "Parity and Reasonable Sufficiency." International Affairs, no. 10 pp. 75-
317
______ (1988). "How much defence is enough?" International Affairs, no. 4 pp. 31-44.
Arkhipov, General V. (1990, December 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 5). Pravda.
Artamonov, Colonel N. (1990, March30). "Kto komu sluzhit?" Sovetskaya Kul'tura.
Azrael, Jeremy R. (1987, June). The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High 
Command, 1976-1986. R-3521-AF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Babyev, Col-Gen V. (1990, September 27). Pravda.
Baklanov, Oleg (1991, April 27). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, April 18). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 15). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-212. pp. 65-66.
Bandura, Yury (1989). "The Doctrine of Deterrence: Pro and Con." Moscow News. no. 42 p. 
6 .
Becker, Abraham S. (1987, December). Ogarkov's Complaint and Gorbachev's Dilemma: 
The Soviet Defense Budget and Party-Military Conflict. R-3541-AF. Santa Monica, 
CA: The RAND Corporation.
Benn, David Wedgwood (1992). From Glasnost to Freedom of Speech. London: Pinter 
Publishers.
Bitzinger, Richard A. (1990 October). The Role of Military Power and Arms Control in 
Western Security in the 1990s. R-3994-FF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
Corporation.
Bogdanov, Radomir and Kortunov, Andrei (1989). '"Minimum Deterrence': A Utopia or a 
Real Prospect." Moscow News, no 23 p. 6.
_______ (1989). "On the Balance of Forces." International Affairs. no 7 pp. 3-15.
Bovin, Alexsander (1990, November 11). "Germaniya: Pobeda ili porazhenie." Izvestiya.
_______ (1989, May 24). "Etot tselostnyi, etot razorvannyi mir." Izvestiya.
_______ (1989) "Breakthrough." Moscow News. no. 10. p. 6.
Brown, Archie (ed) (1992). New Thinking in Soviet Politics. London: Macmillan Academic 
and Professional Ltd.
Brown, Bess (1991). "Central Asia: Mixed Ractions." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 43-47.
Bruth, Christoph (1990). New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy. London: Pinter Publishers.
Bungs, Dzintra (1991). "Latvia Reaffirms Its Independence." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 
36-58.
Burkhar, Grey (1990). "The Soviet Military Leadership." In William C. Green and Theodore 
Karasik (eds) Gorbachev and His Generals. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 203-215.
Chekov, Col-Gen N. (1990, January 26). Krasnaya zvezda.
Chemavin, Admiral V. N. (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-151. pp. 60-61.
_______ (1989, October, 19). Pravda.
Chervov, Col-Gen N. (1991, January 8). Verejnost. (Bratislava). Translated in FBIS-SOV- 
99-011. p. 1.
Clarke, Douglas L. (1991). "Trouble with the Conventional Forces Treaty." Report on the 
USSR. no. 15 pp. 6-10.
Colton, Timothy J., and Gustafson, Thane (eds) (1990). Soldiers and the Soviet State. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
______ (1979). Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of
Soviet Military Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cooper, Julian (1991). The Soviet Defence Industry: Conversion and Reform. London:
Pinter Publishers.
Cronin, Patrick (1990). "Perestroika and Soviet Military Personnel." In William C. Green and
318
Theodore Karasik (eds) Gorbachev and His Generals. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 
125-145.
Crow, Suzanne (1991). "Who Lost Eastern Europe?" Report on the USSR. no. 15, pp. 1-5.
________(1990). "The Changing Soviet View of German Unification." Report on the USSR.
no. 31 pp. 1-4.
Dallin, Alexander (1992). "New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy." In Archie Brown (ed) 
New Thinking in Soviet Politics. London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd. 
pp. 71-85.
Dallin, Alexander, and Lapidus, Gail W. (eds) (1991). The Soviet System in Crisis. Boulder: 
Westview Press.
Denisov, Col-Gen V. (1990, December 14). Pravda.
Dobrynin, Anatolii (1986). "Za bez' yademyi mir, navstrechu XXI veku." Kommunist., no. 9 
pp. 26-27.
Dubynin, Col-Gen V.P. (1991, January 24). "Logika zabveniya." Sovetskaya Rossiya. 
Dumev, Lt-Col V. (1990). "Kakoi byt1 armii 90-kh?" Argumenty i fakti. no. 8 p. 2.
Dvorkin, Col. V. and Torbin, Col V. (1989). "On Real Sufficiency for Defense." Moscow 
News. no. 26 p. 6.
El'tsin, B. (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-243. pp. 79-80.
Ermakov, Maj-Gen V. M. (1990, March 27). "Professional'naya armiya: za i protiv." Trud. 
Erokhin, Major E. A. (1990). "Kakaya armiya nam nuzhna." Ogonek. no. 9 p. 29.
Fedorov, Maj-Gen V. et. al. (1987). ""Armiya v usloviyakh demokratizatsii." Kommunist. 
no. 14 pp. 117-119.
________ (1987). "Perestroika i demokratizatsiya nashei armeisko zhizni." KVS. no. 16 pp.
9-16.
FitzGerald, Mary C. (1991). "Soviet Armed Forces after the Gulf Waf: Demise of the 
Defensive Doctrine?" Report on the USSR, no 16 pp. 1-4.
 (1990). "Gorbachev's Concept of Reasonable Sufficiency in National Defense." In
George E. Hudson (ed) Soviet National Security Policy under Perestroika. Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, pp. 175-195.
Foye, Stephen (1991). "The High Command Confronts "New Political Thinking" at Home 
and Abroad." Report on the USSR. no. 13 pp. 24-27.
_______ (1991). "The Gulf War and the Soviet Defense Debate." Report on the USSR. no.
11 pp. 1-3.
________ (1991). "The Soviet Officer Corps and Gorbachev's Crackdown." Report on the
USSR. no. 5 pp. 29-30.
_______ (1991). "Crackdown Ordered to Enforce Military Draft." Report on the USSR. no.
3 pp. 7-9.
_______ (1991). "The Case for a Coup: Gorbachev or the Generals?" Report on the USSR.
no. 2 pp. 1-5.
 (1991). "From Defending the Empire to Saving the Union." Report on the USSR.
no. 1 pp. 10-12.
 (1990). "Gorbachev, the Army, and the Union." Report on the USSR. no. 49 pp. 1-
3.
 (1990). "Lopatin on Party Control of the Armed Forces." Report on the USSR. no.
37 pp. 3-5.
 (1990). "Defense Issues at the Party Congress." Report on the USSR. no. 30 pp. 1-
5.
 (1990). "Military Hard-Liner Condemns "New Thinking" in Security Policy."
Report on the USSR, no 28 pp. 4-6.
319
______ (1990). "Radical Military Reform and 'The Young Turks'." Report on the USSR.
no. 15 pp. 8-10.
Fukuyama, Francis (1989, June). Gorbachev and New Soviet Agenda in the Third World. R- 
3634-A. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Fuller, Elizabeth (1991). "The Transcaucasian Republics." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 
40-42.
______ "Georgia's National Guard." Report on the USSR. no. 7 pp. 17-18.
Galeotti, Mark (1991). "The Role of the Security Forces." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 5- 
8.
______ "Eyewitness Accound of Policing of Moscow Demonstration." Report on the USSR.
no. 16 pp. 9-11.
Gareev, M. General (1987). "Eshche raz ob obrazovannosti: Est' drugoe mnenie," 
Literaturnaya gazeta, June 3, 1987
______ (1985). M. V. Frunze - voennyi teoretik. Mocow: Voenizdat.
Raymond L. (1990). Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine. Washinton, 
D. C.: The Brookings Institution.
Gelman, Harry (1990, May). Gorbachev's First Five Years in the Soviet Leadership. R- 
3951-A. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
______ (1989, December). The Soviet Turn Toward Conventional Force Reduction. R-
3 876/1-AF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Gimius, Saulius (1991). "Attempted Coup Leads to Recognition of Lithuania." Report on the 
USSR. no. 36 pp. 51-54.
Gimius, Kestutis (1989). "No Love Lost between the Military and the Lithuanian 
Restructuring Movement." Radio Free Europe Research, January 5. p. 15.
Gorbachev, Mikhails S. (1991, August 23). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, June 22). Pravda.
______ (1991, April 1). Pravda.
______ (1991, January 21). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, December 2). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 16). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 15). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1990, September 6). Pravda.
______ (1990, August 19). "Dostoino proiti pereval v istorii strany: vystuplenie M. S.
Gorbacheva v odesskom voennom okruge." Krasnaya zezda.
______ (1990, February 6). "Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1988, June 29). "O khode realizatsii reshenii XXVII s'ezda SPSS i zadachakh po
uglubleniiu perestroiki." Pravda. pp. 2-7.
______ (1987). "O zadachakh partii po korennoi perestroike upravleniya ekonomikoi."
Kommunist. no. 10 pp. 5-47.
______ (1987). Perestoika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. London:
Fontana.
______ (1987). "O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii." Kommunist. no. 3 pp. 5-47.
______ (1987, January 28). "O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1986). "Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII S"ezdu
Kommunistichekoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza." Kommunist. no. 4 pp. 5-80.
______ (1985, November 28). "Ob itogakh sovetsko-amerikanskoi vstrechina vysshem
urovne v Zheneve i mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke." Pravda.
______ (1985)."Bessmertyi podvig sovetskogo naroda." Kommunist. no. 8 pp. 13-14.
______ (1985, April 24). "O Sozyve ocherednogo XXVII s"ezda KPSS i zadachakh,
320
sviazannykh s ego podgotovkoi i provedeniem." Pravda.
Gottemoeller, Rose E. (1989, October). Conflict and Consensus in the Soviet Armed Forces, 
R-3759-AF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Goure, Daniel (1990). "Soviet Doctrine and Nuclear Forces into the Twenty-first Century." 
In William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (eds) Gorbachev and His Generals. 
Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 75-107.
Grachev, Col-Gen P. (1991, January 4). Krasnaya zvezda.
Grechko, Marshal A. A. (1971). Na strazhe mira i stroitel'stva kommunizma. Moscow, 
Voenizdat.
Green, William C. and Karashik, Theodore (eds) (1990). Gorbachev and His Generals: The 
Reform of SovietMilitrary Doctrine. Boulder: Wstview Press.
Gromov, Col-Gen B. (1989, November 15). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
Gustafson, Thane (1991). "Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?" In Timothy J.
Colton and Thane Gustafson (eds) Soldiers and the Soviet State. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 334-364.
Gustafson, Thane, and Mann, Dawn (1987). "Gorbachev's Next Gamble." Problems of 
Communism. (July-August) pp. 48-67.
_______ (1986). "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority." Problems of
Communisim (May-June) pp. 1-19.
Gromov, Col-Gen B. (1990, December 22). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 3). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, September 18). "A Military Coup Is Out of the Question." Danas (Zagreb)
Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-187. pp. 69-70.
______ (1990, July 18). Krasnaya zvezda.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi (1986). "Soviets on nuclear-war-fighting." Problems of Communism.
(July-August) pp. 68-79.
Hauslohner, Peter (1991). "Politics Before Gorbachev: De-Stalinization and the Roots of
Reform." In Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds) The Soviet System in Crisis. 
Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 37-63.
Herspring, Dale R. (1990). The Soviet High Command 1967-1989. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
______ (1987). "On Perestroika: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military." Problems of
Communism. (July-August) pp. 99-107.
______ , and Volgyes, Ivan (eds) (1978). Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Holloway, David (1991). "State, Society, and the Military Under Gorbachev." In Alexander 
Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds) The Soviet System in Crisis: a reader o f Western 
and Soviet views. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 616-631.
Hudson, George E. (ed) (1989). Soviet National Security Policy under Perestroika. Boston: 
Unwin Hyman.
Isaev, A. I. (1989). "Reforma i oboronnye otrasli." Kommunist. no. 5 pp. 24-31.
Ivanovsky, General E. F. (1987). "Vydayushchayasya pobeda Sovetskoi Armii'." Voenno- 
istoricheskii Zhurnal. no. 11 pp. 44-53.
Ivashov, Maj-Gen L. G. (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-237. pp. 75-76.
Izyumov, A. I. (1990, March 27). "Professional'naya armiya: za i protiv." Trud.
______ (1989). "Military glasnost' lacks openness." Moscow News. no. 37 p. 4.
Jones, Ellen (1991). "Social Change and Civil-Military Relations." In Timothy J. Colton and 
Thane Gustafson (eds) Soldiers and the Soviet State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 239-284.
321
______ (1985). The Red Army and Society. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Karasev, Colonel N. (1990, February 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1989). "Material'naya osnova perestroiki." KVS. no. 23 pp. 21-28.
Katusev, Lt-Gen A. (1991, April 3). Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1990, September 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
Kionka, Riina (1991). "A Break with the Past." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 58-62. 
Kireyev, Alexei (1990). "Beating swords into... what?" New Times, no. 44 pp. 24-26.
______ (1989). FBIS-SOV-89-197, pp. 95-105.
______ (1989). Ogonek. no. 19 pp. 6-8.
Kokoshin, Andrei (1990, October 2). Trud.
(1988). "Alexander Svechin: On War and Politics." International Affairs, no. 11
pp. 118-126.
______ (1988). "Sokrashchenie yademykh vooruzhenii i strategicheskaya stabil'nost'."
SShA. (February) pp. 3-12.
______ (1988). "Razvitie voennogo dela i sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh
vooruzhenii." MEMO. no. 1 pp. 20-32.
______ and Larionov, Valentin (1988). "Protivostoyanie sil obshego naznacheniya v
kontekste obespecheniya strategichekoi stabil'nosti." MEMO. no. 6 pp. 24-30.
______ (1987). "Kursakaya bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitel'noi doktriny." MEMO.
no. 8 pp. 32-40.
Kokowicz, Roman (1985). The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Unversity Press.
______ (1982). "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial)
Systems." In Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzei Korbonski (eds) Soldiers, Peasants, 
and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 231-252.
Kozlovsky, Lt-Gen P. (1991, April 3). Krasnaya zvezda.
Kozyrev, Andrei (1990). "Building a bridge — along or across a river." New Times, no. 43
pp. 6-8.
Kondrashov, Stanislav (1989, May 2). "Razoruzhenie v Evrope: Dve Polozheniya: Vzglad iz 
Moskvy." Izvestiya.
Korablev, Lt General V. (1987). "Po puti razvitiya demokratii." KVS. no. 20 pp. 18-23. 
Kordonsky, Simon (1991). "The coup d'etat: a failure fraught with consequences." New 
Times, no. 37 pp. 13-15.
______ (1991). "Reform is necessary, but of what kind?" New Times, no. 2 pp. 28-29.
Krivosheev, Col-Gen (1991, July 18). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 23). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-232. pp. 72-74.
______ (1990). FBIS-SO V-90-182. pp. 56-58.
______ (1990). FBIS-SO V-90-130. pp. 36-37.
Kulikov, Marshal V. (1989, February 21). "Strazh mira i sotsializma." Krasnaya zvezda. p. 
2 .
______ (1987, February 22). Trud.
Kuz'min, Col-Gen F. (1989, March 16). "Ul'timatum' komanduyushchemu." Krasnaya 
zvezda.
Kvitsinsky, Yulii (1991, March 18). "Vostochnaya Evropa, Chto gryadet s peremenami." 
Pravda.
Lane, David (1990). Soviet Society under Perestroika. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Lapidus, Gail W. (1991). "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the
322
Soviet Union." In Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds) The Soviet System In 
Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 130-150.
Lapygin, Vladimir (1989, October 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989, June 27). Izvestiya.
Larrabee, F. Stephen (1988). "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, 
no. 5 (summer) pp. 1002-1026.
Lebedev, Maj-Gen Yu. and Podberezhkin, A. (1988). "Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaya 
bezopasnost'." Kommunist. no. 13 pp. 110-121.
_______ (1987). "Why SS-20 Missiles Have Appeared." Moscow News. no. 11 p. 6.
Leebaert, Derek, and Dickinson, Timothy (eds) (1991). Soviet strategy and new military 
thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lepingwell, John W. R. (1990). "Military Deputies in the USSR Congress." Report on the 
USSR. no. 20 pp. 19-22.
Ligachev, Egor (1990, March 18). Pravda.
______ (1985). "Gotovyat' k priinomu s"ezdu." Kommunist. no. 12 pp. 8-22.
Lipitsky, S. (1989). "Voennaya reforma 1924-1925 godov." Kommunist. no. 4 pp. 102-109.
Litov, V. (1991, January 9). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
Lizichev, General A. (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-128 pp. 55-56.
______ (1989, February 3). "V tsentre perestroiki-chelovek." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989). "Armiya: razgovor o nasushchnom." Kommunist. no. 3 pp. 16-22.
______ (1987). "Oktiabr1 i leninskoe uchenie o zashchite revoliutsii." Kommunist. no. 3 pp.
85-96.
Lobov, General V. N. (1990). "Voennaya reforma: tseli, printsipy, soderzhanie." Kommunist. 
no. 13 pp. 14-22.
______ and Kokoshin, A. A. (1990). "Predvidenie." Znamya. no. 2 pp. 170-182.
______ (1989). "Aktual'nye voprosy razvitiya teorii sovetskoi voennoi strategii 20-kh—
serediny 30-kh godov." ViZ. no. 2 pp. 42-45.
______ (1988). "Vysokoe kachestvo: glavnyi kriterii boevoi podgotovki." KVS. no. 1 pp.
12-18.
Lopatin, Major V. (1990, November 15). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1990, November 4). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990). "To serve the poeople not parties." Dedelya. no. 22 pp. 1 and 3. Translated
in FBIS-SO V-90-118 pp. 68-71.
______ (1990). "Armiya i politika." Znamya. no. 7 pp. 147-159.
______ (1990, April 10). "Proekt voennoi reformy." Izvestiya.
______ (1990, March30). "Kto komu sluzhit?" Sovetskaya Kul'tura.
______ (1990, March 27). "Professional'naya armiya: za i protiv." Trud.
______ (1990, March 18). "Chest' ofitsera." Komsomol'skaya pravda.
______ (1990, February 11). Komsomol'skaya prvada.
Loshak, V. (1990). "Who Controls the Army After All?" Mowcow News. no. 34 p. 5.
Losik, Marshal O. (1990, March 5). "Gde graitsy razumnoi dostatochnost?" Krasnaya 
zvezda.
Lushev, General P. (1987). "Vysokaya otvetstvennost1 voennykh kadrov." KVS. no. 5 pp. 9- 
17.
Makashov, Col-Gen A. (1990, June 21). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1990). FBIS-SO V-90-129. pp. 67-68.
Makunin, Lt-Gen A. (1990, March 3). Krasnaya zvezda.
Malashenko, Igor (1989). "Parity Yesterday and Today." Moscow News. no. 31 p. 6.
Mann, Dawn (1991). "An Abortive Constitutional Coup d'Etat?" Report on the USSR. no. 27
323
pp. 1-6.
______ (1990). "Gorbachev Sworn In as President." Report on the USSR, no 12 pp. 1-4.
Marchenkov, Colonel V. (1989, July 11). "Opora." Krasnaya zvezda.
Martirosyan, Colonel V. (1990). "Vasha pozitsiya, tovarishchi deputaty?" KVS. no. 2 pp. 62- 
63.
______ (1989, August 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
Matveev, General I. (1991, July 15). Izvestiya.
______ (1991, July 10). Krasnaya zvezda.
MccGwire, Michael (1991). Perestroika and Soviet National Security. Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution.
______ (1987). Military Objectives in Soviet Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution.
McNamara, Robert S. (1989). "Minimum Deterrence— A Final Aim." New Times, no. 37 p.
6.
Meyer, Stephen M. (1983). "Soviet National Security Decisionmaking: What Do We Know 
and What Do We Understand?" In Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter (eds) Soviet 
Decisionmaking for National Security. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. pp. 
255-297.
Mihalisko, Kathleen (1991). "Ukrainians Ponder Creation of a National Army." Report on 
the USSR. no. 8 pp. 16-18.
Moiseev, General M. (1991, June 12). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, March 12). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, February 23). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, January 9). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
______ (1991, December 23). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, December 7). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 20). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 18). "Voennaya reforma: deistvitel'nost' i perspektivy." Krasnaya
zvezda.
_______ (1990). "Housing of Servicemen." Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik. Translated in FBIS-
SO V-90-171. p. 70
 (1990, August 7). FBIS-SOV-90-153. pp. 10-11.
______ (1990, July 29). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, July 22). Krasnaya zvezda. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-143. pp. 83-85.
______ (1990, March 15). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, February 23). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, February 10). "Zadachi u nas odin." Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1990). "Vasha pozitsiya, tovarishchi deputaty?" KVS. no. 2 p. 58.
______ (1989, June 11). Pravda.
______ (1989). "Eshshe raz o prestizhe armii." KVS. no. 13 pp. 3-14,
______ (1989, February 23). "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma." Krasnaya zvezda.
________ (1989, February 10). "S pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny." Krasnaya zvezda.
Moiseyev, Nikita (1989). "Both Calculations and Sound Thinking." Moscow News. no. 28 p.
7.
Musatov, Valerii (1991, March 13). "Vostochnaya Evropa, 'Taifun' peremen." Pravda.
 (1990, May 14). "Peremeny v Vostochnoi Evrope i nasha perestroika." Pravda.
 (1990, April 25). "Shag vpered ili dva nazad." Sovetskaya Rossiya.
Myalo, Kseniya (1991). "After "the Red Yuletide" in Lithuania." New Times, no. 11 pp. 10- 
13.
324
Nichols, Thomas and Karasik, Theodore (1990). "Civil-Military Relations Under Gorbachev: 
The Struggle over National Security." In William C. Green and Theodore Karasik 
(eds) Gorbachev and His Generals. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 29-61.
Nikitin, Lt-Col N. (1990, April 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
Novoselov, I. (1990, December 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
Ochirov, Colonel V. (1990, Nov. 13). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
Odom, William E. (1991). "Alternative Perspectives on the August Coup." Problems of 
Communism. (November-December). pp. 13-19.
______ (1985). "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions." Problems of
Communism. (July-August) pp. 1-14.
Ogarkov, Marshal N. V. (1985). Istoriya uchit bditeVnosti. Moscow: Voyenizdat.
Omelichev, Col-Gen B. (1991, Feb. 16). Krasnaya zvezda.
Parker, John W. (1991). Kremlin in Transition, Volume II. Cambridge: Unwin Hyman.
Parrott, Bruce (1991). "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations." In Timothy J. Colton 
and Thane Gustafson (eds) Soldiers and the Soviet State. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 54-75
______ (1988). "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev." Problems of Communism.
(November-December). Reprinted in A. Dallin and G. W. Lapidus (eds) (1991) The 
Soviet System in Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 573-615.
Petrushenko, Colonel N. (1990, December 21). KomsomoVskayapravda.
______ (1990, October 16). "Vovremya ostanovimsya-budet chto zashchchat'?" Izvestiya.
______ (1989, November 29). "Ya za trezvyi vzveshennyi podkhod." Krasnaya zvezda.
Pleshakov, Konstantin (1991). "Abaddon takes offhis dark glasses." New Times, no. 38 pp. 
12-13.
Popper, Steven W. (1990, January). The Prospects for Modernizing Soviet Industry. R-3785- 
AF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
______ (1989, March). The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements.
R-3659-AF. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Pravitelstvennyy vestnik (1990). "Defense Ministry Draft Reform Plan." no. 48 pp. 5-10. 
Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-239. pp. 62-75.
______ (1990). "Draft Reform Plan by Lopatin, Others," no. 48 pp. 10-12. Translated in
FBIS-SOV-90-239. pp. 75-80.
Pumpyanskiy, Aleksandr (1990). "Polemics: Stellar Eclipse." New Times, no. 33, pp. 24-27.
Rahr, Alexander (1991). "Further Restructuring of the Soviet Political System." Report on 
the USSR. no. 14 pp. 1-4.
______ (1990). "A Pyrrhic Victory for Gorbachev?" Report on the USSR. no. 29 pp. 6-8.
Record, Jeffry, and Rivkin, David B., Jr. (1988). "Defending Post-INF Europe." Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4 (Spring) pp. 735-754.
Remington, Thomas F. (1989). "Gorbachev and the Strategy and Glasnost1." In Thomas F. 
Remington (ed) Politics and the Soviet System. London: Macmillan, pp. 56-82.
Rice, Condoleezza. (1987). "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet 
Union." World Politics, no. 40 (October) pp. 55-81.
Rigby, T. H. (1989). "The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics." In Amin Saikal 
and William Maley (eds) The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-81.
Rodin, Col-Gen V. (1991, April 12). Krasnaya zvezda.
Rodionov, Col-Gen I. (1989, April 22). Krasnaya zvezda.
Rogov, Sergei (1991). "Kakoi budet voennaya reporma?" Kommunist. no. 6 pp. 88-99.
Ruble, Blair A. (1991). "The Social Dimensions of Perestroika." In A. Hewett and Victor
325
H. Winston (eds) Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, pp. 91-111.
RUSI (1986). "Afghanistan Reporting Battle Casualties." RUSI News Brief vol. 6, no. 7 pp. 
1-4.
Saikal, Amin, and Maley, William (eds) (1989). The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacques Sapir, Jacques (1987). Le systeme militaire sovietique. Translated by David Macey, 
The Soviet Military System. Worcester: Polity Press, 1991.
Savinkin, A. (1988). "Kakaya armiya nam nuzhna." Moscovskie Novosti. no. 45 p. 6.
Scott, William F. (1990). "Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity and Change?" In William C. 
Green and Theodore Karasik (eds) Gorbachev and His Generals. Boulder: Westview 
Press, pp. 1-11.
Selivanov, Major Yu. (1990). "Save our tanks!" New Times, no. 48 pp. 14-15.
Semeiko, L. (1989). "Razumnaya dostatochnost'-put' k nadezhnomumiru." Kommunist. no. 7 
pp. 113-123.
______ (1987, August 13). "Vmesto gor oruzhiya - o printsipe dostatochnosti." Izvestiya.
Serevryannikov, Lt-Gen V. (1990, June 5). "Initsiativa nakazuema?" Komsomol'skaya 
pravda.
______ (1990). "Voennaya reforma: kto 'za' i pochemu." Argumenty i fakty. no. 16 pp. 4-5.
______ (1990). "Kakaya armiya nam nuzhna?" KVS. no. 9 pp. 33-34.
______ (1989, February 12). "Armiya. Kakoi ei but?" Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1988). "Blokirovanie voin: politichesky mekhanizm." KVS. no 19 pp. 16-17.
______ (1988). "Dialektika politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotisalizma."
Voennaya mysT. no. 10 pp. 3-11.
______ (1987). "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma."
KVS. no. 18 pp. 11-12.
______ (1985, May 30). "Imperializm: usilenie agressivnosti." Krasnaya zvezda.
Shabanov, General V. (1990, September 28). Trud.
______ (1989, November 1). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1986). "Doktrina bezopasnosti i mira." International Affairs, no. 10 p. 23.
______ (1986, August 15). Krasnaya zveda.
Shaposhnikov, Marshal of Aviation E. (1991, August 31). "Obrashchenie ministra oborony 
SSSR." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, August 27). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, July 28). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, September 5). Krasnaya zvezda. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-183. pp. 54-
56.
______ (1990, August 10). Izvestiya.
Sharin, L. (1990, December 15). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, December 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
Sherr, Alan B.(1988). The Other Side of Arms Control. Boston: Unwin Hyman. 
Shevardnadze, Eduard (1990, June 26). "O vneshnei politike." Pravda.
______ (1990). "Diplomatiya i nauka: soyuz vo imya budushchevo." Kommunist. no. 2 pp.
17-23.
______ (1988) "Towars A Safe World." International Affairs. no. 9 pp. 1-14.
Shlyaga, Col-Gen N. (1991, April 11). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, May 1). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1991, March 30). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 11). Krasnaya zvezda.
326
______ (1990, Septemberl5). Krasnaya zvezda. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-177. pp. 64-
67.
______ (1990, July 20). Krasnaya zvezda. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-141. pp. 59-61.
Shreeves, Rosamund (1990). "Mothers against the Draft: Women's Activism in the USSR."
Report on the USSR. no. 38 pp. 3-8.
Sidorova, Galina (1991). "Tossed Tanks." New Times, no. 7 p. 11.
Smith, Gordon B. (1992). Soviet Politics: Struggllig with Change. London: Macmillan. 
Snyder, Jack (1988). "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Warning of Soviet Expansionism?"
International Security. (Winter 1987/1988) pp. 109-110.
Socor, Vladimir (1991). "Moldavia Defies Soviet Coup, Removes Vestiges of Communism." 
Report on the USSR. no. 38 pp. 18-23.
______ (1990). "Moldavia Resists Soviet Draft and Seeks Own National" Forces." Report
on the USSR. no. 43 pp. 19-23.
Sokolov, Marshal S. (1987, May 9). "Pobeda vo imya mira." Pravda.
______ (1987, February 23). "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti rodiny." Pravda.
______ (1986, May 9). "Poveda, obrashchennaya v nastoyashchee i budushchee." Pravda.
______ (1986, March 2). "Rech' tovarishcha Sokolova, S. L., Minister Oborony SSR."
Pravda.
______ (1986, February 23). "Reshayushchii istochnik boevoi moshchi." Pravda.
______ (1985). "Velikaya poveda." Kommunist. no. 6. pp. 55-69.
Solchanyk, Roman (1991). "Ukraine: Kravchuk's Role." Report on the USSR. no. 36 pp. 47- 
50.
Sredin, Col-Gen G. A. (1978). "Politiceskie Organy." KVS. no. 6 pp. 420-422.
______ (1975). "Razvitie obshchestvennykh nauk—vazhnyi uchastok ideologicheskoi
raboty." KVS. no. 1pp. 9-18.
______ (1974). "O nekotorykh voprocakh ideologicheskoi raboty v vooryzhennykh silakh."
KVS. no. 2 pp. 17-27.
Sorokin, Col-Gen A. (1985, July 2). "Povyshat' deistvennost' politicheskikh zanyatii." 
Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1985, June 25). "XXVII S"ezdu KPSS-dostoinuyu vstrechu." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1984). "Otvetstvennost' rukovoditelya za ukreplenie voinskoi distsipliny." KVS. no.
14 pp. 3-20.
Stankievich, Walter "The Events behind Belorussia's Independence Declaration." Report on 
the USSR. no. 36 pp. 24-26.
Surkov, Maj-Gen M. (1991, April 2). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 25). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, December 21). KomsomoTskayapravda.
Sychev, Colonel Yu. (1991, July 19). Krasnaya zvezda.
Tarasenko, Sergei (1990). "Tanks or people?" New Times, no 48 pp. 15-16.
Teague, Elizabeth, (1991). "The "Soyuz" Group." Report on the USSR. no. 20 pp. 16-21.
______ "The Powers of the Soviet Presidency." Report on the USSR. no. 12 pp. 4-7.
Tedstrom, John (1991). "The 1991 Budget." Report on the USSR. no. 8 pp. 5-9.
Telen, Lyudmila (1991). "Politics is a changeable as the weather." Moscow News, no 26 p. 4. 
Temkina, Anna A. (1991). "The Workers' Movement in Leningrad, 1986-1991." Soviet 
Studies, vol. 44, no. 2 pp. 209-236.
Thorson, Carla (1991). "Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Coup." Report on the USSR. 
no. 56 pp. 19-22.
Tepliakov, Iurii. (1989). "General Staff: Changes." Moscow News. no. 5 p. 5.
Tolz, Vera (1990). "The Emergence of a Multiparty System in the USSR." Report on the
327
USSR. no. 17 pp. 5-11.
Tret'yak, General I. (1988). "Reliable defence first and foremost." Moscow News. no. 9 p. 12.
Tsalko, Colonel A. V. (1990, July 13). FBIS-SOV-90-135-S.
_______ (1990). "Vasha pozitsiya, tovarishchi deputaty?" KVS. no. 2 p. 61.
Tsypkin, Mikhail (1990). "Will the Soviet Navy Become a Volunteer Forces?" Report on the 
USSR. no. 5 pp. 5-7.
Tutov, Lt-ColN. (1990, February 10). Krasnaya zvezda.
Urazhtsev, Vitaliy (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-198. pp. 89-90.
Uskhopchik, Maj-Gen V. (1991, April 2). Krasnaya zvezda.
Utkin, B. (1982). "Dokhdit' do ima i serdtsa." KVS. no. 23 pp. 21-32.
Varennikov, General V. (1990, July 13). Pravda.
______ (1990, July 12). FBIS-SOV-90-134. pp. 51-52.
______ (1990,June 15). Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1989). "Prednaznachenie sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil." KVS. no. 18 pp. 22-25.
_______ (1987). "Na strazhe i bezopasnosti narodov." Partiinaya Zhizn'. no. 5 pp. 9-10.
Vicys, Lt-Col Z. ( 1989, February 23). "Armiya vnov' stanet dlya nas shkoloi zhizni." 
Komsomol'skayapravda (Lithuania), p. 2.
______ (1989, January 13). "Byt' li natsional'nym armeiskim formirovaniyam?" Sovetskaya
Litva. p. 4.
Volkogonov, Col-Gen D. A. (1987, May 6). Literaturnaya gazeta.
Vorob’ev, Maj-Gen I. N. (1991, January 26). "Vse li vzvesheno v nashei doktrine?" Krasnaya 
zvezda.
Warner III, Edward L. (1977). The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An 
Institutional Analysis. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Wehling, Fred (1990). "Old Soldiers Never Die: Marshal Akhromeev's Role in Soviet 
Defense Decision Making." In William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (eds) 
Gorbachev and His Generals. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 63-74.
Weickhardt, George G. (1989). "Moiseev versus Yazov: Backlash in the Armed Forces?" 
Report on the USSR. no. 48 pp. 6-8.
White, Stephen (1991). Gorbachev and After. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_______ (1991). "Towards a Post-Soviet Politics?" In Stephen White et. al. (eds)
Development in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics. London: Macmiilan, pp. 2-21.
Wishnevsky, Julia (1991). "Will the Conservatives Join the Liberals against Gorbachev?" 
Report on the USSR. no. 6 pp. 1-3.
_______ (1990). "Shevardnadze Said to Have Threatened to Resign in Dispute over Tbilisi
Commission." Report on the USSR. no. 5 pp. 1-3.
Wolf, Charles, Jr. et. al. (1990, September). Gorbachev's Allocative Choices. R-3891- 
USDP. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Yakovlev, Aleksander (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-167. pp. 34-35.
_______ (1987). "Dostizhenie kachestvenno nogogosostoianiya sovetskogo obshchestva i
obshchestvenne nauku." Kommunist. no. 8 pp. 3-22.
Yasmann, Viktor (1990). "The Power of the Soviet Internal Securty Forces." Report on the 
USSR. no. 43 pp. 12-15.
Yazov, General D. (1991, June 27). Sovetskaya Rossiya.
_______ (1991). "Parametry voennoi reformy." Izvestiya TsKKPSS. no. 5 pp. 57-59.
 (1991, April 2). Krasnaya zvezda.
 (1991, February 23). "Sluzhim Sovetskomu Soyuzu!" Pravda.
 (1990, November 29). Krasnaya zvezda.
 (1990, November 27). Vremya. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-229. p. 68.
328
_______ (1990, November 23). Rabochaya Tribuna. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-226. p. 6.
_______ (1990, November 13). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990, November 6). Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-188. pp. 39-40.
______ (1990). FBIS-SOV-90-183. pp. 53-54.
_______ (1990, September 2). Krasnaya zvezda. Translated in FBIS-SOV-90-171. pp. 65-
69.
______ (1990, July 2). Izvestiya.
______ (1990, February 23). Pravda.
______ (1989, September 19). "Ofitserskie kadry i perestroika." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1989). "Novaya model* bezoopasnosti i vooruzhennye sily," KVS. no. 18 pp. 62-72.
______ (1989, July 5). "S nakazom partii i naroda." Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1989, April 13). "No osnove novogo myshleniya." Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1989, March 7). "Byt* na ostrie perestroiki." Krasnaya zvezda.
_______ (1989, February 23). "Armiya naroda." Pravda.
______ (1988). "The Military Balance of Strength and Nuclear Missile Parity."
International Affairs. no. 4 pp. 15-22.
______ (1987, August 13). "Gluboko raskryvat' opyt perestroiki." Krasnaya zvezda.
______ (1987, July 27). "Voennaya doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora-doktrina zashchity
mira i sotsializma." Pravda.
______ (1987). Na strazhe sotsializma i mira. Moscow: Veonizdat.
______ (1987, January 16). "Siloi pravday." Krasnaya zvezda.
Zaikov, Lev (1989, November 27). Prcrvda.
Zemtsov, Ilya, and Farrar, John (1989). Gorbachev, the Man and the System. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Zhurkin, V. et. al. (1988). "Vyzovy bezopasnosti: starye i novye." Kommunist. no. 1 pp. 42- 
50.
______ (1987). "Reasonable sufficiency or How to Break the Vicious Circle," New Times.
no. 40 p. 13.
